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EDITOR'S NOTE

Water weaves through time sustaining life, creating
conflict, uniting civilizations, and providing hope. In this issue of
the f0lter Law Review, we explore some of the various roles of
water in our lives.
In "A Bright Idea from the Black Canyon: Federal Judicial Review of Reserved Water Right Settlements," Reed Benson examines the
history of the reserved rights doctrine and its role in the context of state
adjudications. Professor Benson looks at the controversy surrounding
the Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park in Colorado and the
issues of federal judicial review.
Casey Funk and Daniel Arnold explore municipal water right
appropriations in "Pagosa - The Great and Growing Cities Doctrine
Imperiled: An Objective Look from a Biased Perspective." They discuss
the tension between the anti-speculation doctrine and the great and
growing cities doctrine by reviewing the decisions in Pagosa I and Pagosa 11
Arlene Kwasniak's article, "Water Scarcity and Aquatic Sustainability: Moving beyond Policy Limitations," examines water management approaches to enhance instream flow. Professor Kwasniak proposes a set of interventions that North American prior appropriation
and prior allocation jurisdictions might explore to better address instream needs.
In "The Guarani Aquifer & International Groundwater Law: Advancing towards a Legal Framework for the Management of a Transboundary Aquifer," Brian Green discusses the challenges and threats of
transboundary groundwater systems by focusing on the Guarani Aquifer
in South America. Noting that growing populations and decreasing
surface water sources are ever present, Mr. Green looks at ways to preserve and protect the aquifer.
On April 9, 2010, the Water Law Review held its third annual
symposium. This year's symposium, Water Law and Climate ChangePlanning for an Uncertain Future, was a huge success. The Water Law
Review hosted approximately 100 attendees, alumni, students, and
faculty.

The Water Law Review would like to thank the attendees;
we hope that you join us again next year. We would also like to
thank this year's speakers, who generously donated their time to
help us put on this event. The Conference Notes section of this

issue provides a summary of each of their presentations. Again,
thank you to our speakers:
•

Justice Gregory Hobbs, Colorado Supreme Court - Colorado
Water Courts Update

•

Professor Dan Tarlock, Chicago-Kent School of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology - Water Law and Climate Change} Strategies for Adaptation and Mitigation

•

Doug Kemper, Executive Director, Colorado Water CongressColorado Legislative Update of Water Issues

•

Brad Udall, Director of CU- NOAA, Western Water AssessmentProjected Climate Change Impacts on our Water Resources

•

Professor Christine A Klein, University of Florida, Levine College of Law - The Dormant Commerce Clause and Water Export: Open for Business or Suckers Beware?

•

Bart Miller, Water Program Director, Western Resource Advocates - Oil Shale Water in Colorado: The Energy and Water
Connection

•

Melinda Kassen, Director of Trout Unlimited, Western Water
Project - The SECURE Water Act: First .lear Programs & Implementation

•

Casey Funk, Attorney, Denver Water Department - Quality of
Life Decision Making}· Planning Uncertainties}· and Legal Obstacles- Perspectives from Denver Water

•

Marc Waage, Planner, Denver Water Department - Quality of
Life Decision Making}· Planning Uncertainties}· and Legal Obstacles- Perspectives !Tom Denver Water

•

Amy Beatie, Director, Colorado Water Trust - Ethical Issues in
the Water Practice: Appeals

•

George "Rock" Pring, Professor of Law, University of Denver
Sturm College of Law -Overview and Introduction to the Relationship between Climate Change and Water Law

We invite you, reader, to sit down, put your feet up, weave your way
·through this issue, and be reminded of the ways water touches us all.
Danielle Sexton
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INTRODUCTION
Under the reserved water rights doctrine, lands the federal
government has designated for a particular purpose have rights to
sufficient water to fulfill that purpose.' Reserved water rights are also
known as Winters rights after the doctrine's foundational case, in
which the United States Supreme Court held that Congress must have
intended to reserve sufficient water to irrigate an Indian reservation
although the treaty establishing that reservation said nothing about
water.3
The federal and state governments began clashing over the proper
judicial forum for federal reserved right claims soon after the Supreme
4
Court's 1963 decision in Arizona v. California,
which extended the
Winters doctrine to include federal lands such as national monuments,
wildlife refuges, and national forests.5 In the ensuing jurisdictional
battles, the United States argued in favor of federal courts because its
claims were for federal lands and would be determined under federal
law.6 The western states, eager to maintain their traditional control
over water rights, argued that their own state
courts were the
7
appropriate forum for these controversial claims.
A 1952 federal statute known as the McCarran Amendment waived
federal sovereign immunity to state court jurisdiction in the context of
general stream adjudications,8 but provided no clear answer on where
reserved right claims should be decided.
The Supreme Court

1. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
2. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (involving the Fort Belknap
Reservation in Montana).
3. Id.
4. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
5. Id. at 601.
6. See, e.g., Colo. River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 812
(1976); see also Alexander Wood, Note, Watering Down Federal CourtJurisdiction:
What Role Do Federal Courts Play in Deciding Water Rights?, 23 J. ENvrL. L. & LmG.
241, 249-50 (2008).
7. See e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145-46 (1976).
8. Suits for Adjudication of Water Rights (McCarran Amendment), ch. 651, §
208(a)-(c), 66 Stat. 560 (1952) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006)).
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interpreted McCarran very favorably for the states, however, holding
that the policy of the statute favors state adjudications as the preferred
forum for determining reserved water rights.9 For the past thirty years
federal reserved right claims have been heard almost exclusively in state
courts, " with decidedly mixed results. (The same is true for tribal
Winters claims," but this article deals only with claims for non-Indian
federal lands.)
In 2006, however, a federal court decided a case involving reserved
water rights for Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park-and
even more remarkably, the Colorado Supreme Court earlier had
essentially decided that the federal forum was appropriate. 12 While the
most immediate result was settlement negotiations resulting in an
agreement providing stronger protection of flows for the national
park, 3 the broader implication of the Black Canyon cases is the
potential for federal court review of agency decisions affecting reserved
right claims.
This article examines the issue of federal judicial review of reserved
right settlements reached in the context of state adjudications. Part I
briefly gives the reasons why state courts typically hear federal water
right claims, and addresses some key aspects of how those courts handle
such claims. Part II tells the story of the Black Canyon controversy,
focusing on the issues surrounding federal judicial review of a partial
settlement of the park's reserved right claim. Part III analyzes the issue
of whether federal judicial review is appropriate for settlement of
reserved right claims, and concludes that review should be available
when an agency enters into a final settlement agreement. Part IV
considers the implications of federal review of reserved right
settlements, concluding that federal review would not significantly
impact reserved rights litigation, but may have significant effects on
future settlement efforts involving federal claims. The conclusion
suggests that federal judicial review may help address a couple of
9.

Colo.River, 424 U.S. at 806-08.

10. There have been only a few reserved right cases in the federal courts since the
early 1980s, focusing on tribal claims. See John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western
Waters:A CenturyofAdjudicating Rivers and Streams, Part11,9 U. DENV. WATER L. REv.
299, 362-63 (2006). Only in New Mexico and Nevada have several adjudications been
allowed to proceed in federal court. Id. at 361. "New Mexico is unique among western
states in that the majority of its adjudications are in federal court." Id. at 351. Nevada's
federal court adjudications are old cases involving rivers which flow into the state from
California. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 113-118 (1983) (describing
litigation begun in 1913 to determine water rights on the interstate Truckee River);
Mineral County v. State Dep't of Conservation and Natural Res., 20 P.3d 800, 801-805
(Nev. 2001) (describing litigation begun in 1924 to determine water rights on the
interstate Walker River).
11. SeeArizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
12. High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1241 (D. Colo.
2006); United States v. Colo. State Eng'r, 101 P.3d 1072, 1080 (Colo. 2004).
13. See generally Press Release, W. Res. Advocates, Water Court Finalizes Decree to
Benefit Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park (Jan. 7, 2009), available at
http://www.westernresourceadvocates.org/media/pdf/BlackCanyonDecree 1-07-09.pdf
(last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
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fundamental problems with the way that reserved right claims have
been handled.
I. WEVNE!SAND MCCARRAN: FEDERAL CLAIMS, STATE COURTS
A. RESERVED RIGHTSJURISDICTION
For nearly half a century after its foundational case,14 the Winters
doctrine was thought to apply only to Indian Country. The great water
law scholar Frank Trelease wrote, "At no time prior to 1955 did I ever
hear a suggestion that the reserved rights doctrine was anything but a
special quirk of Indian water law." 15 In that year, the Supreme Court
decided FederalPower Commission v. Oregon, holding that the state
did not control the waters on a piece of land previously designated for a
particular purpose under federal law. 6 The Court's opinion did not.
involve a reserved rights claim or even mention Winters--the context
was hydropower dam licensing under the Federal Power Act'V-but it
dearly laid the foundation for reserved rights beyond Indian
reservations. Following that case, western members of Congress began
introducing bills to restrict the use of the8 reserved rights doctrine for
federal lands, but no such bill ever passed.'
Three years before the FederalPower Commission case, however,
Congress enacted a statute that profoundly affected all manner of
reserved right claims. The McCarran Amendment gave consent to
allow parties to join the United States as a defendant in a state court
case "for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system
or other source ... where it appears that the United States is the owner
of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under
State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise... . "19 Congress thus
allowed state court adjudications to determine the water rights of
federal entities along with those of all other users on a stream system.
Given that seemingly no one as of 1952 expected Winters to apply to
non-Indian federal lands, it is not surprising that McCarran's text is
utterly unclear as to whether state courts could hear reserved right
claims. But the Supreme Court held federal Winters claims
were
20
indeed subject to McCarran, finding its language "all-inclusive."
This initial decision interpreting McCarran held that reserved right
claims could be heard in state courts, but did not indicate that they
should be heard there; the statute had not eliminated federal court
14. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
15. Frank J. Trelease, FederalReserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DEN. L.J. 473,
475 (1977).
16. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955).
17. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C §§ 791 (a)-828(c) (2006); Fed,Power Comm'n, 349
U.S. at 437.
18. Eva H. Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts Over Western Waters-A Decade of
Attempted "Clarij'ngLegislation,"20 RUTGERs L. REv. 423, 446-512 (1966).
19. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2006).
20. United States v. Dist. Ct. of County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971).
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jurisdiction over these claims. 21 In ColoradoRiver Water Conservation
District v. United States, 22 however, the Court fashioned an entirely new
doctrine of abstention applicable to water right adjudications where
reserved right claims were being litigated in federal court, but a state
court also had jurisdiction under McCarran.25
Applying this new
doctrine and weighing various factors, the Court ordered the federal
24
court to dismiss the case in favor of a later-fied action in state court.
With no language in the statute to support this result, the Court relied
on McCarran's underlying policy of avoiding "piecemeal adjudication"
of water rights. 25 The Court did not say that federal courts must always
step aside in favor of state adjudications, but hinted that they ordinarily
should, stating that McCarran "bespeaks a policy that recognizes the
availability of comprehensive state systems for adjudication of water
rights as the means for achieving" the statute's goal of resolving
competing claims to water in a single case.26
Some might argue that the judicial forum is not crucial to the
success of reserved right claims; 27 after all, the Supreme Court has
insisted that state courts must apply federal law in determining such
claims, and that it may review state court decisions to ensure that they
do so properly. 28 But three factors suggest that the court that hears
these claims may be at least as important as the law that that court
applies. First, both the western states and the federal government
regarded the jurisdictional issue as very important, and they took steps
in the years after the McCarran Amendment to ensure that their
preferred forum heard federal water right claims. 29 Second, this
jurisdictional dispute repeatedly reached the United States Supreme
Court, which decided at least four cases on reserved right jurisdiction
from 1971 to 1983, 3 and only two cases on the substance of the Winters

21. Id. at 526.
22. Colo.River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
23. Id.at 809.
24. Id.at 818-21.
25. Id. at 819.
26. Id.
27. The Court suggested in Colorado River that the state forum should not be a
major problem even for tribal reserved right claims, insisting that "Indian interests may
be satisfactorily protected under regimes of state law," and that McCarran "in no way
abridges any substantive claim on behalf of Indians under the doctrine of reserved
rights." Id.at 812-13.
28.

Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983); Colo. River, 424

U.S. at 813.
29. See Thorson et al., supra note 10, at 331-33 (describing withdrawal of federal
government from adjudications in state courts, and state efforts to ensure that their
adjudications would satisfy McCarran Amendment requirements). "States feared that
federal and tribal water rights would be determined in federal court. Conversely,
federal and tribal attorneys feared state court determination." Id. at 333.
30. San CarlosApache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 549; Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 803; United
States v. Dist. Ct. for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 528 (1971); United States v. Dist.
Ct. of County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 521-22 (1971).
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doctrine in the same period."1 Third, some state adjudication decisions
have applied Winters so narrowly as to raise questions of whether state
courts always treat reserved rights claims fairly. 2 Indeed, some
commentators have stated that state courts are often "hostile" to the
federal government's reserved right claims.3 3
B. RESERVED RIGHT LITIGATION AND SETTLEMENT IN STATE COURTS

Many western states are in the process of conducting water right
adjudications,' and several of these cases have been ongoing since the
1970s. 5 The prospect of federal reserved water rights was a primary
motivation for the states to launch these cases; the states sought to
ensure that their courts would hear federal and tribal claims, and
engaged in a "race to the courthouse" to achieve that goal.36 After years
of jurisdictional maneuvering and a series of victories in the Supreme
Court, the states got their wish.37 "States commenced their water
adjudications with the grim conviction that federal reserved rights did
in fact exist, a concern somewhat softened by the fact that most of these
rights would38be determined in a forum perceived to be more favorable:
state court.

Within those adjudications, the United States filed tens of
thousands of water right claims for federal and tribal lands. In Idaho's
giant Snake River Basin Adjudication, for example, the government
filed about 50,000 claims; 31 in the relatively small Klamath Basin
Adjudication,4" there were 377 federal and tribal claims. 41 This volume
31. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698 (1978); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 131 (1976).
32. See Michael C. Blumm, Reversing the Winters Doctrine? Deny4ng Reserved
Water Rights for Idaho Wilderness and Its Implications,73 U. COLO. L. REV. 173, 173-75
(2002); Reed D. Benson, Can't Get No Satisfaction: Securing Water for Federaland
TribalLandsin the West, 30 ENVrL. L. REP. 11056, 11056-59 (2000).
33. Blumm, supra note 32, at 178 (asserting that state courts "have proved largely
hostile to reserved rights"); Eric T. Freyfogle, Repairing the Waters of the National
Parks: Notes on a Long-Term Strategy, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 815, 834 (1997)
(recommending that the National Park Service pursue strategic litigation to protect its
interests in water: "Given the hostility of many state courts to federal reserved rights,
litigation should typically occur in federal courts, in districts where judges do not have
known hostilities to either environmental protection or assertions of federal power.").
34. Thorson et al., supra note 10, at 439-42 (table providing status of adjudications
in seventeen western states).
35. Id. at 325-31 (describing commencement of adjudications in ten western states).
36. Id at 324.
37. Seeid. at 331-37.
38. Id.at 337. Only New Mexico has allowed several adjudications to play out in
federal court, based on a 1950s agreement between the federal and state governments.
Id.at 351,475.
39. According to the court conducting the adjudication, the United States filed
approximately 50,000 claims for ten federal agencies and four tribes, although some of
these claims involved rights under state law rather than reserved rights. Snake River
at
available
Brochure,
Informational
Court
Adjudication
Basin
http://www.srba.state.id.us/DOC/BROCHI.HTM (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
40. See Thorson et al., supranote 10, at 339 (noting that the Klamath case involves
only" 730 claims, far fewer than major adjudications such as Idaho's).
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of claims is not surprising, considering that nearly half of the West's
land area is in federal ownership,42 managed by agencies as diverse as
the Forest Service, Department of Defense, Fish & Wildlife Service, and
Bureau of Land Management. A 1978 federal study suggested that a
staggering 187.2 million acres in eleven western states might carry
federal or tribal reserved water rights.43 Although many reserved right
44
claims have already been resolved in the course of these adjudications,
untold thousands of claims await final disposition-some in old, but still
uncompleted, proceedings such as Arizona's Gila River Adjudication, 45
some in newer adjudications such as North Idaho's, 46 and some in river
systems where no adjudication has yet begun, such as New Mexico's
Middle Rio Grande.
Although federal law governs reserved water rights, 47 claims heard
in state courts are subject to the procedural rules of the state
adjudication proceedings. 48 Water rights adjudications are large,
complex cases, and each western state has its own approach for
conducting them; even the most concise summary of the various

41.

This number includes 313 federal reserved right claims and 64 tribal-related

claims. Oregon Water Res. Dep't, Klamath Basin Adjudication Claim and Contest
at
available
2009,
19,
May
of
as
Information
http://wwwl.wrd.state.or.us/files/Publications/klamathadj/Status of the.Adjudication.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
42. "The percentage of federally owned land (excluding Indian reservations and
other trust properties) in the Western States ranges from 29.5% of the land in the State
of Washington to 86.5% of the land in the State of Nevada, an average of about 46%."
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699 n.3 (1978).
43. The eleven states were Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. According to the report, each
of these states could have over 10 million acres of land carrying reserved water rights,
ranging from 10.8 million acres in Washington to 28.2 million acres in California.
supra note 10, at 310-11.
Thorson, et al.,
44. According to the State of Oregon, all 313 federal reserved right claims in the
Klamath Adjudication have been resolved, although most of the tribal claims are still
being contested. Oregon Water Res. Dep't, supa note 41.
45. See Michael K. Jeanes, The Water Case Turns 30,MARIcOPA LAWYER, May 2009,
at
available
3,
at
http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/SuperiorCourt/Adjudications/-pdfs/MLMayO
9.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (describing the 30-year history of Gila River
adjudication, and noting that several federal reserved right claims remain unresolved).
46. 'See Press Release, Idaho Dep't of Water Res., IDWR Commences Northern
at
available
2009),
8,
(Jan.
Adjudication
Idaho
(last
http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/News/news-releases/rels2009/Oljan/2009-O2.pdf
visited Feb. 20, 2010).
47. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983) (holding that
federal courts in Arizona and Montana should abstain from hearing tribal reserved right
claims in favor of state adjudications, but stating "[wle also emphasize, as we did in
ColoradoRiver, that our decision in no way changes the substantive law by which Indian
rights in state water adjudications must be judged. State courts, as much as federal
courts, have a solemn obligation to follow federal law."). See also Colo. River
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976); United States v. Dist. Ct.
of County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 526 (1971).
48. United States v. Idaho ex rel. Dir., Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 508 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1993).
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adjudication procedures would require many pages.4 9 For purposes of
this article, however, two aspects of state adjudications are relevant.
First, once the government (or any other party) files a water right claim,
other parties to the adjudication have the opportunity to object to that
claim. ° The objection may deny that the claimed right is valid at all, or
may challenge the claimed priority date, purpose of use, quantity of
water, or other aspects of the right as claimed.5 1 A single claim may
generate a large number of objections,52 particularly if it is a reserved
right claim.53
Second, state adjudications commonly are not open to every citizen
or group that would like to participate. Unless persons claim or assert
water rights in the adjudication,5 4 they become parties to the case by
objecting to one or more rights claimed by others;5 5 however, many
state adjudication statutes allow only water users to file objections5 In
other states, persons or groups without water rights may participate in
the adjudication, but often find themselves effectively foreclosed from
raising key issues of concern to them.5 7 Thus, entities that are interested
in the river but do not claim water rights-such as environmental,
rafting, and angling groups-are typically either unable to participate in
the adjudication, or foreclosed from raising key issues of concern to
them.
In the end, reserved right claims are often resolved through
negotiated agreements, and these settlements are regarded as a positive
outcome of state water adjudications. 8 Nearly all of the focus on
49. Fortunately, an excellent summary of adjudication procedures exists in a lengthy
article by four experts on western water adjudications. Thorson et al., supm note 10, at
356-432.
50. Id.at 393.
51.

Id.

52. In Oregon's Klamath Basin Adjudication, for example, various parties filed a
total of 5,664 contests (objections) to 730 claims. Oregon Water Res. Dep't, supra note
41.
53. In the Klamath Adjudication, 313 federal reserved right claims produced 4,355
contests. By contrast, 300 claims for private rights yielded 969 contests. Id.

54. For a general explanation of who may claim water rights and how claims are
handled, see Thorson et al., supra note 10, at 384-86.
55. Id. at 392-396 (providing a general explanation of objections and how objectors
become parties).
56. Id. at 393, nn.677-80 (citing sixteen state statutes).

57. In Colorado, for example, although "any person" may object to a filed claim, the
Colorado Supreme Court has held that in the absence of statutory authority to do so, a
water court may not deny an application based on environmental factors. COLO. REv.
STAT. § 37-92-302(1) (b) (2005); In re Bd. of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d 952, 971-73
(Colo. 1995) (rejecting appeal by environmental groups as contrary to Colorado water
law, while acknowledging that "environmental factors might provide a reasonable and
sound basis for altering existing law."). Similarly, in Washington, any interested party
may file objections. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.200 (2009). However, according to the
Washington Supreme Court, environmental and other public interest factors "cannot
operate to impair existing water rights" being determined in an adjudication. State
Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1053 (Wash. 1993).

58.

"The successful completion of reserved water rights settlements is probably the
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reserved right settlements, however, has involved tribal Wmters claims.
The western states, for example, have a longstanding policy resolution
favoring settlement of tribal claims,59 but no similar policy regarding
settlement of non-tribal federal reserved rights. The literature on
reserved right settlements is quite rich as to tribal rights,' and rather
thin as to federal rights.6 Despite the relative lack of information, it
seems clear that federal reserved right claims often settle,62 and those
settlement agreements often protect existing users from any harm that
could otherwise result from recognition of the reserved right.6" Once
brightest achievement associated with western stream adjudications." Thorson et al.,
supranote 10, at 444.
59. W. GovERNoRs' ASS'N, PoucY RESOLUTION 07-3, NEGOTIATED INDIAN WATER
at
available
(2007),
SETTLEMENTS
RIGHTS

http://www.westgov.org/index.php?option=comjoomdoc&task=doc-download&gid=6
56&Itemid= (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (indicating that the policy dates back to 1987
(Resolution 87-007), and has been readopted six times by the Western Governors
Association).
60. See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAx ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 865 n2 ( 3rd
ed. 2000) (listing numerous sources); BONNIE G. COLBY ET AL., NEGOTIATING TRIBAL
WATER RIGHTS: FULFILLING PROMISES IN THE ARID WEST (2005) (providing a general

overview of tribal water rights negotiation); Nez Perce Water Rights SettlementArticles,
42 IDAHO L. REv. 547, 547-794 (2006) (consisting of seven articles that present various
perspectives on the Nez Perce tribal water rights settlement).
61. Perhaps the most detailed explanation of settlement of non-tribal federal
Winters claims is all of eleven pages long. David Amman et al., Negotiation of the
Montana-NationalPark Service Compact, 5 RIVERS 35, 35-45 (1995) (explaining the
State of Montana's successful negotiation with the National Park Service regarding
reserved rights for Yellowstone and Glacier National Parks). A comprehensive review of
western stream adjudications noted that "[s]ettlements have played a large role in
determining federal reserved rights in the west," but went on to discuss only tribal
settlements. Thorson et al., supra note 10, at 407-09..
62.' As stated in the 2000 edition of a leading water law text, "Although litigation
goes forward on many fronts, a trend toward settlement of non-Indian federal reserved
rights claims is emerging." SAx, supra note 60, at 814. In Montana's massive
adjudication, for example, all but a few of the many non-tribal reserved right claims
have been resolved through negotiations, and none of these claims have been litigated.
E-mails from Susan Cottingham, Program Manager for the Montana Reserved Water
Rights Compact Commission, to Reed D. Benson, Professor, University of New Mexico
School of Law (Aug. 10-11, 2009) (on file with author). Montana's numerous compacts
involving water rights, including reserved rights, are codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 8520-101 to -1601 (2009).
63. Water users (and states) often oppose reserved rights because these rights may
be legally senior to existing water uses established after the date of the federal
reservation-meaning that in times of drought, these established uses may fail in favor
of the federal right. To prevent this result, settlements may effectively subordinate the
reserved water right to existing uses, perhaps by assigning it a priority date that junior to
the date of the reservation. "The United States agrees to subordinate its federal
reserved rights to at least some appropriations initiated after the federal reservation, in
return for which the state agrees to cap further appropriations and to manage
groundwater outside the boundaries of the federal reservation to protect wetlands and
other water-dependent resources inside the reservation." SAX, supra note 60, at 815.
See also Press Release, Dep't. of Justice, Historic Water Rights Settlement Reached in
at
available
2000)
15,
(Mar.
Colorado
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2000/March/129enrd.htm (describing a settlement of
Forest Service reserved right claims in southern Colorado, whereby the Forest Service
"relinquishes its claimed early priority dates to water and accepts a 1999 priority date");
W. WATER PoLIcY REVIEW ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST: THE CHALLENGE FOR
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the parties agree on settlement of a reserved64 right claim, the
adjudicating court must still approve the agreement.
Reserved right settlements are often touted because they resolve
water right controversies by mutual agreement and eliminate the need
for years of expensive litigation.65 This kind of praise was heaped on a
2003 agreement between the Interior Department and the State of
Colorado regarding water rights for Black Canyon of the Gunnison
National Park. 66
However, that agreement generated its own
controversy and litigation, with remarkable results.
II. THE BLACK CANYON RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
CONTROVERSY
A. THE BLACK CANYON AND ITS RESERVED WATER RIGHTS

The Black Canyon of the Gunnison is a spectacular gorge in central
Colorado, carved deep into rugged hills and high desert by the
Gunnison River. The gorge's dimensions are dramatic-it is up to
2722 feet deep, as little as 1100 feet wide at the rim, and as narrow as
forty feet at the river 67 -but those numbers only hint at the awesome
grandeur of the Black Canyon.
Far below the gorge rim flows the Gunnison River, named for
Captain John Williams Gunnison, whose 1853 expedition provided the
first written description of the Black Canyon.
The river today,
however, looks very different than the one Captain Gunnison saw, as
described by the National Park Service: 'The Gunnison River no longer
flows freely through canyon. Three dams hold back its seasonal flood,
reducing its former glory to a feeble shadow. Yet even in its diminished
state, the Gunnison continues to add to the geologic story of Black
Canyon ... drop by precious drop."6 9 Even in its diminished state, the
THE NEXT

CENTURY4-13 (1998) (describing a settlement of reserved water rights for Zion
National Park in Utah, which "allows valid existing uses to continue"); In re Water
Rights for the United States of America, No. 01CW05at 11 (Colo. Water Div. 4, Jan. 8,
2009) (outlining the final settlement for subordination to certain existing, junior uses);
A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 923-28 (2009) (illustrating that
subordination provisions are fairly standard features of tribal reserved rights
settlements. The authors noted that in settlements, tribes' "senior claims under Winters
are commonly subordinated to existing (and sometimes future) non-Indian uses").
64. See Thorson et al., supra note 10, at 408-11 (describing approval criteria and
procedures employed by courts in Arizona, New Mexico, and Montana adjudications).
65. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 63(quoting a water user representative as
being "pleased that this long controversy can have such a positive conclusion," and

noting that the settlement will save all parties millions in litigation costs).
66. See infra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
67. U.S. National Park Service, Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park - Black
Canyon
Dimensions,
available
at
http://www.nps.gov/blca/naturescience/dimension.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
68. U.S. National Park Service, Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park Explorers:
1853
Gunnison
Expedition,
available
at

http://www.nps.gov/blca/historyculture/explorer-gunnison.htm
2010).
69.

(last visited Feb. 20,

U.S. National Park Service, Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park - From
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river has outstanding recreational values. The Gunnison through Black
Canyon National Park is designated as a Gold-Medal Trout Stream by
the State of Colorado, and the gorge section of the river offers expert
kayakers Class V rapids and incredible scenery.70
In 1933, President Hoover signed a proclamation establishing Black
This brief
Canyon of the Gunnison National Monument.7 1
proclamation noted that it would serve the public interest to preserve
"the spectacular gorges and additional features of scenic, scientific, and
educational interest." 72 It directed the National Park Service to manage
the Black Canyon under the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916,
with its charge to preserve natural resources and provide public access
in the parks "in such manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.77
Congress upgraded the Black Canyon to a national park in 1999. In
enacting the Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park and
Gunnison Gorge National Conservation Area Act, Congress made
numerous findings regarding the many uses and values of the Black
Canyon and surrounding lands, but said little about the Gunnison
River. 74 The National Park Service retained authority to manage the75
new park under the

1999 statute and the 1916 Organic

Act.

Regarding water rights, Congress declared that the statute did not affect
any existing water rights (including those held by the United States)
and did not constitute an express or implied reservation of water for the
preserving the status quo regarding Black Canyon water
park, effectively
76
rights.

Long before Congress established the national park, however, the
United States had secured a partially defined water right for the Black
Canyon. In 1978, a Colorado water court entered a decree confirming
the existence, priority date, and purposes of a reserved water right for
the Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Monument. 77 As stated in
the decree, the purpose of the monument "is to conserve and maintain
in an unimpaired condition the scenic, aesthetic, natural, and historic

Past to Present, availableat http://www.nps.gov/blca/naturescience/pasttopresent.htm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
70. U.S. National Park Service, Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park Fishing, available at http://www.nps.gov/blca/planyourvisit/fishing.htm

(last visited

Feb. 20, 2010); U.S. National Park Service, Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park
-

Kayaking, available at http://www.nps.gov/blca/planyourvisit/kayaking.htm

(last

visited Feb. 20, 2010); see U.S. National Park Service, Black Canyon of the Gunnison
Scenic
Drives,
available
at
National
Park
http://www.nps.gov/blca/planyourvisit/drives.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
71. Proclamation No. 2032, 47 Stat. 2558 (Mar. 2, 1933).
72. Id.
73. Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
74. See Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park and Gunnison Gorge National
Conservation Area Act, Pub. L. No. 106-76, 113 Stat. 1126 (1999).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 2
(Colo. Water Div. 4) (2001).
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objects of the monument, as well as the wildlife therein, in order that
the monument might provide a source of recreation and enjoyment for
all generations of citizens of the United States."08 Thus, the court
decreed a water right for certain purposes, including both recreation
and conservation as well as preservation of scenic and aesthetic values.
The decree specifically authorized minimum stream flows in the
Gunnison River for fish conservation and to "[a]ttain and preserve the
recreational, scenic, and aesthetic conditions existing" as of the
monument's creation. 79 The priority date was March 2, 1933, the date
President Hoover signed the proclamation designating the
monument.8 0
The 1978 decree thus recognized a Black Canyon reserved right,
but explicitly did not quantify it. The court labeled the decree
"interlocutory," and addressed numerous federal water right claims in
addition to the Black Canyon right.8 1 The decree stated, "The waters
granted herein in fulfillment of the reserved rights of the United States
shall be quantified pursuant to this decree," and it did not award the
government "exclusive tide to any absolute or relative volume of
water..." 8 2 It did, however, "determine all of the reserved rights of the
United States" for certain categories of federal lands in western
Colorado, and "establish the priority of the United States' right to use
water" under its reserved water rights, including the one for Black
Canyon National Monument."
The 1978 decree required the United States to file an application to
quantify the Black Canyon reserved right, which would claim specific
flows for each week of the year and explain why these flows were
necessary to support the purposes of the national monument. 84 Once
the court determined the amounts needed for the Black Canyon, they
would "be the subject of an absolute water right with a priority date as
of the reservation date" of the monument.8 5 The decree required the
government to apply for quantification within five years. 86
Nearly twenty-three years later, the United States finally sought to
quantify the Black Canyon reserved right. On January 17, 2001-in the
final week of the Clinton Administration-the Justice Department filed
papers in the Colorado water court claiming certain flows in the river

78. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 2
(Colo. Water Div. 4) (Mar. 6, 1978 Interlocutory Decree Entered).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 2, 4-5
(Colo. Water Div. 4) (June 17, 2008 Review Draft).
82. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 2
(Colo. Water Div. 4) (2001).
83. Id.
84. See In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 1,
Attachment B (Colo. Water Div, 4) (2001).
85. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 2
(Colo. Water Div. 4) (Mar. 6, 1978 Interlocutory Decree Entered).
86. Id.
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through Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park. 7
The
application did not explain why it was filed nearly two decades late, but
in later filings the government stated that the National Park Service
performed extensive scientific studies and modeling to determine the
necessary flow levels. 88
The federal application claimed instream flows of two primary types:
"base flows" and "peak flows." 89 The minimum claimed base flow, to be
met throughout the year, was 300 cfs. 90 The application sought variable
base flows for the May 1-July 25 period, to be determined by the amount
of water predicted to flow into a specified reservoir above the Black
Canyon; base flows for this period would be lower in drier years and
higher in wetter ones, but would never exceed 3350 cfs. 91 The claimed
peak flow would be met one day per year during the May I-June 30
period. 92 Like the base flow claim, this one-day high flow would vary
depending on the forecasted inflow for the year.93 The application also
claimed certain flow levels, known as "shoulder flows," to be met as
Gunnison River levels rose to and fell from the annual oneday peak.94
By claiming flows for the protection of the park, however, the
application threatened to constrain operation of the Aspinall Unit, a
federal project operated by the Bureau of Reclamation ("USBR") just
upstream of the Black Canyon.9 5 A major element of the Colorado
River Storage Project, the Aspinall Unit comprises three dams with a
combined storage capacity exceeding one million acre-feet; Blue Mesa
dam, completed in 1966, forms the largest reservoir in Colorado. 96 In
addition to storing water for irrigation and other purposes, these dams
provide flood control and generate hydropower that is marketed
through the Western Area Power Administration ("VAPA").9' Congress

authorized the Aspinall (originally "Curecanti") Unit of the Colorado
River Storage Project in 1956 along with other major facilities such as
Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado, Navajo Dam on the San Juan, and
Flaming Gorge Dam on the Green.98 Water rights for the Aspinall Unit
87. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 1
(Colo. Water Div. 4) (2001).
88. Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum in Support of Federal Defendants'
Dispositive Motion at 20-21, High Country Citizens' -Alliance v. Norton, 448 F.Supp.2d
1235 (D. Colo.2005) (Civ. No. 03-WY-1712).
89. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W-437 at 2-3
(Colo. Water Div. 4) (June 17, 2008 Review Draft).
90. Id.at 3.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum, supranote 88, at 1.
96. Id. at 2, 7.
97. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Colorado River Storage Project: Aspinall Unit,
availableat http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/aspinall/index.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2010); see Colorado River Storage Project Management Center, available at
http://www.wapa.gov/crsp/aboutcrsp/default.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
98. Act of Apr. 11, 1956, ch. 203, 70 Stat. 105 (1956); U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
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have a priority date of November 13, 1957.90
The application acknowledged that exercising the claimed rights to
peak flows in the Black Canyon would "require careful consideration of
numerous factors, including the structural capacity of upstream dams
and potential downstream flooding, among other river management
issues."'0 0 It concluded by stating that the Secretary of the Interior
would "confer" with the State of Colorado, the National Park Service,
the Bureau of Reclamation, the Western Area Power Administration,
"and other affected interests in order to ensure that operational
decisions to exercise this right are in accord with the best available
information and with full consideration of the river management issues
noted."'0 ' USBR and WAPA thus got a voice in shaping peak flows for
the park, but the application gave no indication that the Black Canyon's
water rights could be effectively subordinated to upstream storage and
hydropower generation at the Aspinall Unit.
Controversy soon
followed.
B. CUTTING THE CLAIM: A PARTIAL FEDERAL-STATE SETTLEMENT

This effort to quantify the Black Canyon instream flow claims
predictably raised serious and widespread objections. More than 380
entities filed papers in Colorado water court opposing the federal
claims; virtually all of these opposers claimed that the application
sought more water than the park needed."0 2 Others argued that the
claimed flows were inconsistent with federal duties to operate the
Aspinall Unit under the 1956 Colorado River Storage Project Act, or
even that the statute had implicitly modified the Black Canyon's
reserved right. ' ° The government later stated that these and other
arguments showed the risk it faced in litigating the park's instream flow
claim in the Colorado water court.'0 4
If Colorado state officials and water users were upset with the
federal quantification filing in the final week of the Clinton
Administration, they were surely cheered by President Bush's
appointment of former Colorado Attorney General Gale Norton as
Secretary of the Interior.1 0 5 Bennett Raley, a prominent Colorado water
lawyer, became the new Assistant Secretary for Water and Science
(overseeing the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Geological

http://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/crsp/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010); U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation, supra note 97.
99. See In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, No. W437, at 4.
100. Id.
101. Id.at 3.
102. See Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum, supra note 88, at 28.
103. Seeid. at28-29.
104. Id. at 28.
105. David E. Sanger, The 43d President: The Transition; New Picks Firm up
Conservative Cast of Bush's Cabine4 N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2000, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/30/43rd-president-transition-new-picks-firm-upconservative-cast-bush-s-cabinet.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
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David Bernhardt was yet another high-level Interior
Survey).' 0 6
Department official from Colorado' 7 who would play a key role
regarding Black Canyon water rights.10 8
The 2001 quantification claim also raised concerns within the
federal government; USBR and WAPA certainly stood to lose if Black
Canyon instream flows were quantified at or near the levels claimed.
Representatives of these two agencies, the National Park Service, and
other units of the Interior Department began meeting to discuss a
compromise that would protect both the park and the Aspinall Unit.
An internal Park Service memo summarizing these discussions shows
that the various agency negotiating positions were rather far apart,
agreeing only on a minimum flow of 300 cfs.' 9 The Park Service
proposed peak flows of 10,000 to 16,000 cfs, "lower peak flows" of up to
10,000 cfs, and "shoulder flows" of up to 3,200 cfs.' 10 USBR offered
peak flows of 10,000 cfs "infrequently," "lower peak flows" of up to 5,500
cfs, and "shoulder flows" of up to 1,200 cfs." l The WAPA position
allowed for peak flows of 10,000 to 13,000 cfs, but it called for faster
ramping rates (river level increases or decreases) than the Park Service
wanted, did not mention
"lower peak flows," and made no provision for
"shoulder flows." 1 1 2
Further negotiations within the Interior
modeling runs
Department sought to close this gap, informed by USBR
13
of various operational scenarios for the Aspinall Unit.
In April 2003, the Interior Department signed an agreement with
114
the State of Colorado regarding Black Canyon instream flow rights.
The agreement sharply reduced the reserved right claim, leaving only a
300 cfs minimum flow right with a 1933 priority date."' Additional

106. Katherine Q. Seelye, Bush is Choosing Industry Insiders to Fill Several
Environmental Positions, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2001, at A10, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/1 2/us/bush-is-choosing-industry-insiders-to-fillseveral-environmental-positions.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
at
Office
of
the
Solicitor
Homepage,
available
107. See
http://www.doi.gov/solicitor/bernhardt-bio.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (noting
that Bernhardt is a Rifle, Colorado native who has held various senior positions within
the Department of the Interior).
108. See, e.g., Letter from Christopher J. Treese, External Affairs Manager, Colo.
River Water Conservation Dist., to David Bernhardt, Dep't of Interior (June 17, 2003)
(Administrative Record at 6541, High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp.
2d 1235 (D. Colo. 2006)) (thanking Bernhardt for his "efforts ...to honor state water
law and protect historical water users in the Gunnison basin")).
109. Memorandum (apparently from Nat'l Park Serv. staff to Nat'l Park Serv. Dir.
Fran Mainella) on Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park-Federal Reserved
Water Right (Feb. 8, 2002) (Administrative Record at 12784, High Country Citizens'
Alliance, 448 F.Supp.2d at 1235).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Seeid.
114. Agreement, Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Park, Signed by Officials of
the U.S. Dep't of the Interior and the Colo. Water Conservation Bd. (Apr. 2, 2003)
(Administrative Record at 6401, High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F.Supp.2d at
1235).
115. Id.
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flows for the park would rely upon a minimum flow right under
Colorado state law, to be held by the Colorado Water Conservation
Board (CWCB), with a 2003 priority date.' 16 The agreement did not
define specific instream flows for the Black Canyon above 300 cfs;
instead, it included a table of flows that "can be reasonably expected,
based on historical averages of the last twenty-six years, to pass through
the Aspinall Unit" for the benefit of the park.1 7 The table showed a
300 cfs base flow available every year, and "shoulder flows" of 300-1000
cfs available in twenty-two out of twenty-six years." 8 Expected peak
flows ranged from a low of 2000-5000 cfs available in eight out of
twenty-six years, to a high of 10,000+ cfs available in three out of twentysix years.' 9 The agreement clearly stated, however, that these flows
were not guaranteed in the future,
and that the quantity of water would
12
depend on a range of factors.
Other than cutting the reserved right claim to 300 cfs, the
agreement did not quantify water rights for the Black Canyon; instead,
it described the operational priorities and procedures of the Aspinall
Unit, which
in turn would dictate the amount of water available for the
1
park.

12

Other than the 300 cfs minimum flow, nothing in the agreement
imposed any substantive limits or requirements on Aspinall Unit
operations; park flows were stated only as "reasonably expected" values
with no guarantees, and there was no mention of ramping rates, which
had been a key element of the 2001 claim and the subsequent
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. "Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. The agreement stated the following regarding Aspinall Unit operations and
Black Canyon flows:
[T]he ultimate amount of water that will be available [for the park] in the
future is dependent upon many factors, including where the water is removed
from the system, the hydrology and the timing of the hydrology, future project
demand, and reservoir elevation at the beginning of the run-off season. In
light of these considerations, on an annual basis and prior to the spring runoff, the Bureau of Reclamation shall consult with the National Park Service,
the Western Area Power Administration, the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service, the CWCB, the Colorado Water River Water Conservation District, the
Uncompahgre Valley Water Users Association, the Upper Gunnison Water
Conservancy District, the City and County of Delta, and Redlands Water and
Power Company, on Aspinall Unit project operations for the upcoming season
regarding the delivery of the CWCB right. Nothing in the consultation
process will divest the Bureau of Reclamation of its obligation to operate the
Aspinall Unit in furtherance of its authorized purposes and obligations, and
the Bureau of Reclamation shall operate the Aspinall Unit consistently with
*the terms of this agreement.... The Bureau of Reclamation will deliver the
flows of the Gunnison River in accordance with the CWCB instream flow right
with the 2003 priority date described [above], to the extent that such flows
have not been appropriated by senior water right holders under Colorado law,
to the extent that such flows are not subject to appropriation by the Aspinall
Unit under the authorized purposes, and to the extent that such flows do not
impair the structural integrity of the Aspinall Unit.
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interagency negotiations.'22 The mention of "future project demand" as
a factor in determining flows for the park indicated that new offstream
water uses could reduce the amount of water available, leaving the
Black Canyon with even less protection than a 2003 water right might
otherwise indicate.
The April 2003 agreement called for USBR, the National Park
Service, and the State of Colorado to create "a binding Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) ... regarding enforcement and protection of the

instream flow right" to be held by the CWCB. 123 Under the ensuing
MOA of July 31, 2003, the CWCB agreed to act under state law as
24
needed to exercise and protect the instream flow right for the park. 1
The earlier agreement stated that the Park Service would be able to
enforce the instream flow right if the CWCB failed to do so, but the
MOA said only that the United States or the CWCB could sue (in an
unspecified court) to enforce the MOA. 125 The agreement capped peak
flows through the Black Canyon at 10,000 cfs, and specified that
exercise of the instream flow right "shall not interfere
with the
126
operations or authorized purposes of the Aspinall Unit."
Neither the federal government nor the State of Colorado has said
much about the events leading up to the April 2003 agreement, so
there is little public information on how it was developed or who
participated in negotiating it. Notes of a November 2002 "Black
Canyon mtg" show only that ten federal and seven state agency officials
were in attendance. 127 A CWCB staff report in May 2003 said only that
the staff "continues to serve as part of Colorado's negotiating team
working with other Colorado water users and a number of federal
agencies towards the quantification" of the Black Canyon reserved
right,
1 28
without identifying these users or their role in the process.
Federal and state officials hailed the 2003 agreements as a
breakthrough on the Gunnison dispute and a model for resolving
conflicts over water rights for federal lands. Interior Secretary, Gale
Norton, praised the deal as an innovative, collaborative solution to
competing demands for water.12 9
After saying that the 2001
122. Id.
123. Id. at 6402.
124. Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Department of the
Interior National Park Service and Bureau of Reclamation and the Colorado Water
Conservation Board Concerning the Enforcement and Protection of Water and Water
Rights (July 31, 2003) (Administrative Record at 12666, High Country Citizens'
Alliance, 448 F.Supp.2d at 1235).
125. Agreement, supra note 114, at 6402; Memorandum of Agreement, supra note
123, at 12669.
126. Id. at 12669.
127. Attendance Sign-In Sheet, Black Canyon Meeting (Nov. 22, 2002)
(Administrative Record at 11983, High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F.Supp.2d at

1235).
128. Memorandum from Rod Kuharich and Dan McAuliffe to Colo. Water
Conservation Bd. Members 17 (May 8, 2003) (on file with author).
129. Gale A. Norton, Op-Ed., A New Path for Western Water Issues, DENVER POST,
Apr. 20, 2003, at E-04.
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quantification application claimed "far more water than the park has
received in recent memory or will ever need," she stated that the Park
Service and USBR first reached agreement among themselves, then
found a way to protect park needs in cooperation with the state.
A key innovation is using a state "instream flow" right to protect the
park, which avoids the turf battle that sometimes blocks settlements.
The Park Service knows it will get the amount of water necessary to
protect the park. Reclamation knows how to manage its water facilities.
Local communities and citizens know their water rights are secure.
The certainty provided by this agreement will help both the local
economy and natural resource conservation, since both function better
when everyone understands exactly what their water rights are.13
The director of Colorado's Department of Natural Resources said
the agreement would bring "a new era of cooperation with the federal
government that results in real environmental benefits." 131 A State of

Colorado press release said that the original federal claim "could have
permanently imposed drought-like conditions in the Gunnison River
Basin. " 132 Similarly, a major water supplier on Colorado's Western
Slope said the agreement "is being welcomed as a major step
forward. "133
Environmental groups, however, blasted the agreement as a
giveaway that would harm the Black Canyon and set a bad precedent.
Trout Unlimited complained that trading a federal water right with a
1933 priority for a state right with a 2003 priority was a bad deal and
would open the door to more water being diverted out of the Gunnison
upstream of the park.3 3 A Trout Unlimited staff attorney said that the
'deal "cuts the heart out of the park. Our concern is that the Interior
Department will use this as a model to further dewater our National
135
Parks, our National Forests, and our National Wildlife Refuges."
The agreements of April and July 2003 reduced the Black Canyon
claims but did not fully settle them. The Colorado water court in
Montrose still needed to quantify the park water rights, so it scheduled
an eight-week trial on the matter beginning September 2004.136 The
environmental groups had to know, however, that in the Colorado
courts they had no real chance of getting a better result than these
130.

Id.

131.

Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Interior Department Announces Major

Agreement for Gunnison River Water in Colo. (Apr. 2, 2003) available at
http://www.interior.gov/news/03_NewsReleases/030402.htm
(last visited Feb. 20,
2010).
132. Press Release, State of Colo., State, Federal Officials to Announce Historic
Settlement Agreement on Black Canyon of the Gunnison Water Rights (Apr. 1, 2003).
133. Letter from R. Eric Kuhn, General Manager, Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist., to Greg Walcher, Executive Dir., Colo. Dep't of Natural Res. (Apr. 10, 2003).
134. Press Release, Trout Unlimited, Trout Unlimited Condemns Bush
Administration's Decision to "Give Away" the Gunnison River (Apr. 2, 2003) (on file
with author).
135. Id.
136. See Order on Motion for Stay at 1, Concerning the Application for Water Rights
of the United States, No. O1CW05 (Colo. Water Div. 4, Oct. 7, 2003).
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agreements would provide. For one thing, environmental groups had
traditionally gotten little traction in the water courts, largely because
Colorado water law does not allow water judges to consider
environmental factors in determining water rights. 3 And while the
Black Canyon rights would be determined under federal rather than
state law, the environmental groups would be arguing for more water
under the 1933 reserved right than the claimant federal government
would be, placing them in a unique and nearly impossible position.
Realistically, it could only get worse in the water court; if the
environmental groups wanted a better deal for the Black Canyon, they
needed a different forum. Thus, they sued to challenge the Interior
Department's action in federal court 3' and sought to put the water
court proceedings on hold.
C. STAYING THE WATER COURT LITIGATION

When the government reached the April 2003 agreement with the
State of Colorado, it filed a motion in the Colorado water court to
amend its quantification application, 139 cutting its claim to 300 cfs. But,
the Black Canyon reserved right would not be final until the water court
issued a decree following further proceedings. Environmental groups
were pinning their hopes on the federal court to overturn the 2003
agreements, but they recognized that a final water court decree of the
park reserved right would effectively moot their federal claims.' 40 Thus,
in September 2003, they moved to stay the water court proceedings
pending resolution
(including consideration of the motion to amend)
4
of the issues raised in the newly filed federal case.1 '
The motion for stay placed the water court in an unfamiliar
position. For nearly thirty years, since the Supreme Court's decision in
Colorado River Water Conservation Distict, 1 42 federal courts had
generally abstained from cases involving reserved right claims in favor
of state court adjudications. While a deferral by the water court
certainly would not conflict with the Colorado River case, it would
depart from the conventional wisdom that federal courts no longer
have a role in reserved rights litigation.
Colorado agencies and water users opposed the motion for stay on
that basis, arguing that the water court was the proper forum for
quantification of the Black Canyon rights and that it would relinquish
its authority by staying proceedings. 43 The United States did not raise

137. In reBd. of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d 952, 972 (Colo. 1995).
138. See High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1242 (D.
Colo. 2006).
139. Id.
140. See Order on Motion, supranote 136.
141. SeeId.
142. See generallyColo. River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 81920 (1976) (avoiding "piecemeal" adjudication favors deferring to state court
proceedings).
143.

Order on Motion for Stay at 1, supra note 136, at 1.
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these arguments but did oppose the stay, contending that the
environmental groups had not adequately shown a need for it and that
delaying the state proceedings would harm other parties.1"
The
environmental groups maintained that the stay was needed because a
water court quantification decree would make the Black Canyon
reserved rights final, thus preventing any effective relief on their federal
claims; the Colorado agencies and water users countered that the only
proper federal forum was United States Supreme Court review of a final
quantification decree from the Colorado courts.'4 5
After weighing these arguments and others, the water court granted
the motion for stay, exercising its discretion to hold the quantification
proceedings, pending resolution of the federal litigation. 4 6
It
concluded that refusing the stay would prejudice the environmental
groups because a final reserved right decree would be res judicata,
leaving them "without adequate recourse" if they were to win their
federal case.'47 The water court seemed to discount any potential harm
from delaying its proceedings, noting that the quantification
application was filed in 2001 but that the reserved rights themselves
were much older; it did not mention the twenty-three-year delay
preceding that application. The court insisted that it was merely staying
proceedings on the Black Canyon water rights, not deferring to the
federal court on quantification.' 4 8
The Colorado agencies and water users petitioned the Colorado
Supreme Court to overturn the stay, arguing that the water court had
abused its discretion.' 49 The core of their arguments was that all issues
relating to park water rights belonged in the water court under the
McCarran Amendment as applied by Colorado River, and that the
federal case would usurp the water court's role by effectively
determining the minimum amount of the reserved right.50 They
contended that the stay had allowed the environmental groups "to
effectively shift forums for certain key aspects of the quantification
proceeding in contravention of... the clear federal policy of deference
to state court adjudication of reserved rights claims," and resulted "in
an effective abdication of [water court] jurisdiction over a critical
component of the Black Canyon reserved right adjudication." 5 ' The
environmental groups maintained their position that the federal case
was different from the quantification proceeding and therefore not an
infringement on the water court's jurisdiction, and that the stay was

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
Rights
150.
151.

Id.
Id. at 2-4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Reply to Petition Pursuant to C.AR. 21 at 1, 7, 11-12, In re Application for Water
of the U.S., 101 P.3d 1072 (Colo. 2004) (No. 03SA321).
Id. at 2-4, 7, 12.
Id. at 7.
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needed to avoid prejudice from a final decree.' 52 For its part, the
United States evidently dropped its opposition to the stay once the
53
court issued it.'
A divided Colorado Supreme Court upheld the stay in In re The
Application for Water Rights of the United States of America, finding
no abuse of the water court's discretion. 154 After examining the
McCarran Amendment, the judicial review provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act, and cases applying these statutes, the
court concluded that McCarran's waiver of sovereign immunity is "not
so broad that it allows state courts to evaluate or adjudicate the federal
agency decision making processes leading the United States to make a
The Environmental
particular water application in a given case.
Opposers have brought claims in federal court that can only be decided
by that court."155
Because of the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction over these
claims, the only question was whether the stay was an abuse of
discretion.15 6 The court found that the balance of hardships tipped in
favor of the stay because the federal plaintiffs faced the threat of res
judicata from a water court decree, whereas the other parties would
suffer no great harm from further delay of a case that was already
almost three decades old. 15'
Most significantly, the Colorado Supreme Court flatly rejected the
argument that the stay was improper in light of federal and state cases
applying McCarran:
The water court explicitly retained its jurisdiction to quantify the
United States' reserved water right. The fact that the federal case may
decide that the United States violated federal law when it reduced its
water right claim does not amount to a quantification of the water
right.... Because of the exclusivity of the federal court's jurisdiction
over the federal claims, dual proceedings are necessary and the
McCarran Amendment's policy to avoid piecemeal litigation is
inapplicable. As stated above, resolution of the federal case may
but it will not
influence the parameters of the water court's decision,
158
quantify the United States' reserved water right.
Justice Hobbs dissented, joined by Justice Kourlis1 59 Taking a very
expansive view of McCarran Amendment text and caselaw, the dissent
took issue with both aspects of the majority opinion. First, Justice

152. Answer to Rule to Show Cause 1-2, In re Application for Water Rights of the
United States, 101 P.3d 1072 (Colo. 2004).
153. See Reply to Petition Pursuant to C.A.R. 21, supra note 149, at 10 n.7 (stating
that the U.S. initially opposed the stay but "now does not consider it to rise to the level
of an abuse of discretion").
154. In re Application for WaterRights of the United States, 101 P.3d at 1075.
155. Id. at 1080.
156. Id.
157. 1d, at 1083.
158. Id, at 1083-84.
159. Id. at 1084 (Hobbs, J., dissenting).

WA TER LA W REVIEW

Volume 13

Hobbs rejected exclusive federal jurisdiction of the federal claims,
arguing that McCarran "expressly provides for the state court to decide
all factual and legal issues affecting the quantification and
administration of the right, which the plaintiffs' claims in federal court
surely do." 6 ° Second, he argued that the federal case would indeed
infringe on water court jurisdiction, because deciding the legality of the
2003 agreements was not so different from quantifying the reserved
right.' 6' "Such a neat distinction does not accord with the interrelated
factual and legal issues in such a case as this, and, I conclude, derogates
the long history of the Colorado courts' role in McCarran
adjudications."'6 2
Thus, the stay remained, leaving the United States District Court to
determine the environmental groups' federal claims. They would wait
nearly two years for a decision on the merits, but they would find it
worth the wait.
D. MAKING A FEDERAL CASE OF THE 2003 AGREEMENTS
In September 2003, a coalition of local and national
environmental/conservation groups sued the Interior Department and
Secretary Gale Norton in U.S. District Court in Denver, alleging that the
agreements violated various federal laws by relinquishing the reserved
right necessary to protect the park. 6 3 Under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA),' 64 plaintiffs sought an order setting aside the
2003 agreements and remanding the matter of the Black Canyon water
rights back to the Department of the Interior. 165 High Country
Citizens' Alliance v. Norton was assigned to Judge Clarence Brimmer of

the U.S. District
Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by
166
-designation.
The lawsuit framed the agreements as giving up a 1933
(unquantified) reserved right adequate to protect the park in favor of a
junior water right held by the CWCB. Plaintiffs argued that this action
violated the law by essentially delegating the federal government's duty
to protect the park to a state agency, and by disposing of federal
167
property (the reserved right) without Congressional authorization.
The plaintiffs contended that the agreements provided too little water
to protect the Black Canyon environment, and therefore violated both
the Park Service Organic Act 168 and the 1999 statute creating the

160.

Id. at 1086.

161.

Id. at 1088.

162. Id.
163.

See High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1242-43

(D. Colo. 2006).

164. 5 U.S.C. § 701-706 (2000).
165.

High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F.Supp.2d at 1249.

166. Id. at 1235.
167. Id. at 1243.
168. 16 U.SC. § 1 (2000).
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national park.' 69 In addition, the lawsuit claimed that the government
failed to perform an environmental review before taking a major action
that would have significant environmental effects, thereby violating the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
The government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the court
lacked jurisdiction over some of the claims, and that others provided'no
grounds for the court to grant relief.171 Central to this motion was its
characterization of the 2003 agreement as simply a change in the
government's litigation position in the water court case over the Black
Canyon water right. 72 As such, the government's action was committed
to the agency's discretion and unreviewable by the court: the brief
stated that the Interior Secretary had broad discretion in deciding how
to meet the water needs of both the park and the Aspinall Unit, and
that "courts have long acknowledged that the Attorney General's
173
litigation positions are presumptively immune from judicial review."
Similarly, the NEPA claim had to fail because a federal regulation
excluded the Justice Department's litigation decisions from the scope of
federal actions requiring environmental reviews. 174 As for the unlawful
disposition claim, the government argued that the Black Canyon
reserved right had never been quantified and thus was never federal
property, despite the 1978 decree. 7 5
One of the government's primary arguments, however, was that the
federal court should abstain in favor of the state water court case. The
motion to dismiss stated that if the federal court were to determine
whether the 2003 agreement violated federal agency duties to protect
the park, it would "intrude into the reserved rights determination
properly before the water court... How much water is necessary to
fulfill the Park's puroses is the very question now pending before the
state water court."T76 Citing federal and state cases applying the
McCarran- Amendment, the government argued that if the federal court
were to inquire into the adequacy of the park's water rights, it would
"frustrate Congress' intent to give primacy to state determinations of
water rights and encroach upon the state courts' traditional role as
arbiter of water rights disputes." 177 The motion to dismiss did not
mention that McCarran had not stripped the federal courts of
jurisdiction over reserved right claims, or that the Supreme Court had
not required abstention in favor of state court adjudications under

169. 16 U.S.C. § 410ff-2 (2000).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C) (2000).
171. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448
F.Supp.2d 1235 (Civ. No. 03-WY-1712) (D. Colo. Nov. 10, 2003).

172. Seeid. at22-24.
173. Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum, supra note 88, at 23 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 516).
174. Id. at 29 (citing 28 C.F.R § 61.4).

175. Id.
176. Id. at 17.
177. Id. at 18.
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McCarran. 178 The clear message was that the federal court should steer
clear because the case involved a dispute over water rights that were the
subject of ongoing litigation in state water court.
The district court would have none of it, rejecting the government's
arguments and its framing of several issues. 179 In denying the motion to.
dismiss, the court wrote that it "fails to view the decision to relinquish
the federal water rights in the state water court as a 'litigation strategy'
of the Attorney General."' The real issue, said the court, was the April
2003 agreement between the Interior Department and the State, which
was an agency action that may have violated an affirmative statutory duty
to protect the park.' 8 ' Judge Brimmer also held the Black Canyon
reserved right was indeed federal property, rejecting the argument that
disposed of nothing because the right had never
the government 8had
2
been quantified.
Most significantly, the district court refused to view the federal
challenge as improperly duplicative of the state court litigation. The
water court case would address the exact quantity of water needed to
meet the purposes of the Black Canyon reservation; the federal case, by
contrast, would review agency decisions for compliance with federal
law. 83 The court stated that it had exclusive jurisdiction over cases
brought under the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge federal
agency action, and that if plaintiffs prevailed, the remedy would be a
remand to the agency rather than a quantification of park water
rights. 8 4 Because the two cases were sufficiently different, the challenge
to the 2003 agreements was not subject to the McCarran Amendment,
and would therefore proceed in federal court.
The litigation proceeded to the merits, where in essence the key
question was the adequacy of the 2003 agreements in protecting park
resources: did the 300 cfs reserved right, coupled with the variable statelaw instream flow right, provide enough water with enough certainty to
meet the Black Canyon's needs? 8 5 The extensive administrative record
(exceeding 13,000 pages) provided clear documentation that the park
needed more water than a 300 cfs base flow. 186 The government argued
not that 300 cfs was adequate, but that the Colorado instream flow right
provided a sound alternative approach to meeting the park's water

178. Id.
179. See generally Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, High Country
Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, Civ. No. 03-WY-1712 (D. Colo Apr. 19, 2004).
180. Id. at 16.
181. Id. at 16-17.
182. Id. at 20-21.
183. Id. at 15-16.
184. Id.at 15.
185. Seeid. at21.
186. See, e.g., Letter from Craig Manson, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and
Parks, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Greg Walcher, Executive Director, Colo. Dep't of
Natural Res. (May 9, 2003) (Administrative Record at 5941, High Country Citizens'
Alliance v. Norton, 448 F.Supp.2d 1235 (D. Colo. 2005) (Civ. No. 03-WY-1712)
(explaining scientific basis for peak and shoulder flow claims for park).
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needs, and that the 2003 agreements were "intended" to provide a
hydrograph with base, peak, and shoulder flows- the elements needed
to protect the park. 18 7 Far less clear, however, was whether the park
would actually receive such flows under these agreements. Assistant
Interior Secretary Craig Manson's qualified defense was not the type to
inspire much confidence:
And is it an ironclad guarantee? No. We've said all along and been
up-front about that. The April 2nd agreement said there is no
guarantee that these same amounts can be available in the future. Is it
illusory? No, it's not illusory either. It's clear there will be sufficient
water available to the Park. And it's clear that the chart in the April
2nd agreement, while neither an ironclad guarantee nor illusory, is
the type of evidence
88 that prudent people rely upon in making
important decisions. 1
The United States did not suggest that a 2003 instream flow right
would provide the necessary flows as reliably as a 1933 reserved right
would.
Instead, the government argued that its decision was
appropriate because of the need to balance preserving the resources of
the Black Canyon with protecting the functions of the Aspinall Unit:
"Congress' decision to build Aspinall effectively modified the
Secretary's obligations under the [Park Service] Organic Act with
respect to this Park."' 89 The government did not specify the exact
source or nature of this modification, but emphasized that the
Colorado River Storage Project Act directed that the Aspinall Unit be
built to store "no less than 940,000 acre-feet of water, an amount of
water Congress had been informed would amount to all of the spring
run-off from the basin in most years."190 Because a substantial reserved
right might prevent storage of that amount, the Department of the
Interior saw a conflict between its duty to protect the park under the
general language of the Organic Act, and its obligations under the
specific statutory language authorizing the Aspinall Unit. 19. The 2001
quantification application had called for a larger reserved right, but also
for consultation among federal agencies on how to exercise the right
each year. 192 The government contended that the 2003 agreements
were "a different but eminently sensible way" for the Department of the
Interior to resolve the apparent statutory conflict: "Rather than
continue to insist on a massive reserved right with a necessary but
amorphous 'consultation' component, the Secretary chose instead to
have a concrete reserved right, a peak flow fully protected through state
187. Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum, supranote 88, at 56.
188. Transcript of Hearing at 167, Colorado Water Conservation Board Hearing on
Staff Recommendation of the Gunnison River Instream Flow Appropriation, Nov. 19,
2003 (Administrative Record at 7932, High Country Citizens' Alliance, Civ. No. 03-WY1712).
189. Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum, supra note 88, at 60.
190. Id. at 61.
191.

Id.

192. Id.at 23-24.
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law, and to provide1 93mid-range and shoulder flows through operation of
the Aspinall Unit."

The United States also maintained its position that the case was
unreviewable in federal court. Its primary arguments were that the
Administrative Procedure Act precluded review of the challenged
decisions, either because the decisions did not constitute "agency
actions" or because they were committed to the agency's discretion
under the relevant statutes.'94 In addition, the government resumed its
argument that the federal court could not grant relief without
improperly treading on the water court's turf.'95 In maintaining that
the 2003 agreements did not dispose of any federal property, the
government contended that the court would intrude on the state
court's jurisdiction if it issued an order determining that the United
States did not retain a reserved right sufficient to protect the park.'96
"[T]o accept Plaintiffs' theory requires this court to determine that the
federal reserved water right for the park exists in a quantity in excess of
300 cfs," the government argued.'97 "Any order which would define the
parameters of the water right must be left to the water court."'98
In deciding High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, the court
again brushed aside government arguments on reviewabillty 9 9 The
agreements were specific agency actions reviewable under the APA, said
the court, unlike the agency failure to act which the Supreme Court
found unreviewable in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance.2"'
And while the government did have some discretion in its duty to
protect park resources, there was law to apply in measuring the exercise
of that discretion, so the agreements fell outside the "committed to
agency discretion by law" exception to judicial review. 20 ' This time, the
court made no mention of the water court jurisdiction issue.
The court was equally unimpressed by the government's position on
the merits and held for the plaintiffs on all of their claims. 2° 2 On the

crucial question of whether the 2003 agreements adequately protected
the park, the court stressed the importance of the reserved right's 1933
priority date, and determined that the 2003 agreements reduced
protection for the Black Canyon by permanently subordinating it to the
Aspinall Unit. 2

3

"Unlike forgoing a call on the river in dry years, as

contemplated by the 2001 quantification application, the April and July
agreements were a means to deprive the National Park Service of ever
193. Id. at 62.
194. Id. at 48-50.
195. Id.at 69.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199.
2006).
200.
201.
202.
203.

High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1250 (D. Colo.
Id. at 1249 (distinguishing 542 U.S. 55 (2004)).
Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1253.
Id
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204
exercising a right to peak and shoulder flows of the Gunnison River. )
The court also held that the government had unlawfully disposed of
federal property, delegated its park protection duties to a state agency,
and taken a major federal action without conducting the environmental
review required by NEPA.2 °5 On this latter point, the court stressed the
importance of public participation in a decision with great long-term
significance for a national park: "A decision to enter into agreements
which permanently give up a priority to a resource which must be 'saved
for all generations' must be made in public view and not behind closed
doors. ,206
The United States filed a notice of appeal but ultimately chose not
to seek review in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 °7
The
environmental plaintiffs had received their day in federal court and
prevailed. Because the district court had simply remanded the matter
to the agency, 2 8 however, the final outcome for the Black Canyon was
still far from certain.

E. THE REAL DEAL: THE 2008

SETTLEMENT

Rather than return to court, the parties chose mediation to resolve
the Black Canyon water rights controversy.2 9
Thirty entities
participated in the mediation, including not only the United States and
the State of Colorado, but also five cities and towns, six
environmental/conservation groups (three national and three local),
five water districts, four counties, and three farm bureaus. 2 0 The. talks
produced an agreement that the parties announced in June 2008.211
Like the 2003 agreements, the settlement provides the park a range
of instream flows that will vary depending on the forecasted inflow to
Blue Mesa Reservoir, the Aspinall Unit's major storage facility. 212 But in
other key respects, the settlement differs significantly from the earlier
agreements. The reserved right now encompasses the full range of
flows (notjust a base flow) for the Black Canyon and does not rely on a
Colorado instream flow right.21 3 The settlement also specifies peak and

shoulder flows for the park based on Blue Mesa inflows, rather than
204. Id.at 1252.
205. Id. at 1243, 1246, 1248.
206. Id.at 1245-46.
207. See Decree Quantifying the Federal Reserved Water Right for Black Canyon of
the Gunnison National Park Attachment C at 2, In reWater Rights for the United States
of America, No. O1CW05 (Colo. Water Div. 4Jan. 8, 2009).
208. High Country Citizens'Alliance, 448 F.Supp.2d at 1253.
209. Decree Quantifying the Federal Reserved Water Right for Black Canyon of the
Gunnison National Park, supra note 207, at Attachment C.
210. Id.
211. Black Canyon NationalPark Gets Its Water, HIGH COUNTRY REP. (High Country
Citizens' Alliance, Crested Butte, Colo.), Summer 2008 at 1.
212. Decree Quantifying the Federal Reserved Water Right for Black Canyon of the
Gunnison National Park, supra note 207, at Attachment C, at 7-9. Attachment B
includes a different list of the thirty parties than Attachment C of the final decree, and
Attachment C lists only one farm bureau.
213. Id.at 6-9.

Volume 13

WATER LAW REVIEW

simply providing a formula for determining the total volume of water
available for such flows. 2 14 Perhaps most significantly, park water rights

are no longer effectively subordinated to the Aspinall Unit 215, including
potential future changes that could have reduced flows through the
Black Canyon. Yet the agreement includes protection for various
interests;

for

example,

it preserves

flood

control

operations,2

6

subordinates the park reserved right to certain water uses (including all
uses senior to the Aspinall Unit),2" 7 and allows the Aspinall Unit to
release lesser peak21flows
if drought has reduced reservoir storage to
8
specified low levels.

On January 8, 2009, the Colorado water court issued a final decree
for the Black Canyon National Park reserved right based on the
settlement reached in August.2 19 In entering the decree the court noted
that thirty parties, including all the parties to the mediation, had
formally approved the decree, and another 157 parties had agreed to
withdraw their opposition based on the settlement. 22° The decree said a
mouthful in a single sentence on the last page: 'This Decree was
entered pursuant to agreement of the parties to address their interests
and concerns and resolves them finally in this matter." 221 So ended the
quantification controversy that had spanned all eight years of the Bush
Administration and delayed confirmation of a claim pending since the
1970s.
Four months after the decree, a story appeared in the Denver Post
describing how the water right settlement would soon lead to higher
flows in the Gunnison River for the benefit of the Black Canyon
ecosystem. 2222 The story explained that the Aspinall Unit had reduced
average peak flows in the river to22about
1700 cfs, but that the 2009 peak
flow would be around 6,000 cfs 3-similar to the average peak before
214. Id. at 3.
215. Id. at 11; Colo.Div. of Water Res., Concerningthe Tabulation of Water Rights in
Water
Division
4,
90-91
tbl.
1
(2008),
available
at
http://water.state.co.us/pubs/tabulation/divltabulation.pdf
(last visited Feb. 20,
2010).
216. Decree Quantifying the Federal Reserved Water Right for Black Canyon of the
Gunnison National Park, supia note 207, at Attachment C, at 9 (noting that flood
control remains the highest operational priority of the Aspinal Unit, and the decree
does not affect flood control operations).
217. Id.at 4, 5, 11 (stating that the Black Canyon water right carries a 1933 priority;
the Aspinall Unit water rights have a 1957 priority; and providing that the federal
government "shall subordinate the Black Canyon Right to all water rights with
adjudicated priorities that are senior to the Aspinall Unit Rights").
218. Id. at 10 (specifying when the United States may release lesser peak flows due to
drought, and providing a formula for determining such flows).
219. Id.at 13.
220. Id. at 2, Attachments B and C.
221. Id. at 13.
222. Mark Jaffe, Black Canyon River Rlows Swell After 36-year Fight, DENVER POST,
May 8, 2009, at Bl.
223. Id.; see also U.S. Geological Survey, National Water Information System: Daily
Data
for
Gauge
USGS
09128000
available
at
http://nwis.waterdata.usgs.gov/co/nwis/dvstat/?referred-module=sw&siteno=091280
00&por_09128000_4=345637,00060,4,1910-10-01,2009-10-26&startdt=2009-05-
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1937. The article quoted the park's chief of resource stewardship
as
224
saying, "This is the beginning of a return to a more natural river.
I. FEDERALJUDICIAL REVIEWABILIY OF RESERVED RIGHT
SETTLEMENTS
The plaintiffs in High Country Citizens' Alliance sued to challenge
a federal agency's effort to partially settle a reserved water right claim
pending in state court.225 They convinced a federal court to do what
few others have done since the ColoradoRiver case: reach the merits of
a federal lawsuit relating to reserved water rights. High Country
Citizens' Alliance thus indicates that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
federal courts may yet decide certain issues relating to federal water
right claims, even where those claims are pending in a state court
adjudication.
High Country Citizens' Alliance may prove to have somewhat
limited value as precedent for two main reasons. First, and most
obviously, it is a district court case; Judge Brimmer's decision never
reached the Tenth Circuit after the United States chose not to appeal.
Second, High Country Citizens' Alliance involves unusual facts: the
challenged agency action was not the filing of a reserved right claim,
the withdrawal of a claim, or even the final settlement of a claim, but
rather a signed agreement to limit a claim that was still pending in state
court.2 26 Such an agreement is certainly not necessary for resolving a
reserved right claim, and in future cases, parties could easily skip that
intermediate step and proceed directly to final settlement. The key
question, then, is whether final settlement of a federal reserved right
227
claim in a state proceeding is properly reviewable in federal court.
This section addresses that question, and concludes that the answer is
yes.

01&end dt=2009-05-30&format=html table&stat cds=max va&date format=YYYY-MMDD&rdbcompression=file&submittedform=parameter selection-list (last visited Feb.
20, 2010) (provisional data subject to, revision) (In fact, the Gunnison through the
Black Canyon actually peaked at about 6700 cfs on May 13, 2009.)
224. MarkJaffe, supranote 222, at BI.
225. See High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1242 (D.
Colo. 2006).
226. See id,
227. See SAX, supra note 60, at 864 (As noted earlier, this article focuses on federal,
non-Indian reserved right claims. Reviewability of tribal reserved right settlements may
differ from settlement of federal claims, largely because they typically do not become
effective until ratified by Congress, and sometimes by the legislature of the affected state
and the government of the tribe whose rights are being determined.); Ann R. Klee &
Duane Mecham, The Nez Perce Indian Water Right Settlement-Fedeal Perspective,
42 IDAHO L. REV. 595, 607 (2006) (noting that following agreement on the terms of
settlement for the water right claims of the Nez Perce Tribe, "federal, state, and tribal
legislative approvals[ ] had to be sought from the legislative branches of government").
The need for Congressional approval before a settlement takes effect may affect the
finality of agency action regarding the settlement, and the shift of proceedings to the
legislative forum may affect ripeness of the agreement for judicial review.
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A. APA REVIEW PROVISIONS
The APA does not provide for judicial review in every instance
where an agency has done something. Judicial review is precluded in
some situations, including those where an agency has essentially
complete discretion.2 2 8 Otherwise, the APA provides for judicial review
of any "final agency action."229 This latter provision effectively imposes
two requirements on suits brought under the APA: there must be
agency action,23 ° and the action must be final.23 '
1. Action committed to agency discretion
An agency action may be final but still unreviewable under the APA
if it is "committed to agency discretion by law."232 An agency may enjoy
judicially unchecked discretion based on statutory text, either if the
statute specifically confers total discretion on an agency in taking a
certain kind of action,233 or if the language is so broad and general that
a court believes it has "no law to apply" in measuring an agency's
exercise of discretion.2 34 The nature of the agency's decision is also a
relevant factor. For example, where an agency opted not to bring an
enforcement action for a particular violation of law, the Supreme Court
held that the decision was committed to agency discretion because it
was analogous to a prosecutor's decision not to indict a potential
criminal defendant, a choice that courts traditionally have not
reviewed.235
In High Country Citizens' Alliance, the United States insisted that
the court could not review the 2003 Black Canyon agreements because
they were simply litigation decisions that were legally committed to the
government's discretion. 236 This argument against judicial reviewability
had some force in that case, especially because the 2003 agreements did
23 7
not settle the Black Canyon reserved right claim, but only reduced it.
The government's motion to dismiss cited a statute that gives the
Department of Justice control over the conduct of litigation involving

228. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2007). But see 5 U.S.C § 701(a)(1) (stating that review
may also be precluded by statute).
229. 5 U.S.C. § 704 ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial
review.").
230. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 62 (2004).
231. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997).
232. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (2).
233. Websterv. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1988).
234. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
235. Id.at 831-32.
236. Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum in Support of Federal Defendants'
Dispositive Motion at 22-25, High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F.Supp.2d
1235 (D. Colo. 2005) (Civ. No. 03-WY-1712).
237. Id.
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federal agencies,"' along with Supreme Court cases denying review of
certain litigation decisions by the Attorney General.239 It also relied on
a case from the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, denying
review of the government's decision not to file certain tribal reserved
right claims in Idaho's Snake River Basin Adjudication. 4 °
The court rejected this argument in High Country Citizens'
Alliance. In denying the government's motion to dismiss, the court
noted that the Interior Department made the 2003 agreements, and the
Justice Department's subsequent motion to amend the claim in light of
the agreements could not insulate those actions from review. 24' The
court also noted that the law limits the Justice Department's discretion:
"Notwithstanding the 'plenary authority' of the Attorney General to
control litigation 'the Attorney General in representing a government
agency is bound by the same laws that control the agency.' 2 12 In its
decision on the merits, the court brushed aside this argument in the
context of the NEPA claim,243 concluding that the government was
merely "labeling" the 2003 agreements as a litigation decision:
"Defendants cannot shield their conduct from review or from the ambit
of NEPA simply because [they] have advocated their position in water
court."244

The "litigation decision" argument won the day, however, in a case
involving the government's decision not to assert Winters claims on
behalf of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes in an Idaho adjudication.245
The District of Columbia Circuit relied not only on the statute (28
U.S.C. § 516) and cases giving the Justice Department general control
of government litigation,2 46 but also on the leading Supreme Court case
interpreting the "committed to agency discretion" provision of the
APA.247 In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court held that an agency's
refusal to take enforcement action was presumptively unreviewable
238. Federal Defendants' Opening Memorandum, supm note 88, at 23 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 516 (2007)) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation
in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party . .. is reserved to
officers of the Department ofJustice, under the direction of the Attorney General.").
239. Id.(citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (decision involving
criminal proceedings) and Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977) (decision involving
Voting Rights Act)).
240. Id at 24 (citing Shoshone Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476 (D.C. Cir.
1995)).
241. Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supa note 179, at 16.
242. Id. at 16-17 (quoting Executive Bus. Media, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 3 F.3d 759,
761-62 (4th Cir. 1993).
243. Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 179, at 29 (citing 28
C.F.R. § 61.4 to support argument that its actions were not subject to NEPA because of a
Justice Department regulation stating that Justice. Department litigation actions were
not "major federal actions" within the meaning of NEPA).
244. High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1246 n.3 (D.
Colo. 2006).
245. Shoshone Bannock Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
246. Id. at 1480-81.
247. Id. at 1481 ("The circumstances [of this case] resemble, in many respects, those

of Heckler v. Chaney... in which an agency refused to enforce its regulations.").
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because such decisions are ordinarily committed to agency discretion.24
The District of Columbia Circuit stated that the Heckler Court's reasons
for denying review "fully apply to this case" 49 where the Justice
Department had declined to file water right claims in a state
proceeding. "Courts are ill-equipped to evaluate the factors that go into
a decision not to bring suit or to enforce regulations."2 50 The court
noted, however, that under Heckler, even a non-enforcement decision
could be reviewable if Congress had "provided meaningful standards
for defining the limits" of an agency's enforcement discretion. 25' The
Shoshone-Bannock Tribe could point to no law limiting the exercise of
the Attorney General's discretion in the context of that case, however,
review of the government's
so it failed to rebut the presumption against
252
decision not to file water right claims.

Shoshone-Bannock might appear to suggest that decisions
regarding reserved right litigation are committed to agency discretion,
but for purposes of reviewability there is a crucial difference between
settling a claim, and declining to file a claim. The former involves a
specific action by the agency-an agreement to resolve a claim on
specific terms-whereas the latter is a refusal to act.25 3 Section 706(1)

of the APA allows a court to "compel agency action unlawfully
withheld," 254 but the plaintiff carries a heavy burden in such a case; the
Supreme Court has stated that "a claim under § 706(1) can proceed
only where a plaintiff asserts that a [federal] agency failed to take a
Thus, the
discrete agency action that it is required to take. 255
Shoshone-Bannock court correctly evaluated the relevant treaty, statute,
and other sources of law to determine if they required the government
to file certain claims on the Tribes' behalf. A final settlement, however,
would be reviewable under § 706(2) of the APA, allowing a court to
"hold unlawful and set aside agency action" 25 6 on any of several
grounds.257 This distinction appears to be the pivotal difference
between Shoshone-Bannock, in which the court denied judicial review
of the Attorney General's decision, 258 and High Country Citizens'
Alliance, in which the court held that the 2003 Black Canyon
248. Hecklerv. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
249. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 56 F.3d at 1481.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.at 1483-84.
254. A court may also compel action "unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1)
(2006).
255. Norton v. S.Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004).
256. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).
257. For example, a court may set aside agency action that it finds contrary to statute,
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (C), or "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not

in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A).
258. The court held that because no existing law required the government to file
these particular claims on behalf of the Tribes, "judicial review of the Attorney
General's decision is consequently unavailable

Reno, 56 F.3d 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

....

"

Shoshone Bannock Tribes v.
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agreements constituted reviewable agency actions.25 9
In a reserved rights adjudication, most of the government's
actions-including the filing, defense, and proof of its claims-may
appropriately be viewed as litigation decisions. For several reasons,
however, final reserved rights settlements should generally be regarded
as final agency actions subject to federal judicial review. First, the
government's decision to settle a reserved right claim does not so much
involve the conduct of litigation as the conclusion of it; even though
every decision regarding the claim will involve the same complex
judgment calls about the likelihood of success, a settlement represents a
final resolution of a reserved right, and can therefore be evaluated on
its substantive (not merely tactical) merits.
Second, while the Justice Department handles federal litigation, it is
the management agencies (e.g. the National Park Service or the U.S.
Forest Service) that are responsible for stewardship of the lands and
waters within their jurisdiction. 60 Under the "litigation decision"
theory, however, the Justice Department would have absolute and
unreviewable discretion over all reserved water rights that have not yet
been quantified. Alone or in collusion with the management agencies,
the Justice Department could either settle or dismiss all pending
reserved right claims on any terms whatsoever, depriving federal lands
of water rights, absolving management agencies of any duties regarding
those water rights, and effectively abrogating the Winters doctrine.
That kind of wholesale surrender of reserved rights is unlikely, to say
the least-but if all final settlements were within the absolute discretion
of the government, such an action would be entirely unreviewable in
the federal courts26 ' , casting doubt on the validity of that position.
Third, a government decision to settle its reserved water right claims
is very different from an agency decision not to bring an enforcement
action, as in Heckler. If an agency refuses to bring an enforcement
action in a particular situation, a violation may go unremedied and a
violator may escape sanctions, but neither the law nor the agency's
authority has changed: the agency may take action against the next
similar violation, or the next transgression by the alleged violator.262 A
reserved right settlement, by contrast, means that the federal
government's legal interest in water-its entitlement to obtain water in
satisfaction of the specific purposes for which Congress or the President
designated that land-are finally and permanently fixed. 263 Even if the
government made a mistake in pursuing its reserved water rights, it
ordinarily cannot go back and obtain a reserved right to water for
additional purposes, or additional water for the original purposes; the

259. High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1249 (D. Colo.
2006).
260. SeeS. Utah Wilderness Aliance, 542 U.S. at 66-67.
261. See High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1249-50.
262. Hecklerv. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985).
263. See Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 56 F.3d at 1479.
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2"
decreed water rights are resjudicata.
Given that a reserved rights
settlement carries serious consequences that are both legal and eternal,
any uncertainty as to the reviewability of the government action should
be resolved in favor of allowing review.

2. Final agency action
When a federal agency strikes a deal with adjudication parties
regarding its reserved water rights, and agrees to settle its claims
according to that deal, it has almost certainly taken an "action" for
purposes of judicial reviewability. The APA defines "agency action"
through a list, which "includes the whole or a part of an agency rule,
order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or
failure to act;"265 several of these terms are similarly "defined."266 Exactly
how a particular water rights settlement
would fit this definition may
267
depend on the terms of the agreement.
As the Supreme Court has stated, however, "The bite in the phrase
'final action' ... is not in the word 'action,' which is meant to cover
comprehensively every manner in which an agency may exercise its
power. It is rather in the word 'final'.... 2 6 8 In order to qualify as
"final," agency action must "mark the consummation of the agency's
decisionmaking process, and must either
determine rights or
269
obligations or occasion legal consequences."

In most cases, a settlement of federal reserved water rights would
clearly meet this standard for finality, even though the settlement would
still require the approval of the state adjudication court. The agency
completes its decisionmaking process-in this case, negotiations with
other parties to the adjudication of the agency's claim-when the
264. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 135, 145 (1983). This same argument
would apply equally to a decision not to assert reserved water right claims in a pending
adjudication. In holding that the government's refusal to assert certain tribal reserved
rights was unreviewable, the D.C. Circuit appears not to have considered this point.
Instead, the Court's analysis focused on whether the Attorney General had a specific,
nondiscretionary duty based on treaty or statute to assert certain claims requested by the
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes. Based on its review of the relevant law, the court found
none. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 56 F.3d at 1481-84.
265. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2006).
266. For example, the definition of "sanction" has seven subparts, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (10),
and the definition of "relief" has three, 5 U.S.C. § 551(11), including agency
.recognition of a claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption, or exception." 5 U.S.C. §
551(11) (B).

267. Typically, these settlements will not only recognize and quantify a reserved water
right, but will also subordinate that right to existing. private water users, giving them
greater security in times of shortage than the law would otherwise provide. See infra
note 358 and accompanying text. By giving this kind of preferred position to other
water users, the agreement evidently would fit the APA definition of "relief," which
includes agency recognition of an "immunity, privilege, exemption, or exception." 5
U.S.C. § 551 (11)(B). A reserved right settlement might also qualify as an order, which
the APA defines in almost catchall terms as "a final disposition . . .of an agency in a
matter other than rule making .... " 5 U.S.C. § 551(6).
268. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001).
269. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 483 (2004) (internal
quotations omitted).
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agency signs an agreement specifying terms of the settlement. The
agency certainly intends the agreement to determine rights and
obligations of the parties-that, of course, is the whole point of the
deal-although no rights will be final until the state adjudication court
approves the settlement. Upon approval, however, the reserved rights
as provided in the agreement would become resjudicata, effectively
mooting any challenge in federal court.270 A settlement pending
judicial approval has legal consequences because it represents a
conclusive, specific determination of the reserved rights from the
standpoint of the adjudication parties, at the latest stage where a2 federal
71
court could still review its legality and provide meaningful relief.
A reserved right settlement might not qualify as final agency action
if Congress must approve it before it can take effect. Unlike tribal
reserved right agreements, however, federal reserved right settlements
do not typically require Congressional action to become effective.'2 72
B. RIPENESS

Even if an agency action is final and the APA does not preclude
review, a court may still deny review if it determines that the case is not
ripe. 273 In evaluating ripeness, a federal court must assess "both the
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties
of withholding court consideration." 274 Determining fitness of the
issues for judicial review involves two questions: whether further factual
development would assist the court in deciding the matter, and whether
judicial review at this stage
would "inappropriately interfere with further
275
administrative action.
Once an agency has reached a final settlement of a reserved right
claim, the matter would appear ripe. Regarding fitness, there is no
obvious reason why the issues would not be ready for judicial review.
Once all the parties have reached an agreement, there is neither the
need, nor the opportunity, for further factual development: the agency
has made a final decision regarding its reserved right claim, and the
only question is whether that decision is legally sufficient. 276 Nor is it
270. The Colorado water court and Supreme Court both emphasized this point in
deciding that it was appropriate to stay the water court proceeding to quantify the Black
Canyon reserved right, pending the outcome of the federal court challenge to the 2003
agreements. See supm notes 259, 264 and accompanying text.
271. High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1249 (D. Colo.
2006).
272. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
273. E.g., Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 810-12
(2003) (denying review of the final Department of the. Interior rule for lack of
ripeness); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 478-80 (concluding that the final agency action was
subject to and ripe for review).
274. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 479 (2001) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
275. Id.
276. See United States v. Braren, 338 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2003). Ripeness seems
much more doubtful at stages before final settlement, including the filing of reserved
right claims by the government. If the United States were to file a claim that could be
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likely that review would interfere with agency action, given that the
agency has concluded negotiations and reached a final agreement
regarding its claims. Finally, plaintiffs seeking federal judicial review of
a reserved right settlement could argue persuasively that they would
suffer irreparable harm if a court denied review, because if the state
adjudication court approved the settlement and entered a final decree,
the reserved right would be resjudicata as decreed. The Colorado
Supreme Court recognized this potential harm in upholding the water
court's stay of proceedings on the Black Canyon reserved right,
pending the277 outcome of the federal court case over the 2003
agreements.

One might argue that federal judicial review of a final settlement
might not inappropriately interfere with the agency's work, but that it
would interfere with the ongoing state court adjudication. Although
not based on the Supreme Court's factors for assessing ripeness, this
argument finds some support in the Ninth Circuit's decision in United
278 In Braren, the
States v. Braren.
government and the Klamath Tribes
sought federal review of the State of Oregon's proposed standard for
quantifying certain tribal reserved rights in the Klamath Adjudication,
arguing that the standard was contrary to an earlier Ninth Circuit
decision establishing the existence and purposes of those rights.279
Because the federal courts left the quantification of the tribal rights to
the state adjudication, however, the Ninth Circuit held in Braren that
the challenge to Oregon's proposed standard was not ripe
0 for review,
and would not be so until the adjudication was complete.
Braren, however, does not resemble a case challenging a final
settlement of a reserved water right. First, and crucially for purposes of
judicial review under the APA, that case involved a statement by Oregon
officials, not federal agency action.28 ' Second, the standard at issue in
Braren was preliminary; it had not yet been adopted within the
adjudication, and the water rights that would be affected by it were still

challenged as substantively inadequate-if, for example, the government claimed an
amount of water that was arguably insufficient to satisfy the purposes of the federal
reservation-one could argue that a federal court should review the claim, because it
would effectively put a ceiling on the amount of water that the reserved right would
receive through the adjudication. At this early stage, however, a court certainly could
conclude that further factual development (through the adjudication process) would
aid its determination, and that review of the agency's decision in filing the claims could
interfere with the agency's work, including negotiations that could lead to settlement.
The filing of reserved right claims has practical consequences, but it seems likely that
judicial review of the agency's actions at this stage would be available only upon final
settlement. "A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not
directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action." 5
U.S.C. § 704 (2007).
277. In re Application for Water Rights of the United States, 101 P.3d 1072, 1081
(Colo. 2004).
278. Braren, 338 F.3d at 972-73.
279. Id. at 975-76.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 973.
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far from a final determination.2 82 Finally, unlike a challenge to a federal
agency decision settling a federal water claim, the issue in Braren was
whether a federal court would order state officials to apply a certain
standard in their adjudication. 83 In short, neither Braren nor the
Supreme Court's ripeness factors suggest that a final settlement of a
federal reserved water right would be unripe for judicial review. 2 4 The
implications of federal review for the state proceeding are more
appropriately considered in the context of abstention.2 85
C. COLORADO RIVER ABSTENTION

In its 1976 ColoradoRiver decision,8 6 the Supreme Court fashioned
a new doctrine of abstention to apply to a case involving a jurisdictional
dispute over federal and tribal reserved right claims. The Court
concluded that these claims fell within the jurisdiction of the Colorado
water courts under the McCarran Amendment, 287 as well as the United
States district courts. 288 In determining whether the district court
properly dismissed the government's reserved right claims in favor of a
water court proceeding,289 the Court noted the "virtually unflagging
obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given
them," 290 and stated that a federal court should defer to a concurrent
state proceeding only in "limited" and "exceptional" circumstances.291
The Court nonetheless held that dismissal of the federal case was
appropriate based on several factors, primarily what the Court called
the McCarran Amendment's
clear policy to avoid piecemeal litigation
293
of water claims.
In Arizona v. San CarlosApache Tribe, a case involving solely tribal

282. Id. at 975-76.
283. Id. at 972.
284. See id at 975-76. This conclusion may not hold for tribal reserved right
settlements, given that they typically do not become effective until ratified by certain
legislativebodies: Congress, the legislature of the affected state, and the government of
the tribe whose rights are being determined. See Klee et al., supra note 227, at 607.
Here again, the need for legislative approval does not fit cleanly within any of the
ripeness factors as stated by the Supreme Court. But as the debate over the reserved
right shifts from the courts to the legislatures, a court weighing a challenge to the
settlement might believe that it should defer consideration of the matter to the various
legislative bodies, and should direct opponents of the settlement to raise their concerns
in the legislative process.
285. See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1400,1404 (1983).
286. See Colo. River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805-06, 814-16
(1976).
287. Id. at 809-12.
288. Id. at 806-09 (stating that district courts have original jurisdiction of civil suits
brought by the United States).
289. Id. at 803-06 (explaining the history of the case).
290. Id. at 817.
291. Id. at 818.
292. Most of these factors were specific to the ColoradoRiver litigation, including the
lack of activity in the federal case, the number of Colorado defendants involved, and'
the 300-mile distance between the federal and state courts. Id. at 820.
293. See id. at 819.
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claims, the Supreme Court applied Colorado River and again found
that dismissal of federal proceedings was appropriate.2 94 The Court
held that McCarran (which says nothing about tribal water rights) had
conferred jurisdiction on state courts to adjudicate reserved right claims
asserted by tribes, 295 even upon states whose Enabling Acts appeared to
give them no authority. regarding tribal property. 21 Once again, the
Court gave controlling weight to McCarran's underlying policy, both in
determining the existence of state court jurisdiction,2 97 and in holding
that the federal courts
should step aside in favor of state adjudication of
1
298
reserved right claims.
These two Supreme Court cases strongly discourage concurrent
federal and state proceedings to determine reserved water rights, but
Colorado River abstention simply does not apply unless there is
concurrent jurisdiction over the federal claims. 299 The Supreme Court
stated in San Carlos Apache that it was "clear in [this case], as it was in
Colorado River, that a dismissal or stay of the federal suits would have
been improper if there was no jurisdiction in the concurrent state
0 Federal
actions to adjudicate the claims at issue in the federal suits."'O
courts clearly have jurisdiction over reserved right claims;..the major
question is whether state courts can also assertjurisdiction. In these two
cases, the Court read McCarran broadly to allow state courts to
adjudicate the full range of federal and tribal claims.
McCarran's waiver of federal sovereign immunity, however, extends
only to suits "for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river
294. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 545-547 (1983).
295. Id. at 561, 563-64.
296. In this case, the Enabling Acts of both Arizona and Montana seemed to limit
state authority over tribal rights. See id. at 556-59. Rather than analyze the meaning of
these specific provisions, the Court held that McCarran had conferred jurisdiction over
tribal claims on state courts regardless of the language of a particular state's enabling
act. Idat 563-64.
297. The Court believed that the policy of McCarran (as explicated in Colorado
River) would be undercut if certain states could adjudicate tribal water right claims and
others couldn't, based purely on the language of their state enabling statutes. The
Court believed this result would be contrary to Congress' intent in enacting McCarran:
The Amendment was designed to deal with a general problem arising out of
the limitations that federal sovereign immunity placed on the ability of the
States to adjudicate water rights, and nowhere in its text or legislative history
do we find any indication that Congress intended the efficacy of the remedy to
differ from one State to another.
Id. at 564.
298. After acknowledging the strength of the United States' and tribes' arguments
against dismissal of the federal case, the Court responded that "the most important
consideration in any federal water suit concurrent to a comprehensive state proceeding,
must be the 'policy underlying the McCarran Amendment."' Id. at 570 (quoting Colo.
River, 424 U.S. at 820).
299. See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 819.
300. San CarlosApache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 559-60.
301. The Court held in ColoradoRiver that McCarran had not stripped the federal
courts ofjurisdiction over reserved right claims. Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 807-09 (The
federal statute providing jurisdiction in that case was 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2006)). Other
claims involving federal law may be heard under the general federal question
jurisdiction statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
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system or other source.., or [ ] for the administration of such
rights..."3o2 Under McCarran, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
an adjudication in state court can obtain jurisdiction over federal and
tribal reserved right claims because those claims will determine "rights
to the use of water."303 However, a challenge to a federal agency's
decision to settle a reserved right claim would fall outside the McCarran
Amendment; the case would determine the legality of the agency
action, not the existence and terms of a water right, leaving a state court
with no jurisdiction over the matter.
Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to agency
action brought under the APA. Section 702 of the APA establishes a
right to judicial review3 4 for certain kinds of cases against federal
agencies and officials, 3 5 and provides for such cases to be brought "in a
court of the United States." 306 In rejecting state court jurisdiction over
the United States Environmental Protection Agency, in a case
challenging an order issued under the Clean Water Act, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 702 is expressly limited to
actions brought "in a court of the United States False" The legislative
history demonstrates that section 702 was not intended to effect a
waiver of sovereign immunity for suits against the United States or its
officers in state courts. "The consent to suit is also limited to claims in
the courts of the United States; 30 hence,
the United States remains
7
immune from suit in state courts."
The Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged the exclusive
jurisdiction of federal courts over APA claims in upholding the water
court's stay of proceedings to quantify the Black Canyon water rights
following the 2003 agreements. 3 8 The court rejected the argument
that the water court was a proper forum for determining whether the
government complied with federal law in reaching those agreements,
stating that McCarran "is not so broad that it allows state courts to

302. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1) (2006).
303. San CarlosApache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 550-51.
304. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). The section is headed "Right of Review," and its first
sentence reads, "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof." Id.
305. Section 702 states that:
An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money
damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof
acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority
shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is
against the United States ....
5 U.S.C. § 702.
306. Id.
307. Aminoil U.S.A., Inc. v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 674 F.2d 1227, 1233
(9th Cir. 1982); see also 91 C.J.S. United States § 235 (2009).
308. In re Application for Water Rights of the United States, 101 P.3d 1072, 1080
(Colo. 2004).
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evaluate or adjudicate the federal agency decision making processes"
relating to the disputed agreements. 3°9 The court also noted that the
federal challenge to the settlement would have a different focus and
different outcome than the water court adjudication: "[t] he federal case
will decide whether the United States' amended application complied
with the applicable federal law, and the state case will quantify the
reserved water right.""'
Dissenting from the Colorado Supreme Court's holding, Justice
Hobbs admitted that challenges to agency action under the APA are
"normally an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction. "31 He laid out the
best available argument for state court jurisdiction: that the challenge to
the 2003 agreements was really a claim that the Black Canyon was
entitled to more water than it would receive under those agreements,
that the federal plaintiffs were thus effectively seeking partial
quantification of the reserved right in federal court, and that the water
court was the proper forum for quantification. 312 "Although the claims
in the federal suit are styled as [APA] claims," Justice Hobbs wrote, "in
essence they challenge the exercise and scope of discretion in federal
313
agencies administering their water rights under state and federal law."
Because the federal claims really concerned quantification and
administration of the Black Canyon reserved right, in his dissenting
view, McCarran brought them within the jurisdiction of the water
court.31

4

The dissent correctly observed that the federal APA claims related
to the quantity, priority, and administration of the Black Canyon
reserved right. 31 5 In essence, the plaintiffs argued, and the court later

held, that the 2003 agreements violated federal law by protecting too
little water under the park's decreed 1933 priority, leaving the necessary
peak and shoulder flows to a vaguely defined 2003 water right held by
the State of Colorado. 31 6 The question is, does an APA claim-otherwise
exclusively federal-fall under state jurisdiction simply because it has
implications for a reserved right claim? Justice Hobbs answered yes in

the Black Canyon case based on his
view that McCarran confers very
7
broad jurisdiction on state courts.3

For several reasons, however, APA claims should not be subject to
state court jurisdiction even though they relate to a reserved right claim
subject to a state adjudication. Neither the statutory text nor the
Supreme Court caselaw supports the view that McCarran confers
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 1072, 1086 (Hobbs, J., dissenting).
312. Id.at 1084-85.
313. Id.at 1086.
314. The dissent suggested that McCarran gave the water court authority "to decide
all factual and legal issues involved" in the 2003 agreements, including "review of the
decision making of those officers and agencies regarding" the agreements. Id.
315. Id
316. Id. at 1083-84.
317. Id. at 1072, 1086 (Hobbs, J., dissenting).
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jurisdiction over any issue relating to a reserved right. According to
Justice Hobbs, 'The McCarran Amendment expressly provides for the
state court to decide all factual and legal issues affecting the
quantification and administration" of a federal water right." 8 But the
statute expresses no such thing, providing only that the United States
may be joined in any suit for the adjudication of water rights from a
particular source, or for the adjudication of such rights." 9 And
although the Supreme Court has referred to McCarran as "allinclusive, "32 that statement relates specifically to the various kinds of
water rights subject to the statute.3 21 For example, the Court has held
that state courts have jurisdiction over the full range of federal and
tribal water right claims,3 22 not that a state proceeding has jurisdiction
over any issue relating to a claimed right.
While it may be difficult to draw a precise line separating an
exclusively federal APA claim from a reserved right claim subject to
McCarran, that line surely exists. In other words, a federal claim cannot
be subject to state jurisdiction merely because it has some connectionno matter how attenuated-to a reserved right. Consider another
unlikely hypothetical: the government files federal bribery charges
against a private water user because he allegedly offered to pay off a
federal wildlife refuge manager if she would agree123to settle for a smaller
reserved right in an ongoing state adjudication.
Few would suggest
that the federal criminal charge would be subject to the adjudication,
even though it involves an effort to influence a federal water claim. But
the defendant would presumably like to have the local water court hear
the case, and he would have a credible argument if McCarran actually
did empower the state court "to decide all factual and legal issues
affecting the quantification and administration of the right."324 Thus, at
some point, a water-related claim must be so far removed from water
right adjudication that it falls outside of McCarran and becomes an
improper subject for the water court.
One final point is extremely important: a successful APA case
against a federal agency's settlement of reserved rights would not result
in the rights being determined or quantified in that case, as they would
be in an adjudication. Both the federal and state courts involved in the
Black Canyon dispute stressed this fact in rejecting the argument that
318. Id.at 1086.
319. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2007).
320. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 810 (1976).
321. McCarran confers state court jurisdiction in water right adjudications 'where it
appears that the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water
rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise." 43
U.S.C. § 666(a).
322. E.g., Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 553, 563-64 (1983)
(tribal reserved rights asserted by tribes on their own behalf); Colo. River, 424 U.S. at
805, 808-09 (tribal reserved rights asserted by the United States); United States v. Dist.
Ct. of County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520 (1971) (federal reserved rights).
323. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
324. See In reApplication for Water Rights of the United States, 101 P.3d 1072, 1086
(Colo. 2004) (HobbsJ., dissenting).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 13

the federal lawsuit improperly intruded on the water court's domain.
In refusing to dismiss the APA action, the federal court wrote that the
water court proceeding would determine the precise quantity of water
needed to satisfy the purposes of the Black Canyon right under the
1978 decree, whereas the federal case
seeks review of federal administrative decisions for compliance with
various provisions of federal law, including federal statutory mandates
to preserve the environment of the Black Canyon. This Court has
exclusive jurisdiction over claims which challenge federal
administrative decisions and are brought pursuant to the judicial
review provisions of the APA. Plaintiffs are not asking this court to
determine the exact flow characteristics necessary to comply with the
federal mandates. Instead, if this Court finds Defendants have violated
the APA, this Court would order that Defendants' April Agreement
and July MOA be remanded with instructions that they reformulate
their management of the Black Canyon to comply with federal
mandates. Therefore, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction since it is
not holding parallel proceedings as the issues are not substantially
.the
25
same and thus, do not fall under the McCarran Amendment.
The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that because the federal
case could not and would not quantify the water right, the water court
did not abdicate its jurisdiction in staying its consideration of the Black
Canyon claim.326 Further, the court emphasized that the results of the
federal case would not be resjudicatain the water court quantification
proceeding, in which water users "may still argue that the purposes of
the United States' reservation of the Black Canyon are narrow, 'and
that
27
purposes.
those
satisfy
to
adequate
is
water
of
amount
a modest
These courts were correct in finding exclusive federal jurisdiction
over APA claims that would address the legality of federal agency action,
but would not finally determine any aspect of a federal water right. This
distinction provides a practical, objective, and legally sound basis for
determining when a challenge to a reserved right settlement is within
state court jurisdiction: if deciding a federal claim would conclusively
28
establish the existence, priority, purposes, or quantity of a water right
subject to a state adjudication under McCarran, the claim falls under
state court jurisdiction. Otherwise, the claim must be heard in federal
court in accordance with the usual rule of exclusive federal jurisdiction
over APA claims.
In sum, a challenge to a federal agency's final settlement of its
reserved right claims ordinarily should qualify for federal judicial
review, consistent with the results in the Black Canyon cases. That legal
conclusion, however, raises new questions about the practical and policy

325. Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 179, at 16.
326. In re The Application for Water Rights of the United States, 101 P.3d at 1084.
327. Id.
328. The Black Canyon cases focused only on this last element, quantification,
because the 1978 water court decree already established the existence, priority, and
purposes of the park reserved right. See supra notes 308-24.
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implications of federal judicial review of such settlements. The next
section addresses these implications.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RESERVED
RIGHT SETTLEMENTS
In High Country Citizens' Alliance, environmental plaintiffs
obtained federal judicial review of a partial settlement of federal
reserved water rights subject to a state adjudication, and they convinced
the court to overturn the settlement and remand the matter to the
Interior Department. 29 The court's decision revealed that a federal
judicial forum is potentially available for APA claims relating to agency
decisions on reserved rights, and the previous section of this article
concluded that final settlements of federal claims should indeed be
reviewable in federal court. 30 Assuming that conclusion is correct, what
might this new opportunity for federal review mean for reserved water
rights, which for three decades have been determined almost entirely in
the context of state proceedings? This section contends that federal
review of final settlements would have very limited impacts on reserved
right litigation, but may have greater effects on efforts to resolve
reserved right claims through negotiated settlements.
A. LIMITED EFFECTS ON LITIGATION OF RESERVED RIGHT CLAIMS

Given the long-running jurisdictional battles between western states
and water users on one side, and the United States government and
tribes on the other,3 1 one might expect the prospect of a federal
judicial forum for reserved right issues to provoke great concern and
great excitement, respectively, in these two camps. Three years after
the court's decision in High Country Citizens' Alliance, however, the
issue has received little attention.3 2 This absence of reaction suggests
that federal APA review of settlements would have fairly minor
implications for reserved right litigation, and a review of the relevant
law brings up several reasons why that is almost certainly true.
First, and most obviously, McCarran and the applicable Supreme
Court cases are still in effect. Reserved water right claims remain
subject to state court jurisdiction, and federal courts are still
encouraged to abstain from hearing such claims in favor of state
adjudication proceedings. Thus, the federal government is no freer to
pursue determination of its reserved right claims in federal court; to the
contrary, the federal forum is available only to someone who sues the
329. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
330. See supia notes 328-28 and accompanying text.
331. See supranotes 286-320 and accompanying text.
332. As of late March 2010, the High Country Citizens' Alliance decision had been
cited in no cases-only a few treatises, three journal articles, and a handful of briefs and
motions. Westlaw.com, Citing References for High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F.
Supp.
2d.
1235
(D.
Colo.
2006),
http://web2.westlaw.com/Find/default.wl?bhcp= 1&cite=448+F%2ESupp%2E2d+1235
&rs=LAWS2%2E0&strRecreate=no&sv=Split&vr=1%2E0 (last visited March 20, 2010).
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government seeking APA review of a final agency action, i.e., a
settlement agreement.
Second, federal review of settlements does not change the
substantive law that determines federal water right claims. Reserved
rights have always been a matter of federal law, even when they are
adjudicated in state courts-a point made repeatedly by the Supreme
Court.333 Moreover, federal judicial review of state court reserved right
decrees has always been available in the U.S. Supreme Court. While
such review has been quite rare in practice, 334 the Court gave a stern
reminder in Arizona v. San CarlosApache Tribe that state courts do not
have the last word in determining reserved water rights: "any state-court
decision alleged to abridge Indian water rights protected by federal law
can expect to receive, if brought for review before this Court, a
particularized and exacting scrutiny commensurate with the powerful
federal interest in safeguarding
those rights from
state
encroachment."33' 5 Given this established potential for Supreme Court
review of final state decrees, federal district court review of final
settlements is not such a dramatic development.
Third, federal APA review of settlements is likely to appeal primarily
to a fairly narrow group of entities: those who are interested in water
use, but do not hold or claim water rights. Water users claiming rights
under state law may oppose settlement of the reserved rights, but
because they likely are parties to the state adjudication, they already
have a forum that is more familiar, and perhaps friendlier, than the
federal district court. 36 They may be able to object to settlement during
the negotiation process, and if the reserved right is settled despite their
337
concerns, they certainly can argue against approval in the water court.
Federal APA review, however, may open the door to certain entities that

333. After holding that federal courts in Arizona and Montana should abstain from
hearing tribal reserved right claims in favor of state adjudications, the Court stated:
"We also emphasize, as we did in ColoradoRiver, that our decision in no way changes
the substantive law by which Indian rights in state water adjudications must be judged.
State courts, as much as federal courts, have a solemn obligation to follow federal law."
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983); see also Colo. River
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976); United States v. Dist. Ct.
of County of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 526 (1971).
334. The last two Supreme Court cases deciding federal (non-tribal) reserved right
claims on the merits were United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) and
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 128-29 (1976). The last tribal reserved right
decision was the Supreme Court's 4-4 split in Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406,
406 (1989) (affirming the reserved right decree of In re General Adjudication of All
Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988)).
335. San CarlosApache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 571.
336. 1 do not mean to suggest that water users might not also sue in federal court to
block a settlement. Irrigators have certainly sued under the federal environmental laws
in other contexts, especially those involving project operations by the Bureau of
Reclamation. See, e.g., Westlands Water Dist. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 376 F.3d
853, 855 (9th Cir. 2004); Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Or. 2001).
337. See Thorson et al., supra note 10, at 409-10 (describing adjudication courts'
criteria and procedures for evaluating settlements, and noting that Arizona and
Montana courts both assess fairness and reasonableness of agreement).
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have little or no opportunity to affect the adjudication. 3 s The most
obvious beneficiaries are environmental groups (as in High Country
Citizens' Affiance), but others may include river-dependent businesses
(such as fishing lodges or commercial rafting companies), local
governments, or others who have a stake in water, but no rights of their
own.
Fourth, while opponents of reserved right settlements should be
able to have their claims heard in federal court, they typically will find
these cases hard to win. One problem is that the plaintiffs will be
attacking a negotiated settlement, which the government will certainly
argue is the best available compromise, one which provides adequate
water for the purposes of the reserved right while also protecting
existing water users and other interests. 33 9 To the extent that a wide
range of stakeholders had access to the negotiation process, and the
resulting agreement demonstrably addresses a wide range of interests,
this "great compromise" argument should be all the more
persuasive.3 ° Moreover, a federal court reviewing an agency decision
regarding the management and protection of resources overseen by
that agency would appear to owe at least some deference to that
decision.3 4' It is hard to saysay which is the proper level of deference for
an agency decision to settle a reserved right claim, 42 although sliding338. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
339. For example, in High Country Citizens' Alliance, the government argued
strongly that the 2003 agreements were "a creative solution to meeting multiple needs,"
and represented the best approach to protect the Aspinall Unit as well as the Black
Canyon, for water on the Gunnison River. High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton,
448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1243 (D. Colo. 2006).
340. The argument failed in High Country Citizens' Alliance, where the agreement
was the product of closed-door negotiations between the federal and state governments.
See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text. The court stated that it was not lear
who had participated in the settlement talks. High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F.
Supp. 2d at 1241. However, the Colorado Supreme Court made a point of noting that
the environmental plaintiffs in the federal case "were not invited to participate in any
negotiations" leading up to the 2003 agreements. In reApplication for Water Rights of
the United States, 101 P.3d 1072, 1076 (Colo. 2004).
341. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-35 (2001), explains the Supreme
Court's approach to judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of its governing
statute. In short, an agency's decision qualifies for strong judicial deference under
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), if
it appears that that Congress gave the agency authority to make binding law through
that type of decision, and that the agency exercised that authority on this occasion.
Mead,533 U.S. at 229, 234-35. An agency decision not qualifying for Chevron deference
may still receive a weaker form of deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134 (1944), whereby the degree of a court's deference depends on the overall
persuasiveness of the agency's decision in light of various factors. Mead, 533 U.S. at
227-28, 234-35.
342. A recent case involving a water allocation settlement decision by the Army Corps
of Engineers illustrates the challenge of determining the right form of deference. See,
e.g., Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Geren, 514 F.3d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The
States of Florida and Alabama challenged a settlement whereby the Corps allocated to
public water supply a certain percentage of the water stored in one of its reservoirs. Id.
at 1318. In determining whether the settlement violated any of the Corps' governing
statutes, the majority of the court of appeals stated that Chevron deference would apply,
never explaining why it was appropriate. Id. at 1321. A concurring opinion by Judge
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scale deference under Skidmore v. Swift 4" seems most appropriate.3'
One thing is clear however: no form of deference will save a settlement
if the court believes that the agency has clearly violated its governing
statutes,345 as in High Country CitizensAlliance.3"

Finally, even if the plaintiffs succeed in their APA challenge to a
reserved right settlement, they will have won an important battle, but
not the war. The court will not issue an order definitively establishing
the existence or elements of the reserved right; instead, the likely
remedy is a remand to the agency.3 7 Nothing prevents the agency from
reaching a new settlement agreement that is better supported than the
original, but is not more palatable to the plaintiffs. In fact, a simple
remand would leave the agency free to forsake the settlement process
entirely, and pursue confirmation of its reserved right claims through
the state adjudication-which may or may not be a good outcome for
the federal plaintiffs, depending upon their goals regarding the
Silberman, however, denied any deference to the agency because the settlement was
merely a litigating position. Id. at 1327. Judge Silberman also cited United States v.
Mead, however, a case indicating that at least Skidmore deference would be
appropriate. Id. The lack of clarity on this point in a decision by the D.C. Circuit-no
stranger to review of all manner of agency actions-shows the difficulty in resolving this
question of deference for litigation settlements.
343. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
344. Mead supports this conclusion. See supra note 341.- As the Court noted in that
case, the great majority of its decisions giving Chevron deference involve agency
decisions made through rulemaking or formal adjudication, Mead, 533 U.S. at 230,
neither of which is involved in reserved right settlements. In fact, reserved right
settlements do not arise from any federal administrative process, but from negotiations
conducted in connection with a state adjudication; thus, there is no agency proceeding
through which Congress intended the agency to have lawmaking authority. See supra
notes 269-69 and accompanying text; see Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-30. Finally, like the
Customs rulings at issue in Mead, a reserved right settlement does not establish
precedent or apply beyond the right(s) involved that agreement, id. at 233, meaning
that the agency's decision is not intended to make generally applicable law. Even if
Chevron does not apply, however, Mead indicates that a reviewing court generally
should consider whether to accord deference to the agency's decision under Skidmore.
Id, at 234-235. Given the variable nature of Skidmore deference, it is difficult to say how
much weight a court might give to any particular settlement decision.
345. Southeastern FederalPower Customers,Inc., illustrates this point well. In that
D.C. Circuit case involving a Corps of Engineers water allocation settlement, the
majority and concurring opinions disagreed not only about the level of deference to
give the settlement, see supra note 342, but also about the proper baseline for
evaluating the effect of the proposed allocation. Se. Fed. Power Customers, Inc., 514
F.3d at 1324, 1327. Despite these differences, all three judges had little trouble
agreeing that the settlement violated the statute, 43 U.S.C. § 390b(d), prohibiting the
Corps from making major operational changes at a project without first obtaining
Congressional approval. Id. at 1324-25, 1327-28.
346. See supra notes 168-204 and accompanying text. The opinion in High Country
Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, essentially gave Skidmore deference to the settlement
decision, stating that in evaluating the agencies' "informal interpretation of the statutes
governing the administration of the Black Canyon, this Court must consider the agency
interpretation to the extent that the interpretation is well reasoned and has a power to
persuade." High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1251 (D.
Colo.2006).
347. See, e.g., High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1253 (remanding
the Black Canyon reserved right matter to the agency "for further proceedings
consistent with this decision").
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reserved right.
This last point raises the issue of the potential impacts of federal
judicial review on future efforts to settle reserved water rights. These
settlement implications are the subject of the next subsection.
B. EFFECTS OF REVIEWABILITY ON SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
Because negotiated settlement has become the preferred approach
to resolving reserved right claims, 48 federal judicial review of such
settlements may have significant practical impacts on the future
determination of federal claims. Given that every reserved right claim
presents a unique situation, it is impossible to predict how the potential
for federal review might affect any given one of them. Each claim has
its own legal strengths and weaknesses, its own perceived costs and
benefits for local and state residents, and its own array of opponents
and supporters; 9 these site-specific and right-specific circumstances will
determine how the possibility of federal review might influence any
particular settlement effort. That caveat will prove more universally
true than any of the following general observations on the implications
of reviewability for settlements.
The most immediate effect of potential federal review should be an
infusion of influence for those entities that lack water rights, but are
interested in the reserved water right at issue, such as environmental
groups, water-dependent business owners such as rafting companies,
and recreators such as anglers or birders. Despite their strong interest
"in maintaining adequate water for their preferred uses, such entities
have typically been either foreclosed from participating in state
adjudications or prevented from raising issues that could have helped
their cause.350 Unlike the water right holders involved in the
adjudication, many such entities may support the federal claim and seek
to have it quantified at a relatively high level, although that is not
necessarily true. 5'

Because they have had little or no power to affect

state adjudications, such entities may have held little or no sway over
reserved right negotiations in the past. As potential plaintiffs in a
federal court challenge to a settlement, however, they are far more
likely to be taken seriously, and they may even gain a seat at the
negotiating table.

348. See supranotes 58-63 and accompanying text.
349. See Amman et al., supra note 61, at 44 (describing successful settlement of
various National Park Service reserved right claims in Montana, and explaining how
settlement of a claim was affected by legal issues, local economic and political factors,
and potential effects of the right on existing and future uses of water).
350. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text; see also Idaho Conservation
League v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 749-50 (Idaho 1995) (affirming that the public trust
doctrine applies to Idaho water rights, but is not an issue to be considered in an
adjudication).
351. It is not hard to imagine a group of citizens that would lack water rights but
oppose a federal reserved right because of how it might affect them; for example, a
group of landowners downstream of the federal reservation could be concerned that
high flows might result in flooding of their property.
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The prospect of federal judicial review may also strengthen the
negotiating position of those who support recognition and adequate
quantification of the subject reserved right. Opponents of the reserved
right have always had an advantage in negotiations because if talks
failed, the right would be adjudicated solely in state court, 35 2 where
federal reserved right claims have often fared poorly.2 Given the
354
choice between a weak settlement and a politically adverse state court,
the federal negotiators may choose the settlement despite its terms;
whatever else may be said about the settlement, it offers a predictable
outcome and an ability to publically declare a positive result. If a
federal court can review the settlement for its consistency with federal
law, however, the government (and others who support the claim)
should have a stronger basis for insisting that the settlement be
demonstrably adequate for protecting the purposes of the federal
reservation.
If these effects come to pass-that is, if the prospect of federal
review of settlements increases the influence of those lacking water
rights, and strengthens the negotiating position of those supporting. the
federal claim-the result should be better balanced and more durable
settlements. A final resolution of water rights that is manifestly
inequitable or that fails effectively to protect important public values in
the water resource, will not necessarily provide long-term certainty and
stability.355 An agreement that leaves a strongly interested group
352. A state court adjudication decision regarding a reserved right is subject to
federal review only in the unlikely event that the Supreme Court agrees to take the case.
See supa notes 333-34 and accompanying text.
353. See Janet C. Neuman & Michael C. Blumm, Water for NationalForests: The
Bypass low Report and the GreatDivide in Western Water Law, 18 STAN. ENvrL. L.J. 3,
9-11 (1999) (describing Colorado courts' rejection of instream flow claims for national
forest lands); see also Blumm, supra note 32, at 177 (explaining and analyzing the
Idaho Supreme Court's rejection of reserved water rights for instream flows, especially
for wilderness areas).
354. State water politics arguably resulted in an Idaho Supreme Court decision
denying a federal reserved right claim, and in the re-election defeat of an Idaho
Supreme Court justice who originally cast the deciding vote in favor of recognizing the
federal right. See Blumm, supra note 32, at 178-210. Blumm concludes that the Idaho
decision will be remembered for the point "that political expediency is always a factor in
decisions of state court judges who are subject to reelection." Id. at 226. In another
article, Colorado Supreme Court Justice (and water law expert) Gregory Hobbs draws
parallels between the Idaho judicial election and an earlier one where a Colorado
Supreme Court justice had been defeated for voting in favor of the federal government
in a water rights case. Judge Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., State Water Politics Versus an
IndependentJudiciary:The ColoradoandIdaho Experiences,5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
122,123 (2001).
355. The Carson-Truckee basin of Nevada may provide the best example of a "final"
water rights decision yielding ongoing controversy and instability. The U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Nevada v. United Staes, 463 U.S. 110 (1983) barred the Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe from obtaining reserved water rights to restore the Pyramid Lake
fishery, seemingly blocking the Tribe from obtaining additional water for this purpose.
Michael C. Blumm, David H. Becker, & Joshua D. Smith, The Mirage of Indian
Reserved Water Rights and Western Streamflow Restoration in the McCarran
Amendment Era: A Promise Unfuldiled, 36 ENvTL. L. 1157, 1191 (2006). "Despite this
apparently crushing setback, over the past twenty years the tribe has successfully used
Nevada state water law, water quality litigation, and pressure based on the [Endangered
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unsatisfied and determined to undo the deal is likely to face ongoing
turbulence.3 5 6 As Professor Cosens notes, "The fairness of the
negotiation process requires attention to inclusion of a widening circle
of interests. People with direct interests in water must be represented at
the table .... Durability of the outcome requires that the process and
solution be comprehensive by including all interests and all relevant

issues. ,,37
Obviously, not everyone would regard these potential developments
as positive, and this fact raises one further possible effect of federal
review: discouraging some parties from pursuing settlement at all.
Western states and traditional water users, in particular, may decide that
they would sooner litigate federal claims in state court than pursue
multi-party negotiations that could result in a federal court case.3 58 The
prospect of bigger, more complex negotiations that would presumably
be longer, and more difficult, may also cause some parties to question
the settlement path. Thus, subjecting settlements to federal judicial
review seems likely to result in litigation of some federal claims that
otherwise might have settled.35
Counterbalancing these concerns,
Species Act listings of Pyramid Lake fish species] to secure additional instream flows in
the Truckee River and into Pyramid Lake." Id. Congress also passed a statute in 1990
that helped the Tribe make progress toward its restoration goals. Id, at 1192, (citing
Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101618, tit. II, 104 Stat. 3289 (1990)).
356. For example, the Animas-La Plata Project, a proposed reservoir in southwestern
Colorado, was included in a 1988 tribal water rights settlement. Thorson, supra note
10, at 461. "An excruciating five years followed, in which A-LP was downsized and
reconfigured. Groups not involved in the original negotiations, environmentalists and
the Navajo Nation, proved to be formidable opponents as their previously left out or
discounted interests had to be taken into account by project developers." Id. at 462.
According to the authors of a study on adjudications, the Animas-La Plata story shows
that "if a settlement does not include all affected parties, there may be impacts on the
non-represented parties. Unrepresented parties give rise to due process concerns, and
those parties may challenge the legitimacy of such settlements." Id. at 479.
357. Barbara Cosens, Water Dispute Resolution in the West: ProcessElements for the
Modern Era in Basin-Wide Problem Solving, 33 ENVrL. L. 949, 1017-18 (2003). "People
with an interest in the effect of water use on the basin community must also have an
opportunity for comment at a time in the negotiation process when solutions are still in
the design phase." Id. at 1017.
358. Even without the prospect of federal review, some opponents of reserved rights
would rather take their chances in state court than agree to recognize federal claims.
See Steven W. Strack, Pandora'sBox or Golden Opportunity? Using the Settlement of
Indian Reserved Water Right Claims to Affirn State Sovereignty Over Idaho Water and
Promote IntergovernmentalCooperation,42 IDAHO L. REv. 633, 636 (2006) (describing
the State of Idaho's rationale for settling tribal reserved right claims after those claims
had been rejected by the Idaho adjudication court). The court made its decision in
response to "critics of the settlement [who] argue that the settlement agreement cedes
too much to the Tribe." Id. at 650. The court also noted that some people "asserted that
the State had snatched defeat from the jaws of victory." Id. at 670.
359. While it is reasonable to expect that some federal claims will not settle because
of the prospect of federal court review, it is impossible to say whether litigating those
claims would produce better or worse results (as compared to settlement) from the
standpoint of the federal government and its allies. As noted earlier, settlements have
routinely subordinated the reserved right to all established uses of water. See supra
note 63 and accompanying text. Subordination is a major concession that protects
existing water users at the expense of federal interests. Even a modern-day water right,
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however, are powerful reasons why negotiation is superior to litigation
as a means for resolving water disputes,36 including the uncertainty of
litigation outcomes,"' the high cost of litigation for all parties involved,
and the flexibility of settlements in addressing each party's key
concerns. Thus, while the prospect of federal review of settlements may
make negotiations less attractive for some, and may well make
agreements harder to reach, it seems likely that settlements will remain
the preferred approach for resolving reserved right claims.362
36 3
The Black Canyon story, although unusual in one key respect,
illustrates how federal judicial review might play out in future efforts to
settle federal reserved rights. The 2003 agreements, produced through
closed-door negotiations among government officials, were challenged
in federal court;364 the plaintiffs were environmental groups who had

not been included in the settlement process, and who saw the
agreements as giving away water needed by the park.3 65 The federal
court closely reviewed the government's decision for compliance with
federal law, determined that the government violated the law, and
invalidated a locally popular settlement-all without fear of political

however, ordinarily should provide better protection than no water right at all, which is
what the United States might obtain if a state court litigates its claims. See supra notes
354-55 and accompanying text. The extent to which a subordinated right is actually
better than nothing depends on various site-specific factors, including the practical
likelihood of increasing water demands that would reduce flows to the federal lands,
and the chances that such demands would actually obtain all state and federal approvals
needed to allow for the new or increased water use. Thus, even assuming a worst-case
legal scenario where a federal claim is forced into litigation and entirely denied by a
state court, it is impossible to say whether the foregone settlement would be much of a
loss in practical terms.
360. Cosens summarizes these reasons as "(1) the inadequacy of litigation for
resolution of resource allocation problems, (2) ability to use the factual complexity of
water supply and demand to expand availability and protection of the water resource,
and (3) the need for participation by a broader range of interests." Cosens, supra note
357, at 962; see generally Barbara Cosens, 2005 Indian Water Rights Settlement
Conference Keyote Address, 9 U. DENV.WATER L. REv. 285, 286 (2006) (describing
reasons why settlements are superior in tribal reserved rights context).
361. See generallyBarbara Cosens, Truth or Consequences. Settling Water Disputes
in the Face of Uncertainty, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 717 (2006) (providing a thorough
examination of the effect of legal (and scientific) uncertainty on settlement of certain
water right claims of the Nez Perce tribe).
362. After noting a trend toward settlement of reserved right claims for non-Indian
federal lands, the authors of a water law text wrote:
As court decisions provide a better fix on the contours of these rights, federal agencies
assemble the information necessary to quantify them, states discover what little threat
many of these rights pose to state water right holders, and all continue to suffer from
the expense and length of adjudications, the settlement fever is likely to spread. SAX,
supra note 60at 815.
363. That one respect is the 1978 partial decree that determined the existence,
purposes, and priority date of the Black Canyon reserved right, leaving quantification as
the only issue. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text. Without that earlier
decree the parties would have had more issues to negotiate (or litigate), perhaps
making settlement less likely.
364.. High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1241-43 (D.
Colo. 2006).
365. Id.at 1235, 1242-43.
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repercussions. 366 The parties did not resort to litigation in response to
this decision, but instead engaged in negotiations involving a wide
range of groups interested in the Black Canyon water right.3 6v These
talks produced a new settlement agreement that all parties could live
with and that resulted in an uncontested decree, thus finalizing a
reserved right that had been pending in the water court for more than
three decades.368 Thus, in the Black Canyon context, federal judicial
review of the original agreement led to a better process and a better
result.
CONCLUSION
The Black Canyon experience suggests that federal review of
settlements may offer real benefits for the successful negotiation and
resolution of reserved water rights. While the Black Canyon provides a
useful case study, however, the argument for federal judicial review of
reserved right settlements ultimately comes down to good government.
In other words, review of settlements can help address some
fundamental design flaws in the way that the executive and judicial
branches handle federal reserved water rights.
Federal judicial review provides the only real check on a federal
agency's ability to essentially give up reserved rights through settlement,
to the benefit of private water users and the detriment of the public.
This kind of federal action has not traditionally been the greatest policy
concern with respect to reserved rights; western states and water users
have feared just the opposite, an imperious federal government that
would attempt to nationalize water resources at the expense of state
control. 369 The Supreme Court's decisions in Colorado River and
United States v. New Mexico, giving state courts control over reserved
right litigation and prescribing a narrow legal standard for determining
reserved rights, 3v0 provided a powerful and demonstrably effective check
against federal overreaching. Federal judicial review provides the only
corresponding check on federal "underreaching," or giveaway of water
associated with unquantified reserved rights-as the plaintiffs alleged
(and the court effectively agreed) took place with the 2003 Black
Canyon agreements. 371 One can argue that the 2003 agreements were
not in fact a giveaway, or that federal agencies are very unlikely to
"underreach" in settling their reserved rights, but it is difficult to
366. Id. at 1250-53. Judge Brimmer was uniquely unconcerned with Colorado water
politics, unlike a state judge who might fear the electoral consequences of voting the
wrong way in a major water case. See supra note 354. Not only was Judge Brimmer an
Article III judge with a lifetime appointment, but he was also a District of Wyoming
judge sitting by designation in Colorado. Judgepedia.org, Clarence Brimmer, available
at http://judgepedia.org/index.php/ClarenceBrimmer (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
367. Jaffe, supra note 222.
368. See id.
369. See Thorson, supranote 10, at 310, 323.
370. See supranotes 294-98 and accompanying text.
371. See High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1252-53
(D. Colo. 2006.
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maintain that anything would effectively prevent the government from
doing so in the absence of federal judicial review of settlements.
A more basic problem, however, is reliance on courts as the
exclusive forum for making long-term decisions about water issues of
great public interest and importance. Water is a public resource, both
by nature and, in the western states at least, by law.372 Because the
western states have established proprietary rights to use water, however,
this public resource is largely viewed and managed as private
property;3 73 this tendency is strongest in the context of state
adjudications, where the courts have sometimes acknowledged the
public aspects of water but held them to be irrelevant to the
determination of previously established water rights.

374

This exclusion

of public interest factors is particularly inappropriate for federal
Winters claims, which are about as public as water rights can get, in that
they involve water for public lands designated by the government for
public purposes such as national parks and forests.3 75 To the extent that
state adjudications prevent effective participation by those who have an
interest in water but no proprietary rights to it,

76

they effectively

discriminate in favor of established water users, as though the only
important consideration for reserved right claims were their potential
impacts on private rights. Closed-door negotiations involving only
government actors may lack this members-only favoritism, but they too
deny the interested public a meaningful opportunity to influence
decisions on reserved rights that have major public importance.
Providing federal review of reserved right settlements obviously will
not directly solve this 'judicial forum" problem. If it merely shifts the
action temporarily from state to federal court, it will perpetuate the
problem; if it forces more reserved rights to be litigated in state
adjudications rather than settled, it will exacerbate it. Federal judicial
review can help move decision-making in the right direction, however,
by encouraging a more accessible and inclusive process for resolving
disputes over reserved rights. Specific recommendations for design and

372. This idea appears in some form in the constitutions and/or the water codes of
the western states that allocate water based on prior appropriation. See, e.g., IDAHO
CONST. art. XV, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(3); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-1 (West 2009);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 537.110 (West 2009).

373. See, e.g., People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979) (reaffirming that
Colorado constitutional provision declaring water to be property of the public, subject
to appropriation, was primarily intended to establish appropriation doctrine and gave
no right to public access on Colorado waters).
374. See, e.g., Wash. Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1053 (Wash. 1993)
(holding that environmental factors cannot be considered in determining water rights
in adjudication); Idaho Conservation League v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho 1995)
(holding that the public trust doctrine applies in Idaho but cannot be considered in
adjudication of water rights). But see San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 972 P.2d 179,
199 (Ariz. 1999) (striking down statute attempting to prevent consideration of public
trust doctrine in adjudication, and stating that courts would have to decide whether
public trust doctrine was applicable on the facts).
375. High Country Citizens' Alliance, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1237-39.
376. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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implementation are beyond the scope of this article,377 but at a
minimum, the process must be open to the full range of stakeholdersthose with water rights and those without-and their interests in the
waters at issue. Providing an opportunity for public comment during
the course of the negotiations would be one positive step. 378 A further
step would be to allow interested groups to participate directly in
reserved right negotiations, such as the multi-party talks that ultimately
settled the Black Canyon reserved right.3

79

In the end, a judicial decree

will still be necessary to confirm the reserved water right; the question is
whether the process leading up to that decree properly takes account of
public interests and concerns relating to the right.
As the court stated in High Country Citizens' Alliance, "A decision
to enter into agreements which permanently give up a priority to a
resource which must be 'saved for all generations' must be made in
public view and not behind closed doors with the public's interest in
mind."38 The decision in that case led to a process in which more
people had a say in determining the reserved right for Black Canyon
National Park, resulting in a stronger agreement for the waters of the
Gunnison River. By recognizing a right to judicial review of agency
decisions to settle reserved rights, the federal courts may extend that
opportunity to more people and more waters in the West.

377. A fairly detailed set of recommendations for resolving basin-wide water disputes
(including but not limited to reserved rights) may be found in Cosens, supra note 357,
at 1007-18.
378. The Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission provides
opportunities for public comment as it negotiates on federal and tribal claims, and may
seek revisions to an agreement in response to public comment. See Amman et al.,
supra note 61, at 41. Of course, public comment may favor or oppose recognition of a
particular reserved right. Id. (noting strong opposition to Yellowstone National Park
reserved rights by a local chapter of People for the West!, but "generally positive"
reaction to Glacier National Park reserved rights in the local area).
379. See supranotes 363-67 and accompanying text.
380. High Country Citizens' Alliance,448 F. Supp. 2d at1245-46.
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INTRODUCTION
In Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation District v. Trout Unlimited
("Pagosa IT'), the Colorado Supreme Court rejected the argument that
governmental entities act in a legislative capacity when they make
conditional water right appropriations; thus, the courts do not owe
deference to these governmental agencies for the claimed amounts of
water the agencies deem reasonably necessary for their future use.'
Prior decisions acknowledged that courts should defer to a
municipality's "managerial judgment" and the courts "should not
intrude their own opinions to override the studied good-faith opinions
of governmental agencies as to future needs of the public for facilities
or commodities."2 Despite this longstanding recognition for the need
for flexibility in municipal water supply planning, the Colorado
Supreme Court narrowly construed the limited governmental agency
exception to the anti-speculation doctrine in order to meet Colorado's
"maximum utilization and optimum beneficial use goals." 3 The court
concluded that governmental agencies' conditional appropriations are
not immune from judicial review under the proceedings and standards
of the Water Rights Determination and Administration Act.4 However,

the court's conclusion arguably clashes with the General Assembly's
statutory exemption from the anti-speculation statute.5 Furthermore,
the conclusion clashes with a governmental agency's legislative
discretion, which law-makers recognize in a wide range of other
matters, including ratemaking, annexation, and the exercise of police
powers, such as decisions related to public safety, zoning, and the
promotion of aesthetic values. Courts should be sensitive so as not to

1. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa I), 219 P.3d
774, 788 (Colo. 2009). PagosaHIis the second in a series of two consecutive cases with
Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d 307
(Colo. 2007) (en banc) as the first. In Pagosa I, the Colorado Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether a one hundred year planning horizon for a new
conditional appropriation is inherently speculative. Id. at 313. The court held that a one
hundred year planning horizon period was speculative and adopted a three-part test for
determining whether a governmental agency has an intent to make a non-speculative
conditional appropriation of unappropriated water. Id. at 313, 320. The court

remanded the case to the water court, which, after additional fact-finding, entered a
modified decree. Pagosa II, 219 P.3d at 776-77. This decree gave rise to an appeal to
the Colorado Supreme Court, resulting in PagosaII Id.
2. City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 840 (Colo. 1939); Metro.
Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 365 P.2d 273, 289
(Colo. 1961).
3. Pagosa1, 219 P.3d at 317.
4. See id.at 314 n.6, 320.
5. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103 (3) (a) (I) (2009).
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"inappropriately infringe on the water management decisions of...
municipal water officials;" these decisions are just as or more important
than other decisions that governmental agencies make for which they
exercise legislative discretion.
This article examines whether the Colorado Supreme Court
usurped the discretion that governmental agencies exercise when the
court held, in PagosaII, that governmental agencies must prove specific
elements and factors when adjudicating new municipal water right
appropriations. Examining the development of the great and growing
cities doctrine as adopted in City & County of Denver v. Sheriff
('Sheriff), this article next explores the evolution of Colorado's antispeculation doctrine and its growing tension with the great and growing
cities doctrine. The article then reviews the Colorado Supreme Court's
decisions in Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited
("Pagosa f') and Pagosa Area Water & Sanitadon Dist. v. Trout
Unlimited ("Pagosa If') and the new municipal planning standards the
court adopted. Ultimately, against this extensive background, the
article argues that the Colorado Supreme Court has infringed on the
legislative discretion of governmental agencies by specifically requiring
the water courts to assess the reasonableness of certain "factors"
historically reserved for government decision-making.

I.
A.

GREAT AND GROWING CITIES DOCTRINE

THE DENVER WATER BOARD AND THE MOFFAT WATER TUNNEL

Pursuant to the 1919 conditional water right statute,7 the Denver
Water Board filed a petition with the Grand County District Court to
adjudicate its claim for the maximum amount of water (1,280 cubic feet
per second ("cfs")) that could be carried from a collection system on
the Fraser River through the 10.5 foot pioneer bore of the Moffat
Railroad Tunnel for municipal and irrigation purposes.'
6. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Dist., 926 P.2d 1, 52-53 (Colo. 1996) (en
banc).
7. In 1919, the General Assembly required adjudication of all water rights in order
to establish the rights' priorities and enforce them. HAROLD H. ELLIS & MEYERJ. PETER
DEBRAAL, WATER RIGHTS INTHE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 472 (2004). An uncompleted

appropriation was styled a "conditional" decree. City & County of Denver v. Colo. River
Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 730, 745 (Colo. 1985) (en banc).
8. Amended Statement of Claim at 3, Fraser River Diversion Project, No. 657 (Dist.
Ct. Colo., July 13, 1937). Denver's 1937 amended statement of claim described the
Moffat Water Tunnel as a constructed tunnel with a diameter of 10.5 feet and a carrying
capacity of 1,280 cfs. Id. The amount claimed for beneficial use was also 1,280 cfs even
though only 600 cfs had been diverted. Id. at 10. Denver claimed that the City and
County of Denver had a population of 300,000 persons and was constantly growing. Id.
at 14. In order to provide sufficient water for its growing needs, Denver asserted that it
was necessary that the construction of the Denver Municipal Water System provide a
greater supply of water than needed for immediate use by its inhabitants. Id. at 15-16.
Consequently, it was the custom of the City and County of Denver to lease water it did
not need for immediate use to other water users including irrigation. Id. at 16.
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Through the decree, the trial court imposed restrictive conditions to
prevent any sale, lease, or alienation of Denver's South Platte River
water. 9 This guarded "against the City of Denver going into the
business of selling water or disposing of a part or all of her present
water rights and substituting the water acquired
or to be acquired in
10
this proceeding for her present water supply.
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court struck this provision. It
confirmed that Denver's South Platte River water rights are property
rights and held:
If the city, for some legitimate reason, desired to abandon or sell any
of its Eastern Slope water, it would, by so doing, and under these
restrictions, jeopardize its water rights on the Western Slope. The
furnishing of an adequate supply of water to 350,000 people requires
managerial judgment and involves an ever-changing problem. To so
freeze and straight-jacket the city's Eastern Slope water rights, by the
restrictions involved here would be an arbitrary invasion of vested
property rights of the city.
Further, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that only courts
that had originally adjudicated Denver Water Board's South Platte River
water rights have jurisdiction to construe or modify Denver Water
Board's South Platte decrees."2 Thus, the court concluded that a trial
court on the western slope of Colorado did not have jurisdiction to
13
impose the restrictions on Denver's South Platte River water rights.
Finally, the court held:
[a]fter the water had been applied beneficially by the city, as the court
found relative to the 335 cubic feet, it became the property of the city

of Denver, and any such water for which there may at any given time in
the future be no immediate need, may be temporarily leased by the
city, in accordance with [section 31-35-201 of the Colorado Revised

9. See City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 839 (Colo. 1939). The
offending provision stated: "Any waters decreed herein, whether decreed therefore
[sic] to be for direct flow or for storage, and whether the said decree be absolute or
conditional, be diverted, taken and used as supplemental to the decreed water rights
now belonging to claimant, which said decrees are from the waters of the natural
streams of the State of Colorado and that the said claimant be required to satisfy its
needs for waters from said existing decrees owned by it before it shall be held to require
or need waters herein decreed or shall be entitled to take the same. That the waters
herein decreed shall be held by the said claimant as a water supply supplemental to its
present supply of water available under water decrees which the said claimant now holds
and to be used only to the extent necessary to fill the needs and requirements of the
claimant for municipal purposes, after it has made full and economical use of the waters
available to it under water decrees now owned by it." Id.
10. Id. at 840.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 841.
13.

Id.
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Statutes] 14
As to the contention that Denver Water Board had no immediate
need for the water, the Colorado Supreme Court established what
became the "longstanding" 15 great and growing cities doctrine:
The concern of the city is to assure an adequate supply to the public
which it serves. In establishing a beneficial use of water under such
circumstances the factors are not as simple and are more numerous
than the application of water to 160 acres of land used for agricultural
purposes. A specified tract of land does not increase in size, but
populations do, and in short periods of time. Wth that flexibility in
mind, itis not speculation but the highestprudenceon the part of the
city to obtain appropriations of water that will satisfy the needs
resulting from a normal increase in population within a reasonable
period of time.16
Inherent in this doctrine is the principle of economies of scale.
Rather than continually building new pipes and conduits each time a
demand comes on the system, one may size the pumps and pipelines at
17
As
State
the time of design to accommodate future growth.
8
doctrine?
the
describes
Deptartmentof Ecology v. Theodoratus
The growing communities doctrine serves important functions. It
allows communities to secure a source of water to meet growing needs.
It also allows a community to construct a properly scaled water system
at the start rather than constantly expanding the system on a piecemeal basis to meet growing population. The realities of business life
and common sense come into play as well. The pumps and pipes
method "serves important purposes: it allows municipalities to
rationally plan and provide for future requirements."

... As a practical reality, it is impossible for a municipality simply to
tack on infrastructure and water rights year by year as its needs grow.
Instead, municipalities typically plan one or two decades ahead, or
more. The infrastructure required to serve a city cannot gradually be
sized up. Pipes, treatment facilities and other components must be
sized at the time of design to meet growing needs over time. Likewise,
in order to carry out its responsibility to its citizens, the city must
acquire water rights of sufficient size to meet those growing demands.
for a growing
Waiting until the last minute to acquire water rights
1
community would be the height of irresponsibility.0

14. Id. at 843.
15. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d
307, 314 n.6 (Colo. 2007) (en banc) (Coats,J., concurring).
16. Sheriff,96 P.2d at 841 (emphasis added).
17. State Dep't of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 957 P.2d 1241, 1258 (Wash. 1998)
(Saunders, J., dissenting) (discussing the "growing communities doctrine").
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1258. In Theodoratus,the issue was whether a vested water right could be
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THE DENVER WATER BOARD AND THE BLUE RIVER DIVERSION
PROJECT

In the 1942 Blue River adjudication in Summit County, Colorado,
the Denver Water Board claimed 1600 cfs of water from the Blue River
and its tributaries both for storage in Dillon Reservoir and direct
diversion through the twenty-three mile Roberts Tunnel, which conveys
water underneath the continental divide to the Denver Metropolitan
Area. 20 That water diversion discharges into the North Fork of the
South Platte River at the town of Grant, where the water flows to the
Denver Water Board's municipal intakes.2 '
Despite Denver Water Board's claim for 1600 cfs with a priority date
of March 21, 1914, the trial court awarded a conditional decree with an
appropriation date of June 24, 1946, for only 788 cfs. 22 The Denver
Water Board appealed, and on appeal the Colorado River Water
Denver's
protested
District") 23
("River
District
Conservation
appropriation claiming that the Denver Water Board had an adequate
supply of24 water and did not have an immediate need for the amount
In City & County of Denver v. Northern Colorado Water
claimed.
ConservancyDistrict("Blue River'), the Colorado Supreme Court held:
We cannot hold that a city more than others is entitled to decree for
water beyond its own needs. However, an appropriator has a
reasonable time in which to effect his originally intended use as well as
to complete his originally intended means of diversion, and when

appropriations are sought by a growing city, regardshould be given to
its reasonably anticipated requirements ....

Particularly is this true in

awarded based upon the capacity of a private developer's water delivery system, or
whether a vested water right could be obtained only in the amount of water actually put
to beneficial use. Id. at 1243. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
determination that a final certificate of water right must be based upon actual
application of water to beneficial use, not upon system capacity. Id. The supreme court
noted, however, that the appellant was a private developer with a finite development
and not a municipality. Id. at 1247. Yet, the same court also noted that the Governor
had vetoed 1997 legislation that would have allowed for a system capacity measure of a
water right for public water supplies that fulfill municipal water supply purposes. Id.
This decision resulted in uncertainty to cities that held water certificates based upon
system capacity rather than actual use. In reaction to this decision, Washington's
General Assembly passed a comprehensive bill clarifying the nature of water rights for
municipal supply purposes that, in part, grandfathered existing water certificates based
upon system capacity and did not limit the measure of a municipal water right if it had
an approved municipal water plan. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.330 (2009). In 2006,
the statute was challenged as unconstitutional. Lummi Indian Nation v. State of
Washington, No. 06-2-40103-4 (Sup. Ct. Wash., June 11, 2008) petition for cert. Filed
The trial judge determined that certain provisions were
(No. 81809-6).
unconstitutional and the appeal is pending. Id.
20. City & County of Denver v. N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. (Blue River), 276
P.2d 992, 995-97 (Colo. 1954).
Reservoir,
Water,
Dillon
Denver
21. See
http://www.denverwater.org/Recreation/Dillon/ (last visitedJan. 30, 2010).
22. Blue River, 276 P.2d at 996.
23. A water conservation district created under COLO. Rrv. STAT. § 37-46-101 (2009).
24. Blue River, 276 P.2d at 997.
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25
considering claims for conditional decrees.

Dismissing the River District's argument, the court found that both
parties presented witnesses "as to Denver's future water requirements,"
and although they "were not in agreement, there was substantial
evidence to support a finding of future need for water from the Blue
River within a reasonable time." 26 The court concluded that "[t]his
[was] amply confirmed by the City's rapid subsequent growth."27
C.

THE EAGLE RIVER APPROPRIATIONS

In the 1950s, the Colorado Supreme Court adhered strictly to the
great and growing cities doctrine in cases regarding governmental
In Metropolitan
agencies appropriating future water supplies:
Suburban Water Users Ass'n. v. Colorado River Water Conservation
District ('Metropolitan Suburban'), the Colorado Supreme Court
found that the trial court inappropriately overrode the "studied goodfaith opinions of governmental agencies as to future needs .... "when it
denied various governmental agencies' claims for water for future use.
In September of 1956, the Metropolitan Suburban Water Users

Association ("Association"),29 the cities of Aurora and Colorado Springs
which are located adjacent to and south of Denver respectively,
petitioned the District Court of Eagle County to adjudicate pending
claims for water rights in Water District 37.3' These parties all claimed
conditional water rights to divert waters of the Eagle River through the

After the
Homestake Tunnel to the Arkansas River Basin.31
supplemental general adjudication commenced, the River District filed
a claim on November 14, 1956, for the Red Cliff Project, which
consisted of a system of reservoirs, ditches, power conduits, and other
facilities that would divert water on the Eagle River and its tributaries,
In January 1957, the Denver Water
including Homestake Creek.32
Board filed a claim to divert waters of the Eagle River through the
proposed Vail'Pass Tunnel to Dillon Reservoir, a storage reservoir that is

25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Metro. Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo.River Water Conservation Dist., 365
P.2d 273, 289-90 (Colo. 1961).
29. The Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Association was a private nonprofit
corporation formed by John P. Elliott to acquire, own, purchase and sell water rights
associated with his original filings for the proposed Homestake Project. See DAVID F.
JOHN P. ELLIOTr, OWEN MOORE, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF
METROPOLITAN WATER USERS ASSOCIATION (May 16, 1956); Test. John. P. Elliott, In the

LAWRENCE,

Matter of the Adjudication of Water Rights in District 37, No. 1193 (Sept. 24, 1956)
(recounting John P. Elliott's involvement with water diversions for the Homestake
Water Project).
30. Metro. Suburban, 365 P.2d at 275. Former Water District 37 consisted of all
lands lying in the state of Colorado irrigated by water taken from the Eagle River and its
tributaries. COLO. REV. STAT. §148-13-38 (1963).
31. Metro. Suburban, 365 P.2d at 275.
32. Id.at 276.
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part of the Roberts Tunnel Collection System.33 Additionally, in 1956,
the City of Pueblo filed a claim to divert Eagle River water to the
Arkansas River via the Otero Tennessee Pass Ditch.M
The River District opposed the claims of the Association, Colorado
Springs, Aurora, and Denver Water Board claiming that the
appropriations were speculative and not based on any reasonably
anticipated needs.35 With the exception of the City of Pueblo's claim,
the trial court denied the claims of the Association, Colorado Springs,
Aurora, the Denver Water Board, and the River District in part because
the projects were speculative.36
As to the Association's claim for the Homestake Project, the
Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court based upon Section 6,
Article XVI of the Colorado Constitution37 and the 1919 conditional
water right statute. 8 The Colorado Supreme Court found that in
planning for a reasonable municipal water supply, municipalities should
make provisions for an adequate supply in years of minimum runoff
and maximum consumption, which was the case during the drought of
1954. 39 As to the trial court's apprehension that the projects were
speculative, the Colorado Supreme Court again referred to the
safeguards in the 1919 conditional water right statute and Taussig v.
Moffat Tunnel Development Co.,40 that no final decree can be awarded

until the water is actually put to beneficial use.41 Based on the record
before it, the court further found that Aurora's current water supply
was "wholly inadequate to meet its present needs, most of which are
being supplied on a year-to-year basis by Denver."4 2 The court reasoned
that:
Denver can at any time refuse to renew its one-year contract and can,
33. Id. at 277.
34. Id. at 277-78.
35. Id. at 278.
36. Id. at 279-80.
37. Id. at 281. The Court relied on Section 6 art. XVI of the Colorado Constitution,
which provides in relevant part: "The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any
natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6
(emphasis added).
38. Metro. Suburban, 365 P.2d at 281-82, 284. The 1919 conditional water right
"if it shall appear that any claimant at said
statute provides in relevant part:
proceedings, or his predecessors in tide and claim, has prosecuted his claims' of
appropriation and the financing and construction of his enterprise with reasonable

diligence under all the facts and circumstances surrounding and bearing upon such
claim of appropriation, the district court shall enter a decree fixing and determining

the priority of right of each such partially completed appropriation as of the date from
which such reasonable diligence shall be shown to have been exercised, and fixing the
maximum amount of water which such claimant shall be entitled to divert under said
priority for the purpose of perfecting his said appropriation..." Id. at 281-82 (emphasis
added). See also Ellis & DeBraal, supra note 7, at 472.
39. Metro. Suburban,365 P.2d at 283.
40. See Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Development Co., 106 P.2d 363 (Colo.
1940).
41. Metro. Suburban,365 P.2d at 285

42. Id.at 283..
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even during the term of its contract, limit Aurora's supply if needed in
Denver. Aurora is at the mercy of Denver for its present water needs.
Testimony as to its probable enhanced future needs due to population
growth and increased per capita uses is convincing and
uncontradicted .
The court gave the City of Colorado Springs even greater leeway in
defining its need:
It is true that evidence with reference to the water needs of Colorado
Springs does not disclose as bleak a picture as that of Aurora.
However, it does disclose good reason for adding to its supply to guard
against shortages arising in dry years and in contemplation of
increased future needs. 44
On the River District's appeal regarding the trial court's denial of
the Red Cliff Project, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial
court and determined that the River District's act of filing a claim for
the Red Cliff Project and the River District's opposition to other claims
was sufficient due diligence to initiate the appropriation. 5 As to the
speculative nature of the River District's project, the Colorado Supreme
Court admonished the trial court for substituting its judgment for that
of those charged with the duty of supplying adequate water for
municipalities and other public bodies.4 6
Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court on the
Denver Water Board's claim for the extension of its Roberts Tunnel
Collection System. The court concluded that the trial court's findings
concerning the absence of proof of need and the speculative nature of
the project "are all matters of opinion and concerning which there
must be definite proof in the future. 4 7 Having stated this, the court
reiterated "courts should not intrude their own opinions to override the
studied good-faith opinions of governmental agencies as to future
needs of the public for facilities or commodities."'
In sum, a governmental agency could: (1) make an appropriation
based upon the maximum amount for its reasonably anticipated needs
including areas outside it boundaries; (2) lease surplus waters in excess
of its immediate needs outside its. municipal boundaries; and (3) base
its need for an appropriation on the need for an adequate supply in a
dry year such as 1954. In addition, courts gave deference to the
managerial judgment of these governmental agencies in their operation
of municipal water system. Then in 1969, things began to change.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 287-88.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 289.
Id.
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II. THE PRIVATE ANTI-SPECULATION DOCTRINE
A. THE WATER RIGHT DETERMINATION AND ADMINISTRATION ACT OF

1969.
In 1968, the Colorado Legislative Council directed the state division
of natural resources to study and draft legislation concerning the
following water matters:
To investigate relationships in the areas where intermingled surface
and ground water are commonly used in conjunction with each other
on the same lands, or lands immediately adjoining, for the same
purpose of irrigation; to determine the need for and content of
egislation that would provide for integrated administration of all
diversions and uses of water within the state; protect all vested water
rights, conserve water resources for maximum beneficial use, and
permit full utilization of all waters in the state...

The draft legislation was to be ready when the General Assembly
convened in January of 1969 because "the maximum use of water in the
state is the dominant factor for the future development of Colorado
and the solution of water matters is crucial to this end."5 '
In 1969, the General Assembly adopted the Water Right
Determination and Administration Act of 1969 ("1969 Act").5 1 The
1969 Act modified the method of adjudicating water rights,5 2 created
water courts,53 expanded the involvement of the state engineer in the
establishment and administration of water rights, 4 and most
importantly, articulated new policies 55to encourage the maximum
utilization of the state's scarce resources.
49. COLO. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED WATER LEGISLATION 1,
Research Publication No. 143 (1968).
50. Id. at 5.
51. Water Rights and Determination and Administration Act of 1969, ch. 373, § 1
(1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200) (1969 Act) (current version at COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92101 to -602 (2009).
52. See id. at 1207-08.
53. Id. at 1204.
54. Id. at 1216-18.
55. Id. at 1200. In PagosaI, the Colorado Supreme Court described the importance
of maximum utilization under the 1969 Act: "The public's water resource is subject to
maximum utilization, a doctrine intended to make water available for as many decreed
uses as there is available supply." Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout
Unlimited (Pagosa1), 170 P.3d 307, 313-14 (Colo. 2007) (en banc); COLO .REv. STAT. §
37-92-102(1) (a) (2009); see also Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden,
44 P.3d 241, 245 (Colo. 2002). "Within the priority system, maximum utilization
spreads the benefit of the public's water resources to as many uses as possible, within
the limits of the physically available water supply, the constraints of interstate water
compacts, and the requirements of United States Supreme Court equitable
apportionment decrees. In turn, the objective of maximum use administration, under
the prior appropriation system, is to achieve "optimum use" in every appropriator's
utilization of the water." § 37-92-501(2) (e). "[A]ll rules and regulations shall have as
their objective the optimum use of water consistent with preservation of the priority
system of water rights." Id. "Maximum utilization does not mean that every ounce of
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Under the 1969 Act, the General Assembly defined appropriation as
"the diversion of a certain portion of the waters of the state and the
application of the same to a beneficial use." 5 6 It defined beneficial use
as "the use of that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate
under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the
purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made. ... " The 1969
Act made no reference to "speculation," nor did it require proof of
specific factors for a municipal conditional water right.
B. THE HUSTONCASE: A PRECURSOR TO THE ANTI-SPECULATION
DOCTRINE.

In City of Thornton v. Bjou Iragation Co.,58 the Colorado Supreme
Court cited to Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler
Tunnel Company ('idler"), as the seminal case defining the antiInterestingly, the Vidler anti-speculation
speculation doctrine.5 9
doctrine could also have been named the Huston doctrine as the Court
issued both opinions within a span of one week. 60
At the end of the year 1978, John Huston, Allan Leaffer and
Wallace Yaffe ('Joint Venturers") and Nedlog Technological Group,
Colorado Pacific Energy and Colorado Pacific Aztec, and Bob Johnston,
Jr. filed over 100 separate applications involving claims for thousands of
wells and over twenty million acre-feet of underground water rights in
all seven water divisions in the state. 6' The Southeastern, Northern, and
Southwestern Water Conservation Districts, along with the State
Engineer, successfully petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to
consolidate the applications for determination of common questions of
law.62 The court assigned a special water judge to determine the
common questions of law including the threshold question of whether
63
non-tributary waters in Colorado are subject to appropriation.
Another question before the court was whether non-tributary waters
outside the boundaries of designated ground water basins could be
appropriated by persons having no property interest in the surface, or
Colorado's natural stream water ought to be appropriated; optimum use can be
achieved only through proper regard for all significant factors, including environmental
and economic concerns." Pagosa I, 170 P3d. at 314. See Alamosa-LaJara Water Users
Prot. Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914, 935 (Colo. 1983); see also James N. Corbridge,
Historical Water Use and the Protection of Vested Rights: A Challenge for Colorado
Water Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 503, 506 (1998) ("Part III reviews some of the principles
of water measurement in the context of maximum utilization of Colorado's water
resources.").
56. 1969Act, at 1201.
57. Id.
58. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 37 (Colo. 1996).
59. Colo. River Water Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Co., 594 P.2d 566
(Colo. 1979).
60. See Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Huston (Huston), 593 P.2d 1347,
(Colo. 1979) (issued April 16, 1979). See infra Part III.C
61. Huston, 593 P.2d at 1348-49.
62. Id. at 1348.
63. Id. at 1349.
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for use by persons other than the claimant or those whom the claimant
is authorized to represent. 64
As to the question whether the applications were speculative, the
Colorado Supreme Court remarked:
This court has held that a claim to surface water rights cannot be
predicated solely upon speculative purposes ....This court shortly will
announce its opinion inColoradoRiver Water ConservationDistrictv.

Vidler Tunnel Co., 594 P.2d 566, (1979), which deals with the
question. The water judge will have the guidance of those cases in
addressing the related question of whether non-tributary waters
outside the boundaries of a designated ground water basin can be
or others whom the
appropriated except for use. by the respondents
65

respondents are authorized to represent.
One week later, the Colorado Supreme Court issued the Vidler
decision.
C. THE VDLER DOCTRINE.
In 1975, Herbert T. Young's6 6 Vidler Tunnel Water Company
('Vidler") filed an application under the 1969 Act for a 156,238 acrefeet storage right for Sheephorn Reservoir on the Colorado River in
Gore Canyon near the Town of Kremmling.6 7 Vidler planned to use
2,000 acre-feet to irrigate lands it owned or leased; the City of Golden
64. Id.at 1349. In Colorado, there are four classes of water: (1) surface water and
hydraulically connected ground water, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(13) (2009); (2)
water within designated ground water, § 37-90-103(6) (a); (3) not-non tributary
groundwater, § 37-90-103(10.7); and (4) non-tributary groundwater, § 37-90-103(10.5).
Designated ground water is a statutory class of water that in its "natural course would
not be available to and required for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights, or ground
water in areas not adjacent to a continuously flowing natural stream wherein ground
water withdrawals have constituted the principal water usage for at least fifteen years
preceding the date of the first hearing on the proposed designation of the basin, and
which in both cases is within the geographic boundaries of a designated ground water
basin." COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-103(6) (a) (2009).
65. Huston, 593 P.2d at 1354 (emphasis added).
66. In the late forties, Herbert T. Young, geologist, miner and water entrepreneur,
discovered a partially completed but abandoned railroad tunnel that ran from the
headwaters of Leavenworth Creek above Georgetown to the headwaters of Peru Creek,
a tributary to the Snake River, in Summit County. HERBERT C. YOUNG, UNDERSTANDING
WATER RIGHTS AND CoNFLcTs, About the Author (2d ed. 2003). He bought the mining
claims, completed construction of the tunnel in 1968, and built a water collection
system on tributaries of Peru Creek to import water through the Vidler Tunnel to the
Front Range. Id. In 1973, Vidler Tunnel Water Company received a conditional water
right for importations through the tunnel into the headwaters of Clear Creek for
domestic, agricultural, industrial and municipal uses in the Front Range. Colo. River
Water Conservation District v. Vidler Tunnel Co. (Vidler), 594 P.2d 566, 566-67 (Colo.
1979). In 1979, notwithstanding the "longstanding view" against speculation, Water
Court Judge Lohr approved and decreed this claim. Id. at 567. In 2000, the City of
Golden acquired the Vidler Tunnel water rights. City of Golden, Vidler Tunnel and
Collection System, http://www.ci.golden.co.us/Page.asp?NavID=680 (last visited Feb. 8,
2010). Yet, the Company's application in 1975 for Sheephorn Reservoir on the
Colorado River made Vidler a familiar name.
67. Vidler, 594 P.2d at 567; YOUNG, supra note 66, at About the Author.
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had an option to purchase 2,000 acre-feet with a right of first refusal for
an additional 3,000 acre-feet, all conditioned on the success of the
project. Vidler planned to sell the remainder of the yield to various
Front Range municipalities based upon studies of future need in the
Front Range. 68 Notwithstanding the lack of any committed end use for
the water on the Front Range, Water Division No. 5 District CourtJudge
George Lohr granted a conditional water storage decree for the
appropriation .69

On appeal, however, except for the amount needed to irrigate lands
Vidler owned, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed and held:
Our constitution guarantees a right to appropriate, not a right to
speculate. The right to appropriate is for use, not merely for profit.
As we read our constitution and statutes, they give no one the right to
preempt the development potential of water for the anticipated future
use of others not in privity of contract, or in any agency relationship,
with the developer regarding that use. To recognize conditional
decrees grounded on no interest beyond a desire to obtain water for
sale would-as a practical matter-discourage those who have need
and use for the water from developing it. Moreover, such a rule would
encourage those with vast monetary resources to monopolize, for
personal profit rather than for beneficial use, whatever
unappropriated water remains.70
This holding established the Vidler anti-speculation doctrine.
Under this doctrine, the element of intent to appropriate cannot be
satisfied
if there is no intent to place the water to an actual beneficial
1
7

use.

Vidler stood out as a new Colorado Supreme Court judicial
precedent and a turning point in Colorado water law insofar as private
water speculators were concerned. Nevertheless, several decades later,
in City of Thornton v. Bjou, the Colorado Supreme Court attempted to
firm up the underpinning of the Vidler decision. 2 Justice Lohr, whose
decision to grant Iidler its appropriation was overturned by the
Colorado Supreme Court, cited City & County of Denver v. Colorado
River Water Conservation District ("Denver v. CRWCIJ') and Rocky
Mountain Power Co. v. Colorado River Water Conservation District
("Rocky Mountain"), for the proposition that the anti-speculation
doctrine was not a new legal requirement but rather that it followed
"longstanding" principles of Colorado water law.73 Both cases, however,
68. Vidler, 594 P.2d at 567.
69. Id.at566,568.
70. Id.at 568-70.
71. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d
307, 314 (Colo. 2007) (en banc); High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water
Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 719 (Colo. 2005); seegenerallyScottA. Clark and Alix
L.Joseph, Changes of Water Rights and the Anti-Speculation Doctrine: The Continuing
ImportanceofActual Beneficial Use, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 553, 555-556 (2006).
72. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 37 (Colo. 1996).
73. City & County of Denver v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 730,
757 (Colo. 1985); Rocky Mountain Power Co. v. Colo. River Water Conservancy Dist.,
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were decided after /idler. Circularly, Denver v. CRWCD cited to Rocky
Mountain, and Rocky Mountain also quoted Vidler for the
"longstanding view that conditional decrees will not be granted to those
who cannot show more than a speculative or conjectural future
beneficial use."74 This discrepancy may lead some to wonder, whether
the "longstanding" view of the anti-speculation doctrine prior to /idler
was that expressed by Judge Lohr when he granted Vidler the decree
for Sheephorn Mountain Reservoir, or whether the "longstanding" view
of anti-speculation changed after the enactment of the 1969 Act as the
7
Colorado Supreme Court noted in Rocky Mountain?
"

D. 1979 AMENDMENT TO THE 1969 ACT.
In 1979, on the heels of 1Wdler and Huston I, the General Assembly
amended the definition of "appropriation" in the 1969 Act. 76 The
General Assembly amended the definition of appropriation in 1979 to
endorse the /idler intent requirement. 77 However, the "legislation also
recognized the need for a more flexible anti-speculation requirement
that would allow government agencies planning flexibility, the 'great
and growing cities' concept that had earlier been recognized in City &
County of Denver v. Sheriff.... and City & County of Denver v.
Northern Coiorado Water Conservancy District..."78
The 1979
Amendment to the 1969 Act revised the definition of "appropriation" to
provide:
(3) (a) "Appropriation" means the application of a specified portion of
the waters of the state to a beneficial use pursuant to the procedures
prescribed by law; but no appropriation of water, either absolute or
conditional, shall be held to occur when the proposed appropriation is
based upon the speculative sale or transfer of the appropriative rights
to persons not parties to the proposed appropriation, as evidenced by
either of the following:

(I) The purported appropriator of record does not have either a
legally vested interest or a reasonable expectation of procuring such
interest in the lands or facilities to be served by such appropriation,
unless such appropriator is a governmental agency or an agent in fact
for the persons proposed to be benefited by such appropriation.
646 P.2d 383, 388-89 (Colo. 1982); BJou, 926 P.2d at 1, 37. George Lohr was
appointed to the Colorado Supreme Court on December 14, 1979. See Lohr, George
E., Colorado Supreme Court Library, http://www.state.co.us/courts/sctlib/77.htm (last
visited on February 2, 2010).
74. Colo. River Water ConservationDist., 696 P.2d at 757; Rocky Mountain, 646 P.2d
at 388.
75. Rocky Mountain, 646 P.2d at 389.
76. COLO. REV. STAT § 37-92-103(3) (2009); COLORADO LEGiSLATrVE DRAFtING
OFFICE, DIGEST OF BILLs ENACTED BY THE FIFIY-SEcOND GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1979 FIRST

REGULAR SESSION, 162-63 (1979).
77. See§ 37-92-103(3) (a) (II).

78. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d
307, 314 n.6 (Colo. 2007) (en banc); see § 37-92-103 (3) (a) (II).
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(H) The purported appropriator of record does not have a specific
plan and intent to divert, store, or otherwise capture, possess, and
control a specific quantity of water for specific beneficial uses.79
"By amending the definition of appropriation, the General
Assembly reaffirmed the anti-speculation holding of idler to respond
to the Huston filings."80 However, the Amendment also exempted
governmental agencies from the requirement of having a legally vested
interest in the lands or facilities that the appropriation serves. 81 This
change had the effect of creating a distinction between private
Under the statutory
appropriators and governmental agencies.
definition, a private appropriator must have a legally vested interest or a
reasonable expectation of procuring such interest in the lands or
facilities the appropriation serves, but there is no such requirement for
a governmental agency. 82 The statute only requires a governmental
agency to have a specific plan and intent to divert, store, or otherwise
capture, possess, and control a specific quantity of water for specific
beneficial uses.83 The governmental exception is not conditioned upon
whether the government acts in a proprietary function, whether it has a
conservation plan, whether its per capita consumption is reasonably
attainable, whether the amount of consumptive use is reasonably
necessary to serve the increased population, or when the water must be
placed to beneficial use.84 Thus, under the 1979 amendment, the
General Assembly exempted governments unconditionally from the
requirement of having either a legally vested interest or a reasonable
expectation of procuring such interest in the lands or facilities the
appropriation serves, notwithstanding the doctrine of maximum
utilization.85 So theoretically, as long as a governmental agency has a
specific plan of providing service, it should not need firm contractual
commitments with those it intends to serve, even if its future customers
are outside its governmental boundaries.8 6

79. § 37-92-103(3) (2009) (emphasis added).
80. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Arapahoe v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 960 (Colo.
1995).
81. § 37-92-103 (3) (a) (I); see PagosaI, 170 P.3d at 314, n.6.
82. Id. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (I).
83. See id. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (II).
84. Id. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (I).
85. Id. § 37-92-103(3) (1) (I); Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout
Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d 307, 317 (Colo. 2007) (en banc) (citing City of
Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 7 (Colo. 1996).) (holding that the limited
governmental agency exception to the anti-speculation doctrine for conditional water
rights should be construed narrowly in order to meet Colorado's maximum utilization
goals).
86. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (H); see also Pagosa , 170 P.3d at 315 (citing BiJou, 926 P.2d at
38-39) (holding government agencies need not be certain of future needs and thus
may conditionally appropriate within a reasonable planning period, but the agencies
bear to burden to prove the plan is not speculative, and not conjectural future
population growth becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy).
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E. HUSTON II.
To complete the story of the attempted water grab by the
entrepreneurs John H. Huston, Wallace Yaffe, and Allan Leaffer, the
special water judge that the Colorado Supreme Court appointed held
that:
[n]ontributary ground water outside designated ground water basins
can be appropriated for the use of persons other than the claimant so
long as the claim is not speculative under the guidelines of our prior
cases, notably Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Vidler
Tunnel Water Co... Bunger v. Uncompahgre Valley Water Users
Ass'n . ..and Taussig v. Moffat Tunnel Water & Development Co ...
87
On appeal, however, the court determined that nontributary
ground water was not subject to appropriation under the Colorado
Constitution or under the 1969 Act and dismissed the applications.8 8 As
to the trial judge's ruling regarding the Vidler test, the Colorado
Supreme Court declined to offer an advisory opinion "because of the
impossibility of foreseeing and providing for every possible type of
arrangement between applicants and landowners or between applicants
and users of the water.'
The Colorado Supreme Court later applied the Vidler antispeculation test to nontributary water in a designated groundwater
basin, 90 and to designated basin ground waters in the aquifers of the
Denver Basin. 9'
However, in East Cherry Creek Valley Water &
Sanitation District v. Rangeview Metropolitan District, the Colorado
Supreme Court determined that since the appropriation doctrine did
not apply to nontributary ground waters outside designated basins,
neither did the anti-speculation doctrine. 92 The court concluded that
under Senate Bill 5, the legislature specifically intended "to permit
adjudications for future uses without a corresponding obligation to
develop them," 3 unlike the statutory scheme for designated ground
water, which did "not evince any intent to permit adjudication of a use
right without plans for development and use of the resource.'

87. State Dep't of Natural Res. v. Sw. Colo. Water Conservation Dist., 671 P.2d 1294,
1302 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) cert. denied,466 U.S. 944 (1984).
88. Id. at 1310, superseded by 1983 COLO. SESS. LAws 2080 (codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-203 (1), (2009)) as recognized in Qualls, Inc. v. Berryman, 798
P.2d 1095, 1098 (Colo. 1990) (en banc).
89. State Dep't., 671 P.2d at 1319.
90. Jaeger v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 746 P.2d 515, 523 (Colo. 1987).
91. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt. Dist., 77
P.3d 62, 78-79 (Colo. 2003).
92. E. Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Rangeview Metro. Dist., 109
P.3d 154, 157-58 (Colo. 2005).
93. Id. at 158-59 (citing SB 5, ch. 285, sec. 3 § 37-90-137 (July 1, 1985), 1985 COLO.
SESS. LAws 1160 (codified as amended at section 37-90-137, COLO. REV. STAT. (2009))).
94. Id.
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m. POST VTDLER MUNICIPAL EXCEPTION TO THE ANTISPECUIATION DOCTRINE
A. DENVER WATER BOARD'S PINEY, STRAIGHT CREEK AND EAGLE-

COLORADO PROJECTS

In City & County of Denver v. Colorado River Water Conservaton
District, Justice Lohr again applied the Vidler doctrine to a
governmental agency application in apparent disregard of the 1979
statutory exemption. In Denver v. CRWCD, the Denver Water Board
filed statements of claim in 1968 and 1971 for conditional water rights
for Straight Creek (a tributary to the Blue River), Piney River, and the
Eagle-Colorado Collection System. 96 In 1972, the Denver Water Board
put on evidence that it anticipated that it would serve a 1,000 square
mile area in the Denver Metropolitan Area.97 The water court
appointed a referee who made extensive factual findings, including
ones that the appropriation was solely for use outside the municipal
boundaries of Denver; that such use is of some benefit to the residents
of Denver; and the claimed amounts come from projected future
population growth in the Denver Metropolitan Area.98 However, the
referee entered an interlocutory decree denying the Denver Water
Board's claims concluding that the Denver Water Board was without
legal authority or capacity to appropriate water solely for use outside its
municipal boundaries. 99 Thus, the Denver Water Board could not have
formed the requisite intent for a valid appropriation. 100 Accordingly, the
water judge approved and confirmed the interlocutory decree.'l 1
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the water court
and held that the Denver Water Board did have the constitutional and
statutory authority to make an appropriation for use outside the city
boundaries. 0 2 As a matter of local concern, Denver's Charter under
section 6 Article XX of the Colorado State Constitution authorized the
Denver Water Board to provide water outside its boundaries. 10 3 The
court determined, however, that Denver acts in its "proprietary
capacity" when providing water outside its boundaries, thus triggering

95. City & County of Denver v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d 730,
756-57 (Colo. 1985).
96. Id. at 734-36.
97. MIcHAEL D. WHITE, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER REFEREE, 27, Civil Action Nos.
2371, 1529 and 1548 (April 3, 1978) (including testimony ofJames L. Oglivie, Secretary
Manager of the Denver Water Department, who on April 24, 1972 described the
borders of a 1,000 square mile service area which he anticipated that Denver would
eventually supply).
98. Colo. River Water ConservationDist., 696 P.2d at 737, 741, 757.
99. Id. at 737.
100. Id. at 757.
101. Id.at 737-38.
102. Id. at 742, 745.
103. Id. at 744-45.
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review of whether, as a matter of statewide concern, the state had
authorized such appropriations. 10 4 Nonetheless, the Colorado Supreme
Court concluded the General Assembly had expressly authorized this
extraterritorial water service by statute and reversed the water court.0 5
Based on its finding that Denver acts in a proprietary capacity when
it serves water extraterritorially,0 6 the Colorado Supreme Court held
evidence of firm contractual commitments -was missing and remanded
the case back to the water court to take evidence on the 1979 Vidler
doctrine. 10 7 The court noted there was no evidence that the water
court, the parties, or the amicus considered the application of Vidler to
the claims. 10 However, the opinion did not explain why the court did
not consider the application of the statutory exemption. That would
come later from Justice Lohr in Bifou.
Thus, disregarding section 37-92-103 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes, the Colorado Supreme Court formulated the following antispeculation test specifically for the Denver Water Board:
Denver could not have formed the necessary intent to appropriate any
particular amount of water for use until it had plans to use that water
within its own boundaries, firm contractual commitments to supply
that water to users outside its boundaries, or agency relationships with
such users, evidence must be taken and a finding made as to the
amount of the claimed water, if any, that is committed by contract or
agency agreement
and on what dates those commitments came into
09
existence.
B. CITY OF THORNTON'S NORTHERN PROJECT.
In 1986, the City of Thornton filed for conditional water rights for a
water supply project that would yield up to 67,000 acre-feet in three
phases over 70 years. 1 Thornton provided evidence that its supply was
26,000 acre-feet, and it anticipated needing 93,000 acre-feet' to serve a
projected population of 379,000 by the year 2056.'12 Thornton's13
projections of growth included areas not within its present city limits.

The water court confirmed Thornton's projections were "optimistic"
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 742.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 757.
Id. at 757 n.18.
Id. at 757.
City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 19-21 (Colo. 1996).
Thornton based its projected need, in part, on a 10% safety factor and 15%

factor accounting for distribution losses. Testimony of Walid Hajj, Case No. 86CW401,
86CW402, 86CW403 and 87CW332, March 31, 1992, p. 90, 91.
112. Id.at19,40.
113. Id. at 40. ("A municipality may take into consideration facts indicating that its
physical area is likely to expand in the course of growth. Planning need not be limited
to current geographic limits if there is reasonable expectation that those limits will
expand.") Id.
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but not speculative.114 Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
and the City of Fort Collins appealed on numerous grounds. On the
issue of need, they argued Thornton's plan violated the anti-speculation
doctrine because it failed to prove it had firm contractual commitments
or agency relationships for water service outside its boundaries. 1 5
Because W/idler involved a private corporation, the Colorado
Supreme Court re-examined Sheriffand Blue River to determine if the
anti-speculation doctrine applied to municipalities. 16
The court
concluded that Sheriff"clearly counsels against a strict application of
the anti-speculation doctrine to municipalities seeking to provide for
the future needs of their constituents," and under Blue River, "a city
may appropriate water for its future needs without violating the
prohibition on speculation so long as the amount of the approriation
is in line with the city's 'reasonably anticipated requirements. ' ,,I17 Since
W/idler involved a private corporation, the requirement of firm
contractual commitments or agency relationships did not apply with
equal force to municipalities." 8 The General Assembly's action in 1979
supported this limited exception to the Vidler requirements but did not
completely immunize
municipal
applicants
from speculation
challenges. 119
Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court offered this
construction of the municipal anti-speculation doctrine:
[U]nder section 37-92-103(3)(a), a municipality may be decreed
conditional water rights based solely on its projected future needs, and
without firm contractual commitments or agency relationships, but a
municipality's entitlement to such a decree is subject to the water
court's determination that the amount conditionally appropriated is
consistent with the municipality's reasonably anticipated
requirements
120
based on substantiated projections of future growth.
The court explained that this construction of the municipal antispeculation doctrine was consistent with cases decided after the
enactment of section 37-92-103 of the Colorado Revised Statutes;
however, the doctrine was not consistent with the holding in Denver
v.
21
Doctrine.
Non-Non-Speculation
Not
the
to
us
brings
which
CRWCD,
C. THE EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION TO THE ANTI-SPECULATION

DOCTRINE.
In Biou, the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
("Northern") argued that the City of Thornton, under Denver v.
CRWCD, must comply with the V/idler test even though the City of
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at41.
Id.at 36, 39.
Id.at 37-38.
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id.
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Thornton was a governmental entity entitled to the municipal
exception. 122 Northern argued that the word "boundaries," as Denver v.
CRWCD applied it, meant the city's boundaries at the time of the
application, rather than the reasonably anticipated future boundaries of
2 3 Thus, Northern contended that the holding
the municipal applicant."
in Denver v. CRWCD precludes municipalities from appropriating water
based on projected requirements for future growth areas outside the
current municipal boundaries. 12 4 The Colorado Supreme Court noted
that if a city could only plan for use within existing boundaries, it would
remove municipal flexibility to plan for future water needs and
undercut its previous decisions in Sheriff and Blue River.'25 So the
court backtracked in BJou, and distinguished Denver v. CRWCD as
unique to the facts in that case, deciding the Denver Water Board
sought to apropriate water to sell for profit to parties outside its own
boundaries. 6 The court explained that the Denver Water Board acted
"in the capacity of a water supplier on the open market rather than as a
governmental entity seeking to ensure future water supplies for its
citizens."' 27
The municipal 'planning exception was therefore
unavailable to the Denver Water Board, which was "required to comply
with the full range of requirements applicable to private parties under
Vidler."128 Thus, the court established the exception to the exception
to the anti-speculation doctrine that would apply to any governmental
agency that "profits" from the sale of water outside its boundaries.
However, the unique facts of Denver v. CRWCD, as the court in
Bijou described them, were not quite accurate. In Denver v. CRWCD,
the Colorado Supreme Court characterized the Denver Water Board's
lease of water outside its boundaries as "proprietary" to determine
whether the General Assembly had authorized extraterritorial water
service. 129 But neither the special master referee, trial court, nor the
Colorado Supreme Court in Denver v. CRWCD considered evidence, or
made a finding that the Denver Water Board sold water for "profit" as
Vidler used that term. The Denver Water Board's rates and revenues
derive from the city's charter obligation to recover the full cost of
service. 3 ° Denver's city charter requires the Denver Water Board to
charge an additional amount for water leased outside the city,' but
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.at 40.
Id.
Id.

129. Bennett Bear Creek Farm Water & Sanitation Dist. v. City & County of Denver,
928 P.2d 1254, 1266 (Colo. 1996).
130. Id. at 1270.
131. Charter of the City & County of Denver art. X, § 10.1.13 "Water Leases,"
available at http://www.denverwater.org/OperatingRules/OperRulesArticleX/
("The
Board shall have power to lease water and water rights for use outside the territorial
limits of the City and County of Denver, but such leases shall provide for limitations of
delivery of water to whatever extent may be necessary to enable the Board to provide an

Issue 2

GREATAND GROWING CITIES DOCTRINE: AN OBJECTIVE LOOK

303

such charges simply reimburse the citizens of Denver for the use of its
system.13 2 The Denver Water Board, as a governmental entity, does not
"profit" as that term was used in idler,and certainly no member of the
Denver Water Board personally profits. ' Further, when the Denver
Water Board supplies water in its proprietary capacity outside its
boundaries, it remains a public utility for public use.
In addition, the Colorado Supreme Court in Denver v. CRWCD did
not consider the statutory governmental exemption of 1979.135 Because
the claims were filed prior to the enactment of 1969 Act, the provisions
of the 1969 Act, including the governmental exemption to the antispeculation doctrine of 1979, did not apply and Denver v. CRWCD did
not consider them. 3 6 The Denver Water Board, as a governmental
agency, should have been given wide latitude under the 1919
conditional water right statute and cases (including Sherif, Blue River,
and MetropolitanSuburban) decided under the 1919 Act, to determine
its reasonable needs outside its municipal boundaries, rather than the
private speculator test that the court applied in idler.
The City and County of Denver could still annex property outside of
its boundaries.
Even though the1974 Poundstone Amendment 3 v

adequate supply of water to the people of Denver. Every such lease shall contain terms
to secure payment of sufficient money to fully reimburse the people of Denver for the
cost of furnishing the water together with an additional amount to be determined by
the Board.").
132. Bennett, 928 P.2d at 1272 n.27 (The additional amount recovers the costs that
Denver citizens incur for the capital they have invested in utility assets used to provide
service to outside city customers).
133. Charter of the City and County of Denver art. X, §§ 10.1.2-3 available at
http://www.denverwater.org/OperatingRules/OperRulesArticleX/ (The Denver Water
Board created under the Denver City Charter has no shareholders. The Mayor of
Denver appoints the Board Members, who are compensated $600.00 per year).
134. See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Arapahoe v. Denver Bd. of Water Comm'rs, 718
P.2d 235, 244-46 (Colo. 1986) (holding that the Denver Water Board is a non-regulated
public utility when supplying water to customers inside and outside of Denver's
territorial limits); City of Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 575 P.2d 382,
391 (1978).
135. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (2009).
136. See City & County of Denver v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d
730, 739-40 (Colo. 1985). In Byou the Supreme Court gave a partial explanation of the
inapplicability of the governmental exemption, stating that the exemption "was enacted
in 1979, more than ten years after the City of Denver applied" for a decree for the
conditional water rights. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Dist., 926 P.2d 1, 40 n.27
(Colo. 1996). While this statement is accurate, the more encompassing reason is that
the 1943 and 1919 Acts, as opposed to the 1969 Act, governed the entire original
proceeding.
137. To address the federal court's plan to integrate the tri-ethnic area through
bussing and other programs, the City and County of Denver attempted to extend its
boundaries through annexation.
In response, Greenwood Village Mayor Freda
Poundstone drafted an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that required any
annexation by one county of land in another county to be voted on by all citizens in the
county giving up the land. Effectively, the amendment prevented Denver from
annexing surrounding neighborhoods to be included in the desegregation effort. See
COLO. CONST. art. XIV, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1; see generally Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 380 F. Supp. 673, 684, 690-91 (D. Colo. 1974); see generally
Tom 1. Romero, II, Uncertain Waters and Contested Lands: Excavating the Layers of
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constrained Denver's ability to annex areas outside its boundaries, it did
not prohibit Denver from annexing land, as when Denver annexed
forty-five square miles for the Denver International Airport in 1988.13a
Finally, the Denver Water Board's proprietary actions of leasing
water outside its boundaries did not seem to trouble the Colorado
Supreme Court in Sheriff,Blue River, or MetropolitanSuburban. None
of these cases applied a Vidler type common law test; rather, the court
confirmed Denver Water Board's appropriations based upon its
anticipated needs, including amounts necessary to serve adjacent areas
in the metropolitan
area without a requirement of firm contractual
139
commitments.

So, with Biou, despite a clear statutory exception from the General
Assembly limiting governmental agencies' burden of proof in
demonstrating a non-speculative appropriation, the Colorado Supreme
Court created an exception to the exception to the anti-speculation
doctrine, essentially applicable to a single water user within the state.14 °
IV. CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING UP TO PAGOSA
A. DROUGHT OF 2002

In the years preceding the Court's decision in PagosaI and Pagosa
II, Colorado experienced a severe hydrologic drought which
precipitated the enactment of several pieces of legislation considered by
the Court in its Pagosa decisions. In 2002, Colorado experienced
one of the worst single-year droughts in its recorded history. 141 Storage
reserves in Lake Powell dropped dramatically, triggering anxieties in
the upper Colorado River basin that downstream states would place a
compact call. 142 Denver Water Board's storage reserves dropped to

Colorado'sLega Past,73 U. COLO. L. REv. 521, 579-84 (2002).
138. In May 1988, voters in Adams County approved the City and County of Denver's

annexation of approximately 45 square miles for an international airport.

CATHERINE

KRAFT, ELECTIONS ADMIN., ABSTRACT OF VOTES CAST AT THE SPEcIAL ELECTION ON THE
AIRPORTAGREEMENT, May 17, 1988.

139. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Vidler Tunnel Water Co., 594 P.2d 566,
568 (Colo. 1979); Metro. Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist., 365 P.2d 273, 283, 287-88 (Colo. 1961); City & County of Denver v.
N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 276 P.2d 992, 999 (Colo. 1954); City & County of
Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 840-41 (Colo. 1939).
140. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (2009); City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation
Dist., 926 P.2d 1, 39-40 (Colo. 1996).
141. COLO.
Div.
OF
WATER
RES.,
2002 ANN.
REP.,
available at
http://water.state.co.us/pubs/annualreport/annlrpt_2002.PDF (last visited on Feb. 1,
2010); see also Connie A. Woodhouse, A Paleo Perspectiveon Hydroclimatic Variability
in the Western United States, 66 AQUATIC Sx. 346, 349 (2004) (stating that the severity
of the Colorado 2002 drought was matched or exceeded about eight times during the
300 year study period).
142. Bureau of Reclamation, Drought in the Upper Colorado River Basin, Mar. 17,
2010, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/feature/drought.html (last visited March 31, 2010).
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approximately 45% of capacity.1 43 The dilemma for most governing
bodies is how to plan for the unknown. In 2002, the governing bodies
had to grapple with the unknowns of drought severity and duration. 4 4
Droughts test the accuracy of previous planning departments'
determinations of an adequate water supply, the failure of which can
spell disaster for any community -large or small.
B. THE STATEJUMPS INTO WATER SUPPLY PLANNING.

Beginning in 2003, the General Assembly enacted various water
related legislation in reaction to the 2002 drought. In 2003, the
General Assembly authorized three million dollars for the Colorado
Water Conservation Board ("CWCB") to investigate all aspects of water
supply and water demand through the year 2030 in each river basin of
the state.145
The overall objective of the Statewide Water Supply
Initiative ("SWSI") was to help Colorado "maintain an adequate water
supply for its citizens and the environment."14 6 Because of the divisive
nature of water issues in the West and in Colorado in particular, the
study established certain ground rules including the acknowledgement
147
that SWSI was "not [to] take the place of local water planning.
In 2004, the General Assembly amended the Water Conservation
Act of 1991 by an act concerning water planning by retail water
providers to promote wise water use, conservation, and drought
planning by public and private agencies, as well as encourage and
support execution of this act that relates to the development and into
the statewide water supply initiative. 48 The statute still allows water
providers to determine the manner in which they develop, adopt, make
publicly available, and implement a conservation plan. 4
Following the momentum initiated by SWSI, the General Assembly
enacted the Colorado Water for the 21st Century Act in 2005.150
Intending to "facilitate discussion and negotiations between basins on
water management issues, and to encourage locally driven collaborative
solutions to water supply challenges... ," the General Assembly created
an interbasin compact committee and nine basin roundtables 51 The
143. See Denver Water, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report C-12 (2002)
available
at
http://www.denverwater.org/docs/assets/E6522765-BCDF-1B42D942C93720CCOED0/AnnualReport2002l.pdf.
144. National
Drought
Mitigation
Center,
Monitoring
Drought,
http://drought.unl.edu/monitor (last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
145. Act of May 19, 2003, ch. 269, 2 Colo. Sess. Laws 1768.
146. Colo.
Dep't
of
Natural
Res.,
SWSI
&
Technical Resources,
http://cwcb.state.co.us/WIvMD/SWSITechnicalResources/
(last visited Feb. 1, 2010).
147. Colorado Water Conservation Board, Statewide Water Supply Initiative Executive
Summary,
Nov.
2003,
at
ES
3,
available
at
http://cwcb.state.co.us/NR/rdonlyres/7D87609A-1CE6-4E16-ABF4DD34878FOE33/0/ExecSummaryReportl l1504.pdf [hereinafter
Colorado Water
Conservation Board, Executive].
148. Act ofJune, 4, 2004, ch. 373, 2 Colo. Sess. Laws 1777.
149. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-60-126(3) (2009).
150. Act ofJune, 4, 2004, ch. 314, 2 Colo. Sess. Laws 1472.
151. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-75-104(1) (a) (2009).
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General Assembly authorized each roundtable to use the data and
information derived from SWSI to develop a basin-wide consumptive
and non- consumptive water supply needs assessment, to quantify the
amount of available unappropriated water within each basin, and to
propose projects or methods for meeting the consumptive and nonconsumptive water supply needs identified in the assessment.'52
However, the General Assembly did not authorize the roundtables to
construct or operate water supply systems or remove water from the
those activities to
streams to supply its water needs, leaving
15
municipalities and other governmental entities. 7
Then in 2008, apparently concerned that local governments were
granting land development permits based upon inadequate water
supplies, the General Assembly added a section to the Local
Government Regulation of Land Use to require consideration of the
adequacy of water supply before granting development.15 4 The General
Assembly found that securing an adequate supply of water to serve a
land development can have a broad regional impact within and
between river basins. Thus, it was imperative that local governments
receive reliable information concerning the adequacy of the proposed
developers' water supply. 55 So, the General Assembly declared that
"while land use and development approval decisions are matters of local
concern," the local governments must consider certain information in
its determination of whether the water supply for the proposed
developer is adequate under its sole discretion. 156 The General
Assembly also required:
[I]f the water for the proposed development is to be provided by a
water supply entity that has a water supply plan that: (a) Has been
reviewed and updated, if appropriate, within the previous ten years by
the governing board of the water supply entity; (b) Has a minimum
twenty-year planning horizon; (c) Lists conservation measures, if any,
that may be implemented within the service, area; (d) Lists the water
demand management measures, if any, that may be implemented
within the service area; (e) Includes a general description of water
supply entity's water obligations; (f) Includes a general description of
the water supply entity's water supplies; and (g) Is on file with the local
government.
In June 2009, the CWCB issued a draft study extending the SWSI
study to the year 2050, pursuant to a request by the Western Slope basin

152. Id.§ 37-75-104(2)(c).
153. Instead, the General Assembly authorized local entities to develop water supply

systems. See § 31-35-402.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. § 29-20-304(1) (a).
Id. § 29-20-301(1) (a).
Id. §§ 29-20-301(1) (b), 29-20-305(1).
Id. § 29-20-304(3).
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roundtables.'5 8 The study extended the population and water use
projections to 2050, updated the per capita use estimates, and revised
the Self-Supplied Industrial forecast.15 9However, SWSI acknowledged
that providing water for municipal and agricultural users is the purview
of local water providers and that SWSI does not take the place of local
water planning.1 60 In the land use statute, the General Assembly left the
determination of a sufficient water supply to the sole discretion of the
local government.' 6
V.

PAGOSA

A. PAGOSA I THE COURT'S FIRST FORAY INTO JUDICIAL WATER SUPPLY
PLANNING
162
Remember Pagosa?Thisis a song about Pagosa.
In Pagosa I the Colorado Supreme Court faced the questions of
whether, as a matter of law, a government agency may obtain water
163
rights in amounts premised on growth 100 years into the future;
whether the applicants, the Pagosa Water & Sanitation District
("Pagosa") and San Juan Water Conservancy District ("San Juan")
(collectively referred to as the "Districts"), put on sufficient evidence to
substantiate their reasonably anticipated requirements for their
appropriation, including population projections and per capita water
usage; 64 and whether Pagosa and San Juan demonstrated a sufficient
to appropriate water rights in the amounts and for the
intent necessary
15
uses it sought.
In 2003, Pagosa's water resource engineer recommended that
Pagosa apply for conditional water rights sufficient to fill the proposed
66
Dry Gulch Reservoir to the maximum possible size of 35,000 acre-feet.
Pagosa's engineer testified it was a "no brainer" to go for the maximum
site capacity based upon economies of scale.167 To make the engineer's
"no brainer" recommendation fit the Biou standard, Pagosa put on
evidence that this supply of water would meet a need based upon a 100-

158. Colorado Water Conservation Board, State of Colorado 2050 Municipal and
(draft
2009),
Projections
ES-I
Water
use
Industrial
http://cwcb.state.co.us/NR/rdonlyres/C28C7EOF-0374-4982-8BOE138C8851BD2F/0/2050MIDemands2O5ODraftReportFull.pdf [hereinafter Projections].
159. Id. at ES-2.
160. Colorado Water Conservation Board, Projections,supra note 158, at ES-I.
161. § 29-20-303(1).
162. See AP.Lo Gul RiE, Alice's Restaurant,on ALICE's RESTAURANT (Appleseed Music
Inc. 1966) ("Remember Alice? It's a song about Alice.").
163. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d
307, 309 (Colo. 2007) (en banc).

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.at 311.
167. Id.
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The water court then confirmed an
year planning period.16
appropriation for Pagosa and San Juan for a water storage right at Dry
Gulch Reservoir in the amount of 29,000 acre-feet and an eighty cfs
direct flow right from the San Juan River. 169 Trout Unlimited ('TU")
appealed, 70 claiming the amount awarded was more than Pagosa or
San Juan could reasonably anticipate using over a reasonable period of
anti-speculation doctrine. 7 ' The Colorado
time in violation of the
72
Supreme Court agreed. 1

Writing for the majority, Justice Hobbs held that "[b]ased on
Colorado's statutory requirements and Bjou, the limited governmental
agency exception to the anti-speculation doctrine should be construed
narrowly, in order to meet the state's maximum utilization and
optimum beneficial use goals. " 173 He continued, "Although the fifty
year planning period... we approved in Bjou is not a fixed upper
limit, and each case depends on its own facts, the water court should
closely scrutinize a governmental agency's claim for a planning period
that exceeds fifty years." 1 74 Concerned that a municipality's long term
planning horizon could preclude other legitimate water uses and avoid
the state's maximum utilization and optimum beneficial use goals, the
court established a municipal duty of water. 175 Rather than using the
tunnels, reservoirs, pipes and pipelines designed by the municipality,
duty of water is now measured by the following
the municipal
76
elements?

(1) what is a reasonable water supply planning period;
(2) what are the substantiated population projections based on a
normal rate of growth for that period; and
(3) what amount of available unappropriated water is reasonably
necessary to serve the reasonably anticipated needs of the governmental
agency for the planning period, above its current water supply.177
"In addition, [a governmental agency] must show under the "can
and will" test that it can and will put the conditionally appropriated
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.at 310-11.
Id. at 312.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.at 317.
Id.

175. Id.at 315. As to agricultural irrigation "duty of water" is "that measure of water,
which, by careful management and use, without wastage, is reasonably required to be
applied to any given tract of land for such period of time as may be adequate to'

produce therefrom a maximum amount of such crops as ordinarily are grown thereon.
It is not a hard and fast unit of measurement, but is variable according to conditions."
Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P.2d 629, 634 (Colo.
1954).

176. An element is a required part of where the non-establishment of that fact to the
required burden of proof is fatal to the case. Thus, if the Applicant fails to put on proof
of the Pagosa elements, then the applicant failed to meet its burden of proof and the

application must be dismissed. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Arapahoe v. United States,
891 P.2d 952, 961 n.9 (Colo. 1995).
177. Pagosa , 170 P.3d at 313.

Issue 2

GREAT AND GROWING CITIES DOCTRINE: AN OBJECTIVE LOOK

309

water to beneficial use within a reasonable period of time. '178 The court
also articulated
four factors to assist the court in its determination of
179
the elements:
(1) implementation of reasonable water conservation measures for
the planning period;
(2) reasonably expected land use mixes during that period;
(3) reasonably attainable per capita usage projections for indoor
and outdoor use based on the land use mixes for that period; and
(4) the amount of consumptive use reasonably necessary for use
through the
conditional appropriation to serve the increased
180
population.
With this holding, the majority narrowly construed the limited
governmental agency exception to the anti-speculation doctrine by
inferring that a planning period longer than 50 years was
unreasonable. 181 -In doing so, the court effectively fashioned a new
planning standard allowing its opinion to "override the studied goodfaith opinions" of Pagosa and San Juan "as to future needs of the public
for facilities or commodities.'182
Reluctantly concurring in the judgment, Justice Coats took
exception with the majority on the issue of the planning period. He
pointed out the "can and will" standard still requires a reasonable time
frame to develop the facilities necessary to place the waters to beneficial
use.'8 3 He expressed concern that the majority derived the fifty year
planning period from a very complex project and that courts should
not presumptively apply the same planning period to less complicated
projects.'84 Justices Eid and Rice, on the other hand, concurred in the
result but were troubled that the majority's "narrow construction" of
Biou would deprive municipalities of the "longstanding recognition" of
the need for flexibility to plan for future water needs. 85 They even
suggested that it may be necessary to modify or reconsider the Bijou
framework. 186 The court then remanded the case back to the water
178. Id. "No claim for a water right may be recognized or a decree therefore granted
except to the extent that it is established that the waters can be and will be diverted,
stored, or otherwise captured, possessed, and controlled and will be beneficially used
and that the project can and will be completed with diligence and within a reasonable
time." COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305 (9) (b) (2009).
179. Factors are facts that are not required to prove the case but which courts can
consider in determining whether the applicant has established the amount of available
water that is reasonably necessary to serve the reasonably anticipated needs of the
governmental agency for the planning period above its current supply. Failure of the
applicant to present evidence concerning such factors can be considered by the court in
determining whether the elements have been met, but such failure is not in themselves
dispositive. SeeArapahoe,891 P.2d at 961 n.9.
180. PagosaI, 170 P.3d at 317.
181. PagosaI, 170 P.3d at 318.
182. Metro. Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 365
P.2d 273, 289 (Colo. 1961).
183. Pagosa1, 170 P.3d at 320 (Coats, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 321.
185. Id at 322-323 (Eid,J., concurring).
186. Id. at 323.
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court with instructions that it:
[S]hould examine the evidence utilizing the elements applicable to
determining whether the districts have met their burden for a nonspeculative conditional appropriation, accompany its judgment with
sufficient findings of fact based on the evidence, and fashion
appropriate decree provisions, which may include "reality checks" and
volumetric limitations
provisions for the districts' conditional
187
appropriation.

B. PAGOSA HL THEJUDICIARY'S SECOND FORAYINTO MUNICIPAL
PLANNING
On remand, Pagosa and San Juan did not offer any additional
evidence, and the court refused TU's request to present additional
evidence.1 8 8 In considering the evidence from Pagosa I and the
instructions from the Colorado Supreme Court, the water court:
1s9
(1) entered a decree based upon a fifty year planning horizon;
(2) reduced the conditional storage right to 19,300 acre-feet with a refill
right for an additional 6,000 acre-feet; 9 (3) confirmed an appropriation
for a direct right of fifty cfs to meet instantaneous demands;' 1 and
(4) imposed reality checks in subsequent diligence proceedings to
monitor actual growth in equivalent units, actual per capita usage,
federal bypass requirements, and effects of climate change. 9 Again TU
appealed, claiming that Pagosa and San Juan failed to (1) substantiate
population projections based upon a normal rate of growth; (2)
establish the reasonableness of the fifty year planning horizon period;
and (3) establish that the decreed amounts of water are reasonably
necessary to serve the projected population through 2055.193
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the fifty year
planning period because of findings of the lengthy lead time for land
acquisition, environmental field studies, design and engineering,
permitting, financing, constructing, and filling the reservoir; the court
further held that the state's statewide water supply planning process
extended to the year 2050.1" However, the court determined that the
existing record did not contain sufficient evidence to justify (1)
recreational in-channel, instream flow and hypothetical federal bypass
flow requirements; (2) fifty cfs direct flow diversion; and (3) a storage

187. Id. at 320.
188. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa I1), 219 P.3d
774, 777-79 (Colo. 2009).
189. Judgment and Decree, Case No. 2004CW085, 7 (Colo. Dist. Court, Water
Division 7, 2008).
190. Id. at 10.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 13-14.
193. PagosaII, 219 P.3d at 776.
194. Id. at 780-81.
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right of 25,300 acre-feet.
On remand, the Colorado Supreme Court directed the trial court to
take additional evidence that, when considering the 2055 planning
period, it can justify (1) a recreational in-channel, instream flow,
and/or a bypass flow; (2) and independent direct flow diversion water
right; and (3) a storage right of 25,300 acre-feet. 196 The court provided
guidance that based the direct flow right upon the "amount of water
reasonably necessary... to meet seasonal peak demand and potential
outages impeding Dry Gulch Reservoir deliveries into the District's
197
water system," unless other evidence justified a different amount.
The court concluded the record contained evidence supporting the
2055 planning period, the 200 gallons per capita usage number, and
that carryover storage may be necessary to meet their reasonably
anticipated needs including a safety supply margin, recreation,
piscatorial and wildlife uses; but that the remand decree did not address
the projected land use mix of the City of Pagosa Springs or of Archuleta
County. 198 Because the projected land use mix affects the per capita
water usage in the long term, it affects the calculation of the reasonable
amounts of water necessary for the applicants in the study period. 99
In support of its land use factor, the court referenced the 2008 land
use legislation as complementing the elements and factors referenced
in PagosaL200 Then, the court went outside the record and considered
the 2009 draft of 2050 population and municipal and industrial use
projections of the General Assembly's statewide planning process even
though the original study was "not to take the place of local water
planning."20 ' The Colorado Supreme Court directed the water court on
remand to make a finding on the amount of annual dry year yield
available from the District's existing water rights. 20 2 During its
instruction at trial, the court instructed the water court to address the
methodology and results of the 2009 draft SWSI study along with all
other evidence of population projections and water supply needs for
the District's 2055 water needs. °
Finally, the court rejected the amici and District's arguments that
governmental agencies act in a legislative capacity when they make
conditional water appropriations and thus are entitled to deference to
the claimed amounts of water the suppliers deem reasonably necessary
for their future use. 204 According to the Colorado Supreme Court, the
only accommodation the General Assembly made to governmental
195. Id. at 781, 784-85.
196. Id.at 788.
197. Id.at 784.
198. Id. at 785.
199. Id. at 785-86.
200. Id. at 786; see COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-20-301 to -306 (2009).
201. PagosaII, 219 P.3d at 786; Colorado Water Conservation Board, Executive, supra
note 147 at 3.
202. PagosaII. 219 at 788.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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water suppliers is to allow "conditional appropriations to be made and
decreed for a future reasonable
water supply period in reasonably
205
anticipated amounts[.]

C. THE PAGOSA FACTORS INTRUDE UPON GOVERNMENTAL DECISION
MAKING.

In most areas of the law, courts defer under the theory of separation
of powers to the policy determinations of the legislative and executive
branches of government. 2°6 In Colorado, courts have been reluctant to
substitute their udgment for that of the municipal decision maker in
)udmen
208
2210
zoning matters, annexations, rate making, 0 9 and condemnation.
Prior to the 1969 Act, the courts would not intrude upon governmental
agencies' decisions in matters that related to water planning. 211 Even
after the 1969 Act, Bjou cautioned courts to be sensitive not to
"inappropriately infringe 212
on the water management decisions of...
municipal water officials."
By suggesting the trial court make findings on the reasonableness of
conservation, land use mixes, per capita use, and the anticipated
consumptive use, the court entwined itself in municipal planning
functions. 2 3 Fundamentally, the factors intrude upon governmental
decision making and give rise to judicial legislation, which prior
decisions discouraged.2 14
The first pertinent factor, whether the applicant implemented
reasonable water conservation measures for the planning period, 215 is
205. Id.
206. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
207. Nelson v. Farr, 354 P.2d 163, 165-66 (Colo. 1960).
208. City & County of Denver v. Holmes, 400 P.2d 901, 904 (Colo. 1965).
209. Bennett Bear Creek Farm Water & Sanitation Dist. v. City & County of Denver,
928 P.2d 1254, 1265 (Colo. 1996).
210. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-6-105 (2009); City of Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir &
Irrigation Co., 575 P.2d 382, 394 (Colo. 1978). According to the dissent, the majority
allowed home rule municipalities to condemn water rights and water facilities regardless
of necessity as projected over a reasonable period of time, subject only to review for
fraud or bad faith.
211. City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 841 (Colo. 1939).
212. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Dist., 926 P.2d 1, 52-53 (Colo. 1996).
213. See PagosaI, 170 P.3d 307, 317-318 (Colo. 2007).
214. See Holmes, 400 P.2d at 904 (dissenting, Justice Frantz remarked "[a] vigilant,
dutiful judiciary should recognize its sphere of operation and readily restrain itself from
any inchmeal intrusion on that which properly belongs to another branch of
government."); Metro. Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist., 365 P.2d 273, 288 (Colo. 1961) (holding that courts should not substitute its
judgments for that of the government's in water supply determinations); Sheriff, 96
P.2d at 840, 844 (holding that "[tQhe furnishing of an adequate supply of water .. .
requires managerial judgment . : . . [T]he restrictions involved here, would be an
arbitrary violation of vested property rights of the city.").
215. § 37-60-126(1)(g) (providing that "'Water conservation' means water use
efficiency, wise water use, water transmission and distribution system efficiency, and
supply substitution. The objective of water conservation is a long-term increase in the
productive use of water supply in order to satisfy water supply needs without
compromising desired water services.").
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troubling for a number of reasons.2 16
Apparently, conservation
measures are pertinent because beneficial use requires "use of that
amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate under reasonably
efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which
the appropriation is lawfully made...,217 Thus, a municipality must
show its use is reasonably efficient, which a conservation plan can
demonstrate. Further, the State of Colorado requires governmental
entities providing more than 2,000 acre-feet to implement a water
conservation plan encouraging its customers to use water more
efficiently. 2 8 The plan must include a description of the water-saving
measures and programs, the role of the conservation plan in its water
supply planning, the steps used to develop and implement the water
conservation plan, the time period the entity will review and update its
conservation plan and an estimate of the amount of water that the
conservation plan has and will save.2 19
A conservation plan is a strategy to conserve water.220 If the water
user is a governmental entity, it must adopt that strategy pursuant to its
governmental process. 221 Normally, an elected council or Board passes
a conservation plan, acting in a legislative capacity that is subject to
public input and review.222 However, when the court must determine
the reasonableness of a conservation plan, the court then substitutes its
judgment for that of the governing body. This comes at the expense of
government agencies' legislative discretion, as different governmental
entities may desire different conservation objectives.
The minimum water saving measures and programs that the state
requires include: water efficient fixtures and appliances low water use
landscapes, water efficient industrial and commercial water using
processes, water reuse systems, distribution system leak repairs,
education, rate structures designed to discourage water use, billing
systems, regulatory measures, and incentives including rebates. 223 Most
conservation plans do not include drought mitigation or response
plans. 224 Further, a municipality's conservation plan must be balanced
with its goal to develop a reliable water supply that will meet peak
demands under efficient practices without mandatory water use

216. See PagosaI, 170 P.3d at 317.
217. § 37-92-103(4).
218. Id. § 37-60-126(1)(b), (2)(a).
219. Id. § 37-60-126(4) (a)-(e).
220. Colorado Water
Conservation Board,
Drought Miu'gation Planning,
http://cwcb.state.co.us/Conservation/DroughtPlanning/DroughtMitigationPlanning/
DroughtMitigationPlanning.htm [hereinafter Colorado Water Conservation Board,
Drought] (stating that "[a]. Water Conservation Plan can be defined as a strategy or
combination of strategies for reducing the volume of water withdrawn from a water
supply source, for reducing the loss or waste of water, for maintaining or improving the
efficiency in the use of water, and for increasing the reuse of water") (last visitedJan. 31,
2010).
221. § 37-60-126(5).
222. See id.
223. § 37-60-126(4) (a).
224. Colorado Water Conservation Board, Drought,supra note 220.
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restrictions because those restrictions can cause economic injury.2 2 5
Compounding matters, the court's conservation factors leave the door
open to a host of issues:
* What constitutes a reasonable conservation plan?
* What if another governmental entity has a stricter
conservation plan than the appropriator-does that mean
the court can pass judgment and deny an application
because the conservation plan could be different?
* What sanction should be imposed if the conservation plan is
changed, or is not strictly implemented or enforced?
The next pertinent factor, requiring a governmental applicant to
show its reasonably expected land use mixes during that period, also
presents a host of questions and problems. 2

26

To satisfy this factor, the

227
applicant must present evidence of undeveloped land and its zoning.
Land zoned for residential use may have different per capita demand
228
than land zoned for commercial, governmental, or industrial uses.
This is a reasonable method to forecast demands but it is not the only
method to forecast demands, particularly if the service area is "built
out."229 An examination of reasonable land use mixes in an already
developed metropolitan area does not allow for an accurate prediction
of future demands within the area. Property uses and zoning can easily
change over a fifty-year period. Areas that were once used for industrial
purposes can give way to new residential uses and vice versa. Further, a
land use based water demand projection does not take into account the
potential for an increase in density over the years. Econometric
demand models and simple trend spreadsheets, which are based on
anticipated regional economic and demographic growth rather than
projected land use mixes, are other planning methods, which can more
accurately predict future demand for a developed metropolitan area.23

225. For example, in 2002, Denver Water Board imposed drought restrictions that
precluded the watering of new sod and restricted watering of golf courses to only tees
and greens. The landscaping industry suffered economic harm and in some cases golf
See Tom Kensler, Dirt-Poor Condition Water
courses had to replace fairways.
Restrictions Deny Golf Course OperatorsChance to Save Fairways,THE DENVER POST,
May 1, 2003, at D-10 (asserting the Denver Water Board's restriction on watering "all
areas except tee boxes and greens ....

And . . . total water usage ...

limited to 50

percent of the amount the course used in 2001" resulted in the loss of several golf
fairways in the Denver area); Jerd Smith, Tough Choices, ROcKv MOUNTAIN NEws, Apr.
17, 2003, at 12A (reporting on the Denver Water Board's decisions on "plea after plea
from landscapers, sod growers, and golfers.").
226. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d
307, 317-19 (Colo. 2007) (en banc).
227. See generallyid. at 317-319.
228. See WILLIAM Y. DAvIS, WATER DEMAND FORECAST METHODOLOGY FOR CALIFORNIA
WATER PLANNING AREAS 1-2 (2003) (showing that commercial activity, industrial activity,

and urban water efficiency are all factors affecting water demand).
229. Id. "Built out" is a future event when all undeveloped land is fully developed.
However, even fully developed lands can accommodate future growth and additional
water supplies with increased density.
230. E-mail from Doug L.Jeavons, Managing Director BBC Research & Consulting, to
Casey S. Funk, Denver Water (Jan. 4, 2010, 10:30:00 MST) (on file with author).
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When a court assesses the reasonableness of the expected land use
mixes, the court again substitutes its judgment for that of the elected
officials, who are responsible for the quality of life decisions that a
governmental entities should make.
In addition, too many confounding factors affect or influence the
attainability of reasonable per capita usage projections for indoor and
outdoor use based on the land use mixes for a planning period, with
weather being the most significant of these factors. If it rains, then per
2
3
capita use goes down." ' If it is hot and dry, per capita use goes up. 32
So should a governmental agency assume hot and dry per capita usage
without restrictions to be prudent and conservative?
Most
governmental entities design their systems to meet a peak instantaneous
demand, which usually occurs when the climate is hot and dry.23 But
should the court impose hypothetical restrictions to ascertain
reasonably efficient practices? Further, people who live outside the
service area but have jobs inside the service area may not be factored in
a per capita calculation.
Remember, the court in Sheriff and
Metropolitan Suburban deferred to the governmenttls need for
flexibility and its exercise of managerial judgment. 234 By assessing the
reasonableness of the per capita use in the governmental service area,
the court once again becomes the decision maker.
With regard to the consumptive use factor, a
governmental
applicant must now present evidence of "the amount of consumptive
use reasonably necessary for use through the conditional appropriation
to serve the increased population. 2, 35 For this pertinent factor, the
Colorado Supreme Court cited an article, which concluded a
municipality need only to "replace" the amount consumed in an
augmentation plan.23 6 Thus, the authors of the article concluded that
the "size of the required water supply is usually determined by the
amount of water that will be physically consumed, not actually diverted
from a water source." 237 But this factor can be misleading. For
example, of one acre-foot of water used in a home, less than 10% of the
water may be permanently lost to the stream due to evaporation,
human consumption, other consumption associated with household
uses, or losses occurring as part of the wastewater treatment process. 23 9
The remaining 90% of the water not consumed returns to its source.239
231. See John Bougadis, Kaz Adamowski & Roman Diduch, Short-Term Municipal
Water DemandForecasting,19 HYDROLOGICAL PROCESSES 137, 143-47 (2005).
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 840 (Colo. 1939); Metro.
Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 365 P.2d 273, 288
(1961).
235. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d
307, 318 (Colo. 2007) (en banc).
236. Id. at 318 n.10; Daniel S. Young & Duane D. Helton, Developing a Water Supply
in Colorado:The Role ofan Engineer,3 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 373, 377 (2000).
237. Idat 377.
238. See id. at 377-378.
239. Id.
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In determining the amount of water needed to serve its customers,
municipalities do not base their determination of need solely on the
10% of water a single home will consumptively use, but also on the
entire acre-foot of water that a home will "use" while the 10% is being
consumed.24 ° In other words, a municipality needs to be able to provide
the ten gallons that a homeowner will use in taking the shower, not just
the single gallon the towel will "consume". The "one size fits all"
application of a consumptive use factor is not pertinent for many water
users, and it has limited applicability in determining total municipal
demands.
Further, while many municipalities operate significant portions of
their systems under an augmentation plan, many others do not. 4 '
Some municipalities developed their water systems before the 1969 Act
and base their requirements the old fashioned way - by satisfying
diversion demands in accordance with the priority system. 4 2 For
example, the Denver Water Board diverts under its direct flow rights
when it is in priority and exchanges water or releases water from storage
when it is out of priority to meet its fluctuating demands.243 The Denver
Water Board does not to any significant degree, operate its municipal
system under an augmentation plan; thus, its consumptive use does not
drive major portions of its decision making. 2 " Instead, the Denver
Water Board predicts its future diversion demands based upon
historical use data 245 and various factors of water use including
population, employment, household size, precipitation, and lawn
size.246
In Pagosa,the Colorado Supreme Court did not foreclose the water
court from considering other factors in determining the reasonableness
of the particular governmental agency's anticipated needs. 47 Other
factors could include flood control, water administration requirements,
distribution losses, safety factors, operational emergencies, permit
requirements, climate variability, recreational uses, piscatorial uses, and
aesthetic uses. These additional needs may not involve a determination
240. See id. at 378.
241. See, e.g., Upper Eagle Reg'l Water Auth. v. Simpson, 167 P.3d 729, 731-34
(Colo. 2007) (involving municipality which operates its system through an

augmentation plan).
242. City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 841 (Colo. 1939) (stating that a
senior water right holder may not confer his senior water rights to a junior user out of
priority without justifying his actions).
243. E-mail from Robert G. Steger Manager of Raw Water Supply, to Casey S. Funk,
Denver Water (Mar. 4, 2010, 5:37:00 MST) (on file with author).

244. Id.
245. DENVER WATER, AN INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCE PLAN 40 (2002),
http://www.denverwater.org/docs/assets/DDA6502B-BCDF-1B42D6B27D086AD6731A/MasterDocIRPOnlinel.pdf.; see also Young & Helton, supra note
236 at 381 ("Many larger municipalities have historical water use data that are used to
develop more accurate water use estimates, which can also be used to project future
municipal water needs.").
246. Id. at 14-42.
247. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa ), 170 P.3d
307, 318 (Colo. 2007) (en banc).
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of consumptive use, land use mixes, or population projections.
In PagosaII, the court held that carryover storage equal to the water
system's annual demand may be necessary to meet the District's
reasonably anticipated 2055 water needs. 248 However, possession of a
safety reserve is also prudent from a governing body's perspective in
case droughts are worse than what historical gage data has recorded.249
But a governing body may not place safety factor or strategic reserve
water to an actual beneficial use unless there is an emergency. 's this
speculation, or prudent municipal planning? Currently, the Denver
Water Board has a policy to reserve 30,000 acre-feet of yield in its system
for catastrophic events: larger than unexpected build-out demands,
lower than expected yield from its water rights and facilities, and longer
than anticipated droughts. 2 50 For example, the gauged data during a
critical dry period in the 1950s influences Denver Water Board's
yield.251 If a drought occurs that is more severe than the critical period,
then Denver Water Board's yield will be less. Even with mandatory
restrictions, a safety factor or strategic reserve is prudent to protect from
droughts more severe than the historical gauged data reflects.
Where the people and the General Assembly have authorized local
governments to develop and operate water works systems and facilities,
the courts should defer to the exercise of that legislative decision
making unless it is fraudulent, abuses discretion, or is inherently
unsound.25 2 The doctrine of maximum utilization under the 1969 Act
did not take away any of these powers provided to governmental

248. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa I1), 219 P.3d
774, 785 (Colo. 2009).
249. Tree ring studies have confirmed occurrences of drought conditions more
severe than the past 100 years of gauged data. See Woodhouse, supra note 141 at 354;
Connie A. Woodhouse & Jeffrey J. Lukas, Multi-Century Tree-Ring Reconstructions of
Colorado Streamflow for Water Resource Planning,78 CLIMATIC CHANGE 293, 293-94
(2006); David M. Meko et al., Medieval Drought in the Upper Colorado River Basin,
GEoPHYsIcAL

RESEARCH

LETrERS

(2007),

https://portal.azoah.com/oedf/documents/08A-AWSOO1DWR/Omnia/20070524%2OMeko%20et%20a1%2OMedieval%2ODrought%20CO%20R
iver.pdf.

250.
DENVER

Currently, eight percent of Denver Water Board's current estimated firm yield.
WATER,

AN

-INTEGRATED

WATER

RESOURCE

PLAN

9,

7,

69

(2002),

http://www.denverwater.org/docs/assets/DDA6502B-BCDF-1B42D6B27D086AD6731A/MasterDoclRPOnlinel.pdf.
251. Yield has various meanings. Firm/dry/reliable yield is the amount of water that
the water rights and facilities of a municipality can produce in a dry hydrologic period.
Average yield is the amount of water that water rights and facilities in a normal
hydrologic period can produce. All things being equal, average hydrologic conditions
will yield more water than dry hydrologic conditions but average yield will be less
reliable than firm yield. See generally W. B. LANGBEIN & KATHLEEN T.ISERI, GENERAL
INTRODUCTION

&

HYDROLOGIC

DEFINITIONS

(1995)

available

at

http://water.usgs.gov/wsc/glossary.html (defining "Water Yield"); B. Srdjevic, Y. D. P.
Medeiros & A. S. Faria, An Objective Multi-CriteriaEvaluation of Water Management
Scenarios, 18 WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 35, 42 (2004) (discussing how to calculate

"firm yield.").
252. COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-15-708 (2009).
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agencies53 Rather, the doctrine simply encouraged distribution of
plans,.
waters for different beneficial purposes such as augmentation
54
instream flows, and recreational instream channel diversions.1
In making that determination of deference, the court should
consider whether the governmental agencies determined their water
supply needs in an open public process by which the public and
interested stakeholders could have scrutinized the reasons for the water
supply period and the basis for the governmental agencies' need for
additional water. The courts should consider:
(1) Does the municipality have a process to determine its water

supply needs?
(2) Has it followed its process?
(3) Who was involved in the process?
(4) What information was considered?
(5) What assumptions were made? and
(6) Is there a record of that decision making.
Unless there is evidence of fraud or abuse of discretion, the judiciary
should then defer to the decisions the governmental body's decisions in
its legislative or quasi-legislative capacity.
CONCLUSION
In Pagosa I and Biou, the Colorado Supreme Court applied the
chicken or the egg principle when it observed:
The conditional appropriation must not be based on a conjectural
population projection that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy of
Most Front Range municipalities in Colorado could
growth.
conjecture growth in the next few decades at exponential rates. To
some extent, that growth is directly related to the ability of the
municipality to supply water. Hence, the projection becomes a selffulfilling prophecy if the municipality secures a right to the water
necessary to sustain the growth. We do not view such conjecture as
sufficient substantiation to support a conditional decree for water.
Municipalities must do more than represent
255 to the water court that if
they had water, they would be able to grow.
But will communities continue to thrive if their water supplies are
insufficient to sustain the community, and will communities' water
supply needs cease at end of the planning horizon? A simple test exists
at Mesa Verde National Park. Many believe the Park is the abandoned
home of an indigenous people who left their community during a

253. See generally § 37-92-102(l)(a) (not altering governmental powers of
appropriation set forth in Colorado's constitution).
254. Ironically, the General Assembly only authorized governmental agencies to make

such appropriations. §§ 37-92-102(3), (5).

255. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited (Pagosa 1), 170 P.3d
307, 315 (Colo. 2007) (en banc); City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Dist., 926 P.2d 1,
39 n.25 (Colo. 1996).
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period of severe and prolonged drought and cooler temperatures.25 6 So
we offer the Pagosa question: are municipalities merely conjecturing
growth, or are they developing an adequate water supply capable of
sustaining their populations and economies into the future so that they,
too, do not become a piece of history like Mesa Verde?

256. MESA VERDE- THE FIRST 100 YEARS, 37 (Rose Houck & Faith Marcovecchio eds.,
Mesa Verde Museum Ass'n) (2006); Woodhouse, supra note 141 at 351.
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INTRODUCTION
Water scarcity is a problem in many areas of the world. In the
United States, this is particularly so in the southwest, for example,
California and Nevada recently have reported the driest June to May
period since 1924.1 The Colorado River supplies water to 30 million
people in seven states and Mexico, as well as the Lake Mead and Lake
Powell reservoirs, which are only half full and are unlikely to recover for
years.2 Western Canada is no exception, particularly in the South
Saskatchewan River basin ("SSRB"), which begins at the Continental
Divide and flows through southern Alberta and into Saskatchewan.' A
1. Patrick O'Driscoll, A Droughtfor the Ages, USA TODAY, June 8, 2007, available
at http://www.usatoday.com/weather/news/2007-06-07-droughtN.htm
(last visited

Apr. 1, 2010).
2. Id; see also, University of Colorado at Boulder et al.,
Future of Western U.S.
Water Supply Threatened by Climate Change, SCIENCE DAILY, July 21, 2009,
availa ble
at
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/07/090720163555.htm
(last
visited Apr. 1, 2010).
3. CLIMATE CHANGE

AND WATER SSRB FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT

32 (Lawrence Martz
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small portion of the basin dips into Montana.4 In Alberta alone there
are about 20,000 statutory water withdrawal allocation authorizations
with respect to the SSRB.' Because of water.scarcity, in 2006 the Alberta
government declared a moratorium on new surface or surface
connected groundwater water licence allocations for most of the subbasins in the SSRB 6 and later limited allocations to serve First Nations
needs, to enhance instream flows, and for storage to release for existing
water allocations.7 In some areas of the SSRB not all allocations can
come to fruition, and accordingly, junior allocators - those who made
license applications later in time than more senior allocators experience frequent and even substantial deficits. 8
Population
increases, coupled with booming economies in the SSRB, continue to
stress dwindling fresh water supplies.9 Climate change will further
impact supplies."l
It is axiomatic that aquatic ecosystem environments need water to
remain healthy. In many areas of western North America, dwindling
fresh water supplies threaten the health of the instream aquatic
environment. Typically, reducing flows to levels less than the natural
flow regime results in a less healthy aquatic environment. If enough
water is taken away, the aquatic environment becomes severely
impacted and degraded. It also is a simple truth that if the aquatic
environment becomes severely compromised,
the economic,
recreational, and cultural values of a watercourse also become
compromised."
All, however, is not bleak for the world freshwater aquatic ecosystem

et

al.

eds.,

2007),

http://www.usask.ca/geography/giservices/images/SSRBFinalReport.pdf.

4. Id.
5.

ALTA. ENV'T, SOUTH SASKATCHEWAN RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN PHASE

TWO: BACKGROUND STUDIES 8 (2003) [hereinafter SSRB BACKGROUND STUDIES],
http://www3.gov.ab.ca/env/water/regions/ssrb/pdlphase2/SSRB%2Backgroud%20
Studies% 20Web% 20FINAL.pdf.

6.

ALTA. ENV'T, APPROVED WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE SOUTH SASKATCHEWAN

RIVER
BASIN
6
(2006)
[hereinafter
SSRB
WATER
MANAGEMENT
PLAN],
http://www.environment.alberta.ca/documents/SSRB PlanPhase2.pdf.
7. See Bow, Oldman and South Saskatchewan River Basin Water Allocation Order,
Alta. Reg. 171/2007.
8. See SSRB BACKGROUND STUDIES, supra note 5, at 21-22.
9. See SSRB WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 6, at 1, 4.
10. D.W. Schindler & W.F. Donahue, An Impending Water Crisis in Canada's
Western PrairieProvinces, 103 PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF Sci. 7210 (2006), available
athttp://www.pnas.org/content/103/19/7210.full.pdf+html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
11. Although instream flow is a necessary condition for a healthy aquatic ecosystem,
there are many other values achieved or enhanced by restoring and protecting instreamn
water. The Instream Flow Council's third book on instream flow summarizes the
intrinsic and utilitarian reasons why flowing rivers are important: "Rivers have provided
sustenance and economic inputs for centuries. They drive grist mills and power entire
civilizations. They move commerce from seaports inland and back. Rivers provide
inspiration for song, poems, cultural traditions, child's play, and religious rites. Humans
are more strongly drawn to flowing water than any other physical feature on Earth."
ALLAN LOCKE ET AL., INTEGRATED APPROACHES TO RIVERINE RESOURCE STEWARDSHIP

(2008).

1
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future. There are a number of approaches and tools that would help
address water scarcity and provide water to enhance the aquatic
environment through the restoration and maintenance of instream flow
needs, or IFNs, meaning the amount of water scientifically determined
to be required in a watercourse or water body to achieve and maintain a
healthy aquatic ecosystem. 2 Some of these tools have been with us for a
long time, some are new. Some are direct methods to replenish
instream flow and improve water and aquatic ecosystem quality, and
some only do so indirectly.A 'direct' approach is one where water is left
or put into a watercourse directly and intentionally to restore or
maintain instream flow. 13

An 'indirect'

approach is one where an

activity, or course or combination of activities, result in more water
remaining in a water course, where the primary focus of the activity or
activities is not the restoration or maintenance of instream flow. 1 4 More

holistic management would require that water managers adopt both
direct and indirect approaches so as to most efficiently and effectively
restore and protect IFNs.
Examples of these tools or approaches are:
(A) measuring instream flow needs and scientifically determining
how much water needs to be kept instream to meet IFN ;15
16
(B) releasing stored water to restore and maintain instream flow;
7
(C) reducing or limiting withdrawals to enhance instream flow;

(D) timing diversions and changing points of diversions to enhance
instream flow; 8
(E) invoking watershed management to control land use impacts
on instream water quality and quantity; 9

12. See

TOM ANNEAR ET AL., INSTREAM FLOWS FOR RIVERINE RESOURCE STEWARDSHIP

129 (rev. ed. 2004).
13. See generallyJames D. Crammond, Leasing Water Rights For Instream low
Uses: A Survey of Water Transfer Policy, Practices, and Problems in the Pacific
Northwes4 26 ENVrL. L. 225, 228 (1996) (providing a review of instream water right

leasing approaches).
14.

See, e.g., Ginette Chapman, From Toilet to Tap: The Growing Use of Reclaimed

Water and the Legal System's Response, 47 ARIz. L. REv. 773, 781 (2005) (providing a
discussion about expanding reclaimed water as a means to more cost-effectively serve

municipal and industrial out-of-stream uses, where instream restoration is an indirect
benefit of such activities).
15.
THE

See, e.g., G.
SOUTH

KASEY CLIPPERTON ET AL., INSTREAM FLOw NEEDS DETERMINATIONS FOR
SASKATCHEWAN
RIVER
BASIN,
ALBERTA,
CANADA
iii (2003),

http://ssrb.environment.alberta.ca/pubs/IFNMainReport.pdf.
Although
determining IFN is not restoring or protecting it, it is an important step to these ends.
16. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy
Dist. (In re Applications for Water Rights of Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy
Dist.), 838 P.2d 840, 845 (Colo. 1992).
17. See, e.g., Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Skagit County, 158 P.3d 1179, 1180
(Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
18. See, e.g., Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. City of Central, 125 P.3d 424, 440

(Colo. 2005).
19. See, e.g., SwimmiNG UPSTREAM: COLLABORATWE APPROACHES
MANAGEMENT 32 (Paul A. Sabatier et al. eds., 2005); KENNETH N.
HYDROLOGYAND THE MANAGEMENT OF WATERSHEDS 5 (3d ed. 2003).
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(F) moving from supply side to demand side management to
reduce demand, improve water use efficiency and conservation,
20
and provide opportunities for more water to be left instream;
with the result of there being
(G) adopting water conservation
21
more water instream;

(H) managing groundwater and surface water conjunctively so as to
most efficiently utilize supplies and consequently22provide
opportunities for more water to be left instream;
(I) recycling and reusing water supplies with the result that less
water is diverted from a watercourse, leaving more water
instream;

23

(J) invoking
federal reserve rights to restore and protect instream
24

water;
(K) using court or government action pursuant to species
protection legislation to compel water to be left or put
instream.25
This paper is based on the assumption that an approach or tool will
be successful only if it may easily operate within the prevailing water
rights and management law and policy framework. It is also an
assumption that by understanding to what extent an approach or tool
may operate within a framework, law and policy makers, and other
water managers, can better understand the limitations of a framework
when attempting to restore and protect aquatic ecosystems. This paper
demonstrates how western North American water rights and
management laws and policies are, in many ways, abrasive towards the
implementation of various approaches to restore and protect instream
flow. This paper argues that when this is the case, a government has a
range of choices from sitting back and allowing water rights and
management laws and policies to continue, thereby maintaining the
status quo for instream values, to tinkering with water rights
frameworks, to aggressively stepping in and modifying water rights and
management laws and policies to better enable and facilitate the
implementation of water management approaches that can lead to a
better aquatic environment. This paper takes a comparative law
approach, comparing the legal and policy water rights frameworks in
western Canada, as typified by the province of Alberta, with various
western U.S. states. Additionally, this paper contrasts both western
North American approaches with those of South Africa and Australia.
20.

See, e.g., ANTHONY G.

WILLARDSON,

WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, WATER

CONSERVATION AND WESTERN WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 4-5 (1983).

21.

Id. at 9.

22.

See, e.g., THOMAS C. WINTER ET AL., UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
GROUNDWATER AND SURFACE WATER: A SINGLE RESOURCE 76 (1998), available at

http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ 139/.
23. See Chapman, supranote 14, at 774-75.
24. See, e.g., Avondale Irrigation Dist. v. N. Idaho Props., Inc., 577 P.2d 9, (Idaho
1978).
25. E.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c) (2) (2006).
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Part II of this paper describes the legal and policy water rights
frameworks in western North America, as typified by Alberta, and in the
western U.S. states. Part III sets out legal and policy barriers inherent to
these frameworks that make it difficult for governments to replenish
and protect instream flow via new water management approaches. Part
IV describes legal tools and mechanisms that jurisdictions have invoked
in connection with restoring or protecting instream flows, and describes
law and policy obstacles to their implementation. Part V considers ways
to overcome barriers to instream flow restoration and protection. It
explores water law and policy reform in South Africa and Australia as
examples of jurisdictions that have intervened in their water rights and
management frameworks to implement new water management
approaches, and generally to make water rights and management more
efficient and equitable. Part VI sets out a range of interventions, from
modest to major, that a western North American jurisdiction might
explore to better facilitate the restoration and maintenance of IFNs and
identifies policy considerations regarding each intervention.
I. NORTH AMERICAN LEGAL WATER MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORKS AND RESTORING AND PROTECTING
ENVIRONMENTAL FLOWS
A. EVOLUTION OF WATER RIGHTS AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN NORTH

AMERICA

1. Riparian Rights
In the 1800's both the western United States and western Canada
developed water rights systems based on "first in time, first in right"
("FTFR") in an attempt to address deficiencies in the prevailing
common law.26 The prevailing common law in the early 1800's in both
countries was riparian rights. 27 A riparian owner is a person whose land
abuts the shore of a natural watercourse, such as a river or a creek, or a
natural body of water, such as a lake. 28 At common law, riparian owners
or occupants

possessed

"riparian rights."29

Although

there are

numerous riparian rights, the primary one is the right to use water.?0 At
common law, a riparian owner or occupier has the right to have the
water continue to flow past the property in its natural state.31 Generally,
there is not limit on the amount of water that a riparian owner may
take for domestic purposes on the land itself.32

"Domestic purposes"

26. See, e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 141-42 (1855); Arlene J. Kwasniak,

Quenching Instream Thirst: A Role for Water Trusts in the PrairieProvinces, 16 J.
ENVrL. L. &PRkc. 211, 218 (2006) [hereinafter Kwasniak, Instream].
27. See e.g., Irwin, 5 Cal. at 143; Kwasniak, supra note 26.
28. Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Ark. 1955).

29. Id.
Id. at 133
31. Id.
32. Id. at 132-34 (holding that use of water for domestic purposes holds no
30.
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means household purposes such as water for drinking, cooking, fire
control, and for watering domestic livestock."3 If a riparian owner uses
the water for an "extraordinary" purpose, such as a commercial
enterprise, the use must be reasonable, and the user must return the
water to the watercourse substantially unaltered in quantity and
quality. 4
2. Western U.S. Prior Appropriation Water Rights
Western U.S. state FFFR water rights, known as "prior appropriation
water rights," developed at common law.35 They originally developed
because water rights based on riparian ownership did not facilitate
mining on federal public lands, where there was not a riparian water
source.36 Common law "pure" appropriation rights were much like
staking a mining claim.37 An appropriator went to a stream, diverted
water by using some kind of structure, dug a ditch, and installed a
device to regulate flow from the stream to the ditch.38 The ditch carried
the water to where the owner would put it to use.3 9 The common law of
prior appropriation became established through courts recognizing and
upholding diversions as a species of property right40 that vested by the
appropriator applying the water from a natural stream to a beneficial
In time, prior
use, without waste, and with due diligence. 1
appropriation states recognized a variety of uses as beneficial, includin
household uses, agricultural uses, municipal uses, and industrial uses.
Many states now recognize, either statutorily or through case law,
recreational, or instream uses, 43 as beneficial uses.
As property rights, U.S. appropriation rights are constitutionally
protected through the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.' This means that government cannot expropriate or "take"
a water right, insofar as it is constitutionally protected, without due process

restriction against those seeking to use the water for irrigation, manufacturing, fishing,
or recreation).
33. Id. at 133.
34. See Consol. Water Supply Co. v. State Hosp. for Criminal Insane, 66 Pa. Super.
610,5 (1917).
35. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882).
36. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140,145-46 (1885).
37. Id. at 147.
38. State ex rel. Sorensen v. Mitchell Irr. Dist., 262 N.W. 543, 545 (Neb. 1935);
JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS 118
(3d ed. 2000).
39. SAX ETAL., supra note 38, at 118.
40. SeeI4in, 5 Cal. at 142, 146-47.
41.

SAX ET AL., supra note 38, at 98.

42. Id. at 125.
43.

See, e.g.,

s

ADAM SCHEMPP, WESTERN WATER IN THE 2 1 T CENTURY, POLICIES AND

PROGRAMS THAT STRETCH SUPPLIES IN A PRIOR APPROPRIATION WORLD

12 (2009). For a

summary regarding states recognizing instream uses as beneficial uses see
AL., supranote 12, at 74-75.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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and compensation.45 If another appropriator questions an appropriation
right, a lawsuit might ensue and a court would adjudicate appropriation
claims. A court enforces appropriation rights against other
appropriators in accordance with the FTFR principle such that earlier
appropriation rights have a greater right (priority) to water put to a
beneficial use than later appropriation rights. 46 Such adjudication is

possible because courts interpret appropriation rights as property rights
enforceable against the world. However, because appropriation rights
are property rights, junior appropriators may attack those rights by
claiming forfeiture or abandonment of senior rights, thus bettering
their own position.47
Early in the history of appropriation rights, the government rarely,
48
if ever, involved itself in the acquisition of an appropriation right.

Eventually appropriation states developed permit systems, but some
scholars have deemed these systems essentially "recording devices.'A9 In
other words, a right did not arise because of the issuance of a permit.
The right arose at common law, and the permitting system perfected
and recorded them. Eventually all appropriation states, save Colorado,
developed permit systems.5 ° However, there is a question regarding
how much discretion a public authority may exercise in carrying out
permitting functions in the face of available water and the satisfaction of
common law rules for appropriation. This is especially true in states
where the state constitution recognizes the right to appropriate. 1
3. Western Canadian Prior Allocation Water Rights
The Canadian Dominion realized early in western Canadian history
that water use rights based on riparian ownership or occupancy would
not be appropriate for settlers in the arid western prairie provinces. 2
To attract settlement in the dry prairies, the Canadian Dominion
45. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. There are issues surrounding what would amount to a
"taking" of a U.S. FTFR water right. For example, would a modification of a right in the
public interest so that less water may be appropriated in times of shortage to allow some
water to remain instream constitute a "taking?" See Sandra B. Zellmer and Jessica
Harder, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Law Center, Water as Property, available at
http://watercenter.unl.edu/Downloads/ResearchInBrief/WaterAsPropertyUnicameral
(last visited Apr. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Zellmer and Harder, Property] (referencingJ. H.
Archer & T. W. Stone, The Interactionof the Public Trust and the 'Takings" Doctrines:
Protection Wetlands and Crtical CoastalAreas, 20 VT. L. REv. 81, 115 (1995)). See also
Sandra B. Zellmer and Jessica Harder, Unbundling Propery in Water, 59 ALA. L. REV.
679 (2008).
46. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882).
47. E.g.,Jenkins v. State Dep't of Water Res., 647 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Idaho 1982).
48. SAX ET AL., supra note 38, at 132.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 131.
51. The strongest statement arises in Article 16, section 6 of Colorado's constitution,
which states that the "right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to
beneficial uses shall never be denied." COLO. CONsT. art. 16, § 6 (2009).
52. David R. Percy, Water Law of the Canadian West: Influences from the Western
States, in LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT, LAW FOR THE BEAvER 274, 281 (John McLaren et al.
eds. 1992) [hereinafter Percy, Canadian];Kwasniak, supra note 26, at 218.
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needed to convince prospective settlers of the suitability of the land for
farming." A key element was the Dominion demonstrating sufficient

water supplies.54 Under the North-West Territories Act of 1870, "5the

area then comprising the North-West Territories56 received all English
law relating to water. 17 This meant that the common law of riparian
rights, at least at first, governed the North-West territories. The doctrine
of riparian rights, however, was not a suitable water rights system to
attract settlers to the dry prairies.58 Canadian Parliament, in seeking a
solution, looked to jurisdictions that had to some degree ousted
riparian rights to facilitate agriculture in the face of aridity.5 9 It looked
to Victoria, Australia, where the Legislature passed the Irrigation Act
(1886) that claimed Crown ownership of surface water and initiated a
government-controlled water rights system.60 It also looked to the
western U.S. states where prior appropriation water rights developed at
common law. 6' Parliament settled on a legislative solution with the
North-West Irrigation Act of 1894.62 This Act introduced a water rights
system similar to U.S. prior appropriation in that the Act incorporated
the principle of FTFR. 6 The Act based priority to water on the date of
completed application to the public authority. 64 In times of shortage,
junior licensees - those with a later dated priority - had no right to
water until all senior rights became satisfied.65 Until 1930, water
management for the prairies rested with the federal government, but
after 1930, with the federal transfer of natural resources to Manitoba,
Alberta, and Saskatchewan, water resource legislative authority and
management fell within provincial jurisdiction.66 Subsequent to the
transfer, each of these provinces passed
water management legislation
67
that largely mirrored the federal Act.
53. See Percy, Canadian,supra note 52, at 281.
54. Id.
55. The North-West Territories Act, 50 RS.C., 1893 60-61 Vic., c. 28, s 4 (Can.).
56. The Northwest Territory initially consisted of what is today the Yukon Territory,
most of the Northwest Territory, northern Alberta and northern Saskatchewan (which
today comprises northern Quebec and Ontario), the entire province of Manitoba, most
of Saskatchewan, and part of Alberta. See David J. Hall, North-West Territories,18701905,
in
CANADIAN
. ENCYCLOPEDIA
(2010),
available
at
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Params=AlARTA00058
05 (last visited Apr. 1, 2010); C. MARTIN,"DOMINION LANDS" POLCY2-5 (1938).
57. See John E. C6t6, The Introductionof English Law into Alberta, 3 ALTA L. REv.
262, 264 (1964).
58. See Percy, supra note 52, at 275-76.
59. Id. at 275-76, 285.
60. Id. at 285; EDWYNA HARRIS, AN EXAMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS IN TRANSITION IN
COLONIAL

VICTORIA,

AUsTRAiA

1840-1886

15

(2006)

http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE06/PapersO6/03.4/harris.pdf.
61. Percy, Canadian,supra note 52, at 282-83.
62. North-West Irrigation Act, 61 Vict., S.C., ch. 35, s 4 (1894), amended by 1898 ch.
35 (Can.).
63. Id.at s. 25.
64. Id.
65. Id,
66. Percy, supra note 52, at 285.
67. Alta. Water Act, RS.A. 2000, c. W-3, s. 30 (Can.); Water Rights Act, R.S.M. 1988,
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FTFR water rights in western Canada exist as statutory rights.' For
example, the Alberta government allocateswater to users pursuant to
statutory authority in contrast to users in western U.S. appropriating
water in accordance with common law and legislation.69 Hence, the
government licenses prior allocation statutory FTFR rights in Alberta, in
contrast to western U.S. prior appropriation rights.7 ° As well, western
Canadian FTFR rights in all likelihood are not property rights, although
the courts have not determined this matter. Legal scholars, however,
7
have suggested that these water rights do not confer a property right. '
In any case, under legislation only the government can enforce prior
allocation water rights, and these rights are not enforceable against the
world. So, if a junior licensee wishes to challenge a senior right, the
junior is at the mercy of the government. If, for example, the
government chooses not to pursue a forfeiture allegation, there is little
or nothing that the junior can do.72
Unlike the United States, neither the Canadian Constitution nor
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms protect property rights. 73 So even

if water allocation rights were property rights, there is no constitutional
guarantee of procedural or substantive due process if a level of
government attempts to modify or extract them.7 Finally, in contrast to
ch. W80, s. 8; Saskatchewan Watershed Authority Act, S.S. 2005, ch. S-35.03, s. 50.
68. North-west Irrigation Act, 1898 61 Vict., S.C., ch. 35, s. 4 (Can.).
69. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. 16, § 5; Oldman River Basin Water Allocation Order
(Water Act) Alberta Regulation 319/2003 (Can.); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6
Colo. 443, 446-47 (1882).
70. See Oldman River Basin Water Allocation Order (Water Act) Alberta Regulation
319/2003 (Can.).
71. See, e.g., ALASTAIR R. LUCAS, SEcuRrrY OF TITLE IN CANADIAN WATER RIGHTS 31
(1990). This claim is made only of licensed water allocation rights and not of water
rights generally. Riparian rights for domestic use have, in a limited manner, survived
water resource legislation. Riparian rights are usufructory property rights.
72. Alta. Water Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W-3, s. 55(1) (f) (Can.) (authorizing a director to
cancel or suspend a license for lack of use in limited circumstances, with no citizen
enforcement provision in the Water Act. Although private prosecutions are possible
under Canadian law, this process is available only where the offense is clear).
73. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprintedin R.S.C., No.
5 (Appendix 1985); Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act 1982,
Part I.
74. See Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprintedin R.S.C., No.
5 (Appendix 1985). There is no mention of property rights, and due process
guarantees in Canada's Constitution. Not surprisingly, although there is ample
Canadian case law dealing with out-and-out expropriations of land, there is no body of
jurisprudence dealing with alleged regulatory takings, as there is in the United States.
Of the occasional cases where Canadian litigants ask courts to order compensation
where government action has restricted a property right, most attempts are
unsuccessful. This is because the tests for a regulatory taking are strict and hard to
establish. The Queen in Right of British Columbia v. Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533 (Can.)
is one of the leading "takings" cases or, as it is often called in Canada, de facto
expropriation cases. The Plaintiffs owned mineral claims granted by the Province of
British Columbia. Id, at 6. The B.C. government, through legislation and regulatory
actions, made it impossible for the Teners to access their claims to develop them. Id. at
24. The Plaintiffs were successful in their de facto expropriation claim, but the Supreme
Court laid down strict rules for establishing it. Plaintiffs must prove:
(a) The existence of a property interest that was extracted by virtue of
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U.S. prior appropriation states, in Alberta "beneficial use" concerns
neither the measure nor the limit of a prior allocation right. 75 In fact,

the notion plays no formal, legal role in determining the nature of an
Alberta water right. Legislation sets out the measure and limits of a
prior allocation right.76 Under Alberta legislation, the water right is the
right to divert, and the measure and limits are the quantity of water,
rate and diversion point stated in a license, expressed purpose for the
diversion, stated conditions of use, and applicable rights and limitations
under prevailing legislation.77
Hence, to avoid confusion, when
referring to Alberta water law, this paper does not employ the term
"beneficial use." Instead, it uses the expression "licensable use."
B. PRIOR APPROPRIATION,

PRIOR ALLOCATION, AND INSTREAM FLOW

One of the gravest consequences of water shortages on both sides of
the U.S./Canada border is the impact on instream flow needs. The
exercise of prior appropriation and prior allocation water rights can
completely dewater rivers and streams.78 There is nothing inherent to
these systems to stop appropriators or allocators from exercising their
rights, albeit in accordance with the FTFR principle. In pure prior
appropriation or allocation systems, those based only on FFFR and
appropriation or allocation entitlement without conditions, the
government may only stop out of stream diversions from water scarce
areas when it takes emergency action. 79 Governments normally are
hesitant to declare emergencies (which usually remove governance
from Legislature to the Executive during the emergency), and courts
are hesitant to endorse government action if a party challenges it.8 ° As
government legislation,

(b) The deprivation of the interest by government action,
(c) The acquisition of the interest by the government, and
(d) That legislation explicitly or implicitly provides for compensation for the
taking of the right.
Regarding (a): the fact that the mineral interest was an interest in land was not
contested. It was either a property interest in the nature of a proFit a prendre that
consisted of an access right and exploitation right, or a simple mineral title interest. Id.
at 3, 6. Regarding (b): the Supreme Court found that the government's absolute refusal
to issue a permit amounted to total extraction of the interest. Id. at 23-24 The Teners
were left with nothing. Regarding (c): the Supreme Court noted that once the Crown
de facto extinguished the Teners' interest, the right to access or profit a prendre, was,
in effect, absorbed back into the Crown's fee title. Id. at 3. Regarding (d): the Supreme
Court found that there was an explicit right to compensation under the British
Columbia Parks. Id. at 4; see also British Columbia Park Act, 1996, ch. 344, §§ 6, 9, 11,
18 (B.C. 2009).
75. See generallyThe Alberta Water Act, § 51; Water (Ministerial) Regulation, ALTA.
REG. 205/1998, § 11 (2010) (including, as licensable purposes, management of wildlife,
habitat enhancement, and recreation) (Can).
76. See generallyThe Alberta Water Act, § 51.
77. See generalyThe Alberta Water Act, § 51.

78. ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FoLI.Es: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF
AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS 16-17 (2002); Kwasniak, supra note 26, at 215.
79. See Kwasniak, supra note 26, at 221.
80. For example, Canadian case law indicates that courts usually will allow executive
exercise of legislated emergency powers only in extreme situations of clearly unforeseen
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well, western U.S. governments may be reluctant to prohibit or limit
diversions for fear of interference with property rights. Western
Canadian governments also may be reluctant to take emergency
measures but more because of their concerns about interference with
vested rights, since allocation rights likely do not amount to property
rights.
II. LEGAL BARRIERS INHERENT IN NORTH AMERICAN LEGAL
WATER MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS TO ADOPTING NEW
MANAGEMENT APPROACHES TO RESTORE AND PROTECT
ENVIRONMENTAL FLOWS
A. INTRODUCTION

There are legal and policy barriers inherent to prior appropriation
and prior allocation frameworks that make it difficult for governments
to replenish and protect instream flow through the use of new water
management approaches. This part of the paper sets out some, though
not all, of such barriers. This paper identifies a core aspect of prior
appropriation or allocation and then describes how it can be a barrier
to new approaches to water management to restore or protect instream
flow. Although the discussion is not exhaustive of how prior
appropriation or allocation can pose a barrier, it covers, at least once,
each new water management approach Part I identifies.
B "USE IT OR LOSE IT" (FORFEITURE)
Western U.S. prior appropriation water rights are based on the
premise that if water is not used for a beneficial purpose, the holder
forfeits the right, in whole or part.81 Hence, the maxim "use it or lose

it" applies. Since the provincial government legislates prior allocation
rights, and these rights are not common law rights, the government
must legislate any "use it or lose it" provisions.82 Alberta's provisions are
considerably weak. The Director may only cancel a license for lack of
use if the licensee does not use the water for three years or more, and
the Director foresees no reasonable prospect of any water use in the
future. There is no provision for partial cancellations, except where
emergencies and that the powers may only be exercised during the emergency and no
longer. See, e.g., Kuypers v. Langley, [1992] CarswellBC 9,
16, 21, 22, 52 (Can.). In
Kuypers, the defendant township declared via by-law a state of emergency pursuant to
emergency powers in municipal legislation with regard to the frequency and severity of
unprovoked attacks by "dangerous dogs." Id. at
16, 21-23. Justice Hogarth of the

British Columbia Supreme Court determined that there was no "emergency," as defined
in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary definition of emergency as "the sudden or
unexpected occurrence (of a state of things)." Id. at 22. Applying this to instream
flow, a court would likely not find such deficits to be "sudden and unexpected" and, in

any case, instream flow normally would require replenishment beyond an actual
emergency situation.
81. Sears v. Berryman, 623 P.2d 455, 459 (Idaho 1981).
82. See, e.g. Alta. Water Act, R1S.A. 2000, c. W-3 (Can.)
83. Alta. Water Act, RS.A. 2000, c. W-3, s. 55(1)(f) (Can.).
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works are insufficient to handle the entire allocation. 4 Accordingly, in
contrast to U.S. appropriators, "use it or lose it" should not be a huge
threat to Alberta allocators if they choose to leave unneeded amounts
instream. On the other hand, the legislated version of "use it or lose it"
does not function to facilitate leaving water instream, and nothing
prevents other allocators from using the amounts left instream.
The "use it or lose it" threat is thus an incentive to use one's
maximum appropriation, whether or not an appropriator or allocator
needs it. Here are some examples regarding how "use it or lose it" acts
as a disincentive to some of the new water management approaches set
out in Part I:
(c) Reducing or limiting withdrawals to enhance instream flow
"Use or lose it" is a disincentive to reduce or limit permitted
withdrawals to enhance instream flow.
(I) Moving from supply side to demand side management to reduce
demand, improve water use efficiency and conservation, and
provide opportunitiesfor more water to be left instream:
"Use it or lose it" is a disincentive to moving from supply side to
demand side as not using an entire permitted amount could lead
to loss of right.
(g) Adopting water conservation with the result of there being more
waterinstream:
"use it or lose it" is a disincentive to adopting water conservation
because the conservator could lose part of a water right through
conservation measures.8 5
Some states have taken steps to relax "use it or lose it" in order to
increase instream flow. The earliest example of this approach is
Oregon's 1987 Conserved Water Statute.8 6 The legislation establishes a
voluntary program that allows water rights holders to sell or lease up to
75% of water they conserve without losing water rights in accordance
with "use it lose it."87 Under the statute, the state allocates at least 25%
of conserved water for instream use. 8 In 1995 the Montana Legislature
modified its water use legislation to enable water right holders to lease
all or a portion of their water rights to the Montana Water Trust such
that the amount left instream is not subject to the "use it or lose it"

84. Id. s. 54(1) (a) (vii).
85. Some states have gotten around this by declaring conserved water a beneficial
use. For example, Texas explicitly recognizes conserved water, meaning water "saved by
a holder of an existing permit, certified filing, or certificate of adjudication through
practices, techniques, and technologies that would otherwise be irretrievably lost to all
consumptive beneficial uses arising from storage, transportation, distribution, or
application." See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.002(9) (Vernon 2009). The requirement
that the water would dissipate if not conserved limits the utility of this provision for
restoring instream flows. California has a similar provision, see CAL. WATER CODE §
1011(a) (West 2010).
86. OR. REv. STAT. §537.460 (2009).
87. Id. §§ 537.470(3), .490(2).
88. Id. §537.470(3).
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maxim.89 Although such statutory modifications of the "use it or lose it"
aspect of the prior appropriation doctrine have occurred, such
incidents are piecemeal and do not address the underlying anti-water
conservation policy of the prior appropriation system.
C. "FIRST IN TIME FIRST IN RIGHT"

Core to both prior appropriation and prior allocation legal
frameworks is that the earlier the water right, the better the priority to
water in times of shortage. 90 Here are some examples of how FFR can
act as a barrier or disincentive to adopting some of the new water
management approaches to restore or protect instream flow identified
in Part 1:
(a) Measuringinstream flow needs and scientificallydetermining
how much water needs to be kept instream to meet IFN. Although
FTFR does not prevent measuring instream flow needs and
scientifically determining how much water needs to remain
instream to meet IFN, it prevents protection in fully or over
allocated water courses unless water rights become transferred to
instream uses.9' Further, as the next Part demonstrates, there are
legal barriers to instream water rights being full players in the water
rights acquisition or transfer regimes.
(b) Releasing stored water to restore and maintain instream flow:
Generally speaking, stored water must be used in accordance with
the permitted, beneficial use of the appropriation or allocation
right.92 Accordingly, unless the permitted purpose of stored water is
to enhance instream flow, a user may not place water in storage
unless for that purpose.93 As well, as Professor Dan Tarlock points
out, stored water backstops water rights to relieve the sting of
shortages by making water rights firm even in water short years. 4 If
anything, storing water when it is not immediately required reduces
water instream that might otherwise be available for instream
purposes. 5
89. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(2) (a) (2009); Rob Chaney, Missoula-BasedClark
Fork Coalition Takes In Montana Water Trust MISsOuLIAN, Feb. 26, 2010, available at
http://www.missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/article fa00d51 e-2290-11 df-a6d2001cc4c002e0.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010); SASHA CHARNEY, COLO. WATER
CONSERVATION BD., AN ANALYSIs OF INSTREAM FLOw PROGRAMS IN COLORADO AND THE
WESTERN
UNITED
STATES
39,
45,
47
(2005)

http://cwcb.state.co.us/NR/rdonlyres/140CFE4B-65FC-47C5-9A2699CCB45A8D45/0/ISFCompStudyFinalRpt.pdf.
90. See Archuleta v. Gomez, 140 P.3d 281, 284 (Colo. App. 2006); Berscheid v.
Ensign, [1999] CarsweUBC 1111, 10 (Can.).
91. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of PriorAppropriation in the New
Wes4 41 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 769, 772 (2001).
92. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305 (9) (a) (2009).
93. Id.
94. Tarlock, supanote 91, at 771.
95. However, a storage right may not be exercised if it interferes with other
appropriative rights. This is because the right to store water rather than to use it directly
from a source is subject to the no injury rule. For example, an irrigator may not exercise
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(h) Managinggroundwaterand surface water conjunctively so as to.
most efficiently utilize supplies and consequently provide
opportunitiesfor more water to be left instream:Water rights based
on F1FR are not always conducive to managing groundwater and
surface water conjunctively. Experts report that
[s] treams and rivers and shallow groundwater (or underfiow)
are often hydrologically linked. When such water is extracted
from shallow groundwater aquifers, there may be related
short- or long-term reductions in connected surface flows....
Consequently, the regulation and allocation of water should
recognize the tributary relation between subsurface and
surface waters.9 6
Unfortunately, until fairly recently, groundwater rights based on
FFFR could be acquired without consideration of instream flow
impacts, including any adverse impacts during low flow periods.97
More enlightened water management would require groundwater
withdrawals to avoid adverse impacts on instream flow during low
flow periods, while enabling the groundwater user to store water for
use during low flow conditions.
Even more worrisome than the fact that FITFR groundwater and
FTFR surface water rights may not coalesce to result in efficient and
instream flow-friendly water management is the fact that much
groundwater use remains unregulated.98 This is groundwater that
domestic users divert under a well exemption from the priority
system. 99 If a jurisdiction has an exempt well policy, then a
groundwater user may divert water up to the amount of the
exemption for any exempt purpose without an appropriation
permit.' ° Professor Glennon states that most all states do not
regulate exempt wells.'01 He surmises that "[m]ost states have tens
of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands, of exempt wells" and
that most of them are "relatively shallow and usually located near
rivers, streams, or wetlands [and] their cumulative impact on

a water fight to store water for future irrigation if removing the water from source
would interfere with the rights of other appropriators. See 45 AM.JUR. 2D Iigdation § 8
(2007).
96. ANNEARETAL.,supranote 12, at 76.
97. Most, but not all, western states, subject to various exceptions, regulate
groundwater based on FTFR States using this method include Alaska, Colorado, Idaho,
Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming. See JOHN W. JOHNSON, UNrrED STATES WATER LAW: AN
INTRODUcTION 66 (2009). The exceptions are discussed in the text of this paper circa
this note. "Most states today recognize at least some connection between groundwater
and surface streams." Id. at 69. For example, Colorado now defines "groundwater" as

tributary to surface water in some situations. , see.also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90103(10.5), (10.7) (2009) (defining groundwater in terms of nontributary and not
nontributary).
98.

See

GLENNON supranote

78, at 59.

99. Id.
100. Id.; see, e.g., S.D. CODIrIED LAWS
101.

GLENNON supra note 78, at 59.

§ 46-5-8 (2009).

WATER LA W REVIEW

surface flows can be substantial."

Volume 13

10 2

(i) Recycling and reusing water supplies with the result that less
water is diverted from a watercourse, leavIng more water
instream:
FTFR water rights legal systems do not always easily
accommodate recycling and reusing water supplies, and thus do
not easily accommodate returning recycled, reused water to the
stream for the purpose of protecting instream flow.'1 3 FTFR
rights originally were premised on water being taken from a river
or other natural source and Put to beneficial use or, in western
Canada, to a licensable use. 0' Gradually, rights to store water
developed within apporopriation or allocation systems to be put to
use when needed.'0 5 However, F1TR rights as they originally
developed did not accommodate the secondary re-use or
recycling of water after being put to the original beneficial or
licensable use.0 6 As a result, in a given jurisdiction there may be
a question as to whether one may appropriate or allocate water
that is recycled or waste. A related question is whether re-use or
recycling is permissible in a water rights legal system, or whether
one must return the water to its source after the primary use and
make it available to other appropriators or allocators. States and
provinces have developed an array of approaches to resolve these
issues. 107
102. Id.
103. For an exception that enables the legal protection of water for instream uses, see
CAL. WATER CODE §

1210 (West 2009).

104. Alberta Statutes, R-S.A. 2000, c. W-3, s. 49(1) (Can.); see geneiallyJOHNSON,
supra note 97, at 66.
105. SeeA DANTARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 5.37 (2009).
106. James W. Johnson et al., Reuse of Water: Policy Conflicts and New Directions,38
ROCKYMTN. MrN. L. INST. § 23.01, § 23.02 (1992).
107. For example, regarding whether waste or recycled water may be appropriated,
under Arizona law: "The waters of all sources, flowing in streams ... waste or surplus
water ... belong to the public and are subject to appropriation and beneficial use ......
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-141 (A) (2006).
Read plainly, Arizona law permits
appropriation of wastewater. By contrast, the Colorado constitution refers only to the
appropriation of "natural" streams and waters, therefore, assuming wastewater is not
.natural water" it cannot be appropriated. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. Nevada law
authorizes appropriation from "all sources of water supply" and thus should include
wastewater or recycled water. NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 533.025 (2009). But under
Wyoming law, appropriation of wastewater is unlikely since the Wyoming constitution
only enables the water of "natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still
water" to be state water, and a statute provides that only state water may be
appropriated. WYO. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101 (2010). In Alberta,
"water" means "all water on or under the surface of the ground, whether in liquid or
solid state." Alta. Water Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W-3, s. 1 (ffl) (Can.). Thus, although there
is no case authority on the issue, arguably 'water" includes wastewater or recycled water.
Regarding the legal question of whether used water must be returned to source, the
common law "rule of return to common supply" can foil plans to re-use or recycle water.
SeeJohnson et al., supra note 106, at § 23.02. The rule of return to common supply
dictates, "water not consumed in the initial beneficial use must be allowed to return to
the common supply for the benefit of other water users." Id. In the above referenced
1992 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute publication, the authors suggest that
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D. BENEFICIAL USE OR LICENSABLE USE

Core to appropriation rights is the requirement that users put the
water to a beneficial use.1" 8 Similarly, western Canada's water allocation
system requires a licensable use. 0 9 The beneficial/licensable use
requirement could encumber approaches to effect instream flow
restoration and protection identified in Part I:
Measuring instream flow needs (IFV) and scientifically
determining how much water needs to be kept instream to
meet IF7."
A prior appropriation or allocation framework cannot protect
necessary instream flow water unless the state recognizes
instream flow as a beneficial or licensable use of water.11 0 Over
the last few decades, all western U.S. states, with the possible
exception of New Mexico, have recognized at least some
However, the range of
instream use as a beneficial use.'
to
state, and states do not
state
beneficial instream uses vary from
typically include all instream uses that need protection Most
western U.S. state-legislated definitions of instream use as a
beneficial use include water for fish, but only Idaho and
2
Washington specifically mention other aquatic life besides fish."
Idaho is the only state to explicitly mention aesthetic beauty in its
statute," 3 and together with Oregon, they are the only states with4
statutes to specifically mention pollution control or abatement."
Idaho limits what may be considered an instream beneficial use
to "minimum stream flows"" 5 which, as instream flow experts
point out, may be inadequate to meet instream flow needs ideally

(a)

"[m]ost reuse cases can be viewed as exceptions to the rule," and that these exceptions
"have arisen in a specific context" where there was "in the court's view, a desirable social
policy or specific factual circumstances favoring the permitted reuse." Id. There has
been much litigation in the southwest U.S. on whether used water must be returned to
source as a matter of law. In the context of municipal and industrial effluent cases, for
example, in 1925 the Wyoming Supreme Court determined that effluent is such a
noxious substance that it may be disposed of in any way the city sees fit. Id. § 23.04;
Wyo. Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., 236 P. 764, 772 (Wyo. 1925). A few
years prior, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that water may be reused or
otherwise disposed of but only if it is uneconomical to return it to the common supply.
Johnson et al., supranote 106, at § 23.04; Pulaski Irrigation Ditch Co. v. City of Trinidad
203 P. 681, 683 (Colo. 1922). The Colorado approach differed from Wyoming because
it seemed to create an obligation to explore all practicable alternatives to enable a
return to the common supply, prior to disposal of effluent by evaporation. Johnson et
al., supra note 106, at § 23.04.
108. TARLOc, supranote 91, at 74.
109. Alta. Water Act, LSA 2000, c. W-3, s. 49(1) (Can.).
110: SeeANNEARETAL., supranote 12, at 75.
111. Id. at 12, 57-70.
112. Id.
113. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1501 (2009).
114. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1734A(1)(d) (2009); OR. REv. STAT. § 537.336(2)
(2007).
115. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1501 (2009).
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based on a "natural flow paradigm."" 6 These are but a few
examples of the limitations on beneficial use recognition for
instream flow.
The western Canadian provinces fare about the same. For
example, Alberta's legislation specifically allows a number of
instream type uses to be licensed, but the list is not
comprehensive." 7 Accordingly, even though a state or province
recognizes instream use as a beneficial or licensable use, it does
not follow that the state or province enables the protection of all
instream values.
E.

INFLEXIBILITY REGARDING CHANGES OF DIVERSION POINT OR TIMING
OF DIVERSION

Instream flow can be enhanced from time to time if water users
change the timing or the point of diversion." 8 Here are examples of
how this inflexibility poses difficulties in applying some of the new
approaches to water management to enhance or protect instream flow:
(d) Timing diversionsand changingpoints of diversionsto enhance
instreamflow.
Prior appropriation and prior allocation water rights systems are
inherently inflexible in this regard. Since these systems remain
based on KLFR, the systems must, as much as possible, require
that users retain the original conditions of use so that neither
senior nor junior expectations for water are defeated by
alteration of rights.1' 9 This results in burdensome administrative
requirements for changing diversion point or timing, even when
such changes
do notmust
impact
users."'
For for
example,
in
Alberta,
a licensee
applyother
to the
Director
a license

116. See Ruth Mathews, Instream Filow Protection and Restoration: Setting a New
Compass Point,36 ENVrL. L. 1311, 1327 (2006) (discussing the "natural flow paradigm"
as the optimal system and explaining "natural flow paradigm" as accounting for the
seasonal patterns in terms of the magnitude, frequency, timing, and duration of the
natural flow for interanual and intrannual seasonal flow). See also NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES, THE SCIENCE OF INSTREAM FLows: A REVIEW OF THE
TEXAS INSTREAM FLow PROGRAM 140 (2005) (defining "minimum flow" to mean "[t]he
lowest streamflow required to protect some specified aquatic function as established by
agreement, rule, or permit," and "natural flow" as the "flow regime of a stream as it
occurs under completely unregulated conditions; that is, a stream not subjected to
regulation by reservoirs, diversions, or other human works.").
117. Water (Ministerial) Regulation, ALTA. REG. 205/1998, § 11 (2010) (including, as
licensable purposes, management of wildlife, habitat enhancement, and recreation)

(Can).
118. C£ Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. City of Central, 125 P.3d 424, 440 (Colo.
2005) (holding that municipality, in its administrative application to change certain
water rights and diversions thereto, must provide a comprehensive augmentation plan
to replace diverted waters so as not to violate the state's "no injury" statute, thereby
protecting an adjudicated instream flow water right holder as entitled to the protection
of the state's "no injury" statue).
119. Id.
120. Id; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (b) (2009) (outlining the required
administrative procedure to change an instream flow water right).
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amendment to change licence conditions of the

original

license."' The process may be subject to public notice and review
by those potentially "directly affected" by the amendment. -22
'
Comparable requirements apply in western prior appropriation
jurisdictions. 123
F. TIED TO TAND

Both prior appropriation and prior allocation rights are
conceptually related to the land to which the right applies. In both
western Canada and the western U.S., the FTFR water right was adopted
so that non-riparian land, and improvements on specific parcels of nonriparian land, could benefit from the use of water. 124 Again, in both
western Canada and the western U.S., water rights "attach" or are
"appurtenant" to specific parcels of land and, short of a water right
transfer to another parcel, which is a highly regulated process in most
jurisdictions, the attachment cannot be altered.12 5 If a water right is
transferred, the right remains appurtenant to land; it is just
appurtenant to a different parcel of land.1 26 This core aspect of prior
appropriation or allocation can pose a barrier to adopting a new water
management approach to restore or protect instream flow. For example
from Part I:
(a) Measuring instream flow needs and scientifically determining
how much waterneeds to be kept instream to meet IFAQ:

121. Alta. Water Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W-3, s. 54(1)(b) (Can.) (requiring that the
Director must be of the opinion that a change will not result in an "adverse effect on
the rights of a household user, other licensee or traditional agriculture user and that
the proposed change will not adversely affect the ability to conserve or manage a water
body.").
122. Id s. 115(1) (a) (i).
123. E.g., compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-402(12) (2009) (requiring the water
right holder to submit to the Water Resources Division an "application for change in
appropriation right") and Wyo. STAT. ANN § 41-3-104(a) (2009) (requiring the water
right holder to file a change "petition" with the Board of Control, which shall
determine that other appropriators are not injured by the change).
124. See generally United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 745-46
(1950) (discussing the origins of the prior appropriation doctrine); Irwin v. Phillips, 5.
Cal. 140, 146 (1855) (adopting prior appropriation doctrine); accordPercy, supra note
52, at 281.
125. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 449, 614 (1945) (holding that a water right is
appurtenant to the land) accordNevada v. United States., 463 U.S..108, 126 (1983); see
alsoLightning Creek Mining Co. v. Hopp, [1914] '19 B.C.R. 586, 43 (Can.) (holding
that a lease to certain real property necessarily included the granted water rights to that
certain real property as they are appurtenant and attach to the land).
126. See, e.g., Navajo Dev. Co., v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377-78 (Colo. 1982)
(holding that "water rights may be bought and sold without regard to the real property
over which the water flows" but such transfers are limited by the doctrine of prior
appropriation in that the water must still be put to beneficial use upon the land to
which it is appurtenant).
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Unless legislation has specifically addressed the appurtenancy
requirement, waters determined necessary for instream flow
cannot be protected within a prior appropriation or allocation
unless the appropriator or allocator owns land. 2 7 The law might
accommodate such a protection where the owner of the bed and
shores wishes to protect water instream. However, in western
Canada such a protection will be limited to the government,
because typically, beds and shores are Crown owned, thus
limiting the potential for private instream licenses.1 28 Western
U.S. law permits private or public ownership of beds and shores,
depending on the applicability of a complex body of law dealing
with the ownership of lands underlying navigable and nonnavigable waters. 129 With respect to private ownership, bed and
shores are owned by the owners of the land on both sides on
both sides of the water course. If the owners are not the same
person, the medium filum aquae rule applies so that each owner
owns the bed and shores adjacent to his or her property to the
One can easily see the difficulties
middle of the water course.'
a
person
who
wishes
to protect instreain water by
mounting for
using prior appropriation or allocation. First, for all practical
purposes, the main objective of these water rights frameworks has
been defeated as water rights depend on an incident of riparian
ownership, namely ownership of bed and shores. Second, the
entity which desires to protect water instream might well not be
the owner of the bed and shores, or in a shared ownership
situation, might only own half of the bed and shores. The
alternative to bed and shores ownership is that a would-be
instream flow protector owns land or has an interest in land
adjacent to a water course. But again, this requirement is counter
to the essence of prior allocation and appropriation, which is
meant to overcome requirements for riparian ownership or

127. But cf COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2009) (prohibiting anyone, even a
riparian landowner, from owning an instream flow water right); see also City of
Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1,94 (Colo. 1996) (declining to extend
protection of instream waters to a plaintiff appropriator using water in excess of its
decreed appropriation); but see COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(5) (granting certain
political subdivisions the right to make a "recreational in-channel diversion" thereby
gaining an instream flow water right); see generallyJoshua Mack, The Evolution of
Colorado's Recreational In-Channel Diversions, 10 U. DENV. WATER L. REv 73, 73-96

(2006).
128. Arlene Kwasniak, Alberta Crown Ownership of Slough/Marsh Wedands, 18 J.
ENVTL. L. & PRAc. 57, 79 (2008) (noting that in Canada, beds and shores of natural
streams and lakes are owned by the Federal Crown); see also North-west Irrigation Act,
61 Vict., S.C., ch. 35, s4 (1894), amended by 1898 ch. 35 (Can.); Alta. Water Act, R.SA.
2000, c. W-3, s. 3(2) (Can.) (noting that, currently, the Crown claims all waters, beds,
and shores in Alberta).
129; See generalyWELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN
STATES 130-35 (1972) (showing the wide variety of approaches different states' use).
130. C.T. Foster, Apportionment and Division of Area of River as Between Ripaian
Tracts Frontingon Same Bank, in Absence ofAgreement or Specification, 65 A-L.R.2D
143, § 8(a)(1) (2009).
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occupancy. It also severely limits who may hold an instream
license.
(e) Invoking watershedmanagement to control landuse impacts on
instream water quality and quantity
Watershed management involves conjunctive management of all
potential sources of impacts in a watershed.' 3 ' The doctrine of
appurtenancy is a barrier to watershed management because an
appropriation or allocation water right pertains only to the

appurtenant parcel of land that benefits from the water.1 3 2 If

water rights reflected the principles of watershed management,
then land uses that impact water quantity would require a water
right, even though the land does not directly benefit from the
use of water. For example, the development of a residential
subdivision that would result in less aquifer recharge (because of
asphalting over recharge areas thus diminishing instream flow)
is no appurtenant
would require a water right even though there
133
water.
of
use
the
from
benefits
that
parcel
Im. LEGAL TOOLS TO RESTORE AND PROTECT INSTREAM FLOW
A. INTRODUCTION

This Part of the paper describes legal or policy tools that have
protected instream flow in prior appropriation and prior allocation
jurisdictions. It briefly looks at the strengths and weaknesses of the
tools. Where appropriate, the Part points out where a tool represents a
departure from classic prior appropriation or allocation water rights
frameworks to demonstrate the occurrence of incursion into these
water rights systems.
B.

INSTREAM FLOW RIGHTS AS PLAYERS IN THE WATER MARKET-

ACQUISITIONS
One way of increasing instream flow is encouraging and facilitating
private parties, including non-governmental organizations such as
Trout Unlimited, Nature Conservancy, or a water trust, to hold instream
This would enable society and the market to play
flow water licenses."i
131.
ON

SUSAN

S. BRANNING, THE WATERSHED MANAGEMENT APPROACH: POTENTIAL IMPACTS
(2001),
29
INFLOWS
WATER
FRESH

http://gbic.tamug.edu/gbeppubs/T1/gbnepTI-29-32.pdf.
132. George W. Pring & Karen A. Tomb, License to Waste: Legal Barriers to
Conservationand Efficient Use of Water in the Wes4 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § I, §
III(A)(6) (1979).
133. Comparable points could be made for beneficial/licensable use and other
aspects of prior appropriation and allocation. Prior appropriation and prior allocation
focus on discrete beneficial/licensable uses of water relating to land or undertakings in
relation to land. Watershed management would require that states tie water rights to
uses of land that impact water other than water rights that directly use water.

134. See California Trout, Instream lows: a Perspectivefrom CaliforniaTrout, Trout
Unlimited and the California Sportishing Protection Alliance, avilable at
http://www.caltrout.org/pages/conservation/InstreamFlows.asp (last visited Apr. 1,
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a stronger role in restoring instream values. After all, governments
worldwide recognize the role for society and the market to play in
protecting natural land values such as habitat and biological diversity.
Governments welcome land conservation organizations to compete in
the land acquisition market. Land conservation organizations, of
course, acquire land to protect it from development, whereas, their
competitors largely wish to develop land with the accompanying
destruction of natural values. Why should governments not similarly
welcome private environmental flow advocates to compete in the water
rights acquisition market?
Unfortunately, neither prior appropriation nor prior allocation
jurisdictions fully accept instream licenses as players in the water rights
acquisition market. For example, in the Canadian prairie provinces,
given that statutes dictate water rights, a private party may hold a water
right to keep water instream, rather than to divert it out of stream, only
if the water rights-authorizing statute enables instream water use
licenses.13 5 In Alberta, the potential for private instream licenses has
decreased in the last decade. Prior to the Alberta Water Act coming into
force in 1999, a 1971 amendment to the prevailing water rights and
management legislation, the Water Resources Act, authorized water
licenses to keep water in
"its natural state for the purpose of
conservation, recreation or the propagation of fish or wildlife or for any
like purpose" as a valid license purpose.1 36 Only one such license ever
issued under the Act; it was to protect water in a series of wetlands in
north-central Alberta. 3 7 Although regulations under the 1999 Water
Act (which repealed and replaced the Water Resources Act) authorize
licenses for instream flow type purposes such as management of fish,
habitat enhancement, and recreation,138 the Act itself requires that any
water license involves a "diversion" of water and an identifiable point of
diversion, thus making it legally questionable whether one may privately
hold an instream license. 139 The 1999 Water Act only clearly authorizes
instream licenses to the government by expressly excluding a diversion

2010); Brian D. Richter et al., A Framework for Ecologically Sustainable Water
(2005),
Management,
HYDRO
REV.
1-2
http://www.nature.org/initiatives/freshwater/files/hydro-review-july-2005.pdf.
135. ARLENE KWASNLAR, ALBERTA'S WETLANDS: A LAW AND PouLcY GUIDE 76 (2001)
KWASNTAK,
WETLANDS],
[hereinafter
http://www.edmonton.ca/environmental/documents/AlbertaWetlands Guide.pdf.
136. GEOWA INFORMATION TEcHNOLOGIES, LTD., WATER USE FOR INJECTION PURPOSES IN
ALBERTA 3 (2003), http://www.waterforlife.gov.ab.ca/docs/geowa-report.pdf.
137. KWASNIAK, WETLANDS, supra note 135, at 76. The protected area is the Wagner

Bog.
138. Water (Ministerial) Regulation, ALTA. REG. 205/1998, s. 11 (Can).
139. Alta. Water Act. RSA 2000, c. W-3, s. 51(1) (Can.). It should be noted,
however, that the matter could be clarified through a simple amendment to the

regulations as the Water Act enables the Environment Minister to define in the
regulations what constitutes a "diversion." Id. s. 1(m) (ii).
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However, the
requirement for government instream licenses."4
government limits such licenses to established "water conservation
objectives." 141 To date, the government has set these objectives
considerably below the instream flow needs as established by a
government sponsored report.

142

With respect to the U.S. west, as Part III of this paper discusses,
although most states recognize some instream uses as beneficial uses,
such uses are not comprehensive and would not cover many legitimate
instream values. In addition to this shortcoming, many state
constitutions or water statutes require that an appropriation of water
involves a diversion.143 Hence, just as in Alberta, there are legal vagaries
regarding the extent to which instream appropriation rights are
possible. 144 Also, although many states' water rights and management
legislation authorize government agencies to hold instream water
rights, only four of the eighteen western states - Alaska, Arizona,
Nevada, and South Dakota - allow members of the private sector to

140.

The Alta. Water Act. R.S.A., 2000, c. W-3, s. 51(2) (Can.),

states: "(2)

On

application by the Government in accordance with this Act, the Director may issue a
licence to the Government but to no other person, or may refuse to issue a licence, for
(a) the diversion of water,
(b) the operation of a works, or
(c)
providing or maintaining a rate of flow of water or water level requirements
for the purpose of implementing a water conservation objective." Under
section 51 (1) of the Act, private licenses only issue for a diversion of water or
operation of works.

141.

Alta. Water Act. R.S.A, 2000, c. W-3, s. 51(2) (Can.).

142. The water conservation objectives ("WCO"s) are set out in the Alberta
Environmental South Saskatchewan River Basin Approved Water Management Plan.
SSRB WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN supra note 6, at 8. The Plan states that for the most
impacted rivers in the basin (Bow, Oldman, and South Saskatchewan) WCO is set at
"instream objective" plus 10% or 45% of the natural flow, whichever is higher. Id. For
existing licenses, WCO is the original instream objective, or "10," even if a license had
been reissued or renewed. Id, "Natural flow" means the flow "that would be in the river
in the absence of man-made influences." SSRB BACKGROUND STUDIES supra note 5, at 24.
The natural flow regime can serve "as a benchmark condition in making instream flow
needs descriptions." See CLIPPERTON ET AL., supra note 15, at iii. Obviously, 45% of
natural flow is not a very high objective for restoring instream flows. "Instream
objectives" are regulated "[f]lows that are to remain in the river via dam operations or
as a restriction on licence holders." SSRB BACKGROUND STUDIES, supra note 5, at 23.
Through my research regarding key licenses with 10 conditions, I have found that 10 is
considerably below IFN in these rivers. See also Michael M. Wenig et al., Water Under
the Bridge? The Role of Instreamn How Needs (IFNs) Determinationsin Alberta's River
Management, in WATER: Sci. & POL. 22 (H. Epp and D. Ealey eds., 2006)
http://www.cirl.ca/ffles/cirl/IFN-Determin.pdf.
143. Bureau of Land Management, Western States Water Laws, Water Appropriation
Systems, http://www.blm.gov/nstc/WaterLaws/pdf/WaterApprSystems.pdf.
144. See generally Reed Benson, "Adequate Progress," or Rivers Left Behind?
Developments in Coloradoand Wyoming Instream Row Laws Since 2000, 36 ENvr'L L.
1283, 1289-92 (2006) (showing several major deficiencies regarding the effectiveness of
instream flow laws in Western states, as typified by Colorado and Wyoming).
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hold instream water rights. 145 Here, instream water rights depart from
common law appropriation
rights, which do not discriminate on the
146
basis of identity of user.

C. INSTREAM FLOW RIGHTS AS PLAYERS IN THE WATER MARKET CONVERSIONS, LEASES, AND TRANSFERS

Even if a state or province allows for protection of instream water
through a water right, the instream right must have priority over out-ofstream diversions in times of shortage in order for the protection to be
effective.147 Unfortunately, most rivers that need more instream flow in
both the dry western U.S. and in Alberta have been over-appropriated
for decades.'4 8 This makes the acquisition of junior instream rights less
than ideal since at times of water shortages out of stream diversions will
inevitably have priority over instream rights.14 9
Instream flow could be enhanced if a senior licensee converted a
consumptive use to an instream use, or transferred or leased a senior
right for an instream use. States in the western U.S. generally allow
holders of appropriation rights to convert their rights to other uses
without losing priority, provided the change does not injure other
(including junior) appropriators.5 0 As well, subject to the "no injury"
(to other appropriators) rule and legislative requirements and
limitations, since U.S. appropriation rights are property rights, they can
be transferred like other property. 15 Further, subject to the rule,
appropriators may lease rights for a term to other appropriators.'52
However, as the previous section discusses, departing from classic
appropriation rules, states limit who may hold conversions, transfers, or
leases for instream purposes, 15 thus lessening the effectiveness of this
tool to restore and protect instream flow.
Alberta is the only prairie province
that allows transfers of
allocations. 154 As noted previously, although instream use is a licensable
use of water, the statute's diversion requirement could make privately
held instream licenses unlikely. Indeed, to date, the government has
not issued any private instream licenses under the 1999 Water Act.

145.
146.

CHARNEYsupra note 89, at 13.
See Steven E. Clyde, Adapting to the ChangingDemandfor Water Use Through

ContinuedReFinement of the Prior Appropriation Doctrine: An Alternative Approach
to Wholesale Reallocation,29 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 435 (1989).
147. PETER BORKEY ET AL., ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: FINDINGS OF THE
RESPONSES WORKING GROUP 236 (Kanchan Chopra et al. eds., Island Press 2005).
148. David IR Percy, Responding to Water Scarcityin Western Canada,83 TEx. L. REV.
2091, 2104 (2005) [hereinafter Percy, Scarcity].
149. Mary Ann King, Getting Our Feet Wet: An Introduction to Water Trusts, 28
HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 495,501 (2004).
150. Clyde, supra note 146, at 437-38.
151. George A. Gould, Transfer of Water Rights, 29 NAT. REsOuRcESJ. 457, 459-60

(1989).
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 457.
CHARNEY supranote 89, at 11.
Percy, Scarcity,supra note 148, at 2101.
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D. WATER TRUSTS
Water trusts have developed throughout the western United States
to facilitate the restoration and protection of instream flow. 5 5 Water
trusts seek to restore and protect instream flow through a variety of
tools including water transfers, leases, and forbearance agreements.
Forbearance agreements are contracts under which water rights holders
agree not to exercise their water rights as permitted by state or
provincial law, in order to retain water instream. 5' 6 Although water
trusts do excellent work and have been successful with a number of
restoration and protection projects, their work necessarily butts up
against the prior appropriation and allocation barriers discussed in this
paper. These barriers include limitations on who may hold an instream
right, government resistance to instream rights, limited definitions of
"beneficial use," lack of priority for instream interests, the need for an
interest in land, and diversion requirements. Forbearance agreements
are interesting in that they evidence the inadequacy of prior
appropriation and allocation frameworks to adequately deal with
instream flow.157 Unfortunately, if push comes to shove, it is unlikely
that a court would enforce a forbearance agreement over a valid
government-backed water right. 5 '
E. RESIDUAL MINIMUM FLOW CONDITIONS IN WATER RIGHTS

Residual minimum flow conditions are terms on water licenses or
permits that provide that the appropriator or allocator may not divert
water under a water right unless there is a specified residual minimum
"Minimum flow" does not
flow remaining in the watercourse. 5 9
necessarily mean a scientifically determined instream flow need. 160 For
155. See King, supra note 149, at 495.
156. Sandra Zellmer, The Ant-Speculation Doctrine and Its Implications for
Collaborative Water Management., 8 NEv. L.J. 994, 1020 (2008).
157. See id.
158. This claim is based on research examining contracting out of and waiving water
rights to effect more reasonable water management than afforded through prior
appropriation and allocation water right frameworks. For example, the Supreme Court
of Canada in Potash v. Royal Trust Co., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 351 (Can.), acknowledged that
contracting out of or waiving statutory rights is permissible if the statute does not
prohibit it, and if doing so does not contradict public policy. The core principle
regarding contracting out is that contracting out is permissible if (a) the statute does
not expressly or impliedly prohibit contracting out, (b) the contracting out is in direct
and clear language, (c) the contracting out is not in relation to public and fundamental
law, and (d) the statutory provisions in question are for a private benefit. See generally
id. Furthermore, one cannot contract out of regulatory provisions imposed in the
public interest. Id. It is doubtful that, given these limitations, a court would uphold a
person contracting out of water rights conferred by a long-standing, and arguably
fundamental, legal framework, developed, presumably, in the public interest.
159. King, supra note 149, at 504.
1,60. DAvID M. GILLu.AN & THoMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION: SEEKING A
BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE 129 (Island Press 1997) (1960).
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example, in Alberta, generally speaking, minimum flows set in licenses
1
are significantly below scientifically determined instream flow needs. '
Regarding the western United States, pure common law
appropriation rights did not include residual minimum flow
requirements.16 2 Any residual minimum flow conditions result from
legislation.'6 3 Although a few states have such legislation, 64 the
requirements do not apply to water appropriation rights established
prior to the legislative provisions coming into effect. Therefore, the
requirements provide limited utility to protect instream flows. It is the
more senior appropriation rights not subject to residual minimum flow
65
conditions that will impact instream needs in time of water shortages.'
Alberta began including minimum residual instream flow
conditions in some licenses in the- late 1970s.166 In the 1970s and 80s
the government "updated and reissued" numerous licenses, some very
senior, to include new minimum flow conditions, many of which the
water controller could expressly vary from time to time (a "retrofit
condition"). 67 The 1999 Water Act contains provisions designed to
legitimize reissued licenses in case they are legally challenged.168
However, under government policy that applies to the SSRB, the
government will not use retrofit conditions to impose or change
minimum flow conditions, unless the license relates to an application
made after May 1, 2005.69 Accordingly, just as in the western U.S., such
conditions will be of limited use in times of shortage as more senior
licensees may receive their entire allocations.
F.

OTHER POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS, SHORTCOMINGS, BARRIERS, AND

DEPARTURES

1. Introduction
A number of other methods available on one or the other side of
the U.S./Canada border may help to address instream flow deficiencies.
The following sections provide a sampling of such approaches and the
related barriers or shortcomings. The sections also discuss at what point
a method involves a departure from the dominant water rights and
161. Percy, Scarcity, supranote 148, at 2104.
162. King, supra note 149, at 502.
163. See CHARNEY, supra note 89, at 22 (providing examples of legislation regulating
minimum flow in the U.S.).
164. See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-703a (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.346(1) (2009);
WASH. ADmIN. CODE § 173-500-060(5) (a) (2009).
165. Randall W. Block &Joel Forrest, A GatheringStorm: Water Conflicts in Alberta.,
43 ALTAL. REV. 31, 40 (2005).
166. See generallyid. at 33 (discussing how "[w] ater regulation in Alberta began in
the latter half of the nineteenth century").
167. See PARTNERSHIP & STRATEGIES SECTION, ALTA. ENV'T, GLOSSARY OF TERMS
RELATED TO WATER AND WATERSHED MANAGEMENT IN ALBERTA. 32 (2008),
4
http://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/80 3.pdf.
168. SeeAlta. Water Act, 1RSA 2000, c. W-3, s. 18(2) (Can.).
169. SSRB WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 6, at 8.
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management framework in the jurisdiction.
2. Treated Wastewater to Restore Instream Flow - California
California's Water Code provides that an owner of a wastewater
treatment plant holds the exclusive right to treated wastewater. 170 If the
owner chooses to designate treated wastewater for instream beneficial
uses, the government may not permit anyone else to use the water, and
holders of existing water rights may not claim or use such water. 171
Hence, the designated water has an fiber-priority.
Although this is a welcome tool to restore instream flow, it is very
limited in its application. The provision only applies to owners of
wastewater treatment facilities, and applies only where the owner
chooses to designate wastewater for instream use, rather than "selling"
the water for some other use, such as industrial, livestock watering,
irrigation. 172 The legislation contains no incentive for an owner to
return the water to a watercourse for instream use.
The provision is a clear departure from the dominant water rights
and management framework in California. California recognizes three
kinds of water rights: (1) riparian, (2) prior appropriation, and (3)
pueblo.1 73 Before the development of prior appropriation rights in the
1800s, California based its water rights on riparian ownership or
occupancy. 174 California riparian rights are limited to the amount of
naturally flowing water that users can reasonably and beneficially put to
use on the riparian parcel.17 5 Before 1914, prior approrpriation rights
could be acquired at common law without a permit. 7
Since 1914,
these rights could be acquired through a government permitting
Although government retains limited authority over
system.
permitted prior appropriation rights, 17 the rights retain the essential

features of common law prior appropriation - putting water to a
beneficial use, with due diligence and without waste, and subject to
FTFR.179 Pueblo water rights, derived from Spanish law, "'allow the
residents of Spanish or Mexican pueblos to claim water rights from
SeeCAL. WATERCODE § 1210 (2009).
171. Seeid.§1212.
172. Id.
173. Bureau of Land Mgmt., Nat'l Science and Technology Center, Cal. Water Rights
Fact Sheet (2001), available at http://www.blm.gov/nstc/WaterLaws/california.html
(last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
174. Eric T. Freyfogle, Lux v. Haggin and the Common Law Burdens of Modern
Water Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 485, 500 (1986) (discussing the establishment of prior
appropriation in California); see generally Mark T. Kanazawa, Efficiency in Western
Water Law. The Development of the CaliforniaDoctrine, 1850-1911, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
159, 159-60, 182 (1998).
175. Bureau of Land Mgmt., supra note 173.
170.

176.

Id.

177. Id.
178. SeeCAL. WATERCODE § 1394 (2009).
179. Id.§§ 1410(a), 1455.
180. Eric B. Kunkel, The Spanish Law of Waters in the United States: From Alfonso
the Wise to the PresentDay, 32 McGEORGE L. REv. 341,352 (2001).
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naturally occurring waters for municipal use.'
The specially designated instream treated wastewater rights are
neither riparian rights nor prior appropriation, as they are an exception
to the FTFR priority system, and they have nothing to do with pueblo
rights. Instead, they are stand-alone water rights created, at least in part,
because the prevailing legal water rights and management system does
not adequately account for instream flow needs.
3. Public Trust Doctrine to Restore Instream Flow
Under the state-based public trust doctrine, the state holds the
waters of navigable streams in trust for the benefit of all people. Under
this doctrine, the state may not alienate trust property soas to violate
the trust. 82

Some states have extended the doctrine to non-navigable

tributaries of navigable waters, aesthetics, protection of fish and wildlife
habitat, coastal access, and a variety of other public resources. 8 3 The
doctrine has been applied to prevent a government from alienating to
private uses instream water that it holds as trust property. The landmark
14
case in this area is The NationalAudubonSociety v. Supeior.Court.
This case concerned water rights that the Department of Water and
Power of the City of Los Angeles ("DWP") obtained in 1940 to divert
almost the entire flow of five streams that flowed into Mono Lake at the
base of the Sierra Nevada escarpment. 85 By 1980, Los Angeles diverted
almost 100,000 acre-feet of water per year from the Mono Basin causing
the lake to shrink from approximately eighty-five square miles to
approximately sixty square miles.8 6 The plaintiffs contended that the
public trust. protected the bed, shores, and waters of Mono Lake;
therefore, the government must enjoin the DWP from diverting waters
in a manner that harms trust property.187 The defendant, on the other
hand, argued that it had an appropriation right to the water free from
limitations from any public trust. 88 Thus, the court was asked to
"resolve a legal conundrum [between] two competing systems of
thought - the public trust doctrine and the appropriative water rights
system ... "189

In the end, the court found that the government must

consider the public trust when administering the appropriative water
rights systems.' 90 The court, however, acknowledged "the state may
181. See id.at 353-54.
182. Joseph L. Sax, Public Trust Doctrine in NaturalResource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471,486-87 (1970).
183. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983); Marks v.
Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); Carstens v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 182 Cal. App.
3d 277, 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
184. Jan Stevens, Instream Uses Twenty-Five Years Later: Incremental Progress or
Revolving Door?, 36 McGEORGE L. REv. 393,400 (2005).
185. Nat'lAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 711.
186. Id. at 714.
187. Id. at 712.
188. Id. at 716-17.
189. Id.at 732.
190. Id. at 728.
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have to approve appropriations despite foreseeable harm to public trust
uses."' 9 ' In the case at hand, the court found that the public trust was
not considered at all when it approved the 1940 appropriation, and that
to the extent that waters subject to the public trust formed part of the
appropriation, the appropriator holds its right subject to the public
trust.1

2

Therefore, there can be no "taking" of property for which

compensation

is payable when93 the appropriator

appropriation to honor the trust.

must limit an

Although cases such as NationalAudubon Society v, SuperiorCourt
demonstrate that in some states it may be possible to invoke the
doctrine in isolated cases to restore trust property even after an
appropriative right has been perfected, it is unlikely that the doctrine
could be used as a general tool to restore instream flows. As one expert
has stated, "It is virtually untested, and legislators and agencies have
been fearful of pushing its limits.'1 94 Additionally, the court in National

Audubon specifically rejected the plaintiff's claim that the "public trust
is antecedent to and thus limits all appropriative water rights."195
4. Alberta Water Conservation Holdbacks
In Alberta, in certain circumstances the 1999 Water Act authorizes
the Director to require a maximum ten percent holdback for instream
use from the amount of water transferred from an allocation. 96 If a
government license protects
the held-back water, it will have the priority
197
of the transferred license.

Although this is a welcome tool to assist in restoring instream flow
in the province, it is limited in several ways. First, only the government
may hold the license.' 98 Second, as mentioned earlier, the amount
licensed cannot exceed a government established water conservation
objective, which for the driest part of the province, is considerably less
than instream flow need. 199 Third, the transfer procedure is highly
regulated, and the Director's decision both whether to transfer and
whether to require a holdback is discretionary.2 "9 From 1999 to 2009,
there have been only about twenty-eight transfers in the province, and
some of these transfers did not require a holdback. 20 1 All in all, the

191. Id.
192. See id.
193. Id.at 723.
194. Zellmer and Harder, Property,supra note 45, (referencingJ. H. Archer & T. W.
Stone, The Interaction of the Public Trust and the 'Takings" Docaines: Protection
Wetlands and Critical CoastalAreas,20 VT. L. REV. 81, 115 (1995)).
195. Nat'lAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 727.
196. Alta. Water Act, RS.A.2000, c. W-3,s. 83(1) (Can.).
197. Id.ss. 51(2), 83(3) (c).
198. Id.s. 83(3)(c).
199. Percy, Scarcity, supranote 148, at 2104-05.
200. Alta. Water Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W-3, s. 83(1) (Can.).
201.

ALTA.

WATER

COUNcIL,

RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR

IMPROVING

ALTA.'S

9
http://www.albertawatercouncil.ca/Portals/O/pdfs/WATSUP-webFINAL.pdf.
ALLOCATION

TRANSFER

SYSTEM

WATER

(2009),
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conservation holdback provision is unlikely to result in any considerable
instream flow restoration.2 2
The water conservation holdback and the transfer provisions are a
departure from the previous FTFFR regime set out in the Alberta Water
Resources Act, which did not provide for either holdbacks or
transfers. 2°3 However, it is worthy to note that in Alberta, the holdback
does not amount to any kind of taking. 2 4 Before the Alberta Water Act
came into law in 1999, a licensee could not transfer an allocation
independent of a land transfer.2 5 This right to apply to transfer 2an
06
allocation independent of land arose with the 1999 Water Act.

Accordingly, the Water Act's discretionary holdback provision does not
"take" anything away from a prior allocation right. 2 7 The right to apply
to transfer is a new right and the potential for a holdback arises as a
component of this right.
In contrast, beginning in the mid-1800s, state courts in the western
U.S. made it clear that an appropriator has the right to sever a water
right from land and transfer it for use elsewhere. 28" The basis of the
right to transfer lies in the fact that in the western U.S. appropriation
rights, as property, may be "transferred like other property." 09 If a U.S.
state government were to impose a holdback on a prior appropriation
right, an argument could be made that something. has been "taken"
from the appropriator. Whether such an argument would likely succeed,
in court will not be pursued here.
5. U.S. Endangered Species Act to Restore Instream Flow
The U.S. Endangered Species Act ("ESA") 211 contains provisions
that could require water users to make changes in river operations to
save species at risk of extinction or threatened. Section 9 of the ESA
prohibits the "take" of any member of a listed fish or wildlife. 211 The
ESA defines "take" to include to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct."2 2 None of these words, except possibly "harm," would
seem to prohibit or limit diversions, except where a watercourse is so
202. ALTA. ENV'T, SOUTH SASKATCHEWAN RIVER BAsIs ALLOCATION 12 (2005),
http://ssrb.environment.alberta.ca/pubs/SSRB-WaterAllocation.pdf.
203. Aha. Env't, Water Fact Sheet: Transfer of Allocation Water Under a License,
available at http://www3.gov.ab.ca/env/water/legislation/factsheets/Transfer.html
(last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
204. See Bryan P. Schwartz & Melanie R- Bueckert, Regulatory Takings in Canada, 5
WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 477, 482 (2006).
205. David R. Percy, Seventy-Five Years of Alberta Water Law. Maturity, Demise &
Rebirth, 35 ALTA. L. REV. 221, 234-35 (1996).
206. Alta. Water Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W-3, ss. 81(1), 82(1) (Can.).
207. Seeid.s. 83(1).
208. McDonald & Blackburn v. Bear River & Auburn Water & Mining Co., 13 Cal.
220, 232-33 (Cal. 1859).
209. Id. at 233.
210. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
211. Id.§ 1538(a)(1)(B).
212. Id.§ 1532(19).
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low that fish are killed or about to be killed. Regulations under the ESA
213
define "harm" to mean an act that "actually kills or injures wildlife."
Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation
where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or
sheltering." 214 This definition suggests that the ESA may be invoked
where low instream flows seriously threaten the existence of fish, but
that it cannot be used generally to limit appropriations to restore
instream flow.
Section 7 of the ESA prohibits Federal agencies from carrying out
any action that would "jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species." 215 This provision can be
used to enjoin federal agencies to curtail diversions, but not without
considerable controversy and claims for compensation. 6 For example,
in 2001, each of the two agencies responsible for the administration of
the ESA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine
Fisheries Service, issued a biological opinion that summer irrigation
releases from the federal Klamath Irrigation Project would jeopardize
the continued existence of Lost River sucker and coho salmon, listed
under the ESA as endangered in 1988 (sucker) and 1997 (coho
salmon).217 The operation of the ESA forced the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation to close the headgates of the Klamath project. 218 In turn,
holders of could not divert water
this meant that irrigation water rights
to irrigate.219 What resulted was a heated conflict between state held
appropriation rights and federal mandate under the ESA.22 ° In
addition to irrigators and conservation advocates, tribes
that depend on
221
controversy.
the
in
interest
key
a
have
populations
fish
The controversy sparked litigation in the federal court by irrigators
who claimed one billion dollars in compensation for what they
perceived as a "taking" of their constitutionally protected water use
rights. 222 The irrigators' claim was unsuccessful because the court
found that under the circumstances, the irrigators' rights arose from
contract for water deliveries, not from any property right to water.223
Subsequently, the irrigators appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit held that addressing any takings allegation required
213. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2010).
214. Id.
215. 16U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2010).
216. For a fascinating account and analysis of the Endangered Species Act listings and
consequences see e.g., HOLLY D. DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOcK, WATER WAR IN THE
KLAMATH BASIN: MACHO LAW, COMBAT BIOLOGY, AND DiRTYPoLrncs (Island Press 2008).
217. Id at xi; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNSEL, SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF BIOLOGICAL
OPINIONS ON ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISHES IN THE KLAMATH RIVER BASIN 2 (Nat'l
Academy Press 2002).
218. DOREMUs&TARLOCK, supranote 216, at xvi.
219. Id.
220. Id. at xvii.

221. Id. at xvi.
222. Id. at 102.
223.

Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 505 (Fed. Cl. 2005).
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determination of the nature of the irrigators' water rights, a
determination properly under the jurisdiction of the Oregon state
courts.2 24 The irrigators then filed suit in the Oregon state court for
$100 million in damages for the alleged taking.225 The ongoing
litigation may be tempered by attempts to settle issues out of court in
light of the 2008 Klamath .Basin Restoration Agreement, signed by,
among others, irrigators, conservation organizations, and tribes.226 The
Agreement involves the removal of four dams, and other measures
anticipated to result in the restoration of natural fish production, and
of reliable water supplies for agricultural and other
the assurance
7
uses.

22

As a final comment in this section, the Endangered Species Act is an
entirely different animal from prior appropriation. To some experts the
two constitute "macho law" and are "two inflexible, winner-take-all
regimes. 2 ' Nevertheless, the ESA has proven itself a stimulus in the
Klamath basin by forcing cooperation to deal with instream water
shortages and competing values.
6. The Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine
The federal reserved rights doctrine holds that the U.S. federal
government may explicitly or impliedly reserve water independent of
state appropriation laws 2 10 The first case that recognized the doctrine
was Winters v. United States. 23 1 In Winters, the Supreme Court found
that Congress impliedly reserved water for irrigation purposes in an
1888 treaty that established the Fort Belknap Reservation in what would
become Montana, despite the treaty's silence with respect to water. 2
The Court reasoned that the underlying purpose of the treaty was to
ensure land for agricultural purposes for the tribe.233 The land would
not serve this purpose without water. The .right was senior to
subsequent state-based appropriation rights because the reserved right's
priority date was the date of the treaty because the treaty established

224. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 532 F.3d 1376, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir.

2008).
225. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 202 P.3d 159, 160 (Or. 2009);
EndangeredSpecies Act Update, ENVTL. & LAND USE LAW NEWSL. (Wash. Bar Ass'n),
May 2009, at 29.
226. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, KLAMATH BASIN RESTORATION AGREEMENT FOR THE
SUSTAINABILITYOF PUBLIC AND TRUST RESOURCES AND AFFEcTED COMMuNITIEs § 1 (2010),
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/Klamath-Basin-RestorationAgreement-2-18-O.pdf.
227. ED SHEETS CONSULTING, SUMMARY PROPOSED KLAMATH BASIN RESTORATION
(2008),
AGREEMENT

http://www.edsheets.com/Klamath/SummaryofKlamathBasinRestorationAgreemntl15-08.pdf.
228. DOREMUs & TARLOCK, supra note 216, at xvii.
229. See generallyid. at xvi.
230.
231.
232.

Idaho Dep't of Water Res. v. United States, 832 P.2d 289, 293 n. 3 (Idaho 1992).
Wimters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
Id.at 567.

233. Id.at 576.
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Courts later extended the doctrine to other
the reservation."M
situations involving a federal implied reservation of water, such as water
needed to maintain national forests." 5
The federal reserve doctrine has limited application with respect to
instream flow restoration or protection because a court may only find
an implied reservation for the amount of water necessary to achieve the
primary purpose of the reservation. 236 Accordingly, the doctrine
enables instream flow restoration or protection only where the primary
purpose of the reservation requires water either expressly or impliedly
for such needs.5 7
Interestingly, the federal reserved rights doctrine on one hand
conflicts with prior appropriation, but on the other, depends on it. It is
in conflict with the water rights framework because a court may upset
established FTFR priorities by imposing a federal priority for water
relating to a federal purpose that can be more senior than existing
appropriation rights. 21

Yet, the fact that the reserved right enjoys a

senior priority depends on the existence of the FTFR system.

9

IV. MOVING BEYOND POLICYBARRIERS TO RESTORATION AND
MAINTENANCE OF INSTREAM FLOWS
A. SUMMARY OF LEGAL AND POLICY BARRIERS

In the western U.S. and Canada, there are numerous legal and
policy barriers to implementing measures to restore and maintain
environmental flows. These barriers emanate from the core of the legal
frameworks governing water rights and water management in this area.
The barriers include:
(1) Use it or lose it because it is a disincentive to
" reduce or limit permitted withdrawals to enhance instream
flow;
* move from supply side to demand side approaches because
not using an entire permitted amount could lead to loss of
the right;
* adopt water conservation because the conservator could lose
part of a water right.
(2) The FTFR principle since
* it prevents the acquisition of effective instream rights in fully
or over-allocated water courses, unless senior water rights
234. Id. at 577.
235. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
236. See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976) (holding that when

the United States reserved Devil's Hole, it acquired by reservation water rights in
unappropriated appurtenant water sufficient to maiitain the level of the underground
pool to preserve the level of water necessary for the aquatic inhabitants, and .thereby
giving the reservation a priority date senior to subsequent appropriations).
237. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 701-02, 710 (1978).
238. Cappaert,438 U.S. at 138.
239. Id.
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are transferred to instream uses, and there are legal and
policy barriers to instream water rights acting as full players
in the water rights acquisition or transfer regimes;
" releases from stored water cannot usually be used for
instream purposes since stored water backstops both junior
water rights and the FTFR system;
* water rights based on FrFR are not always conducive to
managing groundwater and surface water conjunctively;
" FTFR water rights systems do not always easily accommodate
recycling and reusing water supplies;
* FFR water rights systems are abrasive towards allowing
instream water rights holders to be full players in the
regime.
(3) Beneficial use or licensable use because
* waters needed for instream flow within a prior
appropriation or allocation water rights framework cannot
be protected unless instream flow use is recognized as a
beneficial or licensable use of water and no state or province
recognizes the entire range of instream needs as beneficial
or licensable uses.
(4) Inflexibility regarding changes of diversion point or timing of
diversion to enhance instream flow because of
* burdensome and inflexible regulatory requirements
regardless of whether such changes would not impact other
users.
(5) Tied to land since
" the appurtenancy requirement is difficult to meet for
privately held instream flow right;
* the appurtenancy requirement, in effect, reintroduces an
framework that prior
aspect of riparian water rights
appropriation/allocation was meant to overcome;
* watershed management involves management of all
potential land uses that have quantity impacts in a
watershed, and appurtenancy deals only with land that
specifically benefits from a water right.
Although there is a potpourri of additional methods that this paper
identifies to help restore and maintain instream flow, each has its
shortcomings. Nevertheless, most of these methods depart from the
underlying F-FFR water rights framework, thereby demonstrating some
loosening of the rigidity of that framework. However, it is doubtful that
such piecemeal attempts could be successful at restoring and protecting
environmental flows required for instream and riparian aquatic health.
B. LAW AND POLICY REFORM HERE AND ELSEWHERE

In the past, existing legal and policy frameworks did not stop
western North American jurisdictions from law reform resulting in
major changes to water rights and management legal frameworks. In
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the 1800s,western states and provinces changed from water rights based
on riparian ownership or occupancy, to water rights primarily based on
appropriation or allocation. 24 7 Jurisdictions made these changes in
water rights frameworks because of social and environmental
conditions. 241 More recently, prior to 1971, Alberta groundwater rights
were unlimited and were based on the law of capture. However, in
1971, Alberta brought groundwater rights under its hybrid system.242

All of these changes occurred without government compensation even
though surface and groundwater rights regimes established before
appropriation and allocation were property based.2 4 3 Why can't the
prior appropriation and prior allocation governments do it again, in the
public interest, for more rational and efficient water management?
The remainder of this paper outlines steps that two jurisdictions
have taken to replace antiquated, inefficient, and inequitable water
rights and management frameworks to better meet the goals of rational
water management including restoration and protection of instream
flow. The paper then discusses a range of approaches that western
North American jurisdictions could take in attempting to remedy the
current barriers to restoration and maintenance of instream flow
requirements.
C. SOUTH AFRICA

Like the drier areas in western North America, South Africa's
available freshwater resources are under stress. Freshwater resources are
fully or almost fully utilized, and projected population growth and
economic development will further stress their sustainability. 244 Prior 24to5
the late 1990s, South Africa based its water rights on riparian rights.
Accordingly, those who owned land next to a watercourse had exclusive
rights in perpetuity to the use the surface water.246 A similar water rights
system pertained to groundwater such that "[t]hose who owned land
under which groundwater occurred also effectively had exclusive use of
the water." 247 Following the dismantling of apartheid in the 1990s,
240. Christopher L. Len, Synthesis - A Brand New Water Law, 8 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV. 55, 59-60 (2004); Percy, Scarcity, supra note 148, at 2092-93.
241. Len, supranote 240, at 62.
242. ALTA.
ENV'T,
GROUNDWATER
EVALUATION
GUIDELINE
(2003),

http://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/7508.pdf.
243. See Schwartz & Bueckert, supra note 204, at 482.
244.

DEP'T OF ENVTL. AFFAIRS AND TOURISM, NAT'L STATE OF THE ENV'T REPORT - S.

AFR.: FRESHWATER SYSTEMS AND RESOURCES: OVERVIEW (1999), availableat
http://www.ngo.grida.no/soesa/nsoer/issues/water/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
245. D. D. Tewari, A DetailedAnalysis of Evolution of Water Rights in South Africa:
An Account of Three and a Half Centuriesfrom 1652AD to Presen4 35 WATER SA 693,
697
(2009),
http://www.wrc.org.za/Lists/Knowledge%20Hub%201tems/Attachments/8541/2238%
20abstract.pdf.
246. Id.at 694.
247. DEP'T OF WATER & FORESTRY, REPUBLIC OF S. AF1R, NATIONAL WATER RESOURCE
STRATEGY
13
n.
8
(2004),
http://www.dwafigov.za/Documents/Policies/NWRS/Default.htm.

available

at
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South Africa took advantage of the unique opportunity to reform its
water rights and management framework. The reform resulted in The
National Water Policy (1997),248 the National Water Act (1998),49 and

regulations.
The purpose of the Act is to
ensure that the nation's water resources are protected, used,
developed, conserved, managed and controlled' taking into
account interalia the basic human needs of present and future
generations, equitable access to water, social and economical
development, the public interest, the growing demand for water,
ecosystems and biological diversity and international
obligations.25 °
Key to implementing this purpose, the Act declares that water is owned
people and is subject to government management as a
by all of the
2 1
public trust.

The National Water Act must be understood in the context of South
Africa's constitution which guarantees water for human needs and
environmental sustainability as a right. 252 Only after these two basic
constitutional requirements are met are other water uses possible.
Water for human needs and environmental sustainabiity are part of a
"Reserve," which has priority over all other water uses. Water allocations
are subject to the Reserve, though the "requirements of the ecological
253
Reserve may be met over time by progressively adjusting allocations.,
In addition, this new approach to legal water rights strives to make the
most of available water resources by implementing demand
management, efficiency measures, water conservation, watershed
management, and integrated resource management.2 54 Although still
in its early stages, South Africa's new water rights and management
approach could serve as a model for other jurisdictions struggling to
deal with water shortages. In short, South Africa, albeit having a unique
political opportunity,-replaced an outdated, inequitable, and inefficient
water management regime with an entirely new one. This new regime
operates to make the most out of scarce water resources and to
equitably and efficiently distribute water to users in the nation while
protecting the aquatic environment by ensuring basic environmental
flows.

248. Kader Asmal, White Paper on a National Water Policy for South Africa, at 2
(1997), http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Policies/nwpwp.pdf.
249. Nat'l Water Act 36 of 1998.
250. GJ. Pienaar & E. van der Schyff, The Reform of Water Rights in South Africa, 3

IAw, ENV'T & DEv.J. 179, 183 (2007).
251. Nat'l Water Act 36 of 1998 s. 3.
252. S.AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 24, 27.
253.

DEP'T OF WATER AFFAIRS & FOREsTRY, supra note 247, at 66.

254.

Id.at 54, 66, 76.
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D. AUSTRALIA

Australia, which supports a population of nearly 22 million, 211 is
noteworthy for being the world's driest continent inhabited by
humans.
Much of the Australia's inland receives less than 500
millimeters of rainfall, and evaporation rates are very high. 57 A region
severely impacted by water scarcity is the Murray-Darling Basin shared
by New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, and the
Australian Capital Territory.258 Australia legislated water rights in the
late 1800s to address the shortcomings of the riparian doctrine that
Australia inherited from Great Britain.25 9 Each state created a water
rights system based on Crown ownership of water and government
issued water allocations.26
Initially, in all Australian states, water
licenses "were defined in terms of irrigated land areas," and no
restrictions applied to amount used.2 61 From the 1890s onward, state
statutes proliferated setting forth a range of water rights and
management schemes to meet specialized demands such as irrigation,
urban water supply, mining, and later for general water needs. 6 2 In
short, "a complex institutional structure of multi-level water
2 63
instrumentalities developed which supported water resources policy.
In view of environmental degradation, drought, over allocation of
water, and concerns for water security, the need for water reform
became evident by the 1980s.2" Although reform commenced at the
state level, 265 the Commonwealth initiated reform through the Council
of Australian Governments ("CoAG") Water Resource program, which
drove more focused reform measures.26 6 In one of the key CoAG
agreements, the Commonwealth, the Murray-Darling Basin states, and
255. Australia Bureau of Statistics, Population Clock, http://www.abs.gov.au/
visited Apr. 1, 2010).

(last

256. Lee Godden, Water Law Reform in Australia and South Africa: Sustainability,
Efficiency and SocialJustice,17 J. ENVTL. L. 181, 183 (2005).
257. Id.
258. Id.;
Map
of
Murray-Darling
Catchment,
available
at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Murray-catchment-mapMJC02.png (last visited Apr.

1,2010).
50, 53, 54, 119, 120.
259. See ICM Agric. Pty. Ltd. v. Australia (2009) 51 C.L.R. 1,
260. Id.
50, 53, 54, 58, 119,120.
261. POH-LING TAN, INSTITUTE FOR RURAL FUTURES, AGRICULTURAL AND NATURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT. INTHE MURRAY-DARJNG BASIN: APOLCyHISTORYANDANALYSIS 9
(2002),
http://www.thelivingmurray.mdbc.gov.au/-data/page/1482/PohlingTan-finalreportl.pdf.
262. Id. at 4-5.
263. LEE GODDEN, AUsTL. AcAD. OF TECHNOLOGICAL SCI. AND ENG'G, PERCEPTION OF
WATER IN AUSTRALIAN LAW: RE-EXAMINING RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILMIES 3 (2003),
available athttp://www.atse.org.au/index.php?sectionid=629 (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
264. See Godden, supranote 256, at 183,189-90.
265. See
e.g.,
Victoria
Water
Act,
1989
(Austl.),
available
at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/consol-act/wa198983/
(last visited Apr. 1,
2010).
266. See MARINE AND WATER DIvISION, COUNCIL OF AusTL. GOv'TS WATER REFORM, THE
COUNCIL OF AUsTL. GOV'TS WATER REFORM FRAMEwoRK 3-6 (1994), available at

http://www.environment.gov.au/water/australia/coag.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
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the Australian Capital Territory, agreed to cooperative management of
water resources in the basin for their mutual benefit and to effect
2 67
domestic law reform to incorporate the objectives of the agreement.
Law reform objectives include protecting critical human needs first,
restoring and protecting instream flow requirements, and generally to
provide for watershed and sustainability management. 268 State water law
reforms have effectively ousted previous' water rights frameworks and
substituted water entitlements based on volumetric "sharing the
shortage," after accounting for critical human and environmental
needs.69

E.LESSONS FOR WESTERN U.S. AND CANADIANJURISDICTIONS? - MODEST
TO MAJOR STEPS

This paper has shown that legal and policy frameworks of the
western U.S. and Canadian jurisdictions exhibit barriers to restoration
and maintenance of environmental flows through the adoption of new
water management approaches. The questions raised as a result of these
barriers are: What can these jurisdictions do about it? What stands in
the way of their moving to more efficient and equitable water
management as in South Africa and Australia? What can they do to
remove legal and policy barriers?
In closing this paper's discussion, this section sets out a range of
steps that these jurisdictions can take to deal with barriers. The steps
toward the beginning tend to be more modest than those towards the
end. In addition, ajurisdiction might consider a combination of steps.
1. Ajurisdiction afflrms its currentlegal andpolicy framework, but
continuesits piecemealand uncoordinatedattempts at
facilitatingnew watermanagement approaches.Here, the
jurisdiction could take steps such as enabling private parties to
hold instream rights and ensuring that they can have a viable
place in the water transfer market.
2. Ajurisdiction affirms its currentlegalandpolicy framework, but
takes more coordinated,focused action than in 1 above to
ensure thatnew water managementapproachesft in, while
continuingto utilize F=ER For example, in addition to
authorizing private instream rights the jurisdiction might
coordinate surface and groundwater use while respecting FFR.
3. A jurisdiction,for the mostpart,afirmsits currentFTFR legal
andpolicyframework, but tinkers with certainaspects in order to
betterfacilitatenew watermanagement approaches.For
example, ajurisdiction might relax "use it or lose it" to facilitate
267. COUNCIL OF AUSTL. GOV'TS, AGREEMENT ON MURRAY-DARLING BASIN REFORM, 2,
10-11,
12,
21-22
(2008),
available
at

http://www.coag.gov.au/coag-meeting-outcomes/2008-0703/docs/MurrayDarling._IGA.rtf (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
268. Id. at 2-3, 8, 33-34.
269. Id.at 5-6, 9, 33-34.
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water conservation.
4. A jurisdiction,for the most part,affirms its currentFrFRlegal
andpolicy framework, but tests the limits ofthat framework to
take better controland rationally,efficiently, andmore equitably
manage water resources.For example, ajurisdiction might
conduct legal studies on the nature of a water right to determine
to what extent the jurisdiction may regulate rights in the public
interest, without there being a compensable taking, and then,
regulate those rights.
5. A jurisdiction,while affirming the core components ofits current
TFR framework, authorizes andprov4des incentives for
voluntary departuresfrom thatframework. One example is a
"share the shortage" agreement, such as the Lower Athabasca
Water Management Agreement, where Alberta oil sands
companies agree with one another, the federal and provincial
governments to forego FTFR rights, and they share water
shortages after making accommodation for scientifically
270
determined instream flow requirements.
6. A jurisdictionaflirms FTFR, but through law reform alters other
aspects of appropriationor allocation water rights.For example,
reformed water law might stipulate that all FTFR rights are
subject to facilitation of new water management approaches. An
example would be making all FTFR rights, even senior ones,
subject to a residual instream flow sufficient for a healthy aquatic
ecosystem. Whether this would be a taking depends both on the
jurisdiction's property law in relation to water, and on the results
of an analysis of the nature of the property inherent in a water
right. In Canada, where property rights are not constitutionally
protected, it should be easier for government to legislate such
legal changes without there being a taking requiring
compensation.
7. A jurisdictionclears the deck andintroducesa new water
managementregime as did western North Americanjurisdictions
in the 1800s, South Africanjurisdictionsin the 1990s, and as
Australian statesare currently doing.The new regime could
abandon FITFR and instead become based on "sharing the
shortage." The new regime would facilitate new water
management approaches. The regime would not necessarily
need to alter the security of water rights under the previous
regime, but it would require that rights be proven, and be subject
to reasonable conditions regarding how they must be exercised.
As in South Africa, rights could be subject to environmental flow
270. See ALTA. ENV'T, ATHmBASCA RIVER WATER MGMT. FraMEwoRK 3 (2007), available
athttp://www.environment.alberta.ca/1547.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). There may
be issues regarding the enforceability of such agreements. See discussion in note 158.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 13

conditions and other requirements (such as water for basic
human needs). Although this might require constitutional
change in some jurisdictions (e.g. states in the U.S., like
Colorado, that give a constitutional right to water by
appropriation, ), provided that senior water rights holders still
get the water they need, arguably there would be no
compensable taking.2 7'
8. As in 7 above, ajurisdictionclears the deck and institutesa new
water rightssystem, except that there are no promises of securing
the water rightof existing water users, except for key
requirementssuch as water for basichuman needs, domestic use,
and environmentalflows. In this scenario, anyone who holds an
existing water right must re-apply under the new system. The new
system would be designed to ensure that water is used for the
most reasonable, environmentally sound, equitable, and
economically viable uses. This approach extends beyond law
reform in South Africa and Australian states. In addition to
legislative changes, some jurisdictions may require constitutional
change, and possibly payment of compensation.

271.

COLO. CONST. art. XVI, sec. 5, 6 (1876).
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INTRODUCTION
The Guarani Aquifer is one of the largest freshwater aquifers in the
world, underlying northeastern Argentina, central-west Uruguay, the
west-central and southeast regions of. Brazil, and with portions
extending into Paraguay.1 Its immense capacity to supply the region
with water for both present and future generations depends upon the
sustainable management, conservation, and protection of the aquifer
system. Because there is an ever-increasing strain on potable surface
waters due to growing global populations and increasing water
demands, and because 98% of the freshwater on the planet is
groundwater, it will likely become the focal point in meeting the global
water demands.2
Already, the groundwater from about 300
transboundary aquifer systems around the world plays a critical role in
meeting the water needs of over two billion people.3
Securing and maintaining the water resources of the aquifer is a
priority for all riparians because sustainable water management can
serve as a basis for social and economic growth and development for
much of South America and the MIERCOSUR Common Market. 4 While
no management framework currently exists, advocacy and support for
increased understanding, cooperation, and protection of the Guarani
Aquifer continues to grow. Parallel advancements and progress in the
development of a legal framework for the Guarani Aquifer, and
transboundary groundwaters generally, would have a dynamic impact
on the management of these sensitive resources.
Though international water laws have advanced significantly in the
last twenty-five years, no law specifically addresses a legal framework for
the Guarani Aquifer. Most developments in international water law
have related to surface waters.
The few legal agreements and
advancements that have addressed groundwater have done so
minimally, but without considering most of the unique issues and
problems that exist for groundwater.' The only international treaty or
1. E.g., Maria Laura Mazza, A Treasure Underfoot, TIERRAMiRicA - ACCENTS, Nov.
4, 2003, http://www.tierramerica.info/nota.php?lang=eng&idnews=2111&olt=280 (last
visited Apr. 10, 2010).
2. Michela Miletto & Roberto Kirchheim, The Invisible Resource - Transboundary
Aquifers: An Opportunity for InternationalCooperation, Org. of American States, 3
Policy Series 1 (2004), availableathttp://www.oas.org/dsd/policyseries/3_eng.pdf.
3. Press Release, United Nations Univ., Sharing Water, Sharing Responsibilities Better Insts. for Transboundary Water Cooperation in Times of Climate Change (Nov.
2008)
available
at
http://www.unwater.unu.edu/file/press+releaseTB+workshop-web.pdf.
4. MERCOSUR is the name for the common market established between
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay by the Treaty of Asunci6n. See generally
Treaty of Asunci6n, ch. IV art. 23, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsrtoc.asp.
5. See generallyYoram Eckstein & Gabriel E. Eckstein, TransboundaryAquiers:
ConceptualModels for Development of InternationalLaw, 43 GROUND WATER 679, 680-
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agreement that directly addresses a transboundary aquifer is between
Switzerland and France, which manages the Franco-Swiss Genevese
Aquifer. 6 Because of the general shortage of guidance for the four
states overlying the Guarani aquifer and other interested parties, the
way the parties manage the aquifer could have profound influence on
the future approaches to other transboundary aquifers and
groundwater systems in the rest of the international community.
Part II of this paper provides important general background
information about the Guarani Aquifer. 7 Part III follows with a
discussion of the joint effect to reach a framework for managing the
aquifer through the creation and launch of the Environmental
Protection and Sustainable Development of the Guarani Aquifer System
Project ("Guarani Aquifer Project") in 2003.8 A variety of international
entities and donors, besides the four Guarani riparian nations, are
involved in the project.9 The initial target completion date was in 2007,
but delays pushed it back until 2009.10
To succeed in its mission, the project coordinators and directors
must balance the differences in legal systems, attitudes, and foundations
that exist between the various riparians, which Part IV examines." Part
V consists of an analysis of the well-founded principles of international
water law and how they may be adapted to groundwater.' 2 The success
of the multidisciplinary and cooperative project as well as the
development of a legal framework for the Guarani Aquifer can serve as
a model for other future negotiations and projects concerning
transboundary aquifers and groundwater systems around the world.
Such a development would be a significant advancement for the
relatively young field of international groundwater law.
81 (2005) [hereinafter Eckstein & Eckstein, Models] (discussing the history of
groundwater under international law and noting that it has traditionally either been
omitted or been a secondary focus of the agreement).
6.Gabriel E. Eckstein, Protecting a Hidden Treasure: the U.N. International Law
Commission and the InternationalLaw of Transboundary Ground Water Resources, 5
SUSTAINABLE DEv. L & POL'Y 5 (2005) [hereinafter Eckstein, Hidden Treasure]; see also
Eckstein & Eckstein, Models, supra note 5, at 681 (noting that the agreement, which
covers both the recharge of the aquifer and water extraction, was negotiated at the local
level, instead of internationally between the French and Swiss governments).
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. John Eriksson & Peter Rogers, An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank's
Support of Regional Programs.-Case Study of the GuaraniAquifer Project; vi (The
World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, Working Paper Report No. 39287, 2006),

http://wwwat
available
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/03/30/000
020953_20070330100058/Rendered/PDF/392870LACOGuaraniAquiferProjectOl PUBL
ICl.pdf
10. Id. at vii; see also Implementation Completion and Results Report (Document of
the World Bank, Report No. ICR00001198, July 31, 2009), available at http://www-

wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2009/08/13/000
333037_20090813231853/Rendered/PDF/ICRI1980P068121ICOdisclosedO8l12191.pdf
11.
12.

See infraPart IV.
See infa Part V.
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE GUARANI AQUIFER
Underlying parts of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, the
Guarani Aquifer spans an estimated 1.2 million square kilometers and
stores approximately 40,000 cubic kilometers of water. 13 More than
fifteen million people live in the area directly overlying the aquifer and
more than fifty million live in the region, when including the areas
beyond the outer edges of the system that are either directly or
indirectly influenced by the aquifer. 4 As this number continues to
grow in the region, more and more people will become dependent
upon the Guarani Aquifer and will be affected by its management.
A. HIGH WATER QUALITY

With 90% of the aquifer's water believed to be potable, the Guarani
has major potential as a source of drinking water.' 6 Not only is the
potable volume of the aquifer enough "to supply the entire population
of Brazil for 3,500 years," 7 but also the quality of the water itself is
excellent, and normally does not require chemical treatment. 8 This is
partially due to the relative isolation of the aquifer waters from impacts
on the surface, as surface impacts and actions generally affect the water
quality in aquifers. 9 However, the main factors contributing to the
high quality of the Guarani water are the natural processes that take

13. Claudio R. Gutierrez, The GuaraniAquifer, in WATERSHED MANAGEMENT:
WATER RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, 145, 146 (Larry Tennyson & Pier Carlo
Zingari eds., 2003).
14. Stephen Foster, Karin Kemper, Hector Gardufio, Ricardo Hirata, & Marcella
Nanni, The GuaraniAquifer Initiativefor TransboundaryGroundwaterManagemen4 5
Collection
No.
9,
2006),
(World
Bank,
GW-MATE
Case
Profile
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWAT/Resources/46021221210186345144/GWMATEEnglish-CP.09.pdf.
15. Press Release, World Bank Group, Multilateral Initiative to Manage South
America's Largest Groundwater Reservoir Launched (May 23, 2003),
available at
http://www.watemunc.com/gb/WB34_2003.htm (discussing the expectation that the
population in the region of the Guarani Aquifer will continue to grow and become
more dependent on the aquifer's resources).
16. See ISMAEL PIEDRA-CUEVA, CONTEXT AND PERSPECTIVE OF THE PLATA
BASIN
9
(2002),
http://tc.iaea.org/tcweb/abouttc/strategy/thematic/pdf/presentations/RiverBasinMa
nagernent/ContextandPerspectivesofthePlataBasin.pdf.
17. Amy K. Miller, Blue Rush: Is an InternationalPrivatizationAgreement a Viable
Solution for Developing Countriesin the Face of an Impending World Water Crisis?, 16
IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 217, 253 (2005); see also UNESCO INT'L HYDROLOGY
PROGRAMME & THE INT'L ASSOC. OF HYDROGEOLOGISTS, GROUNDWATER BRIEFING:
MANAGING TRANSBOUNDARY GROUNDWATER RESOURCES FOR HUMAN SECURriY 1(2003)
(estimating that the Guarani has the potential to "supply a population of 5.5 billion
people, for 200 years at a .rate of 100 liters per day per person"),
http://www.unesco.org/water/thirdwwf/transboundary- groundwater.pdf.

18. GLOBAL AcTION ON WATER, MANAGING GROUNDWATER RESOURCES: THE GUARANI
AQUIFER
1
(2006),
available
at:
http://www.gefweb.org/projects/focal-areas/iw/documents/GuaranLAquifer.pdf.

19. MARINA RUBIO, INTERNATIONALLY SHARED (TRANSBOUNDARY)
MANAGEMENT
8
(Shammy
Puni
et
al.
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001243/124386e.pdf.

AQUIFER RESOURCES

eds.

2001),
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place within the aquifer system. These natural physical, chemical, and
biochemical processes purify the water as it infiltrates the aquifer from
the surface at various recharge zones.20 The excellent quality of the
Guarani water makes it prime for consumption, and therefore domestic
water supply continues to be the aquifer's main use.21
B. OTHER USES
In addition to utilizing the water's fine quality for drinking water,
the Guarani Aquifer is used for industrial purposes, agricultural
irrigation, and tourism activities.22 In the northeastern part of the
territory overlying the aquifer, irrigation needs are rising, and
consequently, populations in this region are increasingly turning to
groundwater to meet the growing demand.23 As all four Guarani
riparian states continue to develop and industrialize, the industrial
demands for the water are likely to continue to grow as well.
Other important uses ofthe Guarani Aquifer stem from the thermal
properties of the water in certain locations. The water from the aquifer
in these thermal zones ranges from 30'C up to 68'C in some
locations. 24 The thermal waters are used for such diverse purposes as
recreational spa relaxation and agricultural frost-fighting techniques.2 5
The hot water is also valuable for industrial purposes because it can save
companies energy expenses by eliminating the need to heat the water

20. Luiz Amore, The Guarani Aquifer System: An Agreement Towards the
Sustainable Use of an Important Cross-Border Freshwater Reservoir, MILENIO
at
35,
http://www.idrc.ca/uploads/userAMBIENTAL,
Mar.
2004,
S/11484964871mileniol.pdf [hereinafter Amore, Guarani].
21. Eriksson & Rogers, supranote 9, at 2. Additionally, with some of the advances in
science came new concerns that there might be a previously undetected dangerous level
of radioactivity in the otherwise uncontaminated Guarani waters. However, tests
concluded that these concerns about too many radionuclides existing in the aquifer's
waters were unfounded. The total effective amounts of the natural radioactive particles
falls significantly below the amount established for human health and safety. See D.M.
Bonotto & T.O. Bueno, The Natural Radioactivity in GuaraniAquifer Groundwater,
Brazil, 66 APPLIED RADIATION & ISOTOPES 1507, 1520 (2008) (analyzing the
measurements of gross alpha and gross beta radioactivity in groundwater samples from
the Guarani Aquifer).
22. Erikkson & Rogers, supra note 9, at 2.
23. Luiz Amore, Transboundary Management of the GuaraniAquifer System /
Information to Support Sustainable Water Managementfrom Local to GlobalLevels,
PROCEEDINGS MTM-IV, Sept. 2003, at 259, 260, available at http://www.mtm[hereinafter
Amore,
conference.nl/mtm4/docs/259-Amore%20final.pdf
Management].
24. Edson Wendland, Jorge Rabelo, & Jackson Roehring, Potentialsand Problems
Related to the Guarani-Aquiferin South America, TECHNOLOGY, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
http://www.tt.fh(2006),
88
81,
DEVELOPMENT
&
et al.,
[hereinafter Wendland
koeln.de/publications/ittpub%20303101_10.pdf
Potentials].
25. DRA. OFELIA TUJCHNEIDER, GEOHYDROLOGIC RESEARCH GROUP, GUARANI AQUIFER
SySTEM: A RESOURCE SHARED BY ARGENTINA, BRASIL, PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY, at 23, 25,

http://www.inweb.gr/index.php?option=com docman&task=docdownload&gid=52&I
temid=213 (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
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26
prior to using
uif it. Another
i27 potential use for the thermal qualities of the
aquifer is geothermal energy.
While no such alternative energy use is
currently available, hope remains that scientific advancements will one
day allow the Guarani riparians to utilize the thermal properties as a
clean fuel source.

C. AQUIFER RECHARGE AND DISCHARGE
The Guarani is predominantly a confined aquifer with only 10% of
it unconfined. s
Most of the aquifer's recharge occurs in the
unconfined portion from infiltration at various outcrop zones in parts
of Brazil, eastern Paraguay, and northern Uruguay.
Most of the
identified recharge zones sit along the border of the aquifer.30 The
leading source of recharge for the Guarani is rainwater infiltration that
seeps through the highly permeable layers of rock, soil, sand, and other
earth materials.3 The other important recharge mechanism is indirect
recharge in which "water drain[s] into the aquifer as part of surface
drainage" and below surface stream-flow. 2 Overall, researchers believe
the Guarani has a high rate of recharge that creates the potential for
the aquifer to sustainably meet the water needs of an estimated 360
million people.3 3
Generally, researchers are less familiar with the Guarani Aquifer's
discharge zones than its recharge areas. Speculations put discharge
from the aquifer occurring by way of "locally rejected recharge" waters.
along most of the system's recharge zones.3 4 Researchers believe some
connections exist between the Guarani's discharge via base-flow and
river in the region, such as the Parand River and the Uruguay River, as

26.

See generally id.at 24-28 (providing several different uses for the geothermal

resources).

27. See generallyid. (providing several different uses for the geothermal resources).
28. Abel Pesce, Thermal Spas: An Economical DevelopmentAlternative Along Both
Sides of the Uruguay River; GHC BULL., Sept. 2002, at 22, 24,

http://geoheat.oit.edu/bulletin/bu123-3/art5.pdf.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 22-24; see alsoWendland et al., Potentials,supra note 24, at 84.
See Amore, Management,supra note 23, at 260.
See, e.g., Luis Vives, Eduardo Usunoff, Heraldo Campos & Carlos Fernindez-

Jduregui, PreliminaryNumerical Model of the Regional GuaraniAquifer System and
Information

Management

Proposal

3,

http://www.sigrh.sp.gov.br/sigrh/ARQS/RELATORIO/CRH/CBHPARDO/GUARANI-RP/1031/madrasguarani.pdf; see also Silvana Brandio Fontes &
Osni Jos Pejon, Proposalof a Geo-Environmenta Zoning Method Based on Ottobasin
Compartmentalization, 67 BULL. or ENGINEERING GEOLOGY & THE ENV'T, 555, 561

(2008).
32. Antonio Herman Benjamin, Cldudia Lima Marques & Catherine Tinker, The
Water GiantAwakes: An Overview of Water Law in Brazil, 83 TEx. L. REv. 2185, 2217

(2005).
33. See GlobalEnvironment FacilityProposalforProject Development Funds (PDF)
Block
B
Gran4
at
2,
http://www2.medioambiente.gov.ar/documentos/mercosur/reunionXIII/XIII_anexo
8b.pdf [hereinafter Block B Grant]; see also Wendland et al., Potentials,supra note 24,
at 86.
34. See Foster et al., supra note 14, at 3.
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well as through the wetlands of northeastern Argentina.35 Confirmation
of such connections and methods is but one aspect of the Guarani's
discharge structure that requires further research.
D. THREATS
Beyond learning more about the processes of the discharge zones of
the Guarani, researchers do not understand very much about potential
threats to the aquifer at the recharge and discharge zones, or threats
from other sources and in other areas. For the most part, threats to the
Guarani Aquifer have not reached a critical or severe level to date, but
some areas of the region already do show signs of contamination and
overdraft.3 6 Most of these threats have the potential to produce dire
consequences on the aquifer system if they are not controlled and
prevented. However, the fact that the Guarani Aquifer is still relatively
uncontaminated and pure gives hope that taking preventive measures
to protect it will be an effective and successful strategy, providing more
incentive to implement these preventative measures as soon as
possible.37
The main threats to the aquifer are over-exploitation and
pollution. 38 A related concern of over-exploitation is the drilling of too
many wells, and more importantly, the drilling of poorly designed
wells. 39 One of the ways to prevent over-exploitation and reduce the
risk of pollution is to operate efficient wells that retain a large amount
of water, while also reducing the40 risk of contaminants that seep through
the system and into the aquifer.
Contamination of the Guarani watercourse is a potential major
threat that may come in many other forms in addition to poorly
designed wells. It could result from pollution, particularly in the
aquifer's recharge and discharge areas, from sewage and other poor
waste disposal systems, or from pesticides and fertilizers used in

35. Id; see alsoAmore, Management,supra note 23, at 260.
36. Joshua T. Newton, Case Study, CaseStudy of TransboundaryDisputeResolution:
The GuaraniAquifer, (Oregon State University College of Science, Program in Water
at
1,
available
at
Transformation),
and
Management
Conflict
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case-studies/Documents/guarani_
aquifer.pdf; see also Benjamin et al., supranote 32, at 2218 (stating that "[s]tudies have
shown that the waters of the Guarani Aquifer are still free from contamination");
WORLD BANK, LATIN AMERIcA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUARANI AQUIFER SYSTEM PROJECT 7 (2002),

SUSTAINABLE

available at
http://www00
2/0 7 /03/O00
wds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/DSP/IB/2
094946_02060104010962/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf [hereinafter WORLD BANK,
PROJECT].

37. See generally WORLD BANK, PROJECT, supra note 36, at 5-6 (discussing the
general threats facing the Guarani Aquifer if a "business-as-usual" approach to use of the
aquifer is taken and noting the need for a legal management framework to prevent
such approach).
38. See id. at 5.
39. See generallyWendland et al., Potentials,supra note 24, at 87.
40. See id.
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agriculture. 4' Because the water flows slowly, and so much of the
aquifer is confined, the Guarani Aquifer is actually quite vulnerable to
pollution and contamination.4 2 While the aquifer system is a natural
filter resulting in a very pure and high quality water resource, this
process takes many, many years.43 The costs, in terms of both money
and time, to treat an aquifer the size of the Guarani for contamination
would be enormous. 44
Additionally, many have trepidations about changes in land use in
the region, because soil usage seems to influence the aquifer's recharge
process.45 For example, some researchers have concerns about whether
or not eucalyptus tree plantations, which are common in some areas
surrounding the Guarani, detrimentally harm the soil's ability to filter
many of the contaminating elements that would otherwise percolate
into the aquifer.46 Other land use changes, including intensification of
livestock grazing, deforestation, and conversion of pastures to maize
and soya farming, also threaten the soil and land composition that is so
important to preserving the high quality of the Guarani waters.4 v
The backdrop to many of the challenges facing the Guarani
riparians, regarding preventing harm to the aquifer, is the issue of
whether water should be public or private property. This relates
directly to the issue of who has a right to the aquifer's water resources.
A concern in the region is that non-riparian countries will gain access to
the aquifer and exploit its resources for their own gain, potentially to
the detriment of the local population. 48 The perfect example of such a
concern is a growing apprehension that the United States may be trying
to establish a stake in the aquifer. 49 The United States has heightened
the regions' fears by increasing its presence in Paraguay, allegedly
guarding against possible terrorist activities in the area.5 0 While such
fears might not be rational, many in the riparian countries believe the

41. See, e.g., id.; see also Mazza, supra note 1 (listing many of the known concrete
problems and threats to the Guarani Aquifer).
42. See Benjamfn et al., supra note 32, at 2217.
43. See, e.g., Block B Grant,supra note 33, at 2 (noting that the quality of the water
due to the natural biogeochemical filtering process that occurs in groundwater is
significantly higher than the quality of water withdrawn from lakes, rivers, and other

traditional sources).
44.

See WORLD BANK, PROJECT, supra note 36, at 5.

45. See E. Wendland, C. Barreto, & L.H. Gomes, Water Balance in the Guarani
Aquifer Outcrop Zone Based on HydrogeologicMonitoring,342 J. HYDROLOGY 261, 266
(2007) [hereinafter Wendland et al., Water].
46. See id.; see also INT'L FINANCE CORP., CUMULATIVE IMPACT STUDY: URUGUAY PULP
MILLS, ANNEX B: PLANTATIONS B4.7 (2006) (noting that since eucalyptus trees are
shallow rooted and they draw most of their water from shallow runoff or very shallow
groundwater, they are probably not harming the Guarani Aquifer, but further studies
are warranted).
47. See.Foster et al., supra note 14, at 7.
48. See Kelly Hearn, ConspiracistsAllege U.S. Seizing Vast S. American Reservoir,
NAT'L

GEOGRAPHIC

NEWS,

Aug.

28,

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/08/060828-guarani_2.html.
49. See id.
50. See id.

2006,
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concerns are very real and serious. Some of the governments have even
developed war plans and strategies for confronting and defending
against a military invasion by a non-riparian seeking to gain control of
the Guarani.5 ' Whether legitimate or not, protecting the Guarani
Aquifer from international incursions and exploitation is a high priority
for the riparians.
As with most aquifers, the Guarani riparian states face the challenge
of discovering new information about the system, which is necessary in
order to deal with this variety of threats. The area of the aquifer system
extends from the large and relatively well-understood Parani Basin to
the smaller and less-understood Chaco-Paranfi Basin.52 Awareness of
the transboundary nature of the aquifer itself, is a relatively recent
advancement of the past couple decades.5 3 The riparians used to
believe that there were three separate aquifers, known as the
Tacuaremb6 Aquifer in Uruguay and Argentina, the Botucatu Aquifer
in Brazil, and the Misiones Aquifer in Paraguay.54 With the new
revelation that the aquifers constituted a single giant aquifer, the four
riparians gradually began to understand the importance of cooperating
and working together when dealing with the aquifer.5 The riparians
showed their unity by renaming the aquifer after the Guarani
indigenous tribe, who has lived in the region for centuries.56 This
helped foster a spirit of cooperation that continues to be a vital role in
the effectiveness of negotiations for a management framework and the
enhanced understanding of this complex aquifer systemY.
II. THE GUARANI AQUIFER PROJECT
The negotiations between the Guarani riparians began in Sao Paolo
in 1999 when they held a workshop to discuss a management
framework of the aquifer.5" This workshop spurred a series of meetings
in early 2000 in which the four riparians met with non-governmental
university
organizations,
international
("NGOs"),
organizations
representatives, state/provincial representatives, and others to discuss
undertaking the challenging task of negotiating a management
framework for the aquifer. After deciding on the format and structure
51. SeeJos6 Esteban Castro, Water Struggles, Citizenship and Governance in Latin
at
available
74-75
(2008),
72,
51
DEv.
America,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.development.1100440.
52.Henrique de Almeida Pereira, Transboundary GroundwterManagement in South

(2008),
Identifying Barriers for Policy Implementation 2
America:
http://www.inweb.gr/twm4/abs/PEREIRA%20Henrique%20de%20Ameida.pdf.
53.

See, e.g., Miller, supra note 17, at 253 (noting that understanding

the

interrelationship of the various parts 'of the Guarani Aquifer underlying the four
riparians is a recent discovery by scientists of the last twenty to twenty-five years and
policy makers even more recently acknowledged its transboundary character).

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See, e.g., Foster et al., supranote 14, at 2.
See id. at 6-7.
See Miller, supra note 17, at 253.
See id.at 253-54.
See Newton, supranote 36, at 4.
See idat 4; see also Amore, Management,supra note 23, at 259.
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of the desired project, the four riparians officially signed the agreement
initiating the Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development
of the Guarani Aquifer System Ptoject. 60 The Guarani Aquifer Project is
now the focal point of ongoing negotiations for the development of a
legal and institutional framework to manage the Guarani Aquifer.
Since the project is preventive in nature (as opposed to corrective or
remedial), regional cooperation and coordination is essential due to
the transboundary character of the aquifer. 6' This means that the duty
to cooperate is a fundamental obligation for the riparians and is at the
core of the project.
A. PAST COOPERATION IN THE REGION

One of the strengths of the Guarani Aq2uifer Project is the history of
cooperation between the riparian states.
Cooperation is a critical
ingredient for the effective negotiation and agreement of international
treaties, particularly those that relate to environmental issues, such as
water resources, because they necessarily require some relinquishment
of state sovereignty by the parties.6 3 Such a cooperative spirit is nothing
new for the recent history of the four riparians of the Guarani Aquifer.'
Not only are all the countries members of the Organization of
American States, but they also make up the MERCOSUR Southern
Cone Common Market, a trade agreement in existence since the
signing of the Treaty of Asunci6n in 1991.65
Additionally, Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay were all involved in
the negotiating process that ultimately led to the treaty covering the La

60.
61.

See Amore, Management,supra note 23 at 261.
Erikkson & Rogers, supra note 9, at 6; see also Block B Grant,supra note 33, at

1.
62. SeeGutierrez, supranote 13, at 148.
63. See generally Bryan A. Green, Lessons from the Montreal Protocol-Guidance
for the Next InternationalClimate Change Agreement 39 ENVTL. L. 253, 259 (2009)
(discussing the important role cooperation amongst nations played in coming to an
effective international environmental agreement to address ozone depletion); see
generally Kevin Watkins, Chapter 6: Managing Transboundary Waters, in HuMAN
DEVELOPMENT
REPORT
203,
203-31
(2006),
available
at
http://www.unwater.org/downoads/HDR_2006 Chapter_6.pdf
(explaining
and
analyzing the role of cooperation in avoiding conflicts over resources as well as
improving the effectiveness of agreements managing resources); see also Benjamin et
al., supra note 32, at 2211 (noting that because of uncertainties about transboundary
aquifers, it would be difficult to protect the Guarani Aquifer without cooperation
between all the riparians).
64. See WORLD BANK, LATIN AMERICA - GUARANI AQUIFER PROJECT 2 (2001), available
at
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/03/31/000
094946_0103300601005/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf [hereinafter WORLD BANK,
LATIN AMeRicA].
65. Organization
of
American
States,
http://www.oas.org/en/member states/default.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2010); Treaty
of Asunci6n, ch. IV art. 23, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsrtoc.asp.
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Plata River Basin in 1967.6 This treaty created the Intergovernmental
Coordinating Committee ("CIC") to govern and manage the river
basin.6 7 The Guarani Aquifer riparians' continued cooperation with the
management discretion of the CIC in recent decades is further
evidence of the ability of these countries to work together.6 This spirit
of cooperation in the region is the first step towards reaching a
consensus on a management framework for the Guarani Aquifer, but it
alone, does not ensure the sustainability of the aquifer.69 The riparians
need to build upon the cooperation between the nations themselves
and expand it to include all levels of society: state/provincial
governments, local municipalities, and even the general populations.
Such a multi-faceted approach is necessary to ensure that any
agreement is effective and not merely empty rhetoric.
B. STRUCTURE OF THE PROJECT

The Guarani Aquifer Project is only the first step towards achieving
the long-term objective of "the sustainable, integrated management and
use of the Guarani Aquifer System."70 The focus of the project is "to
support [Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay] in jointly
elaborating and implementing a common institutional and technical
framework for managing and preserving the Guarani Aquifer System
for current and future generations."7 ' The short-term objectives of the
project are: (1) to enhance a technical knowledge of the Guarani
Aquifer; (2) to implement a system to monitor wells and other
information on the aquifer; (3) to elaborate a Strategic Action Plan and
Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis; and (4) to develop a proposal that
factors in the water policies of each of the riparians for the coordinated
management framework to reduce threats to the aquifer.7 2
These objectives are ambitious, but a host of international and
regional entities aid the riparians in executing the project. The
executing agency is the Organization of American States ("OAS"), and
the implementing agency is the World Bank.73 The main source of
funding for the project comes from the Global Environment Facility
("GEF"), which contributed over $13 million dollars to the project.

66. Water Management and Climate Change: Lessons from Regional Cooperation,
PoLIc SERiES No. 9, (Org. of Am. States Dept. of Sustainable Dev., Washington, D.C.),
Mar. 2006, at 2, availableathttp://www.oas.org/dsd/policy-series/9-eng.pdf.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See Pereira, supranote 52, at 1.
70. WORLD BANK, PROJECT, supra note 36, at 3.
71. Id.
72. See Guairani Aquifer System: Environmental Protection and Sustainable
Development of the GuaraniAquifer System, WATER PROJECr SERIEs No. 7 (Org. of
American States Dept. of Sustainable Development, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2005, at 2,
http://www.oas.org/dsd/Events/english/Documents/OSDE_7Guarani.pdf
[hereinafter GuaraniAquiferSystem].
73. Erikkson & Rogers, supra note 9, at vi.
74. Id.
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Additional participants include the International Atomic Energy
Agency ("IAEA") and the German and Dutch governments who serve as
advisors and assist with the implementation of some aspects of the
project. 75 The involvement of the local communities in the aquifer
region and the local governments or municipalities, as well as NGOs
and regional academic institutions, are indispensable elements for the
project to succeed, because these participants inevitably play a vital role
in the testing and implementation of any institutional changes and
management policies.
The responsibilities and roles of the World Bank and the OAS, as
the implementing and the executing agency respectively, somewhat
coincide. 76 The World Bank provides "overall fiduciary and substantive
oversight," but the OAS also serves as a fiduciary as it bears
responsibility to the World Bank and GEF to ensure that the project
adheres to Pertinent policies, procedures, and regulations at the lower
local levels.
The Steering Committee is at the head of the Guarani Aquifer
Project's structure. Comprised of three representatives from each
riparian nation, covering the ministries for water resources,
environment, and foreign relations, the Steering Committee operates at
the national secretary or ministerial level.78 It meets twice a year to
approve policies,
strategies, and programs for the implementation of
79
the project.
The General Secretariat and other senior officials operate under the
direction and control of the OAS and the Coordination Council. 80 The
General Secretariat manages the day-to-day operations of the project,
but must seek the Steering Committee's approval for even minor
decisions. 81 The OAS directs and hires the General Secretariat staff and
assigns an OAS officer who will work in conjunction with the General
Secretariat to oversee the project's ground operations from Buenos
Aires.8 2 The Coordination Council meets on a quarterly basis and
makes reports to the Steering Committee on the progress of the
project. 83 Essentially, it serves as a link between the General Secretariat
and the Steering Committee, relaying instructions and directives from

75.

See GuaraniAquifer System, supra note 72, at 2.

See generally FOOD AND

AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, PREPARING FOR
THE NEXT GENERATION OF WATERSHED MANAGEMENT PROGRAMMES AND

PROJECTS: WATER RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 147 (Lanry Tennyson & Carlo
Zingari eds., 2006) (explaining that the Dutch involvement in the project is through the
Netherlands Water Partnership, and the German involvement is via the Federal Institute
for Geosciences and Natural Resources ("BGR")).
76. Erikkson & Rogers, supranote 9, at vi.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 19.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81.

See WORLD BANK, PROJECT, supranote 36, at 23.

82. Erikkson & Rogers, supranote 9, at 20.
83. Id. at 19.
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the latter to the former.84
Serving under the General Secretariat at more local levels are four
National Project Executing Units ("NPEU"), with one in each riparian
These agencies review and implement their respective
nation. 85
country's developed polices.86 Officials charged with the management
of their country's water resources also typically head their country's
NPEU as the project national coordinator.8 Additional members of the
NPEUs come from a variety of entities, including national and local
government agencies, NGOs, academic institutions, or even from the
general public. 88 The NPEUs are vital to the implementation of the
project at the local level and are essential to the success of the project as
a whole.
The World Bank Independent Evaluation Group estimated the total
cost of the project to be about $27 million, with half the funds
originating from the GEF grant.89 The four riparians and the other
various international actors involved in the project provide the
90
remaining funds of about $12 million and $1.4 million, respectively.
While this is a considerable amount of money, maintaining financial
responsibility and allocating funds efficiently are ongoing challenges for
This predicament escalated as difficulties reaching
the project.
contractual agreements to perform various parts of the pro ect arose,
These
and ultimately delayed the execution of the project.
to
Secretariat
General
the
forced
eventually
delays
contractual
there
that
review
project
midterm
2006
announce at the February
would be an extension of the project by two years, from 2007 to 2009.92
C. THE SEVEN COMPONENTS

The Guarani Aquifer Project consists of seven interrelated
components, each having a different aspect of the overall mission.
These seven components form the backbone of the project and attempt
to methodically address the various issues that are essential to achieving
the long-term objective. Designed to foster a better comprehension of
the form, structure, and behavior of the Guarani, as well as its use,
preservation, and relationship with local communities, the seven
components are important tools for moving forward with the
development of ajoint management framework for the aquifer.

84. Id.
85. Id. at 20.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 21.
90. Id.
91. SeeId.
92. Id.at 25 (noting that the Guarani Aquifer Project was scheduled to conclude in
March of 2007, but the prolonged contracting processes forced the project to be
extended for two more years).
93. See GuaraniAquiferSystem, supranote 72, at 2.
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1. Component I
Component I covers "Expansion and Consolidation of the Current
Scientific and Technical Knowledge Base of the Guarani Aquifer
System." 4
Before proceeding with the establishment of a joint
framework to manage the Guarani Aquifer, the riparian nations
recognized the need for a "unified and consistent knowledge base,"
particularly one that included an understanding of the fundamental
hydrological systems in the aquifer.95 Some information about the
aquifer was available prior to the project, which was provided by several
universities in the region that had previously conducted research of the
system. 96 Because of the need for greater knowledge before many of
the other components could be effectively undertaken and addressed,
Component I was vital to the launch of the project in 2003. Two private
firms, Lavalin and Tahal,97secured contracts to conduct the research
specified in Component I.
The objective of the Component I is simply to "synthesize, analyze,
and expand the existing knowledge base related to the Guarani Aquifer
System in the four countries. 9 8 Essentially, the task requires mapping
or charting the volume of the aquifer, the exact borders of the*aquifer,
the technical and chemical quality of the water, the general flow of the
water, and the interactions between ground and surface waters. 99 This
also includes building on the understanding of the threats to the
aquifer by investigating pollution of the aquifer, assessing the extent of
contamination, and creating an inventory of both public and private
wells. 0 ° The component also includes a technical and socio-economic
evaluation of the aquifer's vast potential with a focus on current and
future uses. 10 1 Such an assessment could lead to an early identification
of new technologies that may increase the efficiency of the aquifer.
2. Component II
Component II, the 'Joint Development and Implementation of the
Guarani Aquifer System Management Framework," forms the core of
the Guarani Aquifer Project and depends on information from each of
the other components. 01 2 Its specific objective is to develop the
94. Id.
95. RUBIO, supra note 19, at 20 (referencing a UNECE survey of transboundary
aquifers and other studies that confirmed the need for a prerequisite knowledge base).
96. See Block B Grant,supra note 33, at 10 (noting that the academic institutions
conducting research on the Guarani prior to the Guarani Aquifer Project were the
Universidad Nacional del Litoral and Universidad de Buenos Aires (in Argentina), the
Universidade Federal do Parand (in Brazil), the Universidad Nacional de Asunci6n (in
Paraguay), and the Universidad de la Repfiblica Oriental del Uruguay).
97. See Erikkson & Rogers, supranote 9, at 9.
98.

WORLD BAN, PROJECT, supra note 36, at 43.

99. Erikkson & Rogers, supranote 9, at 9.
100. See, e.g., GuaraniAquiferSystem, supranote 72, at 2.
101. SeeWORLD BANK, PROJECT, supra note 36, at 43.
102. GuaraniAquifer System, supra note 72, at 2; WORLD
supranote 64, at 4.

BANK, LATIN AMERICA,
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institutional, technical, financial, and legal management framework for
the Guarani Aquifer.10 3 The data and information collected from other
components must support the framework, and this requires a
coordinated and improved system of gathering information, arranging
the data, and creating joint strategies for both localized and generalized
management functions.'04
Important steps to completion of Component II are the creation
and implementation of a Strategic Action Plan ("SAP") and a
Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis ('TDA") .
The SAP is an
articulated plan of necessary actions for achieving the project's longterm goal of sustainable management the Guarani Aquifer. 6
It
includes many aspects of the other components and combines them to
help form the management framework. The TDA is an assessment of
the primary threats to the aquifer, and it particularly evaluates the
threats to the structure and the locations that are in urgent need of
attention due to current vulnerabilities. 0 7 While the SAP combines
many analyses in an effort to develop a coordinated and comprehensive
management strategy, the TDA focuses on legal and social analyses of
the border areas between countries. These complicated tasks are also
partially responsible for the two-year delay of the completion of the
0
project."
'
3. Component III
Component III covers "Public and Stakeholder Participation,
Education and Communication."' 09 People often describe aquifers as
invisible or hidden resources as they lie beneath the ground and are out
of the public's sight. 1 As a result, public awareness and appreciation
for the value and potential of aquifers are relatively low when compared
to other water resources, such as lakes and rivers. Component III of the
project seeks to correct this dilemma by providing information about
the Guarani Aquifer to as many people in the region as possible. In
doing so, the desired result is increased practical involvement of the
stakeholders of the aquifer in the decision-making process affecting the
Guarani.111

Although the tasks in Component III may seem relatively easy
compared to those in the other components, some community
organizations and NGOs posed a challenge to the success of the public

103. WORLD BANK, PROJECT, supra note 36, at 44.
104. See WORLD BANK, LATIN AMERICA, supranote 64, at 4.
105. GuaraniAquiferSystem, supra note 72, at 2-3.
106. Id. at 2.
107. See WORLD BANKx, PROJECT, supra note 36, at 3.
108. SeeErikkson & Rogers, supra note 9, at 12.
109. WORLD BANK, PRoJECT, supra note 36, at 12.
110. See Miletto & Kirchheim, supra note 2, at 1; see Eckstein, Hidden Treasure,
supranote 6, at 5.
111. GuaraniAquifer System, supra note 72, at 3; WORLD BANK, LATIN AMERICA,
supranote 64, at 4.
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awareness and participation campaign.12 These private campaigns
promulgated incorrect information about dangerous theories, such as
foreign powers using the Guarani Aquifer Project to gain access to and
steal the waters of the aquifer. 11 3 While damaging initially, the Guarani
Aquifer Project seems to have recovered from the negative publicity
created by such theories, in part due to small projects funded by the
Citizens' Fund." 4 This funding mechanism has been very successful in
distributing money to NGOs and academic institutions that engage in
educating the public and raising awareness of the project." 5
4. Component IV
In order for a sustainable management framework to be effective,
ongoing analysis and monitoring of the aquifer are essential.
Component IV, "Project.Monitoring and Evaluation, and Dissemination
of Project Results," seeks to generate and implement the necessary
measures to help track, analyze, record, and verify the progress of the
project. 1 6 In this way, the Guarani Aquifer Project seeks to adhere to
the principle of regularly exchanging information and data." 7 This
component entails coordination between the different riparians, as well
as coordination within each country between local and national levels.
Riparians need to efficiently disseminate information and data to each
of the entities involved to maintain cooperation between the parties,
and also to help replicate any programs throughout the aquifer that are
producing successful results. 8 To help track the progress of the
project across international boundaries, as well as the condition of the
water throughout the aquifer, a uniform system of monitoring is
necessary.
5. Component V
Component V involves the "Development of Management and
Mitigation Measures within Identified 'Hot Spots.""' 9 The objective of
this part of the project is to develop and test specific techniques and
procedures dealing with management of the aquifer, prevention of
possible threats, assorted uses of the water, and ways to promote
stakeholder and public involvement in the management practices of the
aquifer. 20 To accomplish this objective, the project identified and
defined four critical zones, each involving different problems and
issues. The Guarani Aquifer Project then set up a priority "pilot
112. See Erikkson & Rogers, supra note 9, at 10.
113. See id.at 13.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See, e.g., GuaraniAquiferSystem, supranote 72, at 3.
117. Seeid.
118. See, e.g., WORLD BANK,PROJECT, supra note 36, at 50.
119. Id.at 56.
120. See, e.g., WORLD BANi, LATIN AMERICA, supra note 64, at 5; see also Miletto &
Kirchheim, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing the focus of the Guarani Aquifer Project).
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project" in identified critical zones to assess the nature of that particular
problem, increase the understanding of it, and develop practical
mechanisms and practices to address, manage, and mitigate the
problem.' 2'
The first of two transboundary pilot projects is located at Concordia,
Argentina and Salto, Uruguay, two bordering cities. 2 2 This region has
numerous thermal zones, and as a result, the project centers on
studying the sustainable management of the thermal waters. 2 1 Salto is
home to the most advanced thermal spa recreation industry in the
K 24
MERCOSUR.
In contrast, Concordia has only recently begun to
utilize the thermal properties of the Guarani Aquifer water for tourism
purposes. 25 This dichotomy permits the pilot project to study both the
advanced uses and effects of the thermal water and tourism, as well as
the most efficient and practical means to develop thermal industries in
new areas. 126 Due to the focus on thermal water of the Concordia-Salto
project, the pilot project
closely relates to Component VI of the
1 27
Guarani Aquifer Project.

The other transboundary pilot project is located at Rivera, Uruguay
and Santana do Livramento, Brazil. 128 This region is a very urbanized
recharge zone with high water use from the aquifer. The focus of the
Rivera-Livramento pilot project is to develop, implement, and test a very
localized joint management framework. 29 The pilot project seeks to
evaluate mechanisms to remedy some of the common problems and
threats that the aquifer as a whole faces. The Rivera-Livramento pilot
project monitors potential risks to see how they respond to various
localized management mechanisms that one130could replicate on a grand
scale and apply to other areas of the aquifer.
Another pilot project is located entirely in Riberao Preto, Brazil.
This is an urbanized zone with marked evidence of over-exploitation,
making it prime for studying ways to mitigate such a threat.13 Another
benefit of conducting a pilot project in this region is the opportunity to
address other environmental threats in the midst of a diversity of uses
for the land and the aquifer. 3 2 As a result, this pilot project provides
the opportunity to study the threats and problems of localized pollution

121.
122.

See GuaraniAquiferSystem, supra note 72, at 3.
Id.

123.

Id.

124. See Foster et al., supranote 14, at 17.
125. Id.
126. See GuaraniAquiferSystem, supra note 72, at 3.
127. See generallyinfia text accompanying notes 138-42 (discussing how component
VI of the Guarani Aquifer Project concerns the geothermal energy potential of the
Guarani Aquifer).
128. See GuaraniAquiferSystem, supra note 72, at 3-4.
129.

See WORLD BANK, PROJECT, supra note 36, at 128.

130. See id.
131. See Vives et al., supra note 31, at 4 (stating that over-exploitation in the Ribeirio
Preto area of Brazil was first identified over twenty years ago).
132.

See WoRLD BANE, PROJEcT, supra note 36, at 131.
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and overdraft in densely populated areas and to experiment
with
133
diverse responses in an attempt to find viable solutions.
The fourth and final priority pilot project is located at Itapfia,
Paraguay, a rural region that primarily uses the land for agriculture and
livestock grazing.1
The Guarani has a large recharge and discharge
zone in this area that exposes the aquifer to pesticides and fertilizers
from the irrigation. 13 The pilot project studies the risks that exist in
such regions of the aquifer and addresses ways to mitigate harm to the
waters. Additionally, changes in land use occur frequently in the Itapfia
area due to deforestation and urbanization. 136 This permits the study of
the technical and economic feasibility of implementing such changes
without detrimentally affecting the Guarani. 1 7 As with the other pilot
projects, the Itapfia project presents a valuable opportunity to research
localized threats and uses of the aquifer in the hope that the region can
subsequently apply successful policies and practices to the aquifer as a
whole.
6. Component VI
Component VI is an "Assessment of Geothermal Energy Potential"
of the Guarani Aquifer.13 s With energy demands in the region
continuing to grow due to the economic development, urbanization,
and population growth, an alternative fuel source such as geothermal
energy from the waters of the Guarani Aquifer would be a wonderful
breakthrough. The four riparians currently use a variety of resources to
meet their energy needs, including oil, hydropower, and ethanol.'39 All
four of the riparians signed the Kyoto Protocol for Global Warming,
and, therefore, have made the commitment to seek clean alternative
sources of energy. 40 Component VI of the Guarani Aquifer Project
seeks to do just that - quantify and evaluate the potential value of the
geothermal qualities of the water in scientific, technical, financial, and
environmental terms.14 1 Unfortunately, results of the studies conducted
thus far seem to indicate that the thermal waters from the Guarani are
not hot enough to produce steam for142power generation without the
assistance of additional energy sources.

133.

See GuaraniAquiferSystem, supra note 72, at 4.

134.
135.
136.

Id.

See WORLD BANK, PROJECT, supranote 36, at 130.
See generally CARLOS GALINDo-LEAL & IBSEN DE GusMAo CAMARA, THE ATLANTIc

FOREST OF SOUTH AMERIcA: BIODIVERSrrY STATUS, THREATS, AND OUTLOOK

291-92, 431

(2003) (discussing deforestation and urbanization of the Paraguayan Atlantic Forest) .

137.

See GuaraniAquiferSystem, supra note 72, at 4.

138.
139.

Id.

140.
141.
142.

See WORLD BANK, LATIN AMERICA, supra note 64, at 2.
Id. at 3.
See GuaraniAquiferSystem, supranote 72, at 4.
Erikkson & Rogers, supranote 9, at 10, 13-14.

Issue 2

GUARANI AQUIFER & INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW

379

7. Component VII
Finally, "Project Coordination and Management" is the focus of
Component VII. 143 The objective is simply to provide organizational
and administrative support to the rest of the Guarani Aquifer Project.
Included in Component VII are project leadership activities, regional
and local coordination, and international coordination between each of
the riparians.' 44 Additionally, this component "facilitates the liaison
activities to be carried out by the [General] Secretariat and the
operational activities of the coordinating and executing units in the
respective countries ....
Overall, the General Secretariat has been
quite successful 46in its role as the coordinator and manager of
Component VII. 1
D. LOOKING FORWARD

Protection and management of the aquifer does not end with the
conclusion of the Guarani Aquifer Project in 2009.147 Since the longterm objective of the project is the sustainable management of the
Guarani Aquifer for current and future generations, the continued
success and effectiveness of the project will depend significantly on the
legal strength of the framework, and its ability to withstand political
changes and pressures within the region.1"
The management
framework must maintain the same coordination and cooperation
between the local and national governments, while also overcoming any
obstacles that may confront it in the future. The transition from the
oversight of the well-structured Guarani Aquifer Project to some sort of
successor entity will require additional funding, cooperation,
adjustments, and evaluation. It will need to be a gradual process, or the
implemented framework will be difficult to maintain.

m.REGIONAL LAWS
As a transboundary aquifer, any joint management framework of
the Guarani necessarily involves multiple actors with multiple visions,
laws, and philosophies for dealing with the aquifer's water. 149 Overall,
the four riparians have rather similar interests in the aquifer, however
their views of the Guarani waters, and water resources in general, differ
to some extent. One of the main differences varying from nation to
nation involves which level of the government should control natural

143. GuaraniAquiferSystem, supranote 72, at 4.
144. Id.
145. WORLD BANK, LATIN AmRICA, supra note 64, at 5.
146. SeeErikkson & Rogers, supranote 9, at 14.
147. WORLD BANK, LATIN AMEPdCA, supra note 64, at 6.
148. See infra Part V for a discussion on the applicable laws and legal principles that
should be present in the management framework in order to maximize the agreement's
effectiveness.
149. Amore, Managemen4 supranote 23, at 261.
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Another factor to consider when assessing the special interests of
the riparians is the debate regarding whether water should be publicly
or privately controlled. Since Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay
must agree to reach an effective management framework of the
Guarani, it is important that each country respect differing beliefs about
water resources to avoid derailing the entire process. 5 ' This is
especially the case because "each involved country considers
transboundary issues a matter of national responsibility and
sovereignty," which decreases the chances that one of the riparians
would go forward with a project it viewed as either seizing too much of
its sovereignty or contrary to its national interests. 5
A. ARGENTINA
In the federal system in Argentina, the country's constitution vests
"decision making authority on waters ... with the provinces." 151 Part of
54
this authority includes delegating groundwater management policies.1
However, as is the case with all the riparian nations, the Argentinean
national government retains the power and authority 15to
oversee
5
transboundary watercourses, including the Guarani Aquifer.
While other riparians staunchly oppose the privatization of water,
156
Argentina has privatized some of its water systems with much success.
For example, Argentina contracted with a consortium led by a French
company to privatize drinking water and sewage services in Buenos
Aires, which rapidly improved water availability."" However, despite the
successes of the privatization, the shortcomings overshadowed the
accomplishments, which caused public confidence in water
management to deteriorate. 5 "The common vision of the Argentine
hydric community is that the use of hydric resources must be achieved
in ways to harmonize the social, economic and environmental values
that society attributes to water.', 59 In this shared vision, the citizens of
Argentina determine "the social, economic, and environmental values"
of water in their country. 160 Both privatization of water and public
control can function within this vision of balanced values benefiting all
of society.

150.

Id.

151. See Erikkson & Rogers, supra note 9, at 18.
152. Amore, Management,supranote 23, at 265.
153. Id. at 261; see alsoFoster et al., supranote 14, at 5.
154. Foster et al., supra note 14, at 5.
155. Amore, Management,supranote 23, at 261.
156. See Miller, supra note 17, at 240-41 (describing the improvements in Buenos
Aires that resulted from Argentina's privatization of some of the major water services in
the city, as well as some of the shortcomings of the privatization efforts).

157. Id.
158. Id.at 241.
159.

See Gutierrez,supra note 13, at 148.
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B. BRAZIL
Brazil has the most advanced water laws of the four riparians; these
laws even include national laws governing groundwater. During the
1990s, demands on Brazil's water resources continued to grow, as did
those throughout the entire region, and Brazil recognized the need to
develop laws that would accommodate the changing landscape. 61 This
led to the revamping of Brazilian water law in 1997 and the adoption of
the National Water Act. 16 2 The National Environmental Policy Act was
already in place at that time, and it imposed a principle of sustainable
use on both surface and groundwater. 63 This recent shift to an
environmental focus in the legal water regime helped increase Brazilian
attention to the Guarani Aquifer, and fostered an understanding of,
and appreciation for, the aquifer's importance to the country.
The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 and the National Water Act
provide that Brazilian waters, both ground and surface, are publicly
owned."
Though Brazil has a federal system of government, the
national government still maintains some control over certain
watercourses, while the states maintain control over others.'65 When
considering transboundary aquifers, the national regulatory framework
in Brazil seems "weak and confusing. " "' While many argue that the
regulatory power for transboundary watercourses lies with the national
government, as opposed to the states, the answer is not clear.'67
Regardless of whether the power to regulate groundwater belongs to
the national or state governments, private ownership of groundwater
does not exist in Brazil.' 6'
C. PARAGUAY

Paraguay, along with Uruguay, is a unitary country that delegates
decision-making
authority for water issues to the national
government. 69 Even with a centralized control of their water issues,
Paraguay lacks comprehensive water laws. 7 ° A few scattered provisions
in various laws address some aspects of groundwater, but for the
most
1 71
part, national legislation on groundwater is still in development.
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164.
165.
166.
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168.
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See Erikkson & Rogers, supra note 9, at 7.
See id see also Benjamin et al., supra note 32, at 2193.
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Seeid.at2214.
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D. URUGUAY
While water laws and policies in Paraguay are still evolving, Uruguay
as a wealthier and more developed nation has made more meaningful
progress in the development of national water laws. The Uruguayan
national government has the power to regulate water issues and the
water code contains the main laws relating to groundwater. 72 Since
2000, Uruguay has allocated management duties of the Guarani Aquifer
between two federal agencies: the Direcci6n Nacional Hidrogrifica
Direcci6n Nacional de Medio
manages quantity issues, and the
73
issues.
quality
manages
Ambiente
A particularly important and sensitive issue in Uruguay is the
privatization of water from the Guarani Aquifer. Based on cultural
roots, many Uruguayans view water as a common good. 74 In fact, the
campaign against water privatization is so strong that in 2004 the people
of Uruguay passed, by a two-thirds margin, a referendum
constitutionally outlawing the outsourcing of water to the private
sector.1 75 Significantly, the referendum was "widely seen as a rejection
of the World Bank-IMF model of market-led economic growth ....
The constitutional reforms even state the right to water is a critical
human right, further strengthening the country's anti-privatization
movement.177 Relating to the Guarani Aquifer, the referendum
expressed the deep concerns of many Uruguayans that the World
Bank's involvement in the aquifer, and the continued presence of U.S.
troops in Paraguay, will ultimately over-privatize the Guarani's
reserves.178

W. INTERNATIONAL LAWS
While transboundary groundwater is an increasingly valuable
resource for meeting the world's water needs and promoting economic
development, very little international law directly addresses it.' 79 "There
are no tried and true models that could be copied from other cases," so
a real need exists for the initial development of a proper integrated
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Javier Taks, El Agua es de Todos/Water for All: Water Resources and
Development in Uruguay,51 DEv. 17, 18 (2008).
175. PETER BAKvis, MOLLY McCoy, & TIM SHORROCK, INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION
OF FREE TRADE UNIONS, FIGHTING FOR ALTERNATIVES: CASES OF SUCCESSFUL TRADE UNION
(2006),
RESISTANCE TO THE POLICIES OF THE IMF AND WORLD BANK 15

http://www.gurn.info/en/discussion-papers/IFI.pdf.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 15-16; see alsoHearn, supra note 48.
179. See Stephen Foster, Essential Concepts for Groundwater Regulators,
GROUNDWATER: LEGAL & POLICY PERSPECTIVE - PROCEEDINGS OF A WORLD BANK SEMINAR

15, 28 (Salman M. A. Salman ed., 1999).
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Successful and
water management plan and approach to aquifers. 8
effective regulation of transboundary aquifers is especially difficult
because it requires complex collaboration and coordination between
entities, both within
different levels of water and land management
18
each country and among multiple countries. 1
International law relating to surface water, on the other hand, has
made significant advancements in recent history. One advancement
includes the codification of multiple legal principles stemming from

customary international law, which guide various international legal
water regimes. 82 It seems that these basic international water laws and
principles for surface water could work for groundwater as well.
The Guarani Aquifer provides a valuable opportunity to apply these
principles to a major transboundary aquifer. For a working legal
framework within the Guarani Aquifer region and other transboundary
groundwater systems, the international principles must harmonize with
the regional laws that are applicable to groundwater within the various
riparian nations. The discussion below briefly outlines the major legal
adoption of these
principles applicable to surface waters and assesses
183
systems.
groundwater
transboundary
for
principles
A. U.N. CONVENTION ON NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL
WATERCOURSES

In 1997, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Convention on the
Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses ("UN
Watercourse Convention").184 This landmark agreement was twenty-five
years in the making, partially because it took the U.N. General Assembly
a long time to devise and agree on the legal principles applicable to
eHowever, the convention limited the
transboundary watercourses,
scope of the agreement such that it only applies to transboundary
groundwater and aquifers that link to surface water systems.18'

This

180. Erikkson & Rogers, supranote 9, at 8; see also Gutierrez, supranote 13, at 145.
181. See Miletto & Kirchheim, supranote 2, at 2.
182. See Miller, supra note 17, at 243-44, 251-52.
183. See infra text accompanying notes 184-200.
184. Gabriel Eckstein, A HydrogeologicalPerspective of the Status of Ground Water
Resources Under the UN Watercourse Convention, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 525, 525
(2005) [hereinafter Eckstein, Perspective].
185. Seeid. at530-31.
186. Stephen C. McCaffrey, An Overview of the UN. Convention on the Law of the
Non-Navigational Uses ofInternationalWatercourses,20J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.

57, 58-59 (2000); Anna Brown & Nancy Odeh, Towards a Global Transbounday/
Watercourse and Aquifer Agreement (GTWAA) in 15 Papers on International
Environmental Negotiation 7 (William R. Moomaw & Lawrence E. Susskind eds., 2006),
http://www.pon.org/downloads/ienl5.7.Brown0deh.pdf. See also Eckstein, Hidden
Treasure, supra note 6, at 5 ("[A] close review of the definition of watercourse reveals
that the agreement excludes many types of ground water from the Convention's
span."); EiC LODDI, TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIFERS MANAGING A VrrAL RESOURCE, THE
UNILC DRAFr ARTIcLES ON THE LAw OF TRANSBOUNDARY AQUIrERS 13 (Raya Marina

4
4
Stephan, ed., 2009), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/00182 /182 31e.pdf
("[RIegarding groundwater, the Watercourse Convention seems limited in its scope.").
See generally Eckstein, Perspective, supra note 184, at 538-39 (discussing groundwater
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means that some groundwater systems that cross an international
boundary, such as the Guarani, can fall outside the scope of the
convention. 7 Despite the likelihood that the Guarani Aquifer falls
outside the scope of the convention, the agreement's principles are still
valuable for the discussion of what law should apply to transboundary
aquifers.
B. DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE LAW OF TRANSBOUNDARYAQUIFERS
When the review of transboundary groundwater laws began in the
early 2000s, the principles from the UN Watercourse Convention served
as a guide and starting point, though significant debate ensued as to the
straight applicability of some of the principles to transboundary
groundwater."' 8 Ultimately, the drafting committee of the United
Nations International Law Commission developed the Draft Articles on
the Law of Transboundary Aquifers 8 9 ("Draft Articles"), which were the
only transboundary
instrument addressing
first
international
groundwater.' 90 Unlike the United Nations Watercourse Convention,
the Draft Articles would have covered the Guarani Aquifer under this
framework.
The Draft Articles contain a couple of significant differences from
the principles elucidated in the United Nations Watercourse
Convention. These differences have actual implications for the Guarani
Aquifer. First, the Draft Articles express the principle of equitable and
reasonable use in terms of "utilization" instead of "use".'' This brings
additional activities under the scope of the articles, such as the means
for extracting water from an aquifer. 9 2 The other significant difference
is that the Draft Articles expand the scope to include any and all.
activities that "have or are likely to have an impact" on the aquifer.193 By
adding this part of the scope to the articles, activities that might not
even involve the use of water could fall under the articles due to the
activities having, an impact on the aquifer. For example, as is the case
with the Guarani, land use can affect the soil and damage the
infiltration recharge process or the aquifer's ability to filter
contaminants.194 Beyond those major differences, the Draft Articles
as a transboundary resource).
187. See Eckstein & Eckstein, Models, supra note 5, at 684-85 (noting that Model E
aquifer systems, such as the Guarani Aquifer, probably fall outside the scope of the UN
Watercourse Convention).
188. See LODD, supra note 186, at 13 (discussing the limited applicability of the UN
Watercourse Convention to groundwater).
189. Gabriel E. Eckstein, Commentary on the UN InternationalLaw Commission's
Draft Articles on the Law of TransboundaryAquifers, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENvrL. L. &
POL'Y 537, 542-43 (2007) [hereinafter Eckstein, Commentary].
190. MargaretJ. Vick, International Water Law and Sovereignty A Discussion of the
ILC Draft Articles on the Law of TransboundaryAquifers, 21 PAc. MCGEORGE GLOBAL
Bus. & DEv. LJ. 191,195 (2008).
191. See Eckstein, Commenary,supranote 189, at 545.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id.
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endorse the key principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, no
significant harm, sovereignty of the aquifer state, cooperation, and the
regular exchange of information.195 All these principles, or a. variation
thereof, are worthy of incorporation in a legal framework for the
Guarani Aquifer.
C. THE GUARANI AQUIFER LEADING ADVANCES IN THE LAw

Because international agreements such as a joint management
framework for the Guarani are often "the application of general
principles to specific situations," 196 Component II of the Guarani
Aquifer Project provides the best opportunity to balance and apply
principles of international water law to the management of the Guarani
Aquifer. The legal aspect of the management framework to be created
and implemented should adhere to any relevant principles, in addition
to the underlying duty 197
to cooperate, which is already present in the
Guarani Aquifer Project.
For example, the principles of reasonable utilization and no
significant harm strike at the core of the long-term objective of the
Guarani Aquifer Project. 198 Any sustainable management framework
needs to provide for management functions, as well as a standard that
will prohibit excessive and uncontrolled extraction of aquifer water.
These two principles would deter harmful activities and practices, and
provide a foundation for reprisal against those activities that violate the
agreed framework.
A principle centered and focused on "equitable" use of the waters is
not necessary because the aquifer has a large volume of water available
to meet the need of an exceptional number of people. Employing a
principle of reasonableutilization increases the likelihood of reaching
an agreement because it maintains firm guidelines on extraction from
the aquifer, and that principle results in decreased infringement on the
riparians' sovereignty over the resources within their territory. Another
possibility is to adapt and to merge the equitable and reasonable
utilization principle with the Brazilian principle of sustainable use. This
new adapted principle could be stated as "sustainable and reasonable
utilization" of the aquifer's resources.
A sustainable and reasonable utilization principle fits much better
with the unique strengths and characteristics of the Guarani Aquifer.
Protecting the recharge capabilities and processes is a major concern
for the Guarani Aquifer, as well as many other aquifers.199 A vital

195. G.A. Res. 63/124,
3-8, U.N. Doc.A/RES/63/439 (Jan. 15, 2009), availableat
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO8/478/23/PDF/NO847823.pdf?OpenElement.
196. Lilian del Castillo-Laborde, Emerging Legal Principles for Transboundary
Aquifers
and
the
South
American
Guarani
Aquifer,
http://www.inweb.gr/twm4/abs/DEL%20CASTILLO%20LABORDE%2OLilian2.pdf.
197. See WoRLD BANK, LATIN AMERICA, supranote 64, at 2.
198. See id. at 3.
199. Id. at 2, 6, 8.
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interest to the region is continual use of the resource into the future. A
guiding principle centered on sustainability ensures that protecting the
recharge aspects of the aquifer remains fundamental to any use or
utilization of the aquifer. This added emphasis, when combined with a
reasonableness standard, allows the framework to retain an important
amount of flexibility that is critical for using the framework as a guide
or model for other transboundary aquifers. Furthermore, increased
flexibility helps states affected by the framework retain their sovereignty,
which facilitates a willingness to negotiate and cooperate.
Additionally, because of the vulnerability of aquifers to
contamination, pollution, and other threats that are costly and timeconsuming to reverse, 2°° the legal framework should seek to incorporate
the more stringent "no harm" principle as opposed to no significant
harm. However, in the end, either definition would work to improve
the effectiveness and strength of the management framework.
CONCLUSION
The Guarani Aquifer is an invisible; yet extremely valuable resource.
Sustainable development of the aquifer is vitally important to protect
the aquifer from a host of threats, such as pollution, contamination,
and over-exploitation. As the population in the region continues to
grow2"' and the riparians continue to develop and industrialize, the
threats facing the Guarani will increase. The situation calls for a
preventive management agenda to protect the aquifer for current and
future generations.
The innovative Guarani Aquifer Project is
attempting to answer that call.
The development and implementation of a comprehensive
management framework will be the foundation for sustainable use of
the aquifer, while also mitigating the risks inherent to the watercourse.
However, the successful completion of the Guarani Aquifer Project,
which has already been delayed two years, 2 is but the first step in the
continued protection of the aquifer. For this reason, the framework
must incorporate legal principles that will withstand a succession of
executing, managing, and controlling entities.
The underlying principles should come from those already
developed and applied to surface waters. The Guarani Aquifer provides
a valuable opportunity to take proven and effective international legal
principles for surface waters and then adapt and modify them for
transboundary groundwaters and aquifers.
Development and
application of groundwater principles,, such as sustainable and
reasonable utilization of the aquifer's waters, the obligation not to cause
significant harm to the watercourse, and the ongoing duty to exchange
data and information, would be a groundbreaking development for the

200. See Nora R. Pincus, Groundwaterand InternationalLaw: The Need for Specific
Regulation, 11 U. DENV. WATERL. REv. 313, 317 (2008).

201. SeeFoster et al., supr note 14, at 13.
202. Erikkson & Rogers, supra note 9, at 25.
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legal community. The principles, plus the continued cooperation
between the riparians, could help secure the waters of the Guarani
Aquifer now and into the future. The groundwater principles adopted
for the Guarani Aquifer would provide a framework that could facilitate
transboundary agreements in other regions of the world.

ARTICLE UPDATE
SIXTH UPDATE TO COLORADO WATER LAW: AN
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
THE HONORABLE GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.,
To provide our readers with the most up-to-date water law
information, the editors periodically include updates of works
previously published in the Water Law Review. The following is the
sixth update to Colorado Water Law.- An Historical Overview,
Appendix-Colorado Water Law A Synopsis of Statutes and Case Law,'
selected by the Honorable GregoryJ. Hobbs, Jr.
In re Tonko
"The remedies and procedures in a district court right-of-way
condemnation proceeding are substantially different from those of a
water court application proceeding. The condemnation action involves
issues such as necessity and valuation in determining the compensation
award for a ditch or pipeline right-of-way needed for water transport in
the exercise of a water right. The prerequisite for maintaining the
condemnation action, pursuant to section 7 of article XVI of the
Colorado Constitution and section 37-86-104(1), C.R.S. (2006), is an
adjudicated conditional or absolute water right, but the adjudication of
such a right is not within the district court's jurisdiction. Adjudication
of water use rights belongs to the water court.
The water court process involves a division engineer's consultation
report, a referee's investigation, discovery, and a trial regarding
contested issues of fact involving claimed water use rights. A water
court applicant has incentives and the opportunity to try water use
questions that a condemnation proceeding lacks.
The existence or non-existence of the Tonkos' water use rights by
reason of the 1908 decree and coterminous conveyance by Picco and
Milano to Delisa of a 2/7ths interest in the Tatman Ditch water rights is
not identical to the condemnation of a ditch right-of-way issues the
district court had before it. The Tonkos' immediate predecessors-in1. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, 1 U. DENV.
WATER L. REv. 1, 27 (1997). The first update to Justice Hobbs' article appears at 2 U. DENY.
WATER L. REV. 223 (1999); the second update is at 4 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 111 (2000);
the third update is at 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 116 (2002); the fourth update is at 8 U.
DENV. WATER L. REv. 213 (2004); and the fifth update is at 10 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 391
(2007).
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interest did not have the same incentive or opportunity to litigate water
use matters in the condemnation proceeding as they are provided by
statute in the water court.
We conclude that the Tonkos' predecessors-in-interest did not have
a full and fair opportunity to litigate their water use rights in the
condemnation action. The fourth element of issue preclusion is not
satisfied.
The Tonkos argue that irrigation of their land is within the 1908
decree and that an undecreed invalid enlargement has not occurred in
regard to the Delisa interest in the Tatman Ditch water rights. The
Tonkos have asserted facts in support of this contention that are
properly triable in the water court, not the district court.
Whether Mallow lawfully extinguished the Delisa Ditch right-of-way
across his land and whether the Tonkos proceed with a condemnation
action turn on the outcome of their change of water rights application.
Because the Tonkos' application to confirm their water use rights
comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the water court, it must be
allowed to proceed."
In re Tonko, 154 P.3d 397, 407 (Colo. 2007) (case citations omitted).

Fort Lyon Canal Company v. High Plains A&M, LLC
"We have previously treated the bylaws of a mutual ditch company,
like the bylaws of other corporations, as provisions of a contract
between the corporation and its stockholders, and we have enforced
them as such, as long as a bylaw purporting to further condition or limit
the right to change a water right can be given effect consistent with
allowing full scope to the jurisdiction of the water court. Whether or
not a contract between a mutual ditch company and its stockholders,
requiring stockholders to bear the company's legal expenses for
opposing their application for a change of water right, without regard
to the merits of the application or the opposition to it, would be
consistent with the court's statutory discretion to award attorney fees,
the provisions of Fort Lyon's bylaws in this case simply do not purport
to impose any such burden.
Fort Lyon Canal Company v. High Plains A&M, LLC, 167 P.3d 726, 727-28 (Colo.
2007) (case citations omitted).

'"The bylaw refers to a determination by the board whether, and
under what circumstances, a requested change may be made without
causing injury. It separately refers to proceedings in the water court to
obtain a final decree or to challenge the board's determination as
arbitrary or capricious. There can be no doubt that the language of the
bylaw expressly refers to the board's required determination as "such
determination," and it expressly juxtaposes "such determination" and
subsequent proceedings challenging its validity "in a court of law having
jurisdiction over water matters." Equally clearly, this provision of the
bylaws imposes an obligation on the requesting stockholder only for
expenses incurred by the board of directors in making "such

Issue 2

ARTICLE UPDATE

determination," and not for additional expenses incurred by the board
should it choose to participate in subsequent water court
proceedings... A contract must be construed to ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the parties, as expressed in the contract itself."
Id. at 728 (case citations omitted).

"Fort Lyon argues that the context and circumstances surrounding
the adoption of the provision in question demonstrate that it was
intended to insulate the company from all expenses associated with a
stockholder's application for a change of water right, including the
expense of defending the interests of the company's remaining
stockholders in proceedings before the water court. Even if that were
the case, however, such an intent is not reflected in the unambiguous
language of the bylaw. Regardless of the expectations of the drafters of
this bylaw or those who voted to adopt it, nothing in the provision itself
can reasonably be interpreted to impose an obligation on stockholders
to cover any expense beyond that of the "legal and/or engineering
services" required by the board in evaluating their written request."
Id. at 729.

Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District v. Trout Unlimited
'We hold that a governmental water supply agency has the burden
of demonstrating three elements in regard to its intent to make a nonspeculative conditional appropriation of unappropriated water: (1)
what is a reasonable water supply planning period; (2) what are the
substantiated population projections based on a normal rate of growth
for that period; and (3) what amount of available unappropriated water
is reasonably necessary to serve the reasonably anticipated needs of the
governmental agency for the planning period, above its current water
supply. In addition, it must show under the "can and will" test that it
can and will put the conditionally appropriated water to beneficial use
within a reasonable period of time."
Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 309-10
(Colo. 2007).

"As we explained in Bijou, the statute excuses governmental
agencies from the requirement to have a legally vested interest in the
lands or facilities served, but the exception 'does not completely
immunize municipal applicants from speculation challenges.' A
governmental agency need not be certain of its future water needs; it
may conditionally appropriate water to satisfy a projected normal
increase in population within a reasonable planning period
The governmental agency does not have carte blanche to
appropriate water for speculative purposes; in effect, the statute
provides for a limited exception from certain requirements otherwise
Public agencies must still
applicable to private appropriators.
substantiate a non-speculative intent to appropriate unappropriated
water, and they must 'have a specific plan and intent to divert, store, or

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 13

otherwise capture, possess, and control a specific quantity of water for
§ 37-92-103(3) (a) (II).
Accordingly, the
specific beneficial uses.'
governmental agency has the burden to demonstrate that its
conditional appropriation is not speculative.
The conditional appropriation must be consistent with the
governmental agency's reasonably anticipated water requirements
based on substantiated projections of future growth within its service
area.
Only a reasonable planning period for the conditional
appropriation is allowed. In Bijou, the water court's findings of fact
addressed what constitutes a reasonable water supply planning period,
fifty years in that case, and found the existence of substantiated
population and water use projections. The judgment and decree we
upheld also included sufficient 'reality checks' for the purpose of
ensuring in subsequent diligence proceedings that the appropriator will
utilize the 'newly appropriated rights for its own purposes and does not
become a permanent lessor or wholesaler of water yielded by these
rights.'
We also determined in Bijou that use of a volumetric limitation in a
conditional decree, rather than a flow rate standard, curbs the
otherwise speculative tendency of a lengthy conditional appropriation
period.
Requiring adjusted, realistic estimates of future need in subsequent
diligence proceedings is consistent with the purpose underlying both
the anti-speculation doctrine and the diligence requirement, i.e.,
preserving unappropriated water for future users having legitimate,
documented needs.
The anti-speculation and the 'can and will' requirements are closely
related. A conditional decree applicant cannot reasonably prove that its
project can and will be completed with diligence and within a
reasonable time if it lacks the requisite non-speculative intent.
The factors a court considers under the 'can and will' requirement
in diligence proceedings include, but are not limited to: 1) economic
feasibility; 2) status of requisite permit applications and other required
governmental approvals; 3) expenditures made to develop the
appropriation; 4) ongoing conduct of engineering and environmental
studies; 5) design and construction of facilities; and 6) nature and
extent of land holdings and contracts demonstrating the water demand
and beneficial uses which the conditional right is to serve when
perfected. The purpose of the diligence proceeding is to gauge
whether the conditional appropriator is making steady progress in
putting the water to beneficial use with diligence and wiihin a
reasonable period of time.
The reason for continued scrutiny of the conditional appropriation
through diligence proceedings is to prevent the hoarding of priorities
to the detriment of those seeking to use the water beneficially. The
effect of a long-term conditional right is to preclude other
appropriators from securing an antedated priority that will justify their
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investment.
Those in line behind a conditional appropriation for a long
planning period risk losing any investment they may make in the hope
that the prior conditional appropriation will fail. They also may not be
able to raise the necessary funds in the first instance that will enable
them to proceed, in light of their subordinated status. Those who
obtain a priority date junior to the antedated priority and proceed to
put the water to beneficial use must involve themselves in a continued
expensive struggle throughout numerous six year diligence periods to
knock out all or part of the antedated conditional appropriation, in
order to protect their appropriations. The General Assembly's intent is
to prevent decreed conditional appropriations from accumulating to
the detriment of those whose priority will be advanced by cancellation
of the senior conditional priority in whole or part, or those who might
proceed to initiate a new or enlarged appropriation.
Thus, in the design of water law, the essential function of the water
court in a conditional decree proceeding is to determine the amount of
available water for which the applicant has established both a need and
a future intent and ability to actually use. As a prerequisite, the
applicant has the burden of demonstrating a nonspeculative intent to
put the water to beneficial use and, under the 'can and will' test, a
substantial probability that its intended appropriation will reach
fruition."
Id. at 315-17.

"Based on Colorado's statutory requirements and Bijou, the limited
governmental agency exception to the anti-speculation doctrine should
be construed narrowly, in order to meet the state's maximum utilization
and optimum beneficial use goals. Although the fifty year planning
period we approved in Bijou is not a fixed upper limit, and each case
depends on its own facts, the water court should closely scrutinize a
governmental agency's claim for a planning period that exceeds fifty
years.
The ultimate factual and legal issue in a governmental agency
conditional appropriation case involves how much water should be
conditionally decreed to the applicant. The experts who testified at the
water court trial in this case were called upon to address such pertinent
factors as: (1) implementation of reasonable water conservation
measures for the planning period; (2) reasonably expected land use
mixes during that period; (3) reasonably attainable per capita usage
projections for indoor and outdoor use based on the land use mixes for
that period; and (4) the amount of consumptive use reasonably
necessary for use through the conditional appropriation to serve the
increased population."
Id. at 317-18 (cases citations and statutory quotations omitted).
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Buffalo Park Development Company v. Mountain Mutual
Reservoir Company
"Any person or organization may maintain a statement of
opposition for the purpose of holding the applicant for a conditional
water right to a standard of strict proof. In addition, ground water
appropriators for small capacity domestic water wells hold vested water
rights pursuant to section 37-92-602(3)(II) (A), C.R.S. (2008). These
vested water rights are entitled to protection when new conditional
water rights or augmentation plans are proposed, independent of
whether their owners adjudicate the water rights.
In an effort to protect small agricultural and domestic water users,
the General Assembly has created a statutory category for exempt small
capacity ground water rights that differ from all other water rights.
When issuing permits for small capacity ground water wells for domestic
use under section 37-92-602(3) (II) (A), C.RS. (2008), where the return
flow from the single family residential household use is returned to the
same stream system in which the well, is located, the State Engineer is
entitled to presume that this use will not materially injure the vested
water rights of others. However, pursuant to section 37-92-602(3) (b)
(III), C.R.S. (2008), this presumption does not apply to subdivision
ground water appropriations proposed afterJune 1, 1972.
Thus, the owners of small capacity ground water wells hold vested
ground water rights, obtained when they complete their wells and put
the ground water to beneficial use. They are exempt from having to
apply to the water court for recognition of their water rights and from
priority administration by the water officials. Yet, they are entitled to
protection of their water rights when new conditional ground water
uses or augmentation plans are proposed pursuant to the 1969 Act and
the well permit provisions of the Groundwater Management Act.
Section 37-90-137(2)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2008), provides that the State
Engineer must make four findings before granting a permit application
to construct a well: (1) there-is-unappropriatedwater ayailable, (2) the
vested water rights of others will not be materially injured, (3)
hydrological and geological facts substantiate the proposed well, and
(4) the proposed well will be located over 600 feet from any other
existing wells. (Emphasis added). Otherwise, the State Engineer must
deny the well permit application.Pursuant to section 37-92-305(6) (a),
C.RIS. (2008), the water court must accord presumptive validity to the
State Engineer's well permit findings.
In lieu of applying for a well permit first, an applicant may elect to
file a conditional water right application and/or an augmentation plan
application directly with the water court. As the State Engineer must
determine whether there is unappropriated water available to. supply
the proposed new ground water diversion, so must the water court.
Pursuant to section 37-92-305(9) (b), C.R.S. (2008), the water court
determines whether the applicant claiming the availability of
unappropriated water has proved at trial that there is unappropriated
water available for appropriation. If not, the court determines pursuant

Issue 2

ARTICLE UPDATE

to section 37-92-305(3),(5) &(8), C.RS. (2008), whether the applicant
has proposed and proved an adequate augmentation plan the
operation of which, in accordance with the water court's decree
including protective terms and conditions, will prevent material injury
to vested water rights or decreed conditional water rights.
In cases where a statement of opposition has been filed to an
applicant's augmentation plan, the applicant must provide the water
court a proposed ruling or decree to prevent injurious effect to a vested
water right or a decreed conditional water right prior to any hearing on
the merits of the application. § 37-92-305 (3), C.RS. (2008).
The owner of a vested small capacity ground water right may contest
the adequacy of a proposed subdivision well augmentation plan
through a statement of opposition in the case, and file for adjudication
of his or her in-house residential ground water right's antedated
priority date."
Buffalo Park Development Company v. Mountain Mutual Reservoir Company, 195 P.3d
674, 686-87 (Colo. 2008) (case citations omitted).

"Buffalo Park's augmentation plan proposal centered on protecting
surface water users. It proposed no augmentation water to protect the
vested ground water rights in the vicinity of the Mountain Park Homes
and Bear Mountain Vista subdivisions. Its plan for the Cragmont
subdivision was based on precipitation and septic return flows being
sufficient to replace depletions to the existing wells. It made no
evidentiary showing about the timing and amount of depletions and the
sufficiency of legally available replacement water, in time and amount,
to alleviate injury to the vested ground water rights of the existing well
owners in the face of evidence that precipitation infiltrating into the
aquifer could not be intercepted without causing injury to existing
rights.
Thus, Buffalo Park's evidence did not meet the legal standards for a
non-injurious augmentation plan in connection with proposed new
ground water diversions, set forth in City of AroraexreLUtiLEnter.
In contrast, the opposers produced evidence, summarized in part I of
this opinion, that the proposed wells for these three subdivisions would
materially injure the vested ground water rights of existing home
owners.
Although section 37-92-305(3), C.R.S. (2008), allows an
applicant to propose terms and conditions for an augmentation plan
decree necessary to protect against injury to existing vested water rights
and conditional water rights, this provision assumes that the applicant
bears its burden of proving the amount and timing of depletions from
its proposed new diversions and the amount and timing of replacement
water from legally available sources to remedy the injurious impact of
those depletions upon pre-existing vested rights. This proof cannot be
postponed for determination later under retained jurisdiction."
Id. at 690.
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Simpson v. Cotton Creek Circles, LLC.
"This is an appeal from a water court's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree ('judgment") upholding
rules related to certain new withdrawals from the confined aquifer in
Water Division Three ("the rules"). Appellant Cotton Creek Circles,
LLC ("Opponent") asserts that the rules are invalid because they are
contrary to statute and violate the Colorado Constitution. We disagree,
and we affirm the water court's judgment upholding the rules."
Simpson v. Cotton Creek Circles, LLC., 181 P.3d 252,254 (Colo. 2008).

'Weaffirm the water court's findings of fact 'unless they are so
clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record.' However, we
review the water court's legal conclusions de novo.
Some of Opponent's arguments implicate the wisdom of the rules.
In general, water law regulations are presumed to be valid until shown
otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. However, while courts
defer to policy determinations in rule-making proceedings, that
deference 'does not extend to questions of law such as the extent to
which rules and regulations are supported by statutory authority.' In
addition, Opponent makes several challenges to the constitutionality of
parts of HB 98-1011 and SB 04-222. 'Statutes enacted by the General
Assembly are presumed constitutional and a party asserting that a
particular statute violates constitutional provisions assumes the burden
of establishing such assertion beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Id. at 260-61 (case citations omitted).

A. Artesian Pressure Provisions Are Valid
Opponent argues that the artesian pressure provisions in SB 04-222
and the rules are invalid. Because the artesian pressure requirements in
the rules merely follow the legislative mandate, this is best described as
an argument against the validity of the statute itself.
According to Opponent, the artesian pressure requirements violate
the right to appropriate by "locking up unappropriated water." Before
we turn to this argument, we first explain the appropriation doctrine as
it applies in this case. There is no right to divert additional water from
the confined aquifer, unless there is unappropriated water available and
that withdrawal will not materially injure the vested rights of others. See
§ 37-90-137 (2) (b) (I) (providing that the state engineer may not issue a
permit to construct a well unless he or she finds that unappropriated
water is available for withdrawal and that the vested rights of others will
not be materially injured). Therefore, Opponent's arguments that the
rules violate the appropriation provision of the Colorado Constitution
must fail unless the confined aquifer contains unappropriated waters.
However, the water court found that the waters in both the confined
and the unconfined aquifers are overappropriated.
Opponent asserts that the correct measure of whether water is
available for new appropriation is whether its use causes material injury
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to a senior vested right. This argument does not support overturning
the water court's ruling, however, because the water court found that
new or increased withdrawals from the confined aquifer system will
cause material injury to existing water rights. Consequently, the
artesian pressure requirements in SB 04-222 and those in the rules do
not violate the constitutional right to divert unappropriated waters
because the waters in the confined aquifer are not unappropriated, and
thus are not subject to that right.
In addition, the provision in SB 04-222 withstands scrutiny because
it has several rational bases. As the water court noted, the artesian
pressure requirements help to protect vested water rights, maintain a
sustainable water supply in the confined aquifer, and prevent
underground water use from interfering with the state's ability to fulfill
its obligations under the Rio Grande Compact. The provisions in the
rules are based on the legislative mandate from SB 04-222, and are valid
as such.
B. One-for-One Replacement Requirement is Valid
Opponent similarly contests the requirement in Rule 6.B.2 that will
frequently have the effect of requiring an applicant for. a new
withdrawal from the confined aquifer to make a one-for-one
replacement of that withdrawal. Opponent assumes that the water
court's finding that the water is being "mined' is the "linchpin" for Rule
6.B.2, but this assumption is misplaced.
The basis for Opponent's challenge to Rule 6.B.2 is its assertion that
the rule violates the right to appropriate. However, as discussed above,
the provision cannot violate the constitutional right to divert
unappropriated waters because there are currently no unappropriated
waters in the confined aquifer. Consequently, while we are not
convinced by Opponent's assertion that the water court's finding of
mining is unsupported by the record, we need not reach that issue.
C. Nonirrigated Native Vegetation
Opponent also argues that the rules related to nonirrigated native
vegetation must be invalidated. Specifically, Opponent objects to the
rules' use of the phrase, 'unappropriated water is not made available
and injury is not prevented as a result of the reduction of water
consumption by nonirrigated native vegetation.' See Rule 6.A.2, 6.B.7.
In support of its argument that the specified language should not be
included in the rules, it notes that SB 04-222 does not contain the
phrase quoted above. However, the statutory authority for the phrase is
found in HB 98-1011, which uses the quoted language three times. See
§ 37-90-137(a); § 37-90-137(12)(b)(I) (repealed 2004); § 37-92305(6) (c). Because the rules mirror statutory law, they do not exceed
the scope of the statutory authority.
Because we find that there is a statutory basis for the rules,
Opponent's other arguments regarding the treatment of nonirrigated
native vegetation are best treated as attacks on the validity of the
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statutory provisions. We hold that there is a rational basis for those
provisions. For example, the provisions may represent an attempt by
the legislature to balance the potential environmental consequences of
encouraging eradication of phreatophytes against the potential benefits
of salvaging water that would have been used by them.The question of
whether to encourage such changed conditions in order to permit
increased water use is 'fraught with important public policy
considerations.' Thus, the legislature properly exercised its authority by
resolving that issue.
D. Finding of Injury is Permissible
Citing Alamosa-a Jara, Opponent asserts that the rules
impermissibly create an irrebuttable finding of injury in every instance
of a new withdrawal. In Alamosa-ILa Iara, we held that provisions of
rules that presumed 'that each underground water diversion materially
injures senior appropriators' were permissible. In so holding, however,
we noted that the rules allowed individuals to "retain the right in 'each
case' to challenge the application of the aquifer-wide determination of
material injury to 'each diversion."' Opponent notes that Rule 5.F
states that new withdrawals of groundwater that will affect the rate or
direction of movement of water in the confined aquifer will cause
material injury and therefore must be properly augmented. Therefore,
Opponent argues that the rules eliminate any possibility of showing that
a particular diversion will not in fact cause injury to vested water rights.
In fact, the rules are based on a finding of fact that a new
withdrawal of groundwater from the confined aquifer will cause injury
unless it is properly augmented. Rule 5.F. This finding provides the
basis for a requirement that any new withdrawal must prevent injury to
senior water rights. See Rule 6.B. Because the confined aquifer is
overappropriated all the time, the only way to prevent injury to senior
rights would be to require full replacement.
We also note that the rules provide an opportunity to rebut the
presumption that the RGDSS model accurately determines the amount,
time, and location of depletions and fluctuations in artesian pressure
that would be caused by a new withdrawal. Rule 6.B.6. If an applicant
for a new withdrawal successfully presents evidence that demonstrates
that the withdrawal would not impact artesian pressures, the rules leave
open the possibility that the applicant would be permitted to withdraw
new water.
E. The Rules Are Not Invalid Because They Fail to Regulate
Existing Users
The rules at issue regulate only new withdrawals from the confined
aquifer. Opponent argues that by failing to regulate existing wells, the
state engineer is abdicating his responsibility. To the extent that
Opponent argues that the rules must fail because they regulate only
new withdrawals, and fail to also regulate existing users, we reject their
argument.
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Opponent does not cite any statutory provisions that could be
construed as requiring the rules to regulate both existing and new water
users of the confined aquifer. Indeed, SB 04-222 gives the state
engineer 'wide discretion to permit the continued use of underground
water consistent with preventing material injury to senior surface water
rights.' § 37-92-501(4)(a). In addition, we note that nothing in the
rules precludes further regulation of existing wells. Thus, we find that
the rules do not violate statutory authority by regulating only new water
uses.
F. HB 98-1011, SB 04-222, and the Rules Do Not Violate
Equal Protection
Similarly, Opponent argues that the rules violate equal protection
because they regulate new diversions without regulating existing
diversions, and because they regulate withdrawals from the confined
aquifer but not withdrawals from the unconfined aquifer. To the
extent that these distinctions are required by HB 98-1011 and
SB 04-222, they argue that those statutes similarly violate equal
protection.
In order to succeed in showing that equal protection was denied,
Opponent is required to show that the classification at issue 'lacks a
legitimate governmental purpose and, without a rational basis,
arbitrarily singles out a group of persons for disparate treatment in
comparison to other persons who are similarly situated.' In addition,
'[i]f any conceivable set of facts would lead to the conclusion that a
classification serves a legitimate purpose, a court must assume those
facts exist.' Because a rational basis exists for treating the groups at
issue here differently, Opponent's argument fails.
First, there is a rational basis for treating those who would make
new withdrawals from the unconfined aquifer differently from those
who would make new withdrawals from the confined aquifer. While the
confined and unconfined aquifers are hydraulically connected, they are
separate systems with different characteristics. For instance, as the water
court notes, the confined aquifer is under artesian pressure while the
unconfined aquifer is not, and there is substantial evidence as to the
negative effects of decreasing artesian pressure. Therefore, it would be
rational to conclude that the issues facing regulation of the confined
aquifer are acute and different from the issues facing regulation of the
unconfined aquifer.
In addition, there is a rational basis to distinguish between those
who currently have the right to withdraw water from the confined
aquifer and others who have not yet obtained a water right. There are
fewer, if any, due process issues with regulating potential water users
who do not have any existing water rights as compared with those who
have perfected a water right by actual beneficial use. Therefore, a
rational basis exists for the distinction, and it does not violate equal
protection.
Id. at 261-64 (case citations omitted).
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Archuleta v. Gomez
"In addition to standing for the proposition that an adverse
possession claimant must demonstrate actual beneficial use of the
deeded owner's water right, our cases establish that no person can
revive or adversely possess an abandoned water right. Thus, adverse
possession cases should address whether the deeded owner abandoned
the water right. If the right has been abandoned, the water belonging
to it for beneficial use reverts to the stream, and the right cannot be
revived through adverse possession.
Instead, the adverse possession claimant must show that the
adjudicated irrigation water right at issue was continuously put to
beneficial use on lands irrigated by the claimant, rather than the
deeded owner, during the statutory period. Section 37-92402 (10),
C.R.S. (2008), of Colorado's 1969 Water Right Adjudication and
Administration Act provides that ten or more years of non-use of a
water right by the person entitled to use the right creates a rebuttable
presumption of abandonment to the stream of the right, or that part of
the right, which has not been exercised. Abandonment is defined as
'the termination of a water right in wholerinpart as a result of the
intent of the owner thereof to discontinue permanently the use of all or
part of the water available thereunder.'
§ 37-92-103(2), C.RS. (2008) (emphasis added).

A presumption of abandonment requires the concurrence of two
elements: non-use for the statutory period (ten years) and the intent to
abandon. This presumption may be rebutted by evidence of the
owner's intent not to abandon the right; evidence rebutting the
presumption of abandonment may include such acts as loaning or
leasing the water to others or good faith efforts to sell the water right.
Abandonment of a water right may occur in whole or in part; the
amount of water abandoned reverts to the stream, to the benefit of
other rights in order of their adjudicated priority. Evidence rebutting
the presumption of abandonment may also be adduced by an adverse
possession claimant who demonstrates his or her continuous use of the
deeded owner's interest in the adjudicated water right."
Archuleta v. Gomez, 200 P.3d 333, 344 (Colo. 2009).

'We summarize our precedent applicable to the 'actual' use
element of adverse possession in an irrigation water rights case.
Because actual beneficial use is the basis, measure, and extent of an
appropriative water right for irrigation in Colorado, an adverse
possession claimant to an irrigation water right has the burden to
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the amount of water
expressed in acre feet belonging to the deeded owner's water right that
the adverse claimant has placed to beneficial consumptive use.
Quantification proof is essential because the effect of a successful
adverse possession claim is to transfer, in whole or in part, the
ownership of the irrigation water right's beneficial consumptive use
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entitlement, under its adjudicated priority, from the deeded owner to
the adverse claimant.
Water that an adverse possession claimant has intercepted in the
ditch from the deeded owner's interest in the adjudicated irrigation
water right, but which has not been beneficially consumed by either the
claimant or the deeded owner, presumably has returned to the tributary
aquifer or the surface stream. Mere diversion of water cannot be
counted as an actual beneficial use upon which adverse possession can
be founded because 'to make [a diversion of water into a constitutional
appropriation] it must be... actually applied to the land.' In addition,
return flow water belongs to the stream as part of the public's water
resource for use by others in order of their decreed priorities."
Id. at 346 (citations omitted).

North Sterling Irrigation District v. Simpson
"The General Assembly has charged the state engineer and division
engineers with administering, distributing, and regulating the waters of
the state. § 37-92-501 (1), C.1S. (2008). Water officials must distribute
water according to the order of priority as fixed by judicial
decrees.Direct flow water rights and storage water rights are entitled to
administration based on their priority, regardless of the type of
beneficial use fof which the appropriation was made. The state
engineer is authorized to adopt rules and regulations to assist in, but
not as a prerequisite to, the fulfillment of these duties. § 37-92-501 (1).
The state and division engineers are also authorized to curtail diversions
that contravene applicable law. § 37-92-502, C.1RS. (2008).
One such applicable law is the 'one-fill' limitation on water storage
rights. Colorado law dictates that a reservoir is limited to one annual
filling, according to its decreed capacity. Where a decree expressly
addresses how diversions are to be accounted for under the one-fill
rule, the water officials must administer the storage right pursuant to
the decree. However, where, as here, storage decrees are silent on the
issue, the state engineer and division engineers are bound by their
statutory mandate to account for, and if necessary, curtail diversions
that violate the one-fill rule.
On the basis of the foregoing, the water court held that the
Engineers are vested with the authority to institute a fixed water year in
order to fulfill their statutory function of administering NSID's storage
rights pursuant to law. According to the court, by instituting a fixed
water year beginning November 1, the Engineers are able to keep track
of how much water has been diverted during a one-year period. Once
the holder of a water storage right has filled its right once, the right is
satisfied and the Engineers can refuse to honor a call during the
remainder of that one-year period. The court concluded that such
fixed-year administration was necessary to protect against the
enlargement of NSID's storage rights beyond its one fill in a given
year."
"Because NSID's rights have historically been administered
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consistent with a fixed water year, NSID has not demonstrated any legal
injury associated with a change in administrative policy. In any event,
such a claim of injury would not be cognizable, as NSID's decrees do
not address how diversions are to be accounted for under the one-fill
Where storage decrees are silent with respect to the
rule.
administration of the one-fill rule, the Engineers have authority under
sections 37-92-501 and 502 to determine how to administer Colorado's
one-fill mandate. 'In times of short supply, water users depend on the
Engineers to curtail undecreed uses and decreed junior uses in favor of
decreed senior uses.' Here, the Engineers have implemented a fixed
water year in order to prevent the undecreed use of water in excess of
the one-fill rule and thereby attain the security of other adjudicated
water rights. This action is within the authority conferred upon them
by law."
North Sterling Irrigation Dist. V. Simpson, 202 P.3d 1207, 1210-11 (Colo. 2009)
(citations omitted).

Cornelius v. River Ridge Ranch Landowners Association (No.
08SA83, March 2, 2009)
Cornelius failed to
"Here, there was extensive nondisclosure.
provide any initial disclosures required by Rule 26(a), although he was
notified several times of the need to do so. Rule 26(a) disclosures begin
the discovery process and provide parties with a starting point for
gathering information about the case. Under Rule 26(a), among other
things, parties must disclose the names and addresses of individuals with
discoverable information; copies of, or a description by category and
location of all documents and tangible things in each party's possession
relevant to the case; and the identity of any person who may testify as an
expert at trial. With the information provided by Rule 26(a)
disclosures, parties may make specific requests for information or
clarification of disclosed information.
Cornelius's applications required precise information about senior
appropriations in the basin, whether his proposed diversion would
harm senior water rights, and the replacement of source water resulting
The applications
from his proposed out-of-priority diversions.
contained only general categories stating the proposed beneficial use of
the water - domestic, commercial, and livestock - and did not identify
end users or the particular manner in which the water would be used.
Because the Arkansas and Cucharas Rivers are overappropriated,
Cornelius's proposed plan for augmentation was crucial. However,
Cornelius only proposed to augment one of the thirty wells from which
he was seeking to appropriate. Accordingly, as a threshold matter,
Cornelius would need to demonstrate his proposed diversions would
not harm senior rights - a difficult task in an overappropriated basin
when not relying on an augmentation plan. Further, Cornelius's
proposed single well augmentation plan provided almost no detail with
regard to the manner in which it would operate. It simply stated the
well in question would 'be engaged and piped to the Cucharas River in
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an adequate amount to augment the water consumed."
Cornelius v. River Ridge Ranch Landowner Ass'n, 202 P.3d 564, 570 (Colo. 2009) (case
citations omitted).

"Cornelius argues that, if it was not error to dismiss the cases, it was
nonetheless improper for the trial court to dismiss the cases with
prejudice. He contends dismissal with prejudice was improper for two
reasons: (1) the Opposers could have mitigated any harm caused by his
delay in prosecution through filing a motion to compel or
interrogatories; and (2) Cornelius is now likely to comply with the
disclosure requirements because he is represented by counsel.
Cornelius did not present this argument to the water court, and raises it
for the first time on appeal.
Cornelius's argument does not change our analysis of whether
dismissal was proper. A trial court retains the discretion to dismiss an
action with or without prejudice. C.1C.P. 41 (b). After balancing the
unreasonableness of the delay with the proffered mitigating
circumstances, dismissal with prejudice may be appropriate if the
defendants are harmed as a result of the plaintiffs failure to prosecute.
As we stated above, the Opposers were harmed as a result of Cornelius's
delay, and Cornelius's proffered mitigating circumstances do not
outweigh the unreasonableness of that delay.
Cornelius's argument that the Opposers could have mitigated harm
through filing a motion to compel or interrogatories is unpersuasive
because, as discussed above, it is the plaintiffs duty to prosecute a case.
Cornelius's argument that he is now likely to comply with the disclosure
requirements similarly fails. The simple fact that, given a second
chance, a plaintiff would prosecute a case more diligently does not
excuse an initial failure to prosecute or mean that a case should not be
dismissed with prejudice.
Cornelius has presented no case law
suggesting the contrary. Rather, he again argues that because he was
previously not represented by counsel, he did not know of his disclosure
obligations. As discussed above, pro se parties are held to the same
rules as parties represented by counsel.
We conclude that the water court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing with prejudice Cornelius's applications for appropriation of
water rights and plan for augmentation.
Cornelius's large-scale
nondisclosure and failure to provide the Opposers and water court with
any information about his applications other than that contained in his
initial applications constituted a failure to prosecute. The Opposers
were prejudiced by this delay and Cornelius has failed to provide any
mitigating reasons to account for the delay."
Id. at 572-73. (case citations omitted).

BOOK NOTES
Jerome C. Muys, George William Sherk, Marilyn C. O'Leary, The Utton
Transboundary Resources Center, University of New Mexico School
of Law, Model Interstate Water Compact, University of New Mexico
Press (2009); 528 pp; $75.00; ISBN-13 978-0826346285; hardcover.
INTRODUCTION
The Model Interstate Water Compact (the "Compact"), by authors
Jerome C. Muys', George William Sherk, and Marilyn C. O'Leary, is a
comprehensive model act intended to address the myriad of challenges
and issues facing individual states, tribal nations, and the federal
government in administering transboundary water resources.
Over the past twenty years, the bitter struggles over the supervision
of interstate water systems throughout the United States significantly
increased. 2 In response, the United States Senate Committee on
Energy & Natural Resources, then chaired by former Senator Pete
Domenici, approved a grant in 2000 for the Utton Transboundary
Resources Center at the University of New Mexico School of Law to
draft a model compact to address the problems facing the states.3 As
part of the effort to draft the document, the authors, together with the
Utton Advisory Committee, held two separate national conferences
beginning in 2002, in which over seventy distinguished scientists and
This
lawyers, tribal, federal, and state representatives attended.4
Compact is the result of that collaboration.
The United States Supreme Court holds original jurisdiction over
disputes between two or more states, thus bringing the states before the
Court to adjudicate problems that arise under the various water
compacts within the United States.' However, the Court reiterates that
such disputes "are more likely to be wisely solved by cooperative study
and by conference and mutual concession on the part of the
representatives of the states so vitally interested in it then by

1. In Memoriam, Jerome C. Muys (1932-2009); your friends and colleagues will
sorely miss your contribution to Water Law scholarship and to the legal profession.
2. JEROME C. MuYs, GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, MARILYN C. O'LEARY, THE UTTON
TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURcES CENTER, UNIVERsrrY OF NEW MExIco SCHOOL OF LAW, MODEL
INTERSTATE WATER COMPACT
COMPACT].

3. Id. at xiii.
4. Id.

5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.

xii (2009)

[hereinafter MODEL INTERSTATE WATER
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proceedings in any court however constituted."' Therefore, according
to the Court, states should turn to the Compacts Clause of the United
States Constitution, rather than the judiciary, to settle their differences
in the administration of transboundary water resources.'
Currently, there are twenty-six water allocation compacts in effect,
predominantly in the West, and most date over fifty years old.8 As
populations increase and the demands upon water resources increase
with them, it is increasingly clear that the legal frameworks of these
compacts are inadequate. Therefore, the Compact's primary goal is to
provide a mechanism to resolve interstate water conflicts in an
amicable, efficient, and equitable manner.9 More specifically, the
Commentary suggests that the Compact's development follows the
contours of the Equitable Apportionment Doctrine, as embodied by the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence, and attempts to mirror how the Court
would address particular compact issues.'o The Compact intends the
states to take the primary self-governance role in the administration and
enforcement of interstate water compacts, a role they traditionally have
not assumed. 1 If states can refrain from Constitutional litigation, then
they can avoid significant inefficiency and expense.
This book note briefly summarizes the Preamble and each of the
eleven articles of the Compact and their corresponding commentaries,
highlighting only the most significant and controversial provisions.
PREAMBLE
The Preamble asserts the basic principle that the states' greatest
concerns lie with the river basins in their respective territories;
therefore the states should exercise primary authority over them
through integrated and adaptive management. 2 The Commentary
reinforces this concept by stating that the goal of the Compact's
Preamble was to set the political, legal, philosophical, and practical
It stresses that cooperative state
underpinnings of the Compact.
action is the only sure way to achieve optimum management of the river
basins. 14 It further notes that the Compact responds to the Court's
repeated admonishments that the states should seek agreement
between themselves, as opposed to seeking resolution before the Court.

6. MODEL INTERSTATE WATER COMPACT, supra note 2, at xiii (citing New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921)).
7. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

MODEL INTERSTATE WATER COMPACT, supranote 2, at xiii.

Id. atxv.
Id. at 5; see also infraArticleI.
Id.at xiii.
Id.at 1.
Id.at 3.
Id.
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ARTICLE I: COMPACT PURPOSE, WATER SUBJECT TO COMPACT
AND SIGNATORY PARTIES
The Compact affects the equitable apportionment of the surface
flows and hydrologically connected subsurface waters of a basin located
within the states that are parties to the Compact. 5 The Compact also
establishes the Water Resource Management and Water Quality
Protection Programs. 6 The necessary signatory parties to the Compact
include the individual states, the United States, Indian Tribes, and
Pueblos. 17
The authors believe that the river basin is the optimal geographic
planning area for Compact purposes, and therefore reject the idea of a
"water common." 8 The river basin, instead of a water common, is
desirable because states can best achieve interstate cooperation by
addressing discrete interstate watersheds, thus fostering certainty and
simplicity of administration.
Additonally, the authors argue that
agreements between compact commissioners or between the state
legislatures themselves, are better equipped to address the broader
regional issues.1 9 Notably, left unaddressed in the Compact are isolated
interstate aquifers not hydrologically connected to surface waters, but
the authors urge that the concepts
expressed in the Compact apply
2 °
equally to these resources as well.
In terms of what waters the Compact's provisions will not govern,
the Compact provides that the signatories may designate certain
segments of land or quantities of imported or "developed" water for
exclusion from the Compact.21 If the signatories choose to exclude
such water, they must explicitly identify those waters and provide a
reason for their exclusion. 2 Indeed, the authors favor the exclusion of
developed water, so long as the water does not commingle at any time
or point with native basin water.
ARTICLE Hl: EFFECTIVE DATE AND DURATION OF COMPACT
The Compact becomes effective after ratification by the legislature
or governing bodies of the signatory parties and by the enactment of
Congressional consent legislation.24
Such consent legislation must
contain a waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States to allow for

15.

Id.at 4.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 6 (defining a water common as a planning unit that includes areas affected
by a particular basin, but rests outside of its boundaries; the authors give the example of
the City of Denver being a major user of Colorado River Water, but resting outside of
the Colorado River basin).
19. Id.
20. Id.(emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.at 7.
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enforcement of federal Compact obligations.2 5 The waiver provision is
necessary so that the effect of any subsequent federal legislation on
interstate compacts is ascertainable, and the parties can decide whether
they want to withdraw or terminate the Compact.2 6 The Commentary
asserts that even if the United States does not consent to the Compact,
litigants may seek to join the United States to any litigation as an
indispensible party.27
In the past, the United States existed as an indispensable party when
it exercised exclusive federal water allocation authority," or when it
acted as the trustee of tribal or pueblo water rights.2 9 However, the
United States is not an indispensable party if it holds water rights that
originated under state law," or when the sole basis of the federal
government's involvement is through the ownership and operation of
Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers projects.3 1 The
Commentary identifies the open issue of whether the federal
government's operation of a comprehensive regulatory scheme (e..
The Clean Water Act ("CWA")) would make it an indispensable party.
The basic idea is that Compact signatories do not want the United
States, as a signatory party, to claim sovereign immunity as a defense
against enforcement of Compact obligations. This concern is especially
apparent in light of the wide array of environmental protection
legislation the United States Congress has enacted over the past thirtyfive years.33 The federal government has waived liability in other
compacts it consented to, and the authors see such waiver as an
essential safeguard to the other signatory parties.34
The initial duration of the Compact is twenty-five years.35 This
"sunset" provision differs from most compacts in that the traditional
approach allows the agreements to last in perpetuity. 36

The principal

argument for a limited term is to allow for flexibility because either the37
Compact may no longer serve the interests of the federal government,
or changed circumstances could lead state
legislatures to view the
38
Compact as no longer in their best interests.
One year prior to expiration, signatory parties must notify the

25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id. at 9; see also infraArticle XI.
Id.; see also FED. R Crv. P. 19.

28. Id. (citing Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 571 (1936)).
29. Id. (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 352 U.S. 991 (1957)).
30. Id. (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 629 (1945)).
31. Id. (citing Idaho v. Oregon & Washington, 444 U.S. 380, 390-91 (1980)).
32. Id. at 10 (citing The Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water Act), ch.
758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000))).
33. Id.at 10.
34. Id
35. Id. at 7.
36. Id. at 11.
37. Id. (The authors argue that the federal government may wish to enact legislation
that would abrogate certain parts of the compact in the future.)

38.

Id.

Issue 2

BOOK NOTES

President of the United States and Congress of their intent to either
extend the Compact for an additional twenty-five years (with or without
any amendments), or to terminate the Compact entirely. 39 Importantly,
should the signatory parties not renew the Compact or all parties
withdraw, all rights gained under the Compact and any financial
obligations incurred, follow the respective parties after dissolution.4 °
The parties can only complete a modification or amendment to a
Compact provision by utilizing the same procedures required
for
41
ratification by the parties, which include Congressional consent.
Some commentators have noted that the twenty-five year term may
be too short for the signatory parties to recoup any meaningful portion
of costs incurred as a result of Compact participation. However, the
authors counter that any such obligations will follow the parties and
would necessarily
be satisfied, regardless of withdrawal or termination of
42
the Compact.
Furthermore, individual party withdrawal is permissible following
two years' notice to the remaining signatory parties.43 This gives the
states the option to "go it alone," despite litigation being the
unattractive and sole alternative in the event of a conflict.'
The
authors believe the risks of participation in the Compact substantially
outweigh the risks inherent in litigation before the Court.45

The

authors, however, feel it is important to provide the withdrawal
mechanism in order to give parties the option to leave the Compact if
they choose.46
ARTICLE III: DEFINITIONS
This article defines a short list of sixteen terms recurrent
throughout the Compact"7 and classifies them into two distinct
categories: structural terms and apportionment terms.48 The authors
explicitly chose a short list of definitions as opposed to a comprehensive
one 49 because amendment to the Compact would be necessary to
modify any definition, which is a cumbersome and time consuming

39. Id. at 7.
40. Id. at 12.
41. Id. at 8.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 13.
45. Id. (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 558, n.24 (1963)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 15-16 (defining: (1) Advisory Committee, (2) Base Apportionments, (3)
Chargeability, (4) Commission, (5) Conjunctive Use, (6) Council, (7) Dispute
Resolution, (8) Division of Scientific Analysis, (9) Perfected Water Right, (10)
Reasonable Beneficial Use, (11) Safe Annual Yield, (12) Species and Habitat Protection,
(13) Subsurface Water, (14) Supplemental Apportionments, (15) Water Quality
Protection Program, (16) Water Resources Management Program).
48. Id. at 18.
49. Id. at 17.
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process." Keeping the list of defined terms short satisfies the need for
discretion, authority, and flexibility in the Compact. 1
ARTICLE IV: THE UTrON5 2 RIVER BASIN COMMISSION
In general, the Compact establishes the River Basin Management
Commission ("Commission") to supervise the implementation of the
Compact and to serve as the overall governing body.53 The Compact
authorizes the Commission to exercise the powers enumerated in the
Article necessary to manage, implement, and enforce the provisions of
the Compact and the obligations of the signatory parties. 4 The
Commission is responsible for the equitable, efficient, and sustainable
use of water apportionments. 5 It is also ultimately responsible for the
administration of the Water Resources Management Program, as well as
the Water Quality Protection Program. 6 It further establishes rules for
meetings of the Council, the Advisory Committee, and the Division of
Scientific Analysis ("Division").
The Commission also institutes the
voting requirements and privileges of the individual signatory parties.58
The Commission may review appeals from decisions by the Council and
the Division.5 9 Finally, decisions by the Commission constitute final
agency actions.60
The Commentary reveals that the Commission's structure is
flexible, but some form of established administrative entity is
desirable.6 1
Ultimate authority vests with Commission members;
however, the Council and the Division should only make policy
decisions within their area of expertise, unless the Commission
expressly assumes jurisdiction over important issues or hears an appeal
from parties before either subordinate body.6 2 The dominant theme is
that the Commission needs broad powers to accomplish its mission of
coordination and cooperation, which it can more efficiently achieve
through flexibility, discretion and delegated authority to respond to
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. The word "Utton" is for representative purposes only and states would replace
the name based on the respective river basin the Compact governs. See also MODEL
INTERSTATE WATER COMPACT, dedication page ("[t]he Utton Transboundary Resources
Center's Model Interstate Water Compact is dedicated to the memory of Professor
Albert E. Utton, whose practice of preventative diplomacy and authorship of
'Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty' brought to reality his values
of inclusivity and mutual respect in the sustainable management of transboundary
natural resources.").
53. Id. at 19.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 20; see also infraArticles VI & VII.
57. Id. at 24.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 25.
62. Id. at 26.

Issue 2

BOOK NOTES

changing conditions, such as drought or climate change."
The Compact gives the Commission several noteworthy enumerated
powers. One such power is the ability to facilitate voluntary inter-basin
transfers and water banking provisions. 64 Another is the power to levy
and collect taxes upon signatory parties as necessary to fund its
operations.r 5 Finally, the Compact provides for the ability to address
and facilitate mitigation of pollution in the basin.' 6
The Commission consists of the governors of the signatory states, a
single tribal representative to speak for all tribes holding water rights in
the basin, and a single federal Presidential appointee representative.67
The authors believe that the addition of the tribal representative is
particularly necessary because tribal nations enjoy sovereign status and
hold substantial water rights throughout the United States, especially in
the West. 68 The federal representative is also of particular importance
given the number of federal regulations promulgated and the amount
of vested water rights the United States holds.69 Indeed, the Compact is
convertible into a Federal Compact if the United States becomes a
signatory, in which the federal representative has voting rights, and the
representative has the ability tobind individual federal agencies, such as
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA").70 Some commentators
have objected to this idea, however, noting that the federal Compact
representative should not have the authority to curtail the discretion
enjoyed by individual federal agencies, because to do so would upset
the settled expectations of parties under their jurisdictions and would
also unbalance the authority inherent within the federal regulatory
scheme. 7'
Aside from the Commission, the Council includes the two highest
ranking state officials involved in overseeing water allocation and
management, two tribal representatives with expertise in the area of
water management, and two federal representatives selected by
interested federal agencies.7 2
The Council focuses on the
implementation of the Water Quality Protection Program and the
Water Resources Management Program.73 Further, the Council sets the
price of supplemental apportionments and enforces Commission
decisions among the signatories.74 The Commentary notes that this
body, while not having a governor as a member, gives state, federal, and
tribal administrators an important role within the Compact's
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.
Id.

27.
21.
20.
19.

27.
32.
34.
35-36.
22.
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Next, the Division consists of an equal number of members from
the signatory parties who possess expertise in hydrology, computer
modeling, storage, diversion, economics, quality, and fish and wildlife
habitats. 6 This body provides multidisciplinary technical support to the
Commission and the Council. 77

The Commentary reports a strong

consensus among the members of the Utton Advisory Committee "that
developing and employing generally accepted scientific data" to balance
out plentiful political input is essential to realistic interstate water
management. 7 Although contrary to the experience of many water
practitioners, the Division must adhere to strict timelines for the
delivery of their scientific findings. 79 This body represents the authors'
recognition' that water law requires scientific expertise to reach levels of
effectiveness. The authors further recognize that elevating science to a
higher standing in the administration of compacts is essential to the
future success of interstate water compact administration. 80
ARTICLE V: INTERSTATE WATER APPORTIONMENTS
The Compact allocates base apportionments of the total water in
the basin to each signatory party. As the authors explain, base
apportionments are the quantities of water necessary to: (1) maintain
stream flows as needed to fulfill requirements of applicable federal,
state, and tribal laws; (2) maintain healthy and productive basin-wide
ecosystems; and (3) provide additional flows as necessary to satisfy the
requirements of all perfected water rights under federal, state and tribal
law. 8' The Compact expresses base apportionments as a percentage of
the estimated safe annual yield of the whole basin. The Commission
calculates the percentage of total safe annual yield for each signatory by
compiling an average of the following: (1) seasonal and annual flows
for the entire record; (2) the driest ten-year period for the entire
record; and (3) the wettest ten-year period for the entire record. Then,
the Commission will adjust the percentage to compensate for any
existing storage capacity. 8 2 Within three years of the effective date of
the Compact, individual signatory states may petition the Commission
to increase their base apportionment to include water rights perfected
before the effective date.
The Commentary extensively justifies the authors' base
apportionment methodology. The authors assert that the principal
shortcoming of traditional compacts is their failure to protect and
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

27.
23.
31.
34.
27.
38-42.
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maintain adequate in-stream flows ("ISF") not subject to subsequent
diversion or consumption8s The authors make ISF the first priority in
establishing a signatory party's base apportionment. 85 Indeed, by
determining base apportionments as the quantity of water necessary to
"maintain stream flows as needed to fulfill all perfected water rights,"

the authors hope this methodology will serve as substantial inducement
to water right holders to support their state's participation. 6 Some
commentators have criticized that current unadjudicatedIndian water
rights represent an extremely large quantity of water, which the
Commission may not appropriately account for in determining base
apportionments. 8 7 However, the authors believe that despite the large
amount of water rights held by tribal nations, once fully adjudicated,
the total volume of water ultimately awarded will add up to much less
than that claimed by the tribal nations. 88 Therefore, an appropriate
compromise is to include the maximum amount of water the tribes
actually use in the initial base apportionment calculation, and once the
individual states fully adjudicate any implicated tribal water rights, the
Commission may award a subsequent supplemental apportionment if
necessary.89
The Commentary also argues that the authors' use of the safe
annual yield methodology in determining base apportionment (as a
percentage of flow volumes) is desirable due to the ease of
measurement for monitoring purposes, efficiency, and its ability to
easily allocate risk between upstream and downstream states. 90 Further,
the authors assert that using this method to achieve a reasonably
reliable baseline referent would avoid the problems encountered
during compact negotiations in the early nineteenth century, where
reliable scientific data was sparse and states had an incentive to
exaggerate their projected needs. 91 The goal in using a percentage is to
avoid distribution of basin water that does not exist by avoiding setting
base apportionments as specific volumes of water for delivery.
Aside from base apportionments, the Compact authorizes the
Commission to make supplemental apportionments of water, which are
waters in excess of the original total base apportionment originally
thought present.92 These supplemental apportionments are not free,
however, and the Commission awards supplemental apportionments in
five-year increments subject to Council and Commission approval. 93
Any supplemental apportionment must include water conservation
requirements,
but
states
can
transfer
these
supplemental
84.

Id. at 45.

85. Id.
86.

Id. at 46.

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.

(alteration in original).
at 48.
at 44.
at 43 (referring to the negotiations of the Colorado River Compact).
at 38-42.
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apportionments, at a reasonable markup, to other states.94
The Commentary acknowledges that it is very controversial to allow
the Council to set supplemental apportionment prices.9 5 However, the
authors recognize the economic value of water as a market commodity,
and believe that facilitating the burgeonin practice of water marketing
between states is a beneficial practice. 9 Therefore, the Compact
incentivizes conservation by allowing the sale of surpluses.97 The
Commission would only charge for previously uncommitted water, and
not for water to satisfy perfected rights or water needed to comply with
other laws. Additionally, the Commission retains the right to subject all
supplemental apportionments to Commission review.98
The Compact requires states, within three years of the effective date,
to implement a measurement system for the extraction and
consumption of subsurface water hydrologically connected to surface
flows. 99 States cannot include these subsurface flows in their base
apportionment, but can charge them against surface flows in an attempt
to preserve ISF. 100 The authors assert that most compacts fail to address
the relationship between surface and subsurface water.'0 ' Because more
reliable scientific knowledge exists regarding the hydrological
interconnectivity of subsurface flows, the authors feel the Compact
should account for this interconnectivity to reach a more representative
Some
understanding of total water available in the basin. 02
commentators, however, have suggested that the study and
system for subsurface flows in only
development of a measurement
03
three years is unrealistic.1

The Compact also deals with the situation of shortage, where the
base apportionment percentage allotted to each state turns out to be
insufficient. If future available water deviates "substantially" from the
original estimates of safe annual yield, the Commission may make
equitable reductions in the perfected use rights of the individual
signatory state water right holders. 10 4 In determining equitable
reduction amounts, the Commission must apply criteria that take into
account the allocation of water among signatory states in times of
shortage; any reductions would only take place after basin water reaches
a minimum trigger threshold. 10 5 Additionally, unless states agree to
another method, the Commission reduces states' apportionments on a
pro rata basis in the event of any future federal environmental
94. Id.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.at 49.
Id.at 49-50.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38-42.
Id.
Id.at 51.
Id. at 52.
Id.

104. Id. at 38-42.

105. Id.
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10 6
programs that diminish basin safe annual yield.
The most important provision of Article V is the requirement that
the Commission investigate each signatory state's legal standards and
procedures for determining what constitutes a "reasonable beneficial
use" of water. 1 7 To the extent reasonably practicable, each state must
make reasonable beneficial use of its base and supplemental
apportionments pursuant to Commission recommendations.08 Failure
of a state to make reasonable beneficial use of its apportionments
authorizes the Commission to reduce the state's base apportionment or
supplemental apportionment, and to make the reduction available to
other signatory parties. °9
The Commentary addresses this controversial provision in some
detail. It notes that the application of the reasonable beneficial use
standard is neither uniform nor aggressively enforced in prior
appropriation or regulated riparian r6gimes." ° The authors believe
that the principal source of 'new' water will be from conservation
efforts, and uniform application of the reasonable beneficial use
standard will greatly increase conservation results."' In keeping with
the Compact's devotion to the Court's precedent, the authors assert
that the Court has endorsed its conversationalist view, and believe that
the standard "lays on each [state] a duty to exercise her right reasonably
and in a manner calculated to conserve the common supply."1' 2
Furthermore, "the states have an affirmative duty under the Doctrine of
the
Equitable Apportionment to take reasonable steps to conserve...
3
natural resources within their borders for the benefit of others."1
The Commentary notes that the Compact's approach in requiring
the Commission to review the reasonable beneficial use standard in
each signatory state and provide recommendations for improvement is
proper because the Commission only makes recommendations." 4 The
authors do not intend the recommendations, however, as a "one-sizefits-all" remedy. 15 Another signatory is the only entity capable of
complaining of another's waste due to failure to comply with
Commission recommendations." 6 In such a case, the Commission,
following notice and hearing, has the authority to reduce the wasting
state's base apportionment by an amount equal to that which the

106. Id.
107. Id.; see also supra note 46 (The Compact defines "reasonable beneficial use" as
"[tihe application of water to a beneficial use in an amount reasonably necessary to
satisfy such use under state, federal or tribal law.").
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Id.at 52.
111. Id.
112. Id.at 53 (citing Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 328-29 (1984); Wyoming
v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 484 (1922)).
113. Id.at 53-54 (citing Idaho v. Oregon &Washington, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025 (1983)).
114. Id.at 54.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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offending state could have reasonably conserved, had that state
followed the Commission's recommendations.' 1 7 In this situation, the
complaining state would carry the burden of showing waste by clear and
convincing evidence."'
The authors recognize that this scheme is highly controversial and
may constitute an intrusion by the Commission into highly sensitive
internal state affairs." 9 However, they state that the Commission's
recommendations are purely permissive.'
But if a state fails to follow
the recommendations, and a complaining Compact member shows
waste, the offending state could face base and supplemental
apportionment reductions. Ultimately, it amounts to a choice by a nonenforcing state as to whether it wants to comply with the Commission's
recommended standards and enforcement authority, or "risk the
predilections and limited knowledge in the field of the nine United
States Supreme Court Justices," in addition to the associated cost of
federal litigation.'
ARTICLE VI: WATER QUALITY PROTECTION PROGRAM
The Council administers the Water Quality Protection Program with
authorization under the program to: (1) establish and enforce water
quality standards and waste-load allocations; (2) enforce National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits under the
Clean Water Act; (3) assume jurisdiction to abate existing interstate
pollution; and (4) control or prevent future pollution whenever it
determines that pollution originated within the flowing streams of the
122
basin.

The Commentary notes that, prior to the CWA, the federal
common law of nuisance governed interstate pollution. 123 After the
enactment of the CWA, the Court concluded the CWA preempted
conditions on the issuance of NPDES permits in an upstream state, 2 4
thus requiring the discharger to comply with downstream water quality
standards. 125 Moreover, the EPA can delegate implementation and
enforcement to the states because the states are more
likely to enforce
26
their own quality standards on an upstream polluter.
The Compact's approach addresses situations where the EPA does
not delegate authority to the signatory state, or when the signatory state
fails to adequately enforce its delegated authority. 127 Alternatively, all

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55-56.

123. Id.
at 58.
124.

Id.at 58-59 (citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981)).

125. Id.
59-60 (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992)).
126. Id.
at 59.
127.

Id.at 61.
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signatories can hand over their delegated authority to the Commission
for collective enforcement.'2 8 In either case, the Commission, not the
EPA or the state, would have authority to assume jurisdiction to enforce
CWA provisions. To buttress their arguments in favor of Compact CWA
enforcement, the authors note that the majority of Western states have
already received delegated enforcement authority from the EPA.
However, Article VI does not usurp the EPA's or the states' authority.'29
Instead, it coordinates effective implementation of the CWA among
signatory parties and provides broad supplemental authority to the
Commission. 3 0
ARTICLE VII: WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
The Council administers the Water Resources Management
Program. The program oversees new water resource development
projects within the Compact basin, including major new surface
diversions or subsurface extractions, interstate transfers, and related
The Commission retains authority to review
operational guidelines.'
these projects.' 32
Within two years of the effective date, signatory parties must submit
the following: (1) a five-year estimate of specific project categories of
reasonable beneficial uses, including ISF; (2) the underlying
assumptions of this estimate; (3) an estimate of water supplies available
to meet the projects' requirements; and (4) plans to augment
Based on the signatory parties'
transferred water supplies. 133
submissions, the Commission must create a basin-wide plan to manage
water resources and prioritize construction or implementation of the
proposed state water projects." The Commission must also study and
encourage conjunctive use of both natural and artificial storage facilities
for storing and managing basin water without regard to ownership or
situs within the boundaries of individual signatories. 13 5 Further, if a
significant conflict arises after state legislative approval, the Commission
will consult with the Army Corps of Engineers and then proceed to
construct and operate flood control projects."' Additionally, the
Commission has the authority to establish standards for land use within
the basin for lands that are subject to flooding. 13
The Commentary notes that all states engage in some degree of
water resource planning, but also recognizes that there is likely no
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Id. at 62.

130. Id.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 63-65.
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meaningful interstate collaboration in this regard." a
Therefore,
suboptimal results occur with regard to placement, timing, scope, and
character of water projects between states.'
The Compact seeks to
change this by granting to the Commission the 'modest' role of
coordinating signatory state activities, but the Commission does not
have to create a comprehensive plan. 4 ° Rather, the Compact provides a
forum for each signatory party to review other signatory parties'
proposed projects and programs,
and to make recommendations for
4
mutually beneficial adjustments.' '

ARTICLE VIII: ENFORCEMENT OF COMPACT OBLIGATIONS AND
RESOLUTION OF OTHER DISPUTES
The Commission has authority to enforce Compact obligations
when a signatory, or group of signatories, alleges that another signatory
party is either not maintaining required stream flows or impermissibly
exceeding its base or supplemental apportionments.'4 2 In the event of
such a dispute, the accused signatory can either concede the allegations
or contest them. 43
If a party concedes the allegations, it must
implement a Commission-approved remedial plan, which then absolves
the party of any liability to other signatories (but not to private parties)
and further Commission sanction.
However, if a party chooses to contest the allegations, the
Commission first refers the matter to either the Council or the Division,
depending on the subject matter of the dispute.'45 If no resolution
materializes within forty-five days after referral, the parties must then
seek alternative dispute resolution ("ADR").

4

ADR consists of either

non-binding mediation or binding arbitration
before the
Commission.' 47 If the parties engage in ADR, neither party niay
proceed with litigation until the ADR process has ended. If a party
proceeds with litigation before completing ADR, the breaching party
must pay all litigation expenses for both sides. 148 Failure to reach a
resolution authorizes the Commission to impose sanctions, including:
(1). suspension of the alleged offending party's voting rights; (2)
suspension of ongoing or planned Commission projects, or programs
from which the alleged offender would receive a benefit; and/or (3)
seek injunctive relief to remedy the alleged violation and seek
Completion of the ADR proceeding
appropriate damages. 49
138. Id.at 66.
139. Id.
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constitutes final agency action on the part of the Commission,
regardless of the outcome. 5 °
The Commentary reveals that the authors took this approach in
light of several recent Supreme Court cases, adjudicating compacts
outside the Equitable Apportionment Doctrine.151 Many Western
compacts require unanimity among signatories for official action to
enforce obligations upon an individual member, which effectively
bestows the offender with a veto power.'52 Typically, the Court then
becomes involved, which can be equally expensive and lengthy as an
equitable apportionment action."' The cases cited in the Commentary
give credence to the authors' notion that if the parties can work out a
resolution, or, alternatively, concede truthful allegations and comply
with the Commission's resolution plans, the parties avoid significant
waste and inefficiency. 5 4 However, the Compact stresses the need for a
strong Commission with adequate enforcement authority.155
With regard to the adoption of ADR as the ultimate administrative
resolution method, the authors' Commentary points to recent cases
where the Court consented to ADR procedures between states in
compact disputes.156 In general, however, the Compact places a
mandatory duty upon signatory states to first seek resolution pursuant
to Compact provisions, or face exorbitant dual litigation costs. 5 ' The
ultimate goal is to keep parties engaged in good faith negotiations until
the parties reach an ADR resolution or negotiated settlement.'58
Some commentators criticize this dispute resolution scheme as
lacking certainty because it allows the parties to choose all of the
characteristics of the ADR procedure.15 9 However, the authors respond
that discussions between the parties in choosing the ADR format may be
conducive to settlement. 1" Of course, after the exhaustion of the ADR
process, parties can seek resolution in a court of competent jurisdiction
61
without the fear of paying the opposing party's attorney's fees.'

150. Id.
151. Id. at 72.
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 129-32 (1987) (holding New
Mexico was liable for breach of Compact obligations, and ultimately, the parties settled
for fourteen million dollars)); (also citing Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86 (2004)
(holding Colorado was liable for breach of Compact obligations and awarding Kansas
thirty-eight million dollars)).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 73-74 (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 534 U.S. 40 (2001); Kansas v.
Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720 (2003)).
157. Id.at 74.
158. Id.
159. Id. (including the overall format, mediation or arbitration, the identity and
number of the arbiters and so on).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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ARTICLE IX INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION
Since a primary goal of the Compact is to promote interagency
cooperation, the Commission, Council, and Division representatives are
responsible for maintaining liaison with their respective constituents
The
and obtaining a consensus regarding disputed issues. 162
Commission also has the obligation to appoint a multi-interest, multidisciplinary Advisory Committee comprised of qualified public agency
representatives with interests in the basin. 163 The Commission must also
maintain a public information program, including the publication of an
annual report that includes financial information and a discussion of
Commission activities. 164
The Commentary notes that the Advisory Committee's major goal is
to promote legitimacy and transparency with respect to Compact
operations, which are essential to stakeholder approval and
involvement.'6 5 By acknowledging that management of water resources
will necessarily be divisive, the Advisory Committee serves as the primary
166
portal for the public to engage in policy and implementation debates.
ARTICLE X: BUDGETING AND FUNDING
The Commission must adopt an annual capital 67 and operating 68
budget. Following the Commission's adoption of the budgets, the
Commission assesses to signatories their share of project costs.

69

A

signatory's failure to pay this assessment authorizes the Commission to
suspend the delinquent signatory's voting rights, cancel or suspend
supplemental
projects,
or
reduce
ongoing
or ,planned
apportionments. a'"
Independent auditors scrutinize the financial
statements of the Commission for inclusion in the annual report,17
which effectively promotes transparency, credibility, and legitimacy. 72
The Commentary asserts that conferring broad financial powers to the

162. Id. at 75.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 78.
166. Id. at 79-80.
167. Id. at 82 (The capital budget must include: (1) all capital projects the
Commission must undertake or continue; (2) statements of estimated costs; and (3)

statements regarding the method of financing.).
168. Id. (The operating budget must include: (1) estimated expenses for
administration, operation, maintenance and repair costs for each project; (2) allocation

of costs for each project among signatory parties; and (3) the estimated revenues for
charges for supplemental apportionments and all other funding sources.).
169. Id
170. Id
171. Id.
172. Id.at 85.

Issue 2

BOOK NOTES

Commission to approve supplemental apportionment prices, as well as
to use fees, cost sharing, and taxation, minimizes the impact on the
state treasuries of the signatories. 173 In the event of a budget deficit, the
based on
signatories equally share the total burden of the shortfall,
174
either total population or total land area within the basin.
Some Commentators have criticized as "draconian" the possible
sanctions upon parties who fail to pay their assessments. 175 However,
the authors warn that weakening the sanctions for delinquency might
- receiving
provide an incentive to the signatories to act as "free riders"
176
benefits from the Compact, but not paying their fair share.
ARTICLE XI: RELATIONSHIP OF COMPACT TO EXISTING LAW
In Article XI, the authors undertake an extensive preemption
analysis of both state and federal law. The authors also acknowledge
that states, the federal government, and courts could intentionally or
inadvertently modify the Compact by amending or enacting statutes
and by rendering judicial decisions. 177 Significantly, provisions of the
Compact supersede any present or future state or tribal laws that are
"irreconcilably inconsistent" with the Compact. 17 The same is true for
any present federal laws. 1 79 The Commentary notes that once the
signatories ratify a compact and Congress consents, it becomes the law
of the United States 8 ° through operation of the Supremacy Clause,
the language of the compact or
unless explicitly exempted by 181
Congressional consent legislation.
With regard to future federal laws, however, the preemption analysis
is not as clear. Regulations, statutes, and judicial or administrative
decisions that are irreconcilably inconsistent with the Compact may
supersede its provisions.' 82 If federal law does, in fact, preempt all or a
portion of the Compact, the signatories may elect to terminate the
Compact via a majority vote. 83 Furthermore, the Commission shall
undertake a detailed analysis of which federal laws, regulations,
contracts, conflicts of interests, financial disclosure, open meetings,
advisory committees, disclosures of information, judicial review, and
related matters are applicable to the activities of the Commission, the
Council, or the Division. 84 In all situations, federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over any action of the Commission, and can
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Id. at 84.
Id.
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 90 (quoting NewJersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 811 (1998)).
Id. at 89-90; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
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review any provision of the Compact inasmuch as it conflicts with future
federal laws.' 85 Except where expressly provided for in the Compact or
upon an unanimous signatory vote, the Compact shall not adversely
affect any interstate water allocation or interstate compact decision by
the Court in an equitable apportionment or interstate compact action
made prior to the effective date of the Compact.'8 6
The Commentary acknowledges that federal preemption remains
an inherent risk.'87 There is some criticism of the Compact for
expressly acknowledging this risk, as it would appear counterproductive
for Congress to consent to compacts inconsistent with federal law or to
later enact laws inconsistent with compact provisions. 8 8 The authors
acknowledge, however, that Congress has expressly reserved the right to
revoke, alter, or amend its consent in two-thirds of all compacts to
which it is a party.' 89 In addition, the authors note Congress can reverse
its decision to amend legislation because subsequent Congresses do not
have to adhere to the intent of a preceding Congress. 190
The reality is that subsequently enacted federal legislation has
superseded or adversely affected numerous compacts.1"' The authors
conclude that irreconcilable and inconsistent federal laws enacted
following consent of Congress to the Compact "would probably
supersede the Compact.' ' 92 The authors reach this conclusion based on
the Riverside Irrga on Disrict v. Stipo, and Riverside Imigadon District
v. Andrews cases.1 93 In the Riverside cases, the irrigation district sought
a NPDES permit to discharge sand and gravel into the stream during
construction of a dam from the Army Corps of Engineers.9 The Army
Corps refused to issue the permit, citing the Endangered Species Act
and the CWA, which together imposed a duty on upstream parties to
protect the water quality of downstream users.1 95 The basic proposition,
according to the authors, is that interstate water compacts are subject to
the provisions of subsequently enacted federal legislation, regardless of
the impact of such legislation on Compact apportionments or on
programs approved by an earlier Congress.1"
The authors respond to this reality by acknowledging that Compact

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
(D.C.
191.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 91 (citing Cmty. Serv. Bd. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 593 F.2d 1102, 1113
Cir. 1978)).
Id.

192. Id.
193. Id.at 92 (citing Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Stipo, 658 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1981),
on remand sub nom, and Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583 (D.
Colo. 1983), affd758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1985)).

194. Id.
195. Id.at 58 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2002), The Federal Water Pollution
Control (Clean Water Act), ch 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000))).
196. Id.
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parties cannot alter Congress' determinations, but they do have
authority to terminate the Compact.'9 7 Thus, the hope is that this
ability to terminate would give Congress pause and provide an incentive
for Congress to pay close attention198to the possible effects -on the
Compact on any proposed legislation.
CONCLUSION
The Compact is an excellent example of thoughtful and scholarly
collaboration produced by legal and scientific experts in the field of
transboundary water resources. Ultimately, like any model statute, its
wholesale import or piecemeal adoption of desirable provisions by the
states engaged in interstate disputes will remain unknown until
significant interstate water allocation renegotiations occur.
As the introduction notes, while compact disputes are increasing,
general interstate allocation disputes between states are also increasing,
but at a higher rate. The antiquated and cumbersome legal frameworks
of the original compacts are approaching obsolescence and proving
unworkable in lieu of today's scientific understanding of the
hydrological connectivity of the water basins. Therefore, the Compact's
learned integration of conservation and ISF into its basic principles will
provide persuasive evidence to future interstate agreement drafters of
the Model Compact's possible effectiveness. The authors hope to
provide a powerful incentive to those engaged in interstate allocation
disputes to turn to compacts, and to avoid Constitutional litigation.
Ultimately, "compact and interstate allocation issues are never truly
resolved, they are only managed over time."'99 What is clear, however, is
that the Compact provides a readily adoptable and comprehensive
approach for the states, the federal government, and tribal nations in
managing their increasingly scarce water supplies.
DanielSnare
Karen Hyun, Ecosystem-Based Management in the Colorado River
Delta, VDM Verlag Dr. Muller Aktiengesellschaft & Co. (2009); 242
pp; $105.00; ISBN 978-3-639-11717-2; paperback.
Karen Hyun has a Ph.D. in Marine Affairs from the University of
Rhode Island and a M.S. and B.S. in Earth Systems from Stanford. Her
dissertation is the basis for EcosystemBased
anagement in the
Colorado Rier Delta. The book explores and promotes EcosystemBased Management ("EBM") in the Colorado River Delta ("CRD").
The first chapter, Introduction, discusses the demise of the
Colorado River Delta and the subsequent cultural and environmental
consequences. The CRD has shrunk to less than ten percent of its
197.

Id.at 94.
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original size and continues to see an annual increase in use. Hyun
suggests that EBM has emerged as the "dominant management
paradigm" to address the degradation of the CRD. EBM is the process
of controlling human activities to protect, conserve, and enhance
ecosystems to meet current and future needs. The remainder of the
introductory chapter outlines the topics that Hyun discusses in the
book, and reminds readers that instituting a sustainable solution to the
CRD's overuse is necessary to maintain the CRD.
Chapter two, Nested Ecosystems in the Colorado River Watershed,
describes the impact that legal and engineering decisions have on
different spatial scales within the Colorado River watershed, especially
within nested ecosystems. A nested ecosystem is a small, distinct
ecosystem that exists within a larger system. Changes in the larger
system affect the nested ecosystem. The Rio Hardy-Colorado River
Complex serves as an example of a nested ecosystem that has
dramatically changed in response to alterations in the larger ecosystem.
The chapter goes on to outline the three main drivers of change:
climate change, population, and the governance system that manages
nested ecosystems. While there is no consensus about the exact
consequences of climate change, there is agreement that even the
slightest changes will increase the variability of the fragile CRD
ecosystem because of increases in evaporation rates, a decrease in
precipitation, and uncertain run-off rates. Population increases also
intensify the demands on water. This is especially apparent in the
American Southwest where there is housing growth, influx of "baby
boomers" seeking sunny retirement homes, and a youthful population
that will undoubtedly remain in their hometowns.
In chapter three, Ecosystem-Based Management Principles, Hyun
begins by discussing past norms, values, and the positives and negatives
associated with other management systems. Next, Hyun explains the
historical background surrounding the definition of Ecosystem-Based
Management.
She concludes that EBM, like the Ecosystem
Management, focuses on the interconnectedness of the system, but
seeks to manage human activity rather than the ecosystem itself. EBM is
important because the governing institutions reflect management of
human action. Hyun identifies and explains the nine principles that
inform the analysis of EBM and governing institutions throughout the
remainder of the book: (1) ecological scales and dynamics; (2)
sustainability; (3) interdisciplinary knowledge; (4) precautionary
approach; (5) adaptive management; (6) monitoring; (7) ecosystem
valuation; (8) participation; and (9) international responsibility. The
first principle, ecological scales and dynamics, accounts for the space,
time, and dynamic attributes that affect an institution's ability to
manage an ecosystem. The second principle, sustainability, investigates
whether the present generation's needs are achievable without harming
future generations' abilities to meet their own needs. The third
principle, interdisciplinary knowledge, examines whether an institution
includes scientific and non-scientific research. The fourth principle,
precautionary approach, addresses the concerns of environmental
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hazard uncertainties.
The fifth principle, adaptive management,
examines whether the institution integrates design, management, and
monitoring into a way of managing the environment. The sixth
principle, monitoring, determines whether the institution monitors
changes in the ecosystem. The seventh principle, ecosystem valuation,
examines whether the institution places market value on the ecosystem.
The eighth principle, participation, examines whether the public
participates in the ecosystem's management. The final principle,
international responsibility, looks at whether the institution considers
international law, treaties, and boundaries.
Chapter four, Methodology - Gap Analysis, explains the method of
gap analysis and previews how the following chapters employ the
analytical strategy. Gap analysis establishes the difference between
present reality and the desired future. Hyun uses this methodology to
examine the differences between the current state of governance in the
CRD and an idealized state of EBM.
Most significantly, this
methodology demonstrates the steps necessary to reach the ideal
outcome.
Chapter five, Governance Baseline, is the most substantial and
comprehensive chapter in the book. Through the nine principles, the
chapter assesses whether the current state of governance of the CRD
ecosystem applies EBM principles.
Hyun begins by exploring
international cooperation between the United States and Mexico
through the International Boundary and Water Commission ("IBWC").
She concludes that while the IBWC has potential to make significant
change and is a model organization for bi-national resource
management, an emphasis on sustainability and implementation of
EBM is noticeably absent.
Next, Hyun scrutinizes national, regional, local and NonGovernmental Organization ("NGO") management of the CRD. She
explains the history of each organization and its role in management
and application of the EBM in the CRD. At the national level, Hyun
examines the Bureau of Reclamation in the United States and Comisi6n
Nacionl de Agua ("CONAGUA") in Mexico. Hyun examines each of
these institutions through the application of the nine principles. She
concludes that the Bureau of Reclamation and in particular, the
"Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages" and "Coordinated Management
of Lake Powell and Lake Mead" fail to truly consider the environmental
impact on the CRD. Hyun conjectures this is the case because the CRD
is only within Reclamation's jurisdiction incidentally and not a top
priority. Additionally, CONAGUA continually fails to enforce the 2004
National Water Law reforms that would dedicate water for
environmental uses. Hyun believes, however, that the 2004 National
Water Law has great potential to allow groups to purchase water rights
for ecological purposes.
At the regional level, Hyun examines the Research Coordination
Network
("RCN")
and
Environmental"
Non-Governmental
Organizations within the context on the nine principles. The RCN is a
network of scholars that focus on researching how natural and human
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influences affect the CRD. In addition to scholarly research, the RCN
proposed the "Mini-Estuary Experiment," which would examine the
possible creation of a mini-estuary with poor quality agricultural tail
water. The proposed project utilizes many of the EBM principles,
however, at this time the project is only theoretical and without
cooperation from national organizations the project will have little
influence over management decisions. A consortium of Environmental
NGOs including Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defense,
National Wildlife Federation, Pacific Institute, Sonoran Institute, and
Pronatura lead the effort to conserve and restore the CRD. Hyun cites
the Pronatura Fish Study as an example of NGO implementation of
EBM principles. The Pronatura Fish Study examined the El-Tapon
dam's impacts on biodiversity. Although this smaller organization does
a good job of implementing EBM principles, Hyun finds that it has little
tangible power to influence the existing system of governance.
At the local level, Hyun examines Asociaci6n Ecol6gica de Usarios
de Rios Hardy Y Colorado ("AEURHYC"), using the nine EBM
principles. AEURHYC began as a group of individuals who sought to
promote conservation in the CRD. The Mexican group has blossomed
into an official NGO, has created wetlands, and has raised funds to
install spillways. Hyun finds that AEURHCYs efforts reflect many of the
EBM principles; however, it lacks member participation in management
decisions, interdisciplinary knowledge, and international relationships.
Chapter six, Scenario Analysis, begins by explaining "scenario
analysis" as a method of defining a future where the CRD management
uses EBM principles. Hyun proposes four scenarios: Dry Future, The
Market Rules, A Delta and Estuary Once More, and Powell's Prophecy.
Hyun chooses to elaborate on Powell's Prophecy because
environmental NGOs prefer that scenario and it is also the most
plausible example of CRD and EMB management.
This scenario
envisions successful management of urban growth and anticipates that
enforcement of water conservation will cause an increase in quality of
life in the CRD.
Examples of successful management techniques
include tiered water pricing systems, strict groundwater replenishment
procedures, and a greater appreciation of the CRD. Hyun believes
these and other measures will result in restoration of the CRD,
including habitat restoration for wildlife, indigenous communities, and
ecotourism. Hyun also hopes these measures will foster community
organizations that ensure ecological use of the water.
Chapter seven, Gap Analysis, investigates how institutions can
achieve Powell's Prophecy,given the limitations described at length in
chapter five. Hyun finds that the Bureau of Reclamation can make
strides by extending Intentionally Created Surplus ("ICS") to Mexico,
which would encourage contractors to take steps toward conservation.
Additionally, Hyun believes that CONAGUA must push for an
amendment to their Mexican National Water Law that would dedicate
water to the environment. Hyun also argues that local and regional
organizations must nurture ecosystem valuation, precautionary
approach, and adaptive management principles in their institutional
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practices. Finally, Hyun advocates for the creation of the Colorado
River Delta Restoration Institute ("Institute"). The Institute would
implement EBM principles, support local CRD restoration projects
through bi-national cooperation, and facilitate ecological management
of the CRD.
Chapter eight, Conclusion, succinctly recaps the book's findings
and urges politicians and administrators to take ecosystem
considerations into account during CRD management. Without EBM,
Hyun fears that the CRD will continue to experience degradation.
Ecosystem Based Management in the Colorado River Delta
extensively covers the governance of the CRD in an approachable
manner. While the subject matter is dry at times, Hyun clearly states
important aspects of her arguments and proposals. Although legal
practitioners may find this book theoretical and policy orientated,
someone interested in the ecological aspects of river management
would likely find this book intriguing and enjoyable.
JenniferBerg
Philippe Cullet, Water Law, Poverty, and Development: Water Sector
Reforms in India, Oxford University Press, New York (2009); 241
pp; $120; ISBN 978-0-19-954623-7; hardcover.
As Philippe Cullet, the Director of the University of London's
International Environmental Law Research Centre, explains in Water
Law, Poverty, and Development: Water Sector Reforms in India, most
societies have given water a special status under the law because of the
unique nature of water. Using India as a case study for water law and
water reforms in the developing world, Cullet examines the connection
between both domestic and international water law and reforms, as well
as their effect upon environmental, economic, and human rights issues.
In Water Law, Poverty, and Development, India serves as a microcosm
of the world, and India's experiences with water issues provide valuable
lessons for other developing nations.
Broken into six chapters, the book provides a general background
and context on the worldwide water situation, and the uses and history
that inform the development of domestic and international water law.
Cullet also examines the main water reforms currently proposed and
implemented throughout various Indian states. Cullet then addresses
the specific situation of drinking water in India. He concludes with a
proposal for an alternative basis for water law reforms to ensure that
water law focuses primarily on the social and human rights aspects of
water law instead of its economic elements. Water Law, Poverty, and
Development aims to contribute a better understanding of the context,
impact, reaction, and potential alternatives to recent reforms in water
law.
Chapter one, Context for Water Law and Water Sector Reforms,
provides the important context for both the current international and
Indian water situations. Freshwater constitutes only 2.5% of all water on
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the planet - much of which exists in the form of permanent ice or snow.
Meanwhile, over the past half century, the demand for freshwater has
Cullet acknowledges that insufficient access to water
tripled.
disproportionately affects those living in poverty. Moreover, of those
living in poverty with access to water, the water available to them is often
unsanitary. For instance, 86% of Indians have proper "access" to water,
but only 33% of them have access to adequate sanitation, which usually
contaminates their accessible water. Unsanitary water leads to disease.
Notably, the poor endure such waterborne illnesses at much higher
rates than the wealthy.
Meanwhile, Indian water law and reform is currently undergoing a
rapid transformation. The increased extraction of groundwater, the
construction of massive dams, and various desalinization efforts have
fundamentally changed the basic premises of formal Indian water law.
Cullet identifies a dichotomy of perspectives regarding water regulation.
The first perspective is that water is simply one of many substances in
In
which regulation evolves in response to increasing scarcity.
opposition to this view is the perspective that water falls into its own
separate category because it directly sustains life.
The varying interests of nation-states frustrate the development of a
comprehensive international water law regime. Many neighboring
countries have competing interests as some nations are predominantly
upstream while others are mostly downstream. Accordingly, water law
and reforms at the domestic level vary greatly from international water
law and tend to be more developed while international water law
remains largely non-binding.
Cullet argues for a comprehensive approach to water law issues at
the domestic level. Both India and much of the developing world have
approached domestic water issues in a piecemeal fashion, with different
rules applying to different bodies of water. Cullet maintains that
addressing issues in isolation will fail. Focusing on India, Cullet
contends that traditional Indian water law is ill-equipped to deal with
the challenges India now faces, especially regarding poverty eradication.
In chapter two, Evolution of Water Law, Cullet addresses the basic
features of water law as they have developed up until the twentieth
century. Although water is an important issue to many Indian lawyers
and policymakers, water law remains a relatively marginal area of law.
Several factors drive this problem, such as a fragmented approach to
water issues depending on the use of the water. Lawmakers often treat
issues such as irrigation, drinking water, and groundwater separately
and with different legal instruments. Another problem with past
approaches to water law is that they often approach water issues in
relation to land ownership and emphasize water use for economic
growth. This approach restricts the scope of water law and treats water
like other natural resources merely harnessed for economic growth,
alone. Still, issues such as increasing water scarcity and pollution are
challenging the current basis of water law. Cullet notes the arbitrary
legal distinction currently drawn between ground and surface waters.
Cullet acknowledges the difficulty of establishing ownership over
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flowing water, which thus results in many nations declaring water as a
"public trust" and developing legal doctrines such as prior
appropriation.
In India, early Muslim rulers viewed water mainly as a common
resource. During India's colonial era, however, many foreign and local
policymakers viewed water as an unlimited resource. As a consequence,
water issues received little attention during this period. Currently,
Indian water law is undergoing major changes as pollution increases
and the social and human costs of water scarcity mount. As a result, the
Indian Supreme Court has joined other developing nations in
recognizing that access to clean water is a fundamental human rights
issue. Cullet identifies the triangular relationship between water, the
environment, and human rights. He resolves that these three issues
interconnect and are of equal importance. Despite this, policymakers
and officials often overlook these environmental issues in relation to
water law, despite the obvious effects that pollution on land can have
upon the degradation of water sources.
In chapter three, From Water Sector Reforms to Law and Policy
Reforms, Cullet examines non-legal water sector reforms from both
international and Indian perspectives. Water reforms - defined as any
policies, planning, implementations, or measures taken to affect change
in the water sector - are essential to understanding the context of
reforms to the overall water sector.
International policy and
organizations affect domestic water sector reform in many developing
nations. In India, organizations such as the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank have greatly influenced domestic water policy
through conditional loans to water development projects water.
Further, Integrated Water Resource Management ("IWRM") - the
idea that constitutes a significant amount of the framework for water
sector reforms - promotes coordinated water development and
management with land and other resource issues to maximize
economic and social welfare without compromising the sustainability of
vital ecosystems. Cullet views IWRM as a noble concept, but not a
guideline for practice because no specific legal consequences attach to
IWRM.
Beyond IWRM, Cullet identifies several principles common to
recent water sector reforms, including: conservation; water as a basic
need; water as an economic good; individual property rights; and
decentralization and user participation. Despite many progressive water
policies recently adopted internationally and in India, Cullet argues that
policy changes without water law reforms are insufficient because such
policies lack the force of law. The reforms to India's water sector,
however, provide a framework for overhauling India's outdated water
law.
In chapter four, Evolving Water Law for the Twenty-First Century,
Cullet analyzes some of the main water law reforms that several Indian
states have proposed and implemented. Recent water law reforms fall
into two basic categories: (1) legislation in new fields, and (2) the
updating and modernization of existing acts.
In the area of
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participation and decentralization, recent Indian water legislation has
created "Water User Associations" ("WUAs") that transfer management
of water infrastructure to actual water users. These regional WUAs are
difficult for governments to apply across the board, however, as regional
WUAs face varying water situations unique to their locations.
Other institutional reforms observed in India include the creation
of independent water regulatory authorities.
These authorities
correspond with the growing trend of privatization and decentralization
promoted by organizations such as the World Bank. The Maharashtra
Water Resources Regulatory Authority ("MWRRA") is an example of
such an authority that has established a regulatory system and aims to
increase water efficiency, allocate control to water users, and establish
criteria for water entitlements. Cullet cautions, however, that such
authorities must be careful in their allocation of water rights, because
such rights are particularly susceptible to monopolies, as there can only
be one company piping a city's drinking water supply. As such, states
must apply diligent water regulation.
Cullet identifies groundwater legislation as the most challenging
and pressing of all water law reforms due to the fact that groundwater
serves as the main source of drinking water. Advances in groundwater
pumping technologies and insufficient permitting for groundwater
extraction have led to increased groundwater scarcity. Several acts
pertaining to groundwater have yet to tackle the problem of overuse.
Groundwater management is an area that desperately requires further
legal reforms, such as prioritizing uses, creating registration
requirements for groundwater extraction infrastructure, and permitting
for water extraction. Cullet views India's water law reforms to date as a
patchwork superimposed over existing principles.
He urges the
adoption of comprehensive water legislation that brings together all
water law principles and discards outdated colonial principles.
In chapter five, Regulation of Domestic and Livelihood Water,
Cullet focuses on what he deems the most fundamental component of
any water law and policy framework: drinking water. Many recent
Indian water laws have failed to address issues surrounding drinking
water. Cullet bemoans the separate status India's society has given
drinking water apart from other water issues. Drinking water policies
also differ significantly between urban and rural areas, where urban
areas have received more favorable treatment. In India, 70% of urban
dwellers receive their water from a municipal supplier that charges a fee
for their services. These authorities also have the power to disconnect
private water sources for non-payment. On the other hand, rural areas
obtain the majority of their drinking water directly from groundwater.
Cullet notes that despite most Indians living in rural areas, most
research has focused on drinking water in urban areas.
Cullet also describes the World Bank sponsored "Swajal Project" as a
first formal step toward a new policy framework for rural drinking
water. As a pilot project in the Uttar Pradesh province, an area facing
severe water scarcity, the project instituted a demand-driven approach
to encourage participation by water users through the creation of water
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and sanitation committees. The demand driven approach, however,
has lead to intra-village equity problems, with the poor unable to pay for
the schemes while the wealthy welcomed them. Cullet advocates for the
reversal of many demand-driven approaches to water law reform. He
maintains that if access to water becomes dependent upon a person's
financial capacity, the poor will not have adequate access to clean water.
In chapter six, Towards an Alternative Framework for Water Law
Reforms, Cullet proposes an alternative framework for water law
reforms in order to foster better management of the water sector so that
human rights, social, and environmental issues receive priority under a
comprehensive and binding legal framework. He outlines a series of
principles that should govern an alternative basis of water law reforms.
These principles include: making poverty eradication the focus of water
law; building water law around India's development, not merely in the
economic sense; creating broad principles that cover the entire water
sector; and giving greater weight to water scarcity issues, such as access,
prioritization of uses, and environmental concerns. According to
Cullet, governments must include groundwater in "public trust" water
arrangements so the same principles govern all water sources. Cullet
also takes issue with the "public trust" basis for water law. He argues to
replace such trusts, which lack accountability, with the idea of water as a
"common heritage." This would allow for preservation of water for all
because water would no longer "belong" to anyone.
Addressing the link between water and land rights, Cullet contends
that states should sever this link to create greater social equity and
environmental sustainability through the trading of water entitlements
regardless of land ownership. According to Cullet, water allocation
should base allocation upon proximity, giving priority to local
development. Additionally, he argues that access to water should be
free, and the concept of a human right to water should apply beyond
merely drinking water to include greater amounts of water for
subsistence crops and other domestic needs that fall under the human
right to water. Cullet concludes by arguing that governments' use of
"issue specific" acts must end. Every state and nation should adopt a
comprehensive framework water legislation.
Water Law, Poverty and Development offers an insightful overview
of global water law and reforms, as well as several valuable alternative
approaches to reform. Although the focus on India is useful, it is
occasionally difficult to determine if Cullet is arguing for specific Indian
legal reforms or general policy reforms that governments and policy
makers should apply throughout the developing world. More generally,
although Cullet provides many alternative principles that should govern
water law to make it more responsive to the human right to water, he
provides little in the way of how to achieve these principles. For
instance, Cullet fails to address ways that nations and regions can avoid
conditional development loans to impose their own water principles
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and still achieve development. Overall, this book is an excellent
resource for anyone hoping to understand the evolution of water law in
the developing world..
Geoffrey Frazier
Susan J. Marks, Aqua Shock - The Water Crisis in America, Bloomberg
Press, New York (2009); 226 pp; $24.95; ISBN 978-1-57660-332-1;
hardcover.
In Aqua Shock, Susan J. Marks presents a realistic depiction of how
the water crisis manifests itself in various localities across the United
States.
By linking statistics with experiences of individuals,
municipalities, states, and regions, Marks provides a fundamental, yet
detailed, explanation of water as a shrinking resource. Additionally,
Aqua Shock explores the problems and complexities associated with
water as a shrinking resource.
Beginning with an analysis of
contemporary global water issues and connections, Marks explains how
humans use various sources of water. Then, she summarizes distinct
bodies of water law controlling water supply and distribution. Finally,
focusing on the depletion and pollution of both ground and surface
water, Marks suggests various ways to mitigate the pending water crisis.
In chapter one, Liquid Gold, Marks emphasizes essential facts
regarding water as a resource. Because less than one percent of the
Earth's water is readily accessible freshwater that can satisfy human uses
for energy, agriculture, industry, and personal use, Marks labels the
resource "liquid gold." After breaking down water use in the United
States by various categories of consumers, Marks illustrates local and
regional water shortage examples and the battles that result. Although
water use levels in the United States have leveled or slowed in the past
thirty years, Marks explains that population growth and new industries
that consume public water supply can lead to dangerous increases in
water consumption, especially in arid areas.
In the beginning of chapter two, Where Our Water Comes From:A
GlobalPerspective, Marks frames the global water crisis with appalling
statistics: (1) 1.1 billion people do not have access to safe drinking
water; (2) approximately 2.5 billion do not have access to adequate
sanitation services; and (3) water-related diseases cause 2 million
preventable deaths each year. Clearly, far too many humans suffer from
lack of a basic need. Marks stresses that future predictions appear even
grimmer. According to the United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization, seventy-five percent of the world's population
could face freshwater scarcity.
Additionally, to elucidate the cross-border nature of the water crisis,
Marks explains, for example, that a drought in Asia can create dust
clouds that cross the Pacific.Ocean and deposit pollution and dirt in the
United States and other parts of the globe. Despite the closed nature of
the hydrological cycle, climate change and increased weather variability
can significantly affect how humans capture, store, and use water.
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Although the hydrological cycle constantly recycles water, shortages
remain a persistent problem for many localities. Shortages result from
over-use of surface water and from extracting groundwater from
underground aquifers at a rate higher than natural aquifer
replenishment.
In chapter three, The DisappearingAct, Marks explores various
causes of and contributions to a dwindling water supply. Population
changes, land and water overuse, a dilapidated water transportation and
treatment infrastructure, and unsound water policy and regulation all
contribute to water shortages in the United States. Notably, Marks
emphasizes that more than half of the wastewater generated in the
United States is actually potable water. In addition, Marks explains that
fixing the nation's water infrastructure network, which is four times
longer than the National Highway System, will be not be quick, easy, or
inexpensive.
In chapter four, Danger!Safe Water at Risk, Marks acknowledges a
deadly global phenomenon: lack of access to safe, toxin-free drinking
water. She explores some of the most pervasive manufactured and
naturally occurring water contaminants that threaten human health:
microbial contaminates, inorganic contaminants, pesticides, herbicides,
materials.
and
radioactive
contaminants,
chemical
organic
Subsequently, Marks reveals that far too many water treatment facilities
are ill-equipped to combat numerous contaminants. In conclusion,
Marks informs readers how to determine if their drinking water is safe
and lists suggestions that businesses can take to lessen the risk of
groundwater contamination. Marks' suggestions range from learning
more about human impacts on groundwater to replacing toxic supplies,
practicing waste reduction, and implementing computerized waste
inventory and control systems.
In chapter five, On Governing Water, Marks provides an overview of
the two main approaches to water rights: riparian and prior
appropriation. In addition, she explains a few approaches employing
variations and combinations of the two. For example, under a system of
regulated riparianism, the state considers water to be public property,
which the state manages in trust through time-limited permits. Later,
Marks explores common problems found in western water disputes and
adjudications to demonstrate that existing water laws and processes
often exacerbate water struggles. Two examples of the common
problems found in western water disputes and adjudications include
resource shortage and over allocation.
Chapter six, America's Water Gods, describes who, besides courts,
controls water use at both the local and federal level and explores how
these entities manage water. The entities Marks examines include state
engineers, state departments of natural resources, heads of utilities,
regional water boards, water management districts, the federal
government, and private individuals holding large amounts of water
rights. Marks espouses various solutions for more effective water
management, including the creation of a nationalized water policy and
management and the implementation of coordinated approaches
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catered to local and regional water nuances.
Chapter seven, The Cost of Water: Cash, Commodities and
Capitalism, explains how water scarcity and antiquated water
infrastructure have contributed to the rise of water as a commodity in
the twenty-first century. Due to increasing demand for water, overused
supply, and the high costs of replacing infrastructure, Marks concludes
that the price of water will continue to rise into the near future.
Because of a widespread belief that water is a readily accessible, reusable
resource, the price Americans are willing to pay for water is often below
its true value. Finally, to demonstrate how individuals profit from the
demand for water (especially during times of shortage), Marks
examines T. Boone Pickens' plan to sell billions of gallons of his
underground "Mesa Water" throughout the Texas Panhandle.
In chapter eight, Can Our Water Be Saved? Marks concludes that
humans must realize the limited nature of water and change their water
use habits accordingly. For example, Marks suggests that states should:
use water more efficiently; limit non-priority uses such as lawn watering;
collectively manage groundwater and surface water; capture storm water
and allow it to replenish aquifers; and include environmental costs in
the price of water. In order to improve water conservation, Marks urges
readers to only use "what is necessary." Finally, Marks highlights the
pervasive problems of non-point source pollution and suggests how
utilizing porous driving surfaces and changing drainage approaches can
help ameliorate it.
In essence, Aqua Shock provides a readable overview of critical
issues relating to water in the United States and elicits the need to find
common ground solutions that better preserve and protect the
resource. Anyone looking for an informative, entry-level narrative
should consider reading this book because it explains the current
hydrological predicament in the United States and provides some
solutions readers can engage in to help relieve some of the problems.
Alternatively, experienced water law practitioners and advanced water
scholars may find this book remedial and less beneficial because the
author wrote the book for inexperienced water practitioners and
individuals interested in water regulation and reform.
Todd Likman
Mohamed T. EI-Ashry and Diana C. Gibbons eds., Water and Arid
Lands of the Western United States, Cambridge University Press,
New York (2009); 415 pp.; $55.00; ISBN 978-0-521-11822-4;
paperback.
Cambridge University Press released Water and Aid Lands of the
Western United States, a compilation of essays edited by Mohamed T.
El-Ashry and Diana Gibbons, in paperback. This volume investigates
agricultural and municipal demands on water supplies and water
management in the American West. The editors chose the essays to
show how the West can avoid expensive supply-side projects and

Issue 2

BOOK NOTES

subsidies by controlling demand and relocating existing water supplies,
all while improving environmental quality.
Chapter One, The West in Profie, written by the collection's
editors, outlines the geography of the West and describes where the
West's waters originate.
The editors summarize Western water
legislation, including the compromises states have struck for sharing
water sources. The chapter explains the factors that influence Western
water demand. First, the editors argue that municipalities' pricing
practices create no incentive to conserve water in the long-term. Next,
the editors note that irrigated agriculture obtains water from state or
federal water projects subsidized by taxpayers. The editors argue that
taxpayer subsidies for projects that bring water to irrigated agriculture
create another disincentive to water conservation; however, increasing
costs of water procurement negates this disincentive by increasing costs
of water procurement.
Finally, the editors report that modern
agriculture's pesticides and salts degrade the water run-off from crops.
The editors argue that regulators should impose fines upon water users
responsible for this degradation and that the regulators adopt a
comprehensive water quality management scheme.
Chapter Two, The Great American Desert Transformed: Aridity,
Exploitation, and Imperialism in the Making of the Modern American
West, by Norris Hundley, Jr., focuses on the history of Western
settlement. Hundley cites four interrelated stages of development and
traces water-use and/or policy in each stage. First, from the 1840s to
1900, the government encouraged private interests to exploit the
region's natural resources with low-cost development projects. During
this period, Western states developed their water laws. Most states
abandoned the East's riparian laws in favor of a new priority-based
system borrowed from mining regulations. Second, from 1900-1940,
the government developed more efficient ways to extract the region's
resources while investing in infrastructure and fostering local
manufacturing and labor. At this point, scientific advances in farming
and irrigation, as well as in mining practices, increased the demand for
water, as did the growing Western population. Third, from 1941 to the
1960s, government funding, especially for war-related industries,
increased Westerners' dependence on Washington, D.C. Government
funding also intensified resource development, industrial growth, and
infrastructure-creation. During this time-period, huge public projects
dammed rivers to provide electricity, increasing pressures on Western
cities to find water sources for their growing populations. States also
battled for control of river water, especially that of the Colorado River.
As a result of one of these battles, the United States Supreme Court in
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), held that Congress has
ultimate authority over interstate rivers. Hundley's fourth category, the
period from the 1960s to the present, signals an era where people are
aware of the cost of past policies of use and growth-for example, air
and water pollution and loss of wilderness. Pressure for massive new
water projects subsided in the 1980s as costs soared and the West's
population-growth rate decreased. However, Hundley argues that the
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West must abandon past attitudes and find new approaches to water
management in the face of legal uncertainties and jurisdictional
confusion amongst water management agencies.
Chapter Three, The Central Valley of California, by Charles V.
Moore and Richard E. Howitt, provides an overview of economic
development, including water management and water legislation, in
California's Central Valley. Moore and Howitt predict that California's
water institutions are about to change substantially. Historically, water
costs and use followed two phases of development: the local
development era (1887-1935) and the governmental development era
(1935-1985). During the local development era, the water district-a
public corporation organized under general state laws to provide
irrigation water for lands within its boundaries-developed and sold
water. The state entered water development planning more directly
when someone published a privately drawn water plan for the valley in
1920. In 1931, California's state engineer achieved the same results
through a private plan, and, after the Depression, the United States
Bureau of Reclamation took it over. The resulting federal project,
known as the Central Valley Project (CVP), made long-distance water
transfers the normal procedure. During the era of governmental
development, water districts-both those for irrigation and those for
municipalities-had to unite to obtain water service.
By 1960, California's government re-emerged as a water manager
Under this project, the
with the State Water Project (SWP).
government moved more water south, at a higher cost due to a
difference in water pricing to SWP contractors. Because of complex
legislation, local water districts continue to govern groundwater use.
Moore and Howitt list current problems for irrigated agriculture in the
Central Valley: urban growth, over-drafted groundwater due to
pumping, and decreasing water quality. The authors suggest that
alternative policy solutions, including reallocating existing supplies
and/or changing technology to adjust the supply-demand imbalance
The authors, recognizing the
could resolve these problems.
bureaucratic resistance such solutions face, propose the creation of
markets to effectuate transfers of low-value water areas. The idea is to
use water districts as providers of information and impartial brokers for
existing supplies, rather than as providers, builders, and allocators of
new supplies.
Chapter Four, Land and Water Management Issues: Texas High
Plains, by Ronald D. Lacewell and John G. Lee, discusses the
implications of aquifer mining through a case study of Texas' High
Plains region. The authors discuss the impact of aquifer mining on
agriculture and soil erosion and present policy options they hope will
affect a smooth transition to dryland farming. After brief descriptions
of the region's geography, Lacewell and Lee describe how farmed
acreage on the High Plains has increased with time through irrigation
water from the Ogallala aquifer. Although crop production is possible
in the High Plains without irrigation, irrigation allows for much higher
production levels. By 1980, though, the region had exhausted more
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than one-fifth of 'the water available in the aquifer. In order to
supplement the aquifer, farmers have considered expensive water
transfer plans and more economically feasible capillary water pumping
Some farmers have also employed water conservation
plans.
techniques, such as reducing run-off by creating small earth dams in
crop rows (called furrow dams) and managing water-robbing soil
erosion through stubble-mulch tilling (through which a farmer plows
and cuts only the roots of plants and leaves the biomass above ground,
thereby reducing evaporation in the topsoil). Lacewell and Lee then
discuss innovations in irrigation techniques that may also help conserve
water, including a departure from flood irrigation and sprinkler systems
to low-energy precision application (LEPA) systems and drip irrigation.
Such technological innovations could increase a farmer's expected
.profits, providing an incentive for farmers to adopt them. Lacewell and
Lee are careful to point out, however, that these solutions are shortterm. The new technological solutions will not diminish the total
amount of water pumped by 2010, but they will minimize the adverse
effects of a crop production transition in the area.
Lacewell and Lee provide charts demonstrating an increase in
dryland crop acreage from 1973-1982, which they expect will continue
to increase over time. The transition to dryland farming will force some
farms, especially those on more vulnerable lands or in smaller farming
communities, out of business. The authors present policies that may
ameliorate the worst aspects of the transition to dryland crop farming.
They discuss the viability of long-term land retirement, cost-sharing
programs, the federal crop commodity program, cropping pattern
restrictions, adjusting and regulating the pumping of the Ogallala, and
a tax on water. The authors conclude that the federal government did
not design its policy (including its commodity program) in order to
minimize the adverse effects of a transition from irrigated to dryland
production. In fact, the government's policy may even enhance these
negative effects. After considering the policy options, Lacewell and Lee
support regulatory options, as well as a water tax that would aid in soil
and water conservation. They argue, above all, for flexible commodity
programs and for funding research and education because they believe
the changes will help to develop new technology to improve farming
systems and to transfer information to farmers.
Chapter Five, Water Resources of the Upper ColoradoRiver Basin:
Problems and Policy Alternatives, by Charles W. Howe and W. Ashley
Ahrens, focuses on the water resources of the Upper Colorado River
Basin ("the Upper Basin"). The Upper Basin has access to 2,894,000
acre-feet of surplus water per year. The authors articulate that the
Upper Basin is not and will not be short of water if Upper Basin states
use their supplies in an economically reasonable way. Howe and
Ahrens argue that the inefficient and outdated institutional framework
of public water agencies and supervised water markets hampers sensible
methods of water allocation. They advocate for institutional reform,
including the establishment of a basin-wide agency that, with the help
of new information technologies, acts as a focal point for the exchange
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of information, and the enforcement and regulation of policies.
Howe and Ahrens note that one cannot separate the Upper Basin's
water management from its land use and management. The major
economic activities of the Upper Basin include agriculture, cattle and
sheep raising, the mining of metallic minerals, and recreation.
Although Upper Basin projects do not consume all of the available
water, the Lower Basin currently uses the remaining water-no flow
reaches the river's original terminus, the Gulf of California. If the
authors are correct about the projected expansion of economic activity
in the Upper Basin, this growth will sacrifice the Lower Basin's uses of
water. The authors provide detailed descriptions of the Upper Basin's
sub-basins' surface hydrology as well as of consumptive water use
patterns-especially for low-value agricultural uses. The authors also
estimate the values of this water to farmers and to farming states, as well
as the value of water in instream uses. Additionally, Howe and Ahrens
discuss water quality issues, with a focus on salinity, in the Colorado
Basin.
The authors identify various conventional steps (i.e. the creation of
salt-sediment reservoirs) and unconventional steps (i.e. on-farm
measures such as modified cropping patterns and irrigation
management) that the Upper Basin could take to improve water quality.
The authors include a cost-estimate of these steps. In addition, Howe
and Ahrens discuss the potential for intrastate and interstate water
markets involving the Upper Basin. The authors acknowledge some
shortcomings of water markets, including a lack of a basin-wide agency
to study and influence the water market process. Notably, Howe and
Ahrens provide a series of recommendations, including the formation
of an interstate river basin commission to act as a focal point for study,
enforcement, and monitoring of agreed upon policies, and the
formation of a long-term agreement with the Lower Basin states,
through which the Lower Basin would pay the Upper Basin not to
develop new uses for a portion of the water during a specified time.
Since the appropriations doctrine fails to recognize conservation at the
state level as a beneficial use of water, the authors recommend that
states consider legislation that recognizes water conservation. Also, they
suggest redefining "beneficial use," so that the term reflects the
availability of modern water management methods. Finally, they
suggest that state governments buy water rights from designated low
productivity-high salinity lands to facilitate the retirement of those
lands.
Chapter Six, Growth and Water in the South Coast Basin of
California, by Henry J. Vaux, Jr., reports on population growth and
water availability in the South Coast Basin of southern California.
Despite the availability of substantial quantities of imported water, the
South Coast Basin faces the prospect of intensifying water scarcity due
to population growth and legal developments that have diminished the
amount of water currently available for importation. Vaux discusses the
implications of a shrinking water supply for the South Coast Basin and
several alternative means for adapting to water scarcity. After providing
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a concise summary of 70 years of water contracting in the South Coast
Basin beginning in the twentieth century, Vaux reports that, had these
contracted-for supplies remained unimpaired, they could have
supported the projected population of the South Coast Basin well
beyond the year 2020 at per capita use levels somewhat above the
historical trend. However, political and legal conflicts have reduced
water development activities. For example, the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Arizona v. Californiaawarded Arizona an additional
one million acre-feet of the Lower Basin's Colorado River allocation,
and in 1982 the United States Supreme Court awarded another 52,000
acre-feet of this allocation to Native Americans. The amount of water
supplied to the South Coast Basin from the Owens Valley is also
precarious because valley residents have pumped more water from their
aquifers than the South Coast Basin's municipalities had anticipated.
Also, Owens Valley residents are now lobbying to require the South
Coast Basin to assess the environmental effects of groundwater
pumping before they will allow the Owens Valley to permit future
extractions. Similarly, environmental groups have challenged the
South Coast Basin's municipalities from diverting streams feeding
Mono Lake.
Additionally, Vaux discusses alternative means for
adapting to water scarcity including the construction of new
impoundment and conveyance facilities, changing water-pricing
policies and a development of market-like institutions through which
one could voluntarily transfer water. Ultimately, Vaux is optimistic that
implementation of appropriate water allocation policies will overcome
most potential legal problems.
In Chapter Seven, Toward Sustaining a Desert Metropolis: Water
and Land Use in Tucson, Arizona, by William E. Martin, Helen M.
Ingram, Dennis C. Cory, and Mary G. Wallace, the authors argue that
Arizona, in general, and the city of Tucson, in particular, exemplify a
shift from water development to water management. Arizona has
agreed to manage its water resources through a groundwater
management law that mandates safe-yield of aquifers (i.e. no overdraft)
by 2025, with the state sharing in the costs of the project. The safe-yield
goal of the groundwater law reflects concern with future generations
and with environmental externalities related to overdraft. The authors
note, however, that many elements of traditional water policy
(characterized by development), including its largely economic
motivations, have survived and are evident in the new management era.
Reaching a safe-yield in Tucson depends upon total reuse of effluentthe authors emphasize that no other city in the country has
accomplished this goal. In addition to the burdens of this lofty goal,
the authors acknowledge that state bureaucracies mu3t face the
challenges of compliance with new legislation, including the Arizona
Groundwater Management Act - legislation that requires them to
support a large planning and enforcement staff. Ultimately, the
authors argue the perceived costs to the public of the current
management-based policy will determine whether more substantial
policy and political change will occur in the state.
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In Chapter Eight, Water Management Issues in the Denver,
Colorado, Urban Area, by J. Gordon Milliken, Milliken argues that
Denver has grown and flourished under laws, customs, and an
institutional culture formed by traditional values. Continued growth
threatens these values because it requires increasingly scarce and distant
resources, especially water. Milliken notes that reformers now call for a
reduction in inefficient use of water, an increase in economic efficiency
through reallocation, and better protection of the public interest. After
outlining the history of Colorado water law, Milliken describes the
aggressively conservative water provision policies Denver historically
held toward nearby suburbs, such as Aurora and Westminster (the
suburbs reconciled with Denver in 1982 through the Metropolitan
Water Development Agreement, which binds the municipalities to
mutual development of water for metropolitan use). Denver's own
growth alone has, for 70 years, required it to rely on trans-mountain
diversions of water from western Colorado through the Continental
Divide. Environmental groups have long opposed the expansion of
Denver's water systems' supplies. The groups claim that restricting
water will restrict urban growth and development and allow other water
uses to flourish (i.e. tourism, agriculture, and recreation). Growth,
however, continues. The Army Corps of Engineers is preparing a
system-wide environmental impact statement of the metropolitan
Denver water supply to help determine the need for new water supply
and storage facilities based on forecasts of growth to 2035.
Demonstrating that no one has updated this edition of Water and the
Arid Lands of the Western United States, Milliken projects a significant
water deficit by 1989. Milliken suggests several alternatives in water
supply and demand management including a reallocation of
agricultural water supplies, a policy encouraging the use of
groundwater, various conservation measures, water pricing to reduce
demand, and a regional growth management plan supported by
political consensus. Milliken concludes by reminding his readers that
the tensions between tradition and change, as well as between
persistence and reform, will determine the Denver area's future
environment, culture, and economy.
The volume's editors composed the final chapter, New Water
Policies for the West. El-Ashry and Gibbons report that the timehonored strategy of increasing water supplies and correcting water
quality degradation through capital-intensive projects has reached its
limits-financial, environmental, and legal obstacles have overwhelmed
it.
They argue that the West should replace structural water
development -with alternative water management schemes that
incorporate all environmental and third-party costs. The editors argue
that the natural response to water markets will include, in cities,
focusing on water conservation programs, which are cheaper than
locating and/or developing new water supplies.
Similarly, in
agricultural communities, higher water use efficiency will make more
water available for recreation or waste dilution-reducing saline and
toxic return. Ultimately, the editors remind their readers that the arid
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west will have to live within its limited water budget, and that water
markets will ease competition allowing western states to thrive in an era
of scarcity; however, they urge action now, before crises govern water
management.
It is important to realize that neither the editors nor the authors
appear to have revised this volume or its paperback edition. Therefore,
it does not provide the most up-to-date information. Nevertheless,
Water and Arid Lands of the Western United States remains a valuable
source that makes a broadly-supported case for the shift away from
development to management and conservation approaches to the
Western water resource - a shift that is still relevant today. Laypersons
with an interest in water-law will benefit from the volume's detailed
histories (both legal and anthropological) as well as from its geographic
and topical scope. The source also continues to serve practitioners
interested in a comprehensive reference volume.
Sarah Felsen
Joseph W. Dellapenna andJoyeeta Gupta, Eds., The Evolution of the
Law and Politics of Water, Springer Science + Business Media
B.V. (2008); 413 pp; $169.00; ISBN 978-1-4020-9866-6; hardcover.
Co-editors Joseph W. Dellapenna and Joyeeta Gupta collaborated
with over twenty contributors from around the world to present a wellorganized overview of global trends in water law and policy. Joseph
Dellapenna is a professor of law at Villanova University in Pennsylvania,
and Joyeeta Gupta is a professor of climate change law and policy at the
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and of water law and policy at the
UNESCO-IHE institute for Water Education in Delft. The editors
organized this book into five distinct parts with a total of twenty-three
chapters; the reader may conveniently examine each part or chapter
separately or successively. Conceptually, the book is organized by case
studies or thematic chapters to focus on water law as it discusses the
evolving characteristics of national as well as supranational and regional
water law and politics across the globe; the body of customary
international law as well as current trends in international water law;
and challenges for the twenty-first century. Many of the authors weave
in a wealth of relevant historical information to enable a distinctive
exploration of the interrelation between culture, religion, government,
and law in water governance and management.
The Evolution of the Law and Politics of Water focuses on key
research questions including: (1) How has water law and policy has
evolved through the centuries? (2) What were the motivating factors
that led to changes in legal and social practices? (3) Why is it that after
5,000 years of governing the water resource, we do not appear to be
closer to understanding and addressing water governance? (4) What are
the current challenges facing governance today? (5) What is the role of
water law in the evolving structure of water governance in the twentyfirst century?
The editors address these complex questions by
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examining the evolution of law and policy processes at various levels of
governance and management, from local communities to the global
scale. Through this collaboration, the editors aspire to contribute to
the general understanding of the Global Water System Project, which
focuses on governance and the global water system, as well as how
societies adapt to water challenges. The editors also aim to examine
issues such as architecture, agency, adaptability, accountability, and
access and allocation of water by exploring how governance and
management systems have dealt with the human right to water, the
allocation of scarce water between countries, water quality issues, and
the shifting of responsibilities over time between social actors at
different levels of governance.
The book begins in Part I with a reflection on past historical
approaches. Itzchak Kornfeld presents a 5,000 year history of
Mesopotamia water law and explains that today's water law can learn
from its non-confrontational dispute resolution system. He also notes
that we seem to have made no progress in water allocation as irrigation
use still accounts for some 80% of water resources. Thomas Naff
discusses the evolution of Islamic law (sharia) over the last 2,000 years
and shows how Islamic evolutionary precepts and modern western law
compete in shaping today's water law in Islamic countries. Richard
Laster et al., explains the Jewish tradition of the community owned the
water and that those living closer to it had more rights than those living
further away.
Part II presents nine comprehensive chapters that trace the
evolution of national water law and politics in different parts of the
world: Brazil, South Africa, East Africa (focusing on Kenya), Israel,
Each chapter
Russia, India, Australia, and the United States.
systematically includes the individual author's insight into the historical
foundation of the subject nation's water laws, including governance and
management systems, as well as that author's forecast as to what is
required next, given the current climate, for that nation's water laws
and systems to continue to evolve and address current and future
challenges. Two of the chapters in this part focus on United States
water law. In one chapter, Dellapenna describes the three different
water allocation systems that developed in the various states over three
centuries, and concludes that although another society cannot simply
transplant the American solutions because of differences in cultural and
legal traditions, the American experience can provide lessons in the
consequences of adopting certain legal structures.
Next, Part III presents five chapters focusing on evolving
supranational and regional legal regimes: European Community Water
Policy, Southern Africa, the Jordan Basin, the North American Great
Lakes, and the Rio de la Plata Basin. Following the same basic format as
Part II, the various authors present the relevant water laws and
frameworks within their geographic areas of focus, by providing a
historical backdrop as well as the cultural,- political, religious,
geographic, or economic context in which the legal frameworks
developed and continue to operate.
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Part IV looks at current trends in international water law. This part
presents an evaluation of the judgments of court decisions in an effort
to understand the direction of the law. Lilian Del Castillo-Laborde
discusses the precedents that emerge with respect to the general
principles of watercourses law, water management, navigation, and
water boundaries. Maria Manuela Farrajota then develops a theory of
water cooperation by looking at how state practice in the area of "water
management" gives the term both substantive and procedural content.
John Razzaque goes on to explore how public participation has become
a key feature of modern day governance in the area of water law.
Joseph Dellapenna then examines both the role of water as an
economic good and the role of markets and pricing in the governance
of water.
In Part V, the book ends with a successful attempt by the editors to
bring together all the different strands of discussion in order to answer
some of the key research questions identified in the book. With the aid
of tables and figures, the editors summarize the factors leading to
different water laws worldwide, the forces leading to convergence in
water law, and the types and sources of key water law principles. The
editors link water to a large number of challenges facing humans in the
twenty-first century. In particular, they note that water is closely
associated with health, food and agriculture, industry and energy, and
ecosystems. The editors surmise that the emerging global climate
disruption will dramatically alter the availability and reliability of water
resources. The editors conclude that identifying and resolving these
challenges is as much a problem for water lawyers as it is for
hydrologists, engineers, and economists. Their proposed solutions
include a need for the water law community to open up to other
disciplines and enable cross-disciplinary fertilization to make water
governance more successful; a need for institutional change in
recognition of the growing importance of water knowledge (both
natural science and social science) to making successful water law and
policy; and a need for legal scholars to collaboratively develop new
instruments, such as global multilateral treaties that adopt principles of
fairness, to cope with these multiple challenges.
Meghana Shah
Steven Solomon, Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth, Power, and
Civilization, Harper Collins, New York (2010); 596 pp; $27.99;
ISBN 978-0-06-054830-8; hardcover.
Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth, Power, and Civilization deals
with the role of water in human history and provides an account of the
challenges various societies face as a result of limited freshwater supplies
and burgeoning populations.
According to Solomon, water is
"[e]arth's most potent agent of change," and he assigns it a leading role
in the development of human civilization. The book's overarching
thesis is that, throughout history, leading civilizations were those with
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the ability to overcome their natural water obstacles to control and
manipulate available water resources to their benefit. Beginning with
the birth of civilization, the author describes how early societies used
canals and aqueducts to establish irrigated agriculture and easily
available domestic water supplies. Progressing through human history,
the book focuses on water breakthroughs such as seafaring navigation,
steam power, and the ascendency of the modem industrial society. The
book culminates with our current age of water scarcity, which is creating
new political and economic realities around the world.
Water consists of seventeen chapters, divided into four separate and
distinct parts, a prologue, and an epilogue. The Prologue begins with a
discussion of water breakthroughs associated with major turning points
in history. Chapters One through Six comprise Part One of the book
and discuss water's role in ancient history. Chapters Seven through
Nine comprise Part Two of the book and describe the role of water in
the ascendancy of western civilization. Chapters Ten through Thirteen
comprise Part Three of the book and describe water's underpinning in
the making of the modem industrial society. Chapters Fourteen
through Seventeen comprise Part Four, the final part, and discuss
potential global conflict due to freshwater scarcity. The Epilogue
provides a capsule review of history's significant water breakthroughs
and concludes with the author's point of view on present and future
water policies that may alleviate water stress around the world.
The Prologue provides background on how prominent societies
have invariably capitalized on their water resources for social and
political control. Solomon describes how responses to water challenges
shape every era. Specifically, the author begins with an example from
1763 when a British inventor's re-design of the steam engine became
"the seminal invention of the Industrial Revolution." Through this
invention, Britain was able to transform itself into a superpower, with a
fearsome steam-and-iron navy and a dominant textile economy. The
Prologue concludes with a discussion of the impending crisis of
freshwater scarcity that is fast emerging on the world stage. As a result
of overuse, increasing pollution, and expanding populations, the
author suggests that a dangerous political fault line is emerging around
the globe. Solomon posits that the societies that find the most
innovative responses to the crisis will most likely come out as winners,
while those who do not will fall behind.
Part One, Water in Ancient History, explains how the world's
earliest empires - the Egyptians, the Romans, and the early Chinese managed water resources to become what the author refers to as
"hydraulic societies," which are land-based societies that focus on
irrigation and agriculture and led by a centralized authoritarian
government. Solomon describes Egypt's success over its mastery of the
Nile River, which provided the region with a large source of irrigation
water in an otherwise rainless region. The Nile's annual flooding
created excellent farmland by depositing a thick, silty layer of topsoil.
The Nile was also a rare two-way navigable waterway as its current and
surface winds moved in opposite directions year round. This simple

Issue 2

BOOK NOTES

feature allowed early Egyptian rulers to effectively exercise control over
the whole of Egypt by regulating all transport of important people and
goods.
Solomon next explains the Roman's success with water, which
came in both mastering shipbuilding to control shipping in the
Western Mediterranean, 'and from constructing a network of massive
aqueducts and waterways to supply its urban populations with
freshwater. As Solomon explains, Rome's provision of copious amounts
of fresh public water cleansed the city of so much filth and disease that
it set a standard of urban life unsurpassed until the sanitary revolution
of the nineteenth century in the industrialized West. By providing its
citizens with luxurious civil works projects such as public bathhouses,
Rome's emperors created a democratic legitimacy that allowed them to
control the population effectively for years to come. According to the
author, this tool for exercising political power has been influential on
modern liberal Western democracies.
From Rome, Solomon moves on to explain how China excelled as a
hydraulic society in the 7th century by constructing the 1,100 mile-long
inland Grand Canal, which linked the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers,
thereby providing an essential source of irrigation and transport
between the country's north and south. The Canal enabled China to
ship vital rice supplies grown on the hillsides of southern China to its
large population centers and army troops in the North. These
shipments fueled China's expansion, allowing China to defend itself
against the continual threat of raids on the Asian steppe. As the author
explains, China's urban centers became hubs of entrepreneurship,
scientific discovery, and industrial innovation nearly seven centuries
before Europe's. During this era, China became a world leader in
producing textiles and iron tools, and was the first to discover
gunpowder. Solomon also notes another significant Chinese water
infrastructure advancement: its use of locks on the Grand Canal. By
impounding water between two locked gates, the Chinese were able to
use hydraulic force to lift their ships up to five feet at a time. By
employing a series of locks, the Chinese were able to ferry their ships
across the region via the Grand Canal, which rose nearly 200 feet above
sea level.
Part Two, Water and the Ascendency of the West, chronicles
Western civilization's rise to unprecedented wealth and political order
during the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This section focuses
on water's key role in Europe's assent, specifically trans-oceanic sailing
and the gradual harnessing of waterpower for industry. The author
begins by explaining that the advent of trans-oceanic exploration
ushered in a new era in which sea power and control of the world's
trade routes became more important to global power than control over
land. By deciphering the Atlantic Ocean's hidden pattern of trade
winds and sea currents, Europe was able to sail back and forth across
Earth's open oceans.
This discovery, Solomon posits, launched
Western civilization into its position as a global superpower. The
author elaborates by discussing various landmark voyages made by
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European explorers. He explains that through mastery of sea travel,
Europe was able to consolidate its power by flooding foreign markets
with its imports and by establishing unparalled naval forces.
In the second half of Part Two, Solomon charts the rise of the
Industrial Revolution and analyzes how England's use of hydrology, first
with the water wheel and later with the steam engine, enabled the
country to convert water's latent energy potential into a. vehicle of
productive expansion. By using condensed steam to power its factories,
the author describes how England -nearly overnight- became the
model of wheat production, textiles, mining, iron tool making, and
weaponry. According to Solomon, the steam engine enabled England
to grow its industrial sector by an average of 14% annually for over a
century. The author believes that during the nineteenth century,
Britain used this "water-energy resource nexus" more beneficially than
any other nation.
In Part Three, Water and the Makings of the Modem Industrial
Society, Solomon explains how the mantle of industrial prowess passed
to America in the twentieth century. According to the author,
America's rise closely paralleled its mastery of its two disparate
hydrological environments: its rainy, temperate fiver-rich eastern half
and its predominantly arid, drought prone, Far West extending from
the Great Plains to the Pacific Ocean. The author begins this section by
discussing how in 1825, the completion of the Erie Canal dramatically
opened up America's interior by allowing freight to move quickly and
cheaply from east of the Appalachian Mountains to the Midwest. By
linking its waterway network with the Mississippi River, Solomon
explains that America was able to unite a nation challenged by
"splintering regional divisions, geographical impediments, slow travel
and communication, and divergent economic and social organization."
In the second half of Part Three, Solomon shifts his focus to discuss
how America developed its frontier west by constructing giant dams on
most of its major western rivers. As the author describes, these major
dams were extraordinarily successful not only because they provided
valuable water storage for year round irrigation, but also because they
generated vast amounts of hydroelectricity. As Solomon explains, this
extra production of electricity tipped the scales in America's favor
during World War II because it allowed America to produce more
aluminum aircraft than any other country.
Lastly, the author briefly discusses how pumping water from the
Ogallala aquifer allowed American farmers to cultivate a far greater
portion of the high plains than ever before. This technique proved so
successful that by the late 1970s "Dustbowl farmers" were growing 15%
of the nation's wheat, corn, cotton, and sorghum. Because of overuse
of the Ogallala aquifer, Solomon predicts that certain quantities will
run out between 2020 and 2030. If this prediction is correct, it will
inevitably result in a major shift away from agriculture in the region as
supplies dry up.
The last quarter of the book, Part Four, The Age of Scarcity, is
devoted to the present situation with water scarcity, and the dire issues it
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poses. According to Solomon, water is replacing oil as earth's scarcest
critical natural resource. As he points out, water is irreplaceable,
whereas oil is ultimately substitutable. Furthermore, a link exists
between water consumption and water infrastructure and the
challenges of food supply, energy shortages, and climate change.
Solomon predicts that as world population continues to soar towards
nine billion, and as much of the third world moves towards increased
consumption, demand for freshwater will outstrip supply. According to
Solomon, the critical issue is that no new innovative breakthroughs
capable of expanding usable water supplies on a large enough scale to
meet demand appear anywhere on the horizon. Absent a long-term
solution, the author states that the situation will lead to disastrously
polluted or vanishing freshwater sources, and to violent human conflict.
Next, Solomon discusses various attempts by nations around the
world to manage their water scarcity. In the Middle East, for example,
the author warns that Egypt and the Nile basin's population continue to
grow and are turning into a "hydrological time bomb" because its major
dam -the Aswan High Dam- sits directly above major earthquake
faults and because the dam's long-term environmental impacts
continue to make farming downstream in the fertile delta less
productive. In India, where many areas are without plumbing, raw
sewage chokes the Ganges River with noxious filth and pollution. This
river is the source of drinking water for hundreds of millions of Indians,
and consequently, it is also the source of untold sickness and child
mortality. The author then goes on to describe similar situations in
countries such as Pakistan, Iraq, Israel, and China.
The final part focuses on the new politics of water in industrial
democracies. In this section, Solomon discusses how America can use
Here, he blames
market forces to limit water consumption.
government policy for setting artificially low water prices for American
agribusiness, which encourages wasteful irrigation practices. Solomon
argues that assigning water its fair market value will be force industry to
find ways to use its allotted supplies more efficiently. According to
Solomon, the West can maintain its preeminence only ifit adjusts to the
reality of freshwater scarcity. In this regard, America must implement
policies to limit waste, and it must recognize that any further gains
made in water productivity must necessarily be environmentally
sustainable. Lastly, America must contribute to the development of
water infrastructure in countries that are water poor because it is there
that the potential for fundamentalist extremism is highest.
The Epilogue provides a summary of the author's thesis: the ability
to overcome water obstacles underpins enduring civilizations. The
author closes by arguing that because each nation's hydrological
realities are unique, it will take flexibility and a myriad approach to
create solutions tailored specifically to each region. According to
Solomon, it will take further trial and error, but he is cautiously
optimistic that we can meet the challenges facing us.
CraigAdams
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Kenichi Matsui, Native Peoples and Water Rights: Irrigation, Dams, and
the Law in Western Canada, McGill-Queen's University Press,
Montreal, Canada (2009); 243 pp; $95.00; ISBN 978-0773535213;
hardcover.
Native Peoples and Water Rights: Irrigation,Dams, and the Law in
Western Canada examines the historical movements and events that
gave rise to Native water rights in Canada. Specifically, Kenichi Matsui
examines the interactions between Canada's provincial and federal
governments and its First Nations from the 1870s to the 1930s. In seven
chapters Matsui examines the practical implications of a Lockean
approach to colonialism and how it gave rise to water conflicts,
irrigation regimes, and rights to waterpower in British Columbia and
Alberta. Matsui's hope is that his historical perspective will shed light
on "the current enigma about Native water rights questions in western
Canada."
Chapter One provides the theoretical backdrop that colored British
expansion into western Canada and concludes with a convenient,
chapter-by-chapter summary of the rest of the book. The book opens
with an extended quote of Edward Bulwar Lytton, Britain's colonial
secretary from 1858-59. Matsui extracts from Lytton the ideological
aims of British colonialism: "[Not] to fight against men, but to conquer
nature; not to besiege cities, but to create them; not to overthrow
kingdoms, but to assist in establishing new communities." Such a vision
did not rely on the area's traditional fur trade and gold mining; rather
it would be built by yeomen on family farms. The yeoman ideal
harkened back to the colonial theories of John Locke and Thomas
Jefferson to which Matsui refers throughout the book. This Lockean
approach to colonialism, however, assumes that the land is both suitable
and available for farming. Matsui's main critique of Lytton's position is
that the British based their vision on the assumption that the area was a
"no man's land" recently opened for civilization. In fact, one of
Matsui's goals with this study is to emphasize the intertwined relations
between Natives and non-Natives, and he asserts that the dynamic
nature of those relations gave rise to the highly localized nature of
Native water rights issues.
Chapter Two further explores the connection between the yeoman
ideal of Locke and Jefferson and western Canada's colonial culture.
Here, Matsui presents the three component parts that gave rise to what
he refers to as "a Water Rights Culture." First, he stresses the utilitarian
view Locke placed on land and property rights. Specifically, Locke
believed that one establishes one's property rights by investing labor
into the beneficial use of land. In the arid west, this same idea
extended from land to water rights. This 'labor theory of property'
justified the Lockean sentiment that Native lands were tabulaerasae,or
blank spaces, because landowners had not yet properly utilized them.
Second, Matsui highlights the American and Canadian legal and
political processes that put this theory into colonial practice. One
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common feature was a system of federal land grants to non-Native
settlers in exchange for improvement of the land. Because the land
granted by the government was often arid, the establishment of a system
of family farms gradually led to widespread introduction of irrigation
programs. Finally, Matsui explores the creation of the notion of Native
water rights with a discussion of the Winters doctrine. In 1908, the
Supreme Court of the United States decided Winters v. United States
which addressed the applicability of the prior appropriation regime to
Native Americans in Montana. The court held that prior appropriation
did not apply to Native water rights because when the federal
government reserved land for Native use, they also meant to*reserve
water as well. Matsui argues that this decision was a product of the
movement in North America that sought to "transform the Natives into
yeoman farmers" so they could be integrated into and advance in nonNative society. This movement had traction at the federal level in
Canada, but it was at odds with provincial ideas.
Chapter Three discusses the battle for administrative control of
water on Native reserves between federal and provincial governments in
Canada using British Columbia as an example. Matsui calls this dispute
for jurisdictional control one of the most significant events in the
development of Native water rights in Canada. Matsui looks to the
history of British Columbia's water rights legislation and argues that it
laid the foundation for the province's assertion of authority against the
Dominion government. Matsui examines the Gold Fields Act (1859),
the Land Act (1875), the Water Privileges Act (1892), and the Water
Clauses. Consolidation Act (1897) and argues that all four provincial
laws were an effort by the province to consolidate the administration of
power over all land and water resources in the province. Even after
such legislation gave rise to litigation between the province and the
Dominion - with the Dominion government prevailing - British
Columbia passed the Water Act in 1914 to outline the process for
obtaining a water license. The Dominion, for its part, attempted to
assert its exclusive jurisdiction over Native lands and water as established
in the British North America Act of 1867. Matsui argues that the
Dominion attempted to stress this power until 1921 when a dispute
resulted in the Indian Water Claims Act of 1921. This act effectively
gave the province power over Native water rights. Matsui closes this
chapter by reminding the reader that in all these debates, both
governments assumed that the water was theirs to distribute based upon
Lockean ideals and the Western notion of priority-based rights. He
concluded by stating that "[t]his systematic marginalization of Native
voices has bedeviled the Aboriginal rights struggle in British Columbia
to the present day."
Chapter Four analyzes the water conflict that arose between settlers
and the Secwepemc people in the southern interior, of British
Columbia. Here, Matsui's goal is to "show the complexities of Nativenewcomer relations surrounding water .rights disputes." His analysis
begins with a discussion showing how the Secwepemc adapted to form a
new farm-based society in the early "postcontact era." Their farming
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was greatly hindered, though, when much of their water reserves were
distributed to incoming settlers by the federal and provincial
governments. Matsui outlines one specific struggle for the waters of
Paul Creek near Kamloops as it played out between the Western
Canadian Ranching Company and the Kamloops Indians (a division of
the Secwepemc). This battle eventually went to an administrative
appeal in which the court decided in favor of the Secwepemc people.
That decision was reversed, though, by the British Columbia Court of
Appeal that made null the Dominion's attempt to give the Kamloops a
priority right that preceded the one held by the ranch company.
Matsui summarizes this case study by characterizing it as a complex
episode with various parties and competing agendas that created a
"localized and heterogeneous culture of Native water rights."
Chapter Five discusses irrigation projects on native lands and
examines the Siksika people living on the Blackfoot reserve near
Calgary. Matsui examines two case studies to exemplify the Native
people's forced shift from a buffalo-hunting economy to an agricultural
one. Matsui argues that the government thrust this new way of life
upon them in an effort to make them civilized land owners. Integral to
this process was the implementation of large-scale irrigation methods
used to farm the semi-arid land. The first case study offered by Matsui is
That
a project undertaken by the Calgary Irrigation Company.
company sought to build an irrigation system through the Sarcee
reserve for which they had to compensate the Tsuu T'ina people.
Historians have not accurately documented whether the Tsuu T'ina
ever did fully consent, but the company's efforts soon fell into disrepair
and they filed for bankruptcy, defaulting on their promises to the
Native people. The next case study examines an irrigation project
undertaken on the Blackfoot reserve. When the Native people living
there began construction of their own irrigation system, the federal
government sought to aid them with technical oversight. Government
officials were frustrated, though, by the Siksika's insistence on attending
the traditional Sun Dance during two crucial farming months in the
summer. Despite many officials insisting that the ceremony would
detract from their farming success, the Blackfoot ditch was one of the
most effective irrigation systems introduced to the area. However, the
region's federally sponsored irrigation projects eventually ended in the
early 20th century at the hands of harsh natural conditions and
flooding. Later, after the Siksika made a few profitable land sales, their
agricultural economy blossomed without governmental aid, and by
1921 they were competitive with many non-Native farms in the area.
Matsui concludes by arguing that the government could have best aided
the Native people with consistent programs and actions.
Chapter Six examines the construction of hydroelectric dams with
the goal of gaining insight to the socio-economic impact on
neighboring Native communities. Matsui begins the chapter with an
examination of the nature of hydroelectric development in North
America. He explains that hydroelectric generation gained popularity
from 1859 to 1903 with the invention of the turbine. The idea had
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significant traction in the area surrounding Calgary in that city's
struggle to become an economic hub. Matsui offers three examples of
early developments on the Bow River downstream of Calgary: (1) the
Horseshoe Dam; (2) the Kananaskis Dam; and (3) the Ghost Dam. All
three affected the Stoney Native reserve, and each project offered its
own distinctive negotiating challenges for the Stoney Nakoda people
living there. The 1907 negotiation concerning Horseshoe Falls set an
important precedent when the Stoney Nakoda "surrendered" portions
of the reserve to the federal government. This effectively established
that they had proprietary rights to begin with and allowed them to
incorporate the idea of forcing the government to make annual rental
payments for waterpower. In 1913, the Stoney Nakoda surrendered
what they referred to, significantly, as their "riparian rights" to water
and waterpower with respect to Kananaskis Falls. By the 1928
negotiations concerning the Ghost Dam, it was an accepted principle
that the Native peoples owned rights in the water for which the
government must compensate when they surrendered those rights.
Chapter Seven gives a concise summary of the substantive material
and provides a succinct context to the case studies of the previous
chapters. It is a useful review because the concepts that Matsui
addresses are alternately technical and theoretical. This final chapter
does well to connect those concepts.
Native Peoples and Water Rights offers a theoretical approach to
the historical developments that gave rise to modem day Native water
rights in Canada. Matsui writes in two tones; one is a scholarly
discussion of colonial approaches and the other is a pointed recitation
of case studies. Though limited in its usefulness to the modern day
practitioner, it will prove a valuable and insightful read for those
interested in Canadian development of Native water rights.
Robert Westfall
M. Ramon Llamas et al. eds., Water Ethics: Marcelino Botin Water
Forum 2007, Taylor and Franci Group, London, (2009); 368 pp.;
$149.95; ISBN 978-0415473033; hardcover.
Water Ethics: Marcelino Botn Water Forum 2007 is a compilation
of nineteen papers presented and discussed at the Third Marcelino
Botin Foundation Water Workshop held in Santander, Spain, in June
2007. The workshop brought together experts from various cultural,
geographic, and religious backgrounds to inspire open and diverse
dialogue on the role of ethical considerations in water development
and management. The papers cover a wide-variety of topics and are
divided into eight sections: (1) Cultural Traditional Approaches on
Water Ethics; (2) Ethical Aspects of New Water Management; (3) Water
as a Human Right and as an Economic Resource; (4) Water and
Poverty; (5) Ethical Aspects of Groundwater Use; (6) Ethics of Water
Ownership and Management; (7) Corruption, Transparency, and
Participation in the Water Sector; and (8) Ethical Aspects of
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Unforeseen and Extreme Events: Floods and Drought.
The book starts with the keynote address from the workshop, given
by Ana Palacio, the Senior Vice President and World Bank Group
General Counsel at the time of the workshop. Palacio discusses the
many different components of the water crisis, including water
shortages, access to sufficient drinking water, poor water quality, and
waterborne diseases. The responsibilities to manage these crises fall on
different state ministries, agencies, and utilities, but many countries
have major elements of water management left unregulated. Palacio
asserts that water ethics play an imperative role in managing our water
resources to allow sufficient, safe, acceptable, and affordable water for
everyone. One approach for addressing the many issues of the water
crisis is to determine a global consensus on water ethics to impose on
stakeholders at every level, across the world.
Section One, Cultural Traditional Approaches on Water Ethics,
consists of three chapters. The first, Waterand Wisdom as Embodiedin
the Works of Thales of Miletus by Alejo Jos6 G. Sison from the
University of Navarra, Spain, discusses the connection of water and
ethics as related to the work and teachings of the ancient philosopher
Thales of Miletus. To the philosopher, water was a metaphor for
wisdom, and it is this wisdom, the author asserts, which will quench our
human thirst for this important resource. Chapter Two, Water and
Conflict: Whose Ethics to Prevail by Dipak Gyawali of the Nepal
Academy of Science and Technology and the Nepal Water Conservation
Foundation, addresses the link between the ethical system of South Asia
and the water conflicts faced by the region. Just as Hindu ethics have a
pluralistic approach to ethical obligations, the author asserts that
modern water conflicts must allow engagement of all voices to enable a
sustainable water policy to reign. Chapter Three is Water Management
Ethics in the Framework of Environmental and General Ethics: The
case ofIslamic Water Ethics by Magdy A. Hefny of the Regional Center
for Studies and Research on Water Ethics in Cairo, Egypt. This chapter
addresses how populations can use Islamic water ethics to formulate
new tools and techniques to promote the ethical use of water. A
cultural approach to water use and management ethics, Hefny states, is
necessary for the sustainable management of our water resources.
Section Two of the book consists of three chapters that discuss
ethical aspects of new water management. The first chapter in the
section is Water Rights and Water Governance:A Cautionary Tale and
the Case for Interdisciplinary Governance by Charles Sampford from
the Institute for Ethics, Governance, and Law located in Australia.
Sampford discusses water governance, or lack thereof, on the dry
continent of Australia. The author uses experiences from Australia's
largest cities to provide lessons on -how to effectively develop and
manage water resources. The next chapter is Ethics and Uncertaintyin
Integrated Water Resources Management with Special Reference to
Transboundary Issues, by Janusz Kindler from Warsaw University of
Technology in Poland. The author discusses integrated and sustainable
water resources management and how uncertainty affects our ethical
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obligations to future generations. Kindler also discusses ethical issues in
transboundary water management, concluding that we must figure out
a cooperative approach to water management beyond political and
administrative boundaries. The final chapter in Section Two is Water
and Ethics in Food Production and Provision - How to Ensure Water
and Food Security and Equity into the 21St Century. The author, Karen
G. Villholth from the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland,
writes about water ethics specifically related to food production and
food security. Villholth states, given that the food demand of the world
is estimated to double by 2050, it is imperative that the developed part
of the world take responsibility for the uneven distribution of global
resources such as food and water.
Section Three is Water as a Human Right and as an Economic
Resource. The section starts with a chapter titled Water: A Human
l 'ht or an Economic Resource? The author, Luis Veiga da Cunha
from Universidade Nova de Lisboa in Portugal, analyzes whether water
is an economic resource or a social good. The paper concludes that if
we are to accept that humans have a right to water, we must put into
place effective water governance to make water both an economic
resource and a social good. The next chapter, Water as a Human Right
and as an Economic Resource: An Example from Mexico, discusses the
downfalls of declaring access to water a human right. The paper looks
specifically at Guanajuato, Mexico, where the state raised taxes on water
60% to 200% over six years. The money raised allowed capital and
infrastructure improvements, and meant fewer subsidies for urban
areas, but more money for rural areas.
Section Four addresses the topic of water and poverty and what, if
any, link exists between them. The first chapter, tided Poverty and the
Ethics of Water Development, is by Caroline A. Sullivan from the
Oxford University Centre for the Environment. Sullivan looks at the
role of water in the rise of poverty, including how inequitable water
management decisions can affect poverty. The paper stresses the need
for basin-scale management strategies to decrease disparities between
human populations. The next chapter is Monitoring Water Poverty: A
Vision from Development Practitioners,written by three authors from
Engineering Without Borders in Spain. The chapter recognizes the
drawbacks to current methodologies for measuring access to water, and
pushes for the adoption of "EASSY' (Easy to get at the local level,
Accurately defined, Standard and internationally applicable; Scalable at
all administrative levels, and Yearly updatable) variables that are
collected at the local level to monitor the water sector. The authors
stress the need for EASSY indicators to make information on water
distribution, development, and infrastructure readily available and
transferable between developing countries. The final chapter in
Section Four is Water and the Twin Challenge of Feeding Three Billion
New People and Ending Rural Poverty. The authors, Paul Polak and
Stephanie Fry from International Development Enterprises in
Colorado, discuss the challenge and possible solutions to feeding the
increasing world population. The paper highlights the need for new
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investments, the creation of affordable irrigation tools, and attainable
green revolution technologies for small farmers. When development
agencies start working at the level of the small farmer, new markets will
serve poor customers and provide opportunity for people to move out
of poverty.
Section Five presents papers on the Ethics of Groundwater Use.
The section starts with a chapter tiled Speciic Aspects of Groundwater
Use in Water Ethics by M. Ram6n Llamas from the Royal Academy of
Sciences in Madrid and Luis Martinez-Cortina from the Spanish
Geological Survey. The authors write that the current water crisis is due
to a crisis in water governance, not water scarcity, and sustainable and
ethical groundwater development may be the answer. The chapter
gives an overview of the hydrological and ecological impacts of
groundwater development, as well as the economic, socio-political and
institutional, and essential ethical aspects. The next paper in the book
is Economics, Ethics, and Politics of Groundwater:Evidence from West
Bengal, India. The author, Aditi Mukherji from the International
Water Management Institute in Sri Lanka, tells how groundwater
irrigation made an agricultural transformation in the state of West
Bengal. Mukherji asserts that the story of West Bengal is an excellent
example of the benefits of encouraging further expansion in
groundwater irrigation.
Section Six provides discussion on Ethics of Water Ownership and
Management The first chapter, tiled Achieving Ethical Business
Conduct in Public and Private Water Enterprises - Troublesome
Challenge or Enhanced Opportunity, is by Reinier Lock and Kathy S.
Shandling from the International Private Water Association. This
chapter discusses the shortfalls of the public sector and the failures of
the private sector in providing universal access to potable water. The
authors analyze the role that ethics play in the water industry, as well as
emerging solutions to maintain the role of ethics in infrastructure
industries. The next chapter addresses Water Ethics and Business.
Written by Jack Moss from Aquafed in Paris, France, the paper looks at
the roles of government, business, and civil society in the challenges to
modern water and wastewater management.
The author offers
numerous approaches that stakeholders can take to ensure both public
and private benefits in managing the world's water.
Section Seven covers Corruption, Transparency and Participation
in the Water Sector. The first chapter, Corruptionand Transparencyin
the Water Sector, is by Donal O'Leary from Transparency International
in Berlin, Germany. According to the World Bank, corruption and
deceitful management cause a 20-30% loss of water finances. The
author uses case studies from Cambodia, Japan, Columbia, and Pakistan
to show the importance of fighting corruption in the water sector.
Tools for fighting corrupt practices include business principles for
countering bribery, international conventions against corruption, and
national integrity systems.
The next chapter addresses Public
Participationto Promote Water Ethics and Transparency. The author,
William J. Cosgrove from Ecoconsult Inc. in Quebec, Canada, pushes
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for a systematic public consultation program that opens the door for
public debate about important water governance decisions. Cosgrove
points to a similar successful process adopted by Quebec in 1978 for
sustainable development. When the decision-makers take into account
the values and voices of citizens, the author argues, the public will see
water as more than merely something given to us by water providers.
Water Ethics concludes with a section tided Ethical Aspects of
Unforeseen and Extreme Events Management: floods and Droughts.
The first chapter, Water Disasters and Ethics, by Janos J. Bogardi from
the Institute for Environment and Human Security at United Nations
University in Germany, discusses whether we have comprehensive and
common ethics to deal with water disasters. The author concludes that
ethics do a play a role in disasters, but usually on a subconscious level.
A coherent water ethics is almost nonexistent, and therefore
researchers should focus on developing a guide to water ethics in the
face of extreme water events. The book concludes with Identif'ng
Actions to Reduce Drought Impacts by Enrique Cabrera from
Polytechnic University of Valencia, Spain, and Jos6 Rold;in from the
University of C6rdoba, Spain. The authors highlight the importance of
putting a drought plan into place that includes both proactive and
reactive measures. The authors assert that in the face of drought,
improvisation will only be detrimental and having a plan in place is the
key to ultimately helping affected areas.
Water Ethics:Marcelino Botin WaterForum 2007 includes nineteen
papers covering eight topics on water ethics. The authors provide
insight from all over the world, giving specific examples of the
important role that ethics can and do have in water management,
development, infrastructure, and use. Overall, Water Ethics gives an indepth look into the need for a comprehensive ethics code for the
world's water.
Tracy Taylor
Elli Louka, Water Law & Policy: Governance Without Frontiers, Oxford
University Press, New York (2008); 462 pp; $85.00; ISBN 978-0-19537413-1; hardcover.
Elli Louka's Water Law & Policy: Governance Without Frontiers
focuses on the problem managing water. Because water in many
instances crosses state borders, Louka asks the questions: can
governments manage water based on national borders, and, if not, is
water management without frontiers possible? In answering these
questions, Louka analyzes the European Union's Water Framework
Directive ('WFD") and its application of Integrated Water Resource
Management ("IWRM").
Louka believes that IWRM may be the
political answer to managing shared water sources between states. In
her analysis of the European Union's management of water, she hopes
to provide an example of effective water management for the rest of the
world.
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Louka divided Water Law & Policy into six different parts and
entitled part one The Making of Water Policy. In chapter one, Water
Governance, Louka focuses on the many problems mismanagement of
water has caused and what it will take to find solutions to all of these
problems. Some of the problems that exist throughout the world
include uneven water distribution, pollution, salinization, droughts, and
floods. When attempting to manage water, the governing body must
take all of these problems into account and attempt to find a solution.
With a solution, however, even more problems seem to arise. Water
governance consists of governments, private and social groups, and
even individual citizens who participate in the management of water.
Because water is so important, everyone must be involved in the
management of water in order to find a real solution to the countless
problems.
Louka focuses on the basics of IWRM in chapter two, Principles of
Integrated Water Resource Management
Water Management.
coordinates the management of water, land, and related resources in an
attempt to maximize the economic and social welfare of those involved.
Basically, one cannot make an effective decision on water management
without taking into account the effects that decision will have on land
Some of the keys to
management and other related resources.
successful IWRM include cooperation between states, cross-border
legislation that mandates IWRM implementation, inclusion of local
governments and individual citizens, clear roles for institutions and
apportionment of responsibility for those involved, and adequate
funding. Some of the problems that usually arise include institutional
fragmentation, weaknesses in national institutions, and feeble
international arrangements. As a result, there is a need for interagency
officials, a market based price for water to make use more efficient, and
stable local governments.
In chapter three, The Making of the European Union, Louka
explains how the European Union is structured and how the different
branches work together in implementing its policies. Various countries
in Europe created the European Union in an effort to avoid future wars
and in order for Europe to develop economically. The idea was that
economic cooperation would lead to cooperation in other sectors.
Next, in chapter four, Water Management in the European Union,
Louka writes about the European Union's implementation of the WFD.
Although IWRM is not explicitly a part of the WFD, it is implied in the
Directive. The WFD sets the framework for legislative action and
establishes the basis of a coherent water policy for the European Union.
It establishes institutional mechanisms that will guarantee the
accomplishment of qualitative goals such as control of hazardous waste
disposal, the emission of greenhouse gases, and release of chemical
substances into the water. The WFD plans its institutions around the
river basin district. Member states are to identify river basins, coastal
water, and ground water in their territory and assign them to river basin
districts. States do not need to create new administrative units, but can
use existing institutions to coordinate the management of river basin
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districts. Also, the WFD mandates that states establish international
river basin districts, facilitating the deepening of cooperation between
member states. Further, the WFD pushes member states to cooperate
with nonmember states. Once the states create these districts, the WFD
leaves the states with some flexibility in coming up with their water
management plans. The WFD provides guidance documents, a series of
deadlines to keep the districts accountable, and mandates that the plans
include measures for the reduction of pollution, maps of their waters,
an economic analysis of water use, and a summary of how the district
has included the public and stakeholders in its decision-making process.
The problem is the many exceptions built into the WFD. For example,
if other wider environmental goals are adversely affected, the WFD does
not apply. All exceptions must be included in the districts plan and
make public. Other problems include the lack of public participation
and problems arising from the management of other sectors such as
agriculture based on national borders.
In chapter five, Implementing Water Management, Louka focuses
on the implementation of the WFD as a planning instrument that
focuses on a common implementation strategy. It leaves states with the
latitude to decide what institutions would implement the WFD and
provides guidance and support rather than punishment. The WFD
created a Common Implementation Strategy in order for member states
to share information and to develop guidance on technical issues. The
strategy was to avoid duplication of effort and minimize the risk of poor
application of the directive. The guidance documents, along with
formal and informal networks among policy makers and experts
regarding the implementation, were supposed to create a consistent
and harmonized methodology of implementing the directive in an
attempt to avoid a la carte implementation.
In testing the
implementation strategy, pilots found that the guidance documents
were too general and gave limited operational value. Three different
countries using the same guidance documents all came up with
different methods and different results. Also, the public was not
involved as the implementation became very technical, and states only
gave stakeholders observer status.
As a result, the Commission
concluded that there needed to be less paper work and more
information sharing. As of 2007, member states created 110 river basin
districts, most with significant differences due to the administrative
structure of the states and existing institutional frameworks of water
management.
The last chapter of part one, chapter six, CoordinationPolicies and
Politics,speaks to the difficulties in coordination of policies and politics.
WFD has led to increased coordination because it represents very
diverse stakeholders who cross state boundaries. The WFD focuses on
regional policy in the cooperation among member states and the
coordination among actors at the sub-national level. Some of the
problems that arise from the hopes of coordination and cooperation
between local governments and the European Union include the lack
of involvement of local government in the policy decisions, while the
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local governments have most of the responsibility to implement the
European Union's policy initiatives. One solution is involving local
governments in the decision-making process. Also, the European
Union can aid the local governments in their implementation by
providing funding. All of the industries involved in water management
also add to the problem of coordinating the implementation of the
WFD. Most industries believe that with the increase in regulations, they
will become less competitive. Clearly, this vast management program
creates many problems; however, Louka wonders how bad it would be
without the attempted management of water across state boundaries.
Part two of Water Law & Policy, National Institutions for Water
Management, focuses on the management of water by national
institutions. Chapter seven, DesigningEffective Organizations,focuses
on the components that lead to a successful organization. Louka
emphasizes that there is no clear blue print for institutional success.
However, effective evaluation of an examination includes leadership,
nature of formal and informal networks built with in an organization,
and the rapport between an organization and its clientele. Informal
networks refer to the culture of the organization, where formal
networks refer to the organizational structure, the rules of procedure,
A successful
the mission, and the goals of the organization.
organization strikes a balance between the two networks. Louka also
acknowledges the difficulties imposed on a democratic organization or
agency. In a democracy, organizations have extra burdens put on them.
For example, they have the additional responsibilities of putting the
public on notice, participating in the legislative process, creating
accountability, and other political constraints. A successful organization
does not have all the answers, but is one that learns from its mistakes
and continues to work for a better solution.
In chapter eight, Cenualization/DecentralizationDilemmas,Louka
explains the differences between centralization and decentralization in
terms of government organizations and the different effects either will
have in the successful implementation of the organizations' goals. In
regards to the WFD, depending on governmental level, there will be
both centralization and decentralization. At the central government
level, there must be decentralization. The central government must
delegate some of its authority to the river basin districts. Also, at the
local level there must be centralization. The local directorates or river
basin authorities must work together with other countries that share the
same water source. In order to do this effectively, for example, the local
governments must give some of their power to international river basin
districts that will have power to make decisions regarding the shared
water source.
Louka, in chapter nine, How to Predict Success in Water
Management,focuses on the implementation of the WFD and how the
success of the implementation process may be measured based on the
different organizational structure of different countries. The first step
of WFD implementation is to involve the local governments. Member
states must focus on Europeanization, a process that establishes
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institutions that will have the authority to implement the directives of
the WFD at the river basin level. The European Union sets the policy
and member states must embrace it and create local administration to
implement the policy. One of the factors in determining success is
whether the member states already have administrative organizations in
place to implement the directives. If not, implementation may take
longer and, initially, not be seen as a success. Other factors to look at
include the administrative capacity of the state, the political capacity of
the state, and the number of veto players involved in the administrative
process. Veto players may include water-users who do not want to lose
their rights or other administrations that do not want to loser their
power. One solution is to make the whole process transparent to the
public, exposing the grounds for the veto players' objections.
In chapter ten, Models of Water Policy, Louka introduces and
explains the different models of water policy and what kind of
institutional leadership is necessary for the successful implementation
of the WFD. Because the WFD crosses different administrative sectors,
cross-sector coordination, or interministerial committees, it is the best
form of institutional leadership. An interministerial committee would
be comprised of leaders from the environmental, agricultural, and
If only the Ministry of the
other interested administrations.
were
in
control
for
example,
then fragmentation and lack
Environment
of cooperation may stifle one of the main goals of the WFD, which is
the harmonious management of water across Europe. Additionally,
because Ministries of Environment are often relatively new, they may
not have the capacity to implement across borders as effectively as an
interministerial committee would.
The four models of water policy include the hydrological model,
the administrative model, the collaboration model, and the river basin
model. The hydrological model is based on the hydrological unit, and
the administrative model utilizes water management entrusted to
administrative authorities within their jurisdiction; neither works within
the WFD. The collaboration model, where various authorities work
together to implement water policy, does work in WFD implementation.
Also, the river basin model, using one river basin authority per river
basin district, is the preferred model used in WFD implementation. In
both the collaboration and the river basin models, different institutions
at different levels must work together to successfully manage water.
In chapter eleven, Case Studies, Louka evaluates several European
states' attempts at implementing the WFD. The states include the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Netherlands, Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece. Louka highlights the history of water
management in each state, the administrations that have the
responsibility of managing water, steps that have been taken to
implement the WFD, the problems and successes of each state in their
implementation of the WFD, and suggestions for states to achieve
future success of WFD implementation.
Next, chapter twelve, Information as the Foundation of the
Democratic State, begins Part III, Expressions of Democracy. In this
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chapter, Louka explains the importance of the free flow of information
in a democratic society. Information is the key to public participation,
which is the key to a democratic society. Today, most democratic
countries have freedom of information acts. In determining the success
of a country's ability to make information available to the public, some
key factors include the government's susceptibility to corruption and
the level of education in a civil society. The WFD mandates the
distribution of information to the public so that it may participate in its
implementation.
In chapter thirteen, The Participation of the Public: Towards
Effective Rules in Water Management? Louka contrasts the
participation of the public and stakeholders in the implementation of
the WFD. For the public, states have not systematically pursued
participation. The public believes it does not have a stake in the
decisions behind water management; one of the reasons for this is that
water management is usually not at the forefront of political debate or
an important election issue.
Stakeholders, on the other hand,
continuously participate and provide their knowledge to those who
have the power to implement the WFD. The problem with avid
participation by stakeholders is that they are looking out for their best
interests, whereas, the implementation of the WFD is supposed to be in
pursuit of the public good.
One solution is transparency and
motivating the public to engage in the dialogue.
Next, in chapter fourteen, Public Participation and the
Strengthening of the Democratic State, the author continues to focus
on the lack of public participation and the problems that arise when
special interests flood the decision-making process. When special
interests are involved, the public has a tendency to see the government
as prone to the special interests needs and not the public good.
Further, there is a problem when special interests can manipulate and
placate the public, butgetting the public involved is problematic. Some
solutions are creating transparency, using the internet to make
information more available, and organizing neighborhood assemblies
to involve the public at the local level.
In chapter fifteen, Public Participationin Practice,Louka explains
how the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have attempted to
involve the public and stakeholders in the implementation process of
the WFD. In the Netherlands, for years the public has been involved at
the local level with the Water Boards. Communities created the Water
Boards to solve problems of flooding and equitable distribution of
water. The community elects the members of the Water Boards and the
public pays taxes to provide a budget to implement their policies. In
the United Kingdom, the government implemented the Ribble Pilot
Project in order to test the implementation of the WFD at the local
level. In its implementation, the government invited the public and
stakeholders to a forum where they could share their ideas before the
government implemented the WFD. Stakeholders actively participated,
whereas public participation was lacking.
Next, in Part IV, InternationalInstitutions for Water Management,
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Louka explores the implementation of the WFD at the international
Chapter sixteen, Instruments for Transboundary Water
level.
Management,focuses on what was already in place in Europe before the
First, the European Union
European Union enacted the WFD.
implemented the 1992 UNECE Helsinki Convention on the Protection
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes.
Under this convention, European states were encouraged to cooperate
in addressing water quality. The European Union created international
groups to monitor, research, develop, and exchange information in
regards to water pollution. Second, the European Union convened the
Uses of International
Convention on
the Non-Navigational
Watercourses to coordinate international water quantity and quality
management. The convention mandated member states share water
equitably and promise to not significantly harm shared water. If one
country wanted to implement a program concerning the use of its
shared waterways, it had to share its plans and notify and consult with
the effected countries.
Next, in chapter seventeen, Nineteen Countries One River: TradeOffs in the Management of the Danube River, chapter eighteen,
Institutional Congestion in the Management of the Rhine River,
chapter nineteen, Institutional Building in the Scheldt and Meuse
Rivers, chapter twenty, The Future of the Elbe River Regime, and
chapter twenty-one, Tepid Institutional Development in Southeast
Europe, Louka explains how the European countries that share rivers
have worked together in the shared management of these rivers. All
involved countries have struggled with the management of the rivers,
especially with the management of the navigation, hydropower
generation, prevention of flooding, and the solution to the problems of
Among all of these problems,
pollution of these shared rivers.
governments must contrast the need for navigation, transportation, and
renewable energy against environmental goals, the need to prevent
flooding, and the equitable distribution of water. In each case, Louka
explains what governments have done to solve and balance these issues,
examines what problems continue to exist, and provides the different
management techniques the many different involved countries have
used.
Chapter twenty-two, Participationof Stakeholders in International
Water Commissions, starts Part V, International Governance
This chapter highlights public participation and
Mechanisms.
information sharing. Louka looks at the management of the Danube,
Rhine, Scheldt, and Meuse Rivers as examples. One of the problems
that arise with public participation is a lack of an ownership interest.
Also, stakeholders resist public participation because they want more
influence, and they want their interests heard over the public's
interests. In every case, each country has attempted to include the
public, and most have placed information on websites. Governments
have also circulated newsletters and brochures to share information
with the public.
In chapter twenty-three, International Water Authorities and the
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Role of Secretariats,Louka explains the importance of secretariats in
the administration of the WFD. A secretariat's role is to formulate the
logistics of the WFD implementation, set agendas of meetings, provide
documentation to interested parties, and facilitate communication
between interested parties. Because they have the power to set the
agendas of the meetings, secretariats can also set the direction of the
implementation process, as they know all the state actors and are usually
experienced policy makers. In order to be successful and respected,
secretariats must appear impartial and objective. The involved state
actors must be able to respect them so that all the involved parties
communicate effectively, aiding the management effort. Because so
many parties are involved on the international level, international
cooperation is crucial, and secretariats coordinate that cooperation.
Finally, chapter twenty-four, Sketches from National and
TransnationalExperience, and chapter twenty-five, Towards a Future
Water Policy, begin Part VI, Anticipating the Future, and conclude
Louka's analysis of the WFD. In her concluding chapters, Louka
contrasts the Australian Murray-Darling Commission's implementation
of the IWRM with that of the European Union's. One of the similarities
includes the problem of state autonomy. In both instances, states do
not want to freely give up their power to control and manage their
water sources. However, the European Union may be more successful
because they have more power to enforce their management apparatus
and can provide more incentives.
Overall, member states have
implemented the WFD with caution. Most states have not created new
agencies to manage their waters, but instead, reoriented existing
agencies to implement the WED. There has been some success in
coordination at all levels, but member states still need to do more. The
key is participation and information sharing.
Louka- effectively explains what the WFD is and what goals it hopes
to accomplish in its implementation. Also, she highlights the problems
that have arisen or may arise, addresses how countries correct the
problems, and proposes what countries should do in the future to
make the implementation process a success. Those interested in water
management at all levels of governance, especially at the international
level, should read this book.
Steve Brander

CONFERENCE REPORTS

THE IFtY-SECOND ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE
COLORADO WATER CONGRESS: COLORADO
COMPACTS WORKSHOP

Denver, Colorado

January 27-29, 2010

DAY 1: WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2010
The Fifty-Second Annual Convention of the Colorado Water
Congress's Colorado Compacts Workshop provided informative
discussion on the history and current relevance of Colorado's interstate
water compact obligations. The workshop consisted of four sessions.
Nicole Seltzer, Executive Director of the Colorado Foundation for
Water Education ("CFWE") presented the first session. Ms. Seltzer
introduced the newly-released CFWE's Citizen's Guide to Colorado's
Interstate Compacts ("the Guide"), the ninth in a series of Citizen's
Guides. The CFWE designed the Guide to provide a big picture
understanding of compacts and their importance.
Ms. Seltzer explained that Colorado, as a headwater state, shares
water with nineteen downstream states, as well as Mexico. Although this
water originates in Colorado, the amount of water Colorado is entitled
to use and consume within its boundaries is determined by nine
interstate compacts (formed between 1922 and 1948), two memos of
For
understanding, and two Supreme Court equitable decrees.
Colorado, the downside to its involvement in compacts is, of course,
that it may not use all of the water originating within its borders.
However, Ms. Seltzer points out an upside to Colorado's water
compacts: Coloradans can use compact arrangements to promote
certainty about how much water exists in the state and how Coloradans
can preserve it in perpetuity.
The next session's speaker was Justice Gregory Hobbs of the
Colorado Supreme Court. Justice Hobbs discussed the early legal
background of water compacts, especially the Colorado River Compact.
Justice Hobbs explained how early legal thinking regarding water in the
Western States, especially in those states benefiting from the Colorado
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River, involved, a number of complex and sometimes conflicting legal
perspectives. Under the equal footing doctrine and Colorado's state
constitution, which rejected riparianism in favor of the doctrine of prior
appropriation, Colorado has claim to title to all of the water arising
within her borders. However, when Colorado's neighbor-state of
Kansas entered the union, it used riparianism to govern its water. On
the one hand, the federal government claimed rights to waters flowing
interstate under the doctrine of equitable apportionment. On the
other hand, federal laws, such as the 1866 Mining Law, suggested that
each state could have its own water law- Additionally, Justice Hobbs
stated that, when examining the legal background of water compacts,
one must consider the Native Americans' "reserved rights doctrine." In
1908, the Supreme Court held in UnitedStates v. Wimters that when the
government created these reservations, it did so with a reserved amount
of water rights recognizable by all states independent of use. For
example, as Justice Hobbs noted, the Ute tribe has an 1868 reserved
water right.
In 1922, in order to make sense of this "confusion" of early law, the
United States Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, called
negotiators from Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, Utah, and
Wyoming to the first meeting of the Colorado River Compact
Commission ("CRCC"). The CRCC negotiation was the first negotiated
water compact of its size in the United States. The Boulder Canyon
Project Act of 1928 ratified the 1922 compact, authorized construction
of the Hoover Dam in the lower basin, and apportioned the lower
basin's allotment of water among the states of Arizona, California, and
Nevada. In 1948, the Upper Colorado River Commission apportioned
the upper basin's allotment among Colorado, New Mexico, Utah,
Wyoming, and a portion of Arizona. Ultimately, the Colorado River
Compact allowed Colorado to use only one-third of the water that its
watersheds produce. However, guided by the able representation of its
commissioner, Delph Carpenter, Colorado won the perpetual right to
take water from the Colorado River and distribute it to other parts of
the state.
Next, a trio of water professionals spoke on the topic of
"Administration of Colorado's East Slope Compacts: Case Studies on
South Platte and Republican Rivers." The first speaker in this session
was Peter Ampe of the Colorado Office of the Attorney General. Mr.
Ampe focused on the Republican River Compact
The Republican River Compact Administration ("RRCA')
administers the Republican River Compact, effective 1943. The
compact provides for the efficient use of the waters of the Republican
River and its tributaries for multiple purposes, including the equitable
allocation of what the compact calls a "virgin" water supply (or, water
that is "undepleted by the activities of man") to the three states that
share the Republican River Basin: Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska.
Drainage basin calculations help allocate virgin water--one modifies
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the allocation if the amount varies more than ten percent each year.
The compact allocates a total of 54,100 acre feet of virgin water to
Colorado. Additionally, the compact has some unallocated waters that
it gives to the first appropriator.
Mr. Ampe described Kansas's discontent with the regulation of the
compact-an unease that it began to vocalize in the 1980s. Finally, in
1998, Kansas filed suit against Nebraska for overuse of the basin's
groundwater. Kansas named Colorado as a defendant, but Kansas
sought no relief from Colorado.
In .1999, the Supreme Court
appointed a special master to investigate the case. Nebraska eventually
counterclaimed against Kansas and cross-claimed against Colorado,
alleging that if all groundwater connected to the Republican River is
subject to the compact's allocation, then Colorado had consumed more
water per year than the compact had allocated it. In 2002, the special
master negotiated a settlement in the case under which the states
barred all claims going forward, stream-flow depletions caused by well
pumping would be determined using a ground water model, and the
compact's accounting would be done on a five-year running average.
The final settlement included a procedure for bringing disputes to the
RRCA that would involve nonbinding arbitration. Mr. Ampe suggested
that this process helps states fully understand what the other compact
states want and allows a neutral arbitrator to decide what is truly fair; in
addition, the process could also help smooth more minor discussions,
such as the placement of gauges. Since signing the agreement in 2002,
Colorado has been out of compliance every year. Mr. Ampe suggests
that this may well be because changes in use are not reflected in actual
amount fluctuations for decades.
Mike Sullivan, Colorado Deputy State Engineer, spoke next about
the Rio Grande River Compact. Giving a brief overview of the history of
the compact, Mr. Sullivan explained that the Rio Grande Compact
came about because of development along the Upper Rio Grande and
the need to divide the upper Rio Grande water between Colorado, New
Mexico, and Texas. The Upper Basin saw the construction of the San
Luis People's ditch in 1852 and the appropriation of the first surface
water right from the Conejos River in 1855. In 1866, the Rio Grande
River had its first water right appropriation. From 1880 to 1890, the
area experienced the most extensive development of surface water
irrigation systems in the area with approximately 200 artisan wells
drilled during that time. Downstream water users started experiencing
water shortages, and by 1896, the Rio Grande had dried up. As a result,
Mexico filed a complaint.
In 1906, the United States signed a treaty with Mexico to divide the
waters of the Rio Grande. To allocate water between southern New
Mexico and Texas, Congress authorized the Rio Grande Project that
built the Elephant Butte and Caballo dams in 1916. From 1928 to 1937,
Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas conducted a joint investigation to
negotiate a permanent compact between the three states that would
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reach all of their water needs from the Rio Grande. In 1938, the three
states reached an agreement and signed the Rio Grande River Compact.
Mr. Sullivan continued discussing the basics of the Rio Grande River
Compact, stating that the Compact has many objectives: it establishes
the Rio Grande Commission; apportions the Rio Grande water between
Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas; establishes delivery schedules for
the states; and establishes credit and debit limits. The compact also
eliminates obligations of the states during spill years, restricts the
storage of upstream states in dry years, and allows for trans-mountain
and closed basin project diversions.
Mr. Sullivan explained that in the beginning of the Rio Grande
Compact, Colorado ran a credit and a little bit of a water debt. Then
Colorado went into greater debt. In 1976, New Mexico and Texas told
Colorado that the state was not living up to the compact, so Colorado
starting honoring its obligations. Colorado curtailed water use in order
to make deliveries. The state came out of debt in 1985 and since that
year Colorado has had little debt.
The compact is an annual delivery obligation. The reservoir
development never came to fruition so the compact is run future
forward. Colorado must look at the forecast, including snowmelt, to
figure out how much water the state thinks it will receive and how much
the state will have to deliver. Mr. Sullivan concluded by saying that
Colorado currently enjoys a good working relationship with the
downstream states under the Rio Grande Compact.
Jim Hall, Division Engineer for Water Division 1, concluded the East
Slope Compacts Administration Primer With a presentation addressing
the South Platte River Compact. In contrast to the Rio Grande River
Compact, the South Platte Compact only involves two states: Colorado
and Nebraska. Mr. Hall stated that the South Platte Compact is similar
to the prior appropriation system and is much more straightforward
than other compacts.
The events leading to the South Platte River Compact started with a
lawsuit from Nebraska concerning the Western Canal in 1916, alleging
that irrigated farms in Colorado deprived Nebraska of water at the state
line. The two states investigated the issue and came up with an
agreement in 1923. Mr. Hall noted that there are several key provisions
of the compact. First, Colorado has full right to the use of the flow in
the upper section of the South Platte River, which is the portion of the
river in Colorado that is upstream of the west boundary of Washington
County. Second, Colorado has full right to use of the flow in the lower
section of the river between October 15 and April 1. The lower section
is the portion of the South Platte in Colorado that is between the west
boundary of Washington County and the state line. The last key
provision of the compact states that from April 1 to October 15 each
year, Colorado must curtail all diversions of water in the lower section
of the river that impact flows at the state line and whose priority dates
are junior to June 14, 1897, when the flow is less than 120 cubic feet per
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second.
There are also several lesser-known provisions of the South Platte
Compact. One provision states that Colorado must make up flow
shortfalls to Nebraska within 72 hours. In addition, Nebraska may use
water diverted through Peterson ditch and other ditches in the
Julesburg Irrigation District that flow to Nebraska. The compact also
divides the waters of Lodgepole Creek (a tributary of the South Platte)
at a point two miles north of the state line, with Nebraska having
exclusive use of the water above and Colorado having exclusive use of
the water below the division point. Finally, the two states can
implement extra provisions under the compact should Nebraska build
the Perkins County Canal near Ovid.
Mr. Hall also addressed why Colorado has to curtail only the flows
in the lower section of the river. He stated two points: First, water rights
senior to 1897 control the upstream portion of the river and in years
when it matters there are rights that dry up the river four or five times
above the point of the senior rights. Second, there are mainly 1882 and
1888 water rights in District 1 and mainly 1897 water rights in District 4.
Because these rights irrigate and have return flows, the compact
drafters chose to develop the compact the way that it is.
Looking back on recent years of the river flow, Mr. Hall stated that
going into 2002 things looked good, but it was not long before it turned
bad. Colorado had thirteen days total that the river was above 120 cubic
feet per second. In 2008, it was still dry but it was much better than in
2002. The South Platte had a great year in 2009 and Colorado
exceeded its compact requirement by quite a bit during that year.
In conclusion, Mr. Hall addressed the operational concerns of the
South Platte River Compact. He stated that measurement concerns do
exist and every change in flow changes the relationship between stage
and flow; thus, Colorado has to measure the flow inJulesburg. Mr. Hall
also said that Colorado does not have to curtail surface water rights to
assure compact compliance; the reservoir is generally full so that is not a
problem. Finally, Mr. Hall concluded by stating that it is a real
challenge to assure that Colorado curtails in time in order to maintain
the flow at 120 cubic feet per second or above.
The final presentation of the workshop was the "Legal Background
for Litigating a Compact, Case Study: Kansas v Colorado,"presented by
David Robbins, attorney for Hill and Robbins. Giving a brief overview
of interstate compacts, Mr. Robbins stated that the compacts are both a
contract and a law of the United States. Unless the compact is
somehow unconstitutional, no court may order relief that is
inconsistent with the express terms of the compact. The United States
Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to resolve controversies between two
or more states, including a dispute over a compact. Contract remedies
are generally available to remedy a breach of a compact, including
damages. Equitable remedies, such as specific performance, may also
be available. Finally, states cannot enter into compacts without the
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consent of Congress.
In 1907, Congress authorized the negotiation of a compact between
Colorado and Kansas for the equitable apportionment of interstate
rivers. The purpose of the Arkansas River Compact is -to allocate
consumption. The compact tells each state how much water it can
consume; what each state is not entitled to consume has to pass by
gravity downstream.
In 1948, the Arkansas River Compact Commissioners signed the
compact and Congress approved it in 1949. Mr. Robbins explained that
in 1984, the Kansas Commissioner felt that Colorado had breached its
deal on how the state would administer the Purgatory project and
consequently was depriving Kansas of water. The Kansas Commissioner
hired engineers who conducted a study that suggested that there was
damage to Kansas from winter water storage projects and post-project
well pumping in the basin, as well as damage from the Purgatory
project. Kansas told Colorado to shut down the projects.
By 1985, Kansas claimed that Colorado was in violation of the
compact and requested an investigation. Kansas filed a complaint with
the United States Supreme Court and the Court accepted the
complaint in early 1986. Colorado and Kansas litigated the case from
1985 to 2009, during which there was a lengthy discovery period, five
reports from the special master, four arguments before the Supreme
Court, and over 270 days of actual trial. The Supreme Court entered a
final decree in March 2009.
Mr. Robbins offered several general truths about river compacts.
First, all water compacts limit and allocate consumption. Second, it is
hard to live with limits on consumption. Mr. Robbins stated that under
most conceivable circumstances, when a compact controversy arises,
Colorado will be on the defense. Furthermore, other states are not as
impressed with Colorado and its growing need for water as Colorado
citizens are themselves. Finally, for every compact there is a lot of
folklore and coffee shop wisdom that is frequently off the mark about
how the compact came to be and how the compact should work. '
Next Mr. Robbins went over the process for dealing with water
compact litigation. As a first step, the parties must learn the applicable
law and remember that Colorado's internal law may be relevant and
can work against you. In addition, it helps to learn the history; it is
beneficial to hire a historian and to study the state's own records of the
negotiations and subsequent interactions. Lawyers must review the
public records in the other state(s) and review the public records of
federal agencies, including those in the National Archives and the
Library of Congress. Third, the lawyer must learn the facts by studying
what has occurred in his or her state that has raised the ire of his or her
neighbor. Assemble all the available information, including but not
limited to climate data, stream flows, diversion records, water rights
decrees, well records, pumping data, and land use data. Last, in water
compact litigation, each party must determine the best tools to use. It is
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important to decide whether to model or not to model, what
techniques are best for finding missing data, and the appropriate
equations to estimate the unmeasured or the unknown. The lawyers
must also determine the tools for discovery, pre-trial maneuvers, trial to
the Master, and exceptions to the Supreme Court.
Talking specifically about Kansas v. Colorado, Mr. Robbins
discussed the trial phases that he experienced. First, Colorado had to
determine liability by determining if the state did anything wrong.
Next, Mr. Robbins needed to examine the extent of Colorado's
wrongdoing. The*Court needed to determine the extent of the remedy
and if it would be a water remedy or a dollar remedy. In this case, the
Master agreed with Kansas that a dollar remedy would be appropriate.
Finally, Mr. Robbins determined how Colorado would ensure future
compliance and what the costs would be.
In conclusion, Mr. Robbins discussed why interstate water compact
litigation is so complicated. He stated that it is inevitability a basin-scale
problem. There are data gaps, uncertainty, and multiple interests;
there are also expectations and political requirements that play a role.
On one hand, to admit you are wrong means that some citizens must
give up water that they rely on, and that position is difficult to take. On
the other hand, once the sense of outrage rises, it is hard to accept less
than what you have convinced your water users and politicians is fair.
Lastly, there is a lot of money at stake. For example, Mr. Robbins
explained that in Kansas v. Colorado, Kansas originally wanted $300
million in damages. Colorado reduced its damage request to $68
million dollars, and, ultimately, the Court awarded Kansas $21 million.
Kansas also claimed about $11 million in costs, of which the Court
awarded the state $1 million.
In sum, the Colorado Compacts Workshop of the Colorado Water
Congress Fifty-Second Annual Convention provided an informative
discussion of Colorado's interstate water compacts.
The sessions included an overview of the Citizen's Guide to
Colorado's Interstate Compacts, a discussion of the legal background
for creating and litigating a compact, and a primer on east slope
compact administration. The workshop provided great insight into the
historical and legal framework used to develop and maintain
Colorado's interstate water compacts.
Sarah Felsen and Tracy Taylor
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DAY3: FRIDAY,JANUARY29, 2010

FEDERAL LEGISLATION OF INTEREST TO THE COLORADO WATER
COMMUNITY
SPECIAL PRESENTATION ON THE CLEAN WATER RESTORATION

Act

Mark Pifher, Director of Utilities for Aurora Water, opened the
third general session with a discussion of the implications that the
current iteration of the Clean Water Restoration Act (CWRA) may have
on water users. Pifher followed with a discussion of the on-going dialog
between western water diverters and federal regulators regarding a
proposed rule change that may require diverters to acquire NPDES
permits for water transfers.
Pifher explained that Congress proposed CWRA to clarify recent,
ambiguous court rulings and interpretive agency findings by defining
which waters are under the.jurisdiction of the federal government.
Pifher framed his discussion with the ramifications that the current
version of the CWArRA may have on water users and then addressed
recent congressional hearings that may shrink the original expansive
version of the bill. Of concern to Pifher is the uncertainty that the
current version of the bill brings. The bill strikes from the Clean Water
Act the words "navigable waters" and replaces them with a much more
expansive and exhaustive enumeration of potential water bodies,
including intrastate waters and "activities affecting" said waters.
Additionally, the bill states that Congress derives its power not only
from the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, but the
fullest extent granted by the Constitution.
Pifher described many of the uncertainties that water users would
face should the bill pass in its current version. The expansive language
of the bill makes the line between federal and state jurisdiction unclear.
This may pose a potential barrier for new infrastructure construction
and modifications to historically irrigated agriculture. Additionally, it
would likely create a huge demand for new NPDES permits,
overwhelming the current administrative mechanisms.
Pifher also
addressed the congressional findings enumerated in the bill.
In
particular, the congressional findings seem to suggest that the new law
would assert federal jurisdiction over the entirety of aquatic systems,
including groundwater, ephemeral streams, wetlands draining, source
water, and even bird watching and photography. Pifher mused, "I can
watch a bird in a bird bath, does that federalize my bird bath?" Pifher's
greatest concern is that striking "navigable waters" from the Clean
Water Act will overturn pertinent CWAjurisprudence and assert federal
jurisdiction over areas that state and local laws previously governed.
Pifher ended his discussion of the CWRA positively. He noted that
testimony from himself and other western water users at committee
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hearings have led to a number of legislative compromises. Congress
clarified the ambiguous United States Supreme Court Cases and "waters
of the United States" is defined to the liking of western water interests.
Amendments as a result of this compromise included striking "activities
affecting the waters of the United States" and adopting the current EPA
definition of waters of the United States.
Despite these compromises at the committee hearings, Pifher
recently learned that Congress is currently drafting a new version of the
bill, titled differently and not yet released to the public. This new bill
will maintain a number of the CWA's exemptions, including existing
irrigated cropland and wastewater treatment. It also removes the
controversial phrase "activities affecting." The bill still broadens the
federal jurisdiction, however, by making any newly constructed facilities
subject to federal jurisdiction. Ultimately, Congress is not likely to vote
on the controversial CWRA or variations thereof during such a busy and
important mid-term election year.
The federal government is considering a second potential change
that could affect western water interests. In the final days of the
administration of George H. W. Bush, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) promulgated and adopted a rule exempting water
transfers and trans-basin diversions from the NPDES permit programs,
so long as the water user did was not put to an intervening industrial or
municipal use. However, with the recent change in administrations, the
Executive branch has pushed to reexamine this question. A change
requiring NPDES permits and treatment of trans-basin diversions would
cripple Colorado because of the enormous amount of water transferred
from the Western Slope to the Front Range. The new rule would
require that transferors treat and permit the water, which is practically
and economically untenable. A delegation, including Pifher, from
Colorado met with a task force of high-level officials from the
Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, and the EPAAccording to Pifher, Colorado and western water interests seem well
represented in this task force. There are a number of Coloradoans
currently serving in these agencies and a genuine interest among the
agencies in coming to a logical resolution of the issue. The delegation
made many suggestions, but most importantly requested that the task
force exclude trans-basin diversions and water transfers from point
source regulation. At this time, a change to the rule does not seem
imminent, but interested parties, particularly municipal users, should
monitor the process closely because of the large consequences a change
to this rule may have.
A PERSPECTIVE ON WORKING WITH THE BUREAU OF RECLA2MATION
Robert Johnson, Senior Consultant for Water Consult and HDR
Engineering, and former Commissioner for U. S. Bureau of
Reclamation ("Reclamation"), shared his expertise with the Colorado
Water Congress on how to develop a healthy working relationship with
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Reclamation and explained the best strategies for obtaining
Reclamation funding for local water projects. Johnson opined that the
best way to establish a good and trusting relationship with Reclamation
is to develop relationships with the local staff and management.
Additionally, Reclamation staffers and managers have recently
implemented a Managing for Excellence program (M4E), designed to
build relationships with customers. M4E puts procedures in place to
ensure that the customer is part of scheduling, funding, and other
activities. It establishes formal partnership agreements that guide the
process of developing a project and encourages partnerships with
customers. Johnson cautioned that Reclamation must still maintain its
control over the projects, but emphasized that the formal agreements
provide for a means to appeal local decisions with which the customer is
unhappy.
Finally, Johnson addressed strategies for acquiring funding from
Reclamation for local water projects. Because Reclamation has a
bottom-up budgeting procedure, a stakeholder has the best chance of
acquiring funding by applying directly to the area offices during the
summer. This ensures the project is a part of the budget when it goes
before Congress for approval the following spring. Beyond this local
point, the budgeting process evolves into a macro process and is very
difficult to alter. Secondarily, once the budget leaves the Executive
branch for Congressional approval, there may be an additional
opportunity to acquire funding by petitioning legislators for changes.
Finally, moving projects to a "shovel-ready" point can be a very effective
way of having a project funded when additional money becomes
available, as was the case with the most recent government stimulus
funding or other end of year budget surplus monies. Johnson also
stressed that Reclamation has not fixed or codified rules for project
standards. This can be somewhat frustrating for water managers, but
ultimately this flexibility ensures that Reclamation considers each
project on its own merits.
PLAIN TALK ON FEDERAL WATER QUALITY REGULATION

John Hall of Hall and Associates, addressed upcoming water quality
regulations and policies being promulgated under the Clean Water Act
(CWA), Hall began by noting that as the science behind water quality
regulation becomes more and more complex, crafting simple solutions
in the form of regulations becomes more and more difficult. As a
result, the administrative process has eroded, resulting in policy
declarations promulgated outside of the normal comment and hearing
parameters. These complex, scientific policies pose a great financial
burden to states and water users who have to employ an increasingly
sophisticated and expensive army of staff in order to comply. As a
solution, Hall suggests that stakeholders proffer as much input into
these policy findings as possible to help mitigate possible future costs
associated with compliance. Recent CWA regulations have regulated
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boats, constructions sites, ballast water, and perhaps most
Because
consequentially, pesticide and herbicide application.
agricultural users and application of pesticides and herbicides are so
prolific, Hall hypothesizes that forcing states to issue permits for
application will over-burden the application process. In addition to
these regulations initiated by EPA, environmental groups have used the
administrative process to file rule-making petitions. There are currently
over 150 petitions being considered just involving Endangered Species
Act rules. Water users must provide input at these proceedings to
Perhaps the greatest burden already
represent their interests.
occurring are the impairment standards being imposed on streams.
Once EPA determines that impairment to a stream exists, the EPA will
not approve new operations that discharge into the waters unless the
source is under a compliance schedule. However, this may be nearly
impossible to achieve if most of the pollution in an impaired stream is
the result of non-point sources because regulations do not require nonpoint sources to have compliance schedules making it nearly impossible
to add additional discharges (i.e. grow housing or industry).
Typically, the EPA reaches conclusions about nation-wide
impairment standards by using flawed statistical methods. Recently,
plaintiffs in Pennsylvania won an administrative victory against an unfair
standard by complaining to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) that the nationwide standard would cost upwards of $500
billion. The OMB sided with the plaintiffs and required that the EPA
standards be subject to peer review. The peer review found that the
Hall commented that
impairment standards were inappropriate.
petitioning for peer review can be an effective tool at battling
burdensome regulatory restraints. Notably, the agency has yet to
overturn the contested regulation in Pennsylvania. One final means to
combat these burdensome standards can be petitioning for a variance
from the standards. Often regulatory bodies grant these variances on
extended schedules (sometimes even up to thirty years) if the
municipality or user can show that it is maximizing benefits while
minimizing economic burdens.
PLA~rE RIVER RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM WATER PLAN
UPDATE AND LOOK AHEAD

Jerry Kenny and Beorn Courtney from Platte River Recovery
Implementation Program Executive Director's Office, discussed the
progress being made by the Platte River Recovery Implementation
Program. The purpose of the program is to effectuate an agreement
reached by the three basin states of the Platte River and the Secretary of
the Department of the Interior to maintain stream flows and acquire
lands in an effort to benefit targeted endangered species that inhabit
the basin. Jerry Kenny spoke on the issue of land acquisitions, and
Beorn Courtney addressed the water delivery aspects and progress of
the program. The targeted species of the program are the Whooping
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Crane, the Pallid Sturgeon, and the Piping Plover. The agreement calls
for the acquisition of 10,000 acres of lands for the purposes of habitat
rehabilitation. At this point, the program has acquired nearly 6,000 of
the agreed acres. The office runs the program under an adaptive
management program that allows the program to move forward in a
scientific manner, gathering information to better use the land and
water for better rehabilitation of the endangered species.
In addition to the on-going land acquisitions, the program must
acquire an additional 130-150,000 acre-feet of water to supplement the
current in-stream flows. This quantity increases water flow, aiding the
habitat rehabilitation, and compensating for consumptive water uses
that existed prior to the agreement. In addition to this overall flow
increase, the managers have an immediate duty to ensure that certain
short duration high flows or "pulse flows" travel through the basin
resulting bank full stage for periods of three to -five days at various times
of the year. Because the plan requires managers to implement the
pulse flows on an "as soon as possible" basis, the program has focused
on engineering infrastructure to ensure their implementation.
Economic and hydrologic studies have indicated that the program can
use existing hydro-electric conveyance infrastructure combined with a
new reservoir to stage water in order to send the pulse flows into the
area when necessary at various times of the year. The studies also
indicate that this new reservoir may also help maintain 30,000 acre feet
of the long-term target flows thus accomplishing both goals of pulse'
flows and the long-term target flows all implemented on a schedule that
allows the program to stay within its original budget. The program is
researching additional ways to acquire the remaining flow needed to
achieve the target flows mandated by the agreement, including
efficiency incentives for water owners and the possibility of purchasing
rights.
AT YOUR SERVICE: THE WATER RESOURCES ARCHIVE

Patty Retig from Water Resources Archive ("Archive") at Colorado
State University, discussed the mission of the Archive: to document all
aspects of water in the western United States. The Archive contains
numerous types of documents, including ditch company meeting
minutes, diaries, correspondence, photographs and maps dating back
as far as the 1870s. In addition to documents, there are materials that
catalog various historical water data points, such as groundwater data
from the Eastern Plains of Colorado. Retig emphasized that the
Archive is continually adding to its collection. For instance, the Archive
recently acquired the files from the United States Supreme Court case
Kansas v. Colorado. Currently, the Archive is in the process of
digitizing its records and is welcoming input from the water community.
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. §1031 EXCHANGE OF WATER RIGHTS

Kennen Cohen, Division Manager of Asset Preservation, Inc.,
opened by introducing the concept of "§ 1031 exchanges." Internal
Revenue Code § 1031 provides, in part, that the IRS recognizes no gain
or loss in the exchange of property for other property of a "like kind."
Cohen explained that generally an exchange is not a two party swap. In
fact, most exchanges take place through an intermediary exchange
company. Furthennore, "like kind" property does not have to be
property of exactly the same type. The IRS merely requires, in the
water rights context, that "like kind" property be an interest in real
property, though personal property is also exchangeable. For example,
one could exchange a piece of fanrland for a leasehold interest that is
at least thirty years in duration.
In the water rights context, Colorado and most other states consider
perpetual water rights to be an interest in real property, allowing
owners to exchange them for other real properties. Cohen emphasized
that the water rights must be perpetual or else they will not qualify as
like kind property. Cohen then went on to address whether ditch
company stock is a real property interest. Generally, the IRS does not
consider stock to be real property. However, recent legislation has
removed ditch company stock from the definition of stock, and, at least
in Colorado, owners may exchange ditch company stock under § 1031.
Cohen explained that the typical process involved in a §1031 exchange
is: the seller deeds the property to the buyer, the seller then escrows the
proceeds with ,an exchange company who then distributes the funds to
the seller of the new piece of property. Cohen illustrated the benefits
that §1031 exchanges can have for water rights holders. Recently,
several water rights holders in southern Colorado sold their rights to a
municipality. The sellers escrowed the funds with an exchange
company and then, within the 180-day statutory period, acquired a
number of pieces of property ranging from farmland to apartment
complexes. This resulted in a complete avoidance of capital gains taxes
on the proceeds of these long-held water rights, preserving a great deal
of the sellers' capital and keeping a large amount of funds cycling
through the local community instead of to the federal government.
Aaron O'Quinn
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28TH ANNUAL WATER LAW CONFERENCE

WHOSE SPIGOT IS IT?

San Diego, California

February 17-19, 2010

WATER LAW 103: WATER FEDERALISM: "GET OUT AND PAYUS"

Robert "Bo" Abrams, professor at Florida A&M University College of
Law in Orlando, Florida, started the morning with a discussion of
federalism at the sovereign level focusing on the Constitutional division
.ofauthority and state police power regarding property and resources.
Abrams explored three areas of federalism: (1) pre-twentieth century,
(2) twentieth century, when the balance of power began to shift to the
federal government mid century; and (3) post 1978, when the states
began to regain power.
First, Abrams addressed pre-twentieth century federalism. The
nation changed shape through the Louisiana Purchase and the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and questions arose about how later-formed
states would be treated in regard to natural resources found within their
Once those areas became states, they argued for
boundaries.
recognition of their sovereignty as being the same as existing states.
This policy, known as the equal footing doctrine, ensured that all states
would have a comparable police power over water and other natural
resources. However, in the West, the equal footing doctrine meant that
arid states might still have to adopt riparianism as a matter of federal
law. In Californiq Oregon Power Co., v Beaver Portland Cement Co.,
the Court annouficed the Severance Doctrine, which severed water
rights from federal land grants. Despite the fact that the Doctrine does
not address navigable waters, the courts have treated it as if it did. This
Doctrine led to western states becoming prior appropriation states. The
Severance Doctrine does not change the federal power of navigation
servitudes or of commerce power. The federal government still has the
power to regulate, such as through the Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act.
Next, Abrams examined twentieth century federalism. Since the
New Deal, the Court has construed the interstate commerce power
broadly to support many federal programs. Reclamation and power
generation remained solidly in the federal government's purview.
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Further, during much of the twentieth century, the Court allowed states
to discriminate in favor of their own citizens in regard to natural
resources, and the Court extended the Dormant Commerce Clause to
natural resources.
Finally, Abrams notes that beginning in 1978 with the decision in
California v. United States, the federal reclamation program has had to
adhere closely to state law requirements regarding water regulation and
allocation, curtailing some federal power under interstate commerce
power. Following Sporhase vNebraska in 1982, states could rely on the
Dormant Commerce Clause and could no longer implement anti-water
export statutes because water is an article of commerce that brings it
within the purview of the federal government. Since Sporhase, the only
water hoarding that will survive Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny are
facially even-handed enactments. Abrams also discussed interstate
allocations of shared basins that occur through congressional
apportionments, interstate compacts, or equitable apportionment.
Holly Doremus, professor at Boalt Hall School of Law, University of
Dovetailing with Abrams' presentation,
California, spoke next.
Doremus noted that the main exception to the primacy of state power is
federal reserved water rights. These rights are essentially a wild card in
the state law system that lie dormant until they are needed. Two types
of reserved rights exist: tribal and non-tribal.
Focusing first on tribal rights, Doremus discussed the Winters
doctrine, noting that that priority date of appropriation is the date of
creation of the reservation. She then explained that the measure of the
right is not use, but rather what is necessary to support tribal needs.
Doremus then moved to non-tribal rights, stating that the Winters
doctrine applies to areas such as national forests and national
recreation areas. Discussing US. v. Cappaert,Doremus explained that
when land is reserved for a specific public purpose, water is impliedly
reserved also; the scope of the reservation is only what is needed to
support the purpose, and no more. However, US. v. New Mexico
narrowed Cappaertnoting that federally reserved water can serve only
the core purpose of federal reserved lands. Doremus concluded her
presentation with a discussion of reclamation federalism, observing that
it is a major source of tension between state and federal governments.
DanielleSexton.

CHANGING PARADIGMS AND NATIONAL AGENDAS
Thomas Sansonetti, of Holland & Hart L.L.P. and moderator of the
panel, opened the discussion noting that changes in the presidential
administrations often lead to changes in paradigms for federal agencies.
Mr. Sansonetti noted that while some policies result from lobbying by
interest groups, many policies however stem directly from the
administrations themselves. He pointed out that the Obama
administration has been no different in these regards. To that end, the

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 13

panel proceeded to identify the hallmarks of the Obama
administration's water policies.
Professor Barton Thompson of Stanford Law School then outlined
the basic themes he believes the administration is enacting through the
federal agencies. (1) Principal of Partnership - the Obama
administration seeks to revitalize state and federal partnerships. Mr.
Thompson noted that it remains to be seen whether the agencies will
merely participate in .these partnerships, or whether the agencies will
attempt to influence decisionmaking policies at the state and local
levels. (2) Co-Equal Objectives - a term the Obama administration has
been using to refer -to its attempts to promote environmental and
economic interests. The administration's policy promotes projects that
stress the importance of both interests, particularly where the interests
are not inconsistent with each other.. (3) Ecosystem Services - the
Obama administration is also attempting to incorporate ecosystem
services, the concept that the environment provides services useful and
marketable in our economy, into federal planning and agency
considerations. (4) A Need to Address Climate Change - likely the
most pervasively stated policy, the Obama administration intends for
federal agencies to plan for climate change. Mr. Thompson noted that,
to date, the administration has espoused "no regret" policies, like
increased water storage and reduced consumption, which face little
opposition. However, the degree to which the administration will push
more unpopular, but perhaps necessary for mitigation and adaptation,
(5) Watershed Planning and Ecosystem
strategies is unclear.
Management - The administration is pushing a holistic, basin-wide
approach to managing our water resources. (6) Water Marketing Finally, the last hallmark of the Obama administration's water policy
has been the administration's emphasis on the need for active water
markets.
Lynn Scarlett, Former Deputy Secretary of the Department of the
Interior, next spoke and focused mainly on the challenges which the
She emphasized several new
Obama administration faces.
complications: (1) climate change; (2) federal agency's fragmented
management authority and jurisdiction; (3) non-point source pollution;
(4) aging infrastructure of federal water delivery systems; and (5) the
lack of relevant data. Ms. Scarlett noted that the Obama administration
has actively engaged in trying to solve many of those problems. Ms.
Scarlett then recommended, considering these new complications, that
the administration should focus on several strategies. Chief among
those strategies would be flexible river and reservoir management with
a focus on ecosystem services. As an example, Ms. Scarlett spoke about
floodplain restoration which would reduce the reservoir storage
required for flood management, subsequently increasing the storage
available for water use. Another strategy she emphasized was urban
infrastructure greening, which would both reduce runoff management
infrastructure and also increase groundwater storage in urban
environments. Ms. Scarlett also agreed that water marketing needed to
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be a more prominent strategy in the administrative policy.
Cynthia Koehler, a Senior Consulting Attorney with the
Environmental Defense Fund, then spoke regarding her work on the
California Bay Delta issue. She synthesized four major points from her
experiences working with the federal agencies, which she believed were
indicative of how the Obama administration was influencing federal
agency work. First, Ms. Koehler stressed a renewed effort in the
administration to coordinate federal agencies. Second, the Obama
administration is stressing the importance of partnerships and
collaboration between federal agencies, stakeholders, and the states.
This emphasis on partnership often manifests where federal agencies
can provide either financial assistance or technical assistance. Third,
the Obama administration is directing agencies to focus on concrete
actions, which have broad support. In other words, the administration
is directing the agencies to move forward on projects in which the
interested parties generally agree upon the outcome. Finally, Ms.
Koehler noted that the Obama administration has been avoiding
conflict as a tool for resolving water disputes. Ms. Koehler identified
this policy as a way of pulling the federal agencies out of the "cycle of
conflict." As an example, she noted that in the California Bay Delta
dispute, the invasive species issue is much less controversial than other
problems. Therefore the federal agencies focus on a resolution on
issues that the parties agree upon, instead of only focusing on issues
which the parties cannot yet agree upon. As a final point, Ms. Koehler
noted that in terms of water policy, the Obama administration has been
actively grappling with the water issues; but from a practical perspective,
many of the difficult or attenuated decisions within the Obama water
policy have yet to be addressed.
Ryan McLane

WATER SETT.EMENTS: CAN THEY EVER BE FINAL?

Settlement is the preferred method to resolve disputes, especially
disputes over water, as it is a shared resource. This panel explored the
potential legal and practical challenges that face negotiators in
settlement agreements and the issues that settlement implementers
encounter, and asked the question: can water settlements ever be final?
Settlement negotiations often begin among water right holders
because their adjudication has staggered and the parties want finality or
they realize that a settlement agreement will better address their needs
of water. Typically, in these cases, after years of settlement negotiations,
the final settlement is made public, where it requires legislative action
by an Indian Tribe, the State, or the United States Congress. At this
point, non-parties often become involved.
Sarah Bond, Assistant Attorney General, began her presentation
discussing the necessity of settlements for states who are seeking to
participate in federally funded projects, and for states and tribes who
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are seeking expensive infrastructure for water solutions to reserved
water rights claims. She noted that, in the past, the United States has
been unwilling to fund water projects unless the involved states and
tribes can reach an agreement on the water in the sources.
Bond continued to discuss the history of the Yellowstone River
Compact, an interstate stream compact among Montana, Wyoming, and
North Dakota, which was approved by the United States. The compact
was entered on December 8, 1950, and each state later legislatively
ratified the Compact. Montana and Wyoming had been negotiating
this settlement for almost twenty years before the Compact was signed,
but an agreement always failed because Montana and Wyoming had
different ways for implementing prior appropriation.
The current dispute regarding the Yellowstone River Compact is
about the pre-Compact rights, which the parties left unquantified. The
drought in the early 2000s resulted in Montana believing that its pre1950 rights were not being satisfied, while Wyoming's post-1950 rights
were receiving their water. Montana viewed the Compact as not
allowing Wyoming to take such rights, if Montana was not receiving its
pre-1950 water. However, Wyoming viewed the legislative history and
the lack of specific division of pre-Compact water as indicators that the
pre-1950 water rights were essentially excluded.
Bond concluded by discussing how parties' interpretations of
compacts can chan-ge over time, while the agreements themselves
The United States has supported the
usually remain intact.
development of the nation's water resources and the environmental
consequences of building large federal dams. Because of this, Bond
seems certain that parties will ultimately settle or comply with the
ultimate decisions, whatever they may be.
Melinda Kassen, Director of Trout Unlimited's Western Water
Project, explored the alternative of pursuing settlement rather than
litigation in the context of water rights in the West. Kassen discussed
three projects: the Black Canyon of the Gunnison River Reserved Right,
the Chester Dam Hydropower License, and Montana's Forest Service
Water Rights Compact.
In 1933, President Hoover designated the Black Canyon of the
Gunnison River as a National Monument. In 1999, Congress upgraded
the Black Canyon to a National Park. In 2001, the U.S. filed an
application to quantify and perfect the Black Canyon reserved right.
Based on studies, the National Park Service sought year-round base
flows, an annual spring peak flow and "shoulder flows" to transition
between base and peak. Over 300 parties joined the water court case,
many to object to the application, while some Non-Governmental
Organizations ("NGOs") filed in support.
However, in 2003 the Department of Interior and the State of
Colorado announced that the United States would abandon most of the
reserved right. The NGOs saw this as ignoring the ecological needs of
the Black Canyon, and they asked the water court to stay proceedings to
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allow them time to challenge the agreement. The water court upheld
the stay. In federal court, the NGOs argued that the United States
violated the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), and the
federal court held in their favor, invalidating the agreement. Kassen
felt that federal and state governments usually exclude NGOs from "a
seat at the table." However, by "pulling up a chair," the NGOs were
able to gain the respect of the other parties, and have since been more
included in settlement negotiations.
Regarding the Chester Darn Hydropower License, Kassen noted
that the negotiation was a successful example where the parties talked
about interests rather than their positions, respected each others'
bottom lines, and worked together to find a solution that achieved each
party's goals. Kassen concluded by noting that regardless of whether
NGOs legally have to have a "seat at the table," when parties allow
NGOs to be involved in settlement negotiations, it will affect the
outcome in a meaningful way.
Carl Ullman, Director of the Water Project for the Klamath Tribes
in Oregon, discussed the Klamath Basin Project: He examined the
background of the Klamath Tribes' water rights, the political interests
joined in the struggle of dealing with policy changes, the policy
initiatives that are aimed at resolving some of the Basin's resource
issues, and the challenge of fitting the litigation demands of the
adjudication into the negotiation of policy issues. He noted that most
parties to the Klamath Basin Project are committed to a path to end
litigation and to work on a settlement agreement that will provide new
opportunities for all water-dependent communities in the Klamath
Basin.
Kathlyn Bullis
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: INTERIOR WATER ISSUES: A YEAR OF TRANSITION AND
PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

David J. Hayes, Deputy Secretary of the Interior, reminded the
attendees that lawyers are problem solvers, which is so important in
water issues. Water is integral to what is happening at the Department
of Interior ("Interior"). Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar, has
created, with the President's support, five priorities for Interior that all
include water: (1) Energy and Climate Change; (2) Treasured
Landscapes; (3) Reconnecting Youth to the Outdoors; (4) Repairing
Relationships with the First Americans; and (5) Water.
First, Hayes explained Interior's priority surrounding energy and
climate change. During this administration, there is a refocus on
renewable energy. Currently, solar energy, which uses water in its
production, is prohibited on public lands, but this administration is
moving aggressively toward implementing it. The goal includes
achieving five to ten thousand megawatts of energy on public lands by
the end of 201.1. Interior also wants to increase offshore wind energy
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because it is twenty percent more efficient than onshore wind energy.
During the Bush administration, there had been jurisdictional disputes
that had stalled growth in wind energy. In fact, the governments of all
the Atlantic states are planning to meet very soon to discuss this
possibility. The current administration has placed a huge emphasis on
climate change. Hayes, as the primary Interior manager, has seen the
fire season lengthen, wildfires strengthen, and coastal lines change.
While there was good work during the previous administration, lack of
communication between bureaus slowed progress. A secretarial order
has now created components to enable science centers to work
regionally and with locals in order to implement new science. The
federal government is the catalyst to bring interested parties together,
provide baseline data, and facilitate coordination. For example, the
Bureau of Reclamation will set up eight landscape conservation
cooperatives in the Colorado Basin.
Second, Interior emphasizes the protection and conservation of
treasured landscapes. By returning funding to the Land and Water
Conservation Fund, Interior hopes to restore damaged landscapes.
These sites include water-based ones such as the Colorado River Basin,
Glen Canyon, the Great Lakes, Chesapeake Bay, the Everglades, San
Joaquin Valley, and California Bay Delta.
Third and fourth, Hayes noted that Interior plans to help reconnect
youth to the outdoors by involving young people in water activities.
Next, Hayes discussed repairing relationships with Native Americans by
addressing Indian water rights settlements.
Finally, Hayes examined Interior's opportunities to place more
consistent attention on water challenges. These include the United
States Geological Survey's science component and WaterSMART, a
programmatic effort to improve spending practices.
Hayes ended his lunchtime talk by answering questions from the
attendees.
DanielleSexton
BREAKOUT SESSION IA: FRONTIERS OF SCIENCE

Lynn Bergeson, of Bergeson & Campbell, P.C. and moderator of
the panel, first introduced the topic: the presence of micropollutants
and the water quality effects they have on our drinking water.
Micropollutants are trace measures of chemicals that may include
Ms.
pharmaceuticals, disinfection byproducts, and nanomaterials.
Bergeson noted that much of the current debate centers on which
micropollutants are present in the water, how to identify them, and
then how to communicate those findings to the public. She noted that
while determining the standards or limits on micropollutants is a major
concern, the lack of information regarding these pollutants makes it
hard to identify contamination, and then assess the harm resulting from
the contamination.
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Mae Wu, a Program Attorney with the Natural Resource Defense
Council, then spoke regarding the concerns with micropollutants. She
first noted that humans produce approximately 80,000 to 90,000
different chemicals and that almost all of them make their way into
drinking water supplies. She then noted that less than ten percent of
those chemicals have data on their effects in drinking water. According
to Ms. Wu, the presence of micropoilutants is therefore alarming
because the regulation of chemicals usually occurs when regulators can
show known categories of humans at risk, high concentrations of the
chemical, or knowledge of toxicity. Because limited data exists in
regards to most of these micropollutants, regulation or protection of
our drinking water sources rarely occurs.
Pankaj Parekh, Manger of Water Quality Compliance at Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power, then gave a public water supplier's
perspective of micropollutant contamination. He noted that water
quality regulation may not provide an effective response to
micropollutants. Mr. Parekh noted that federal regulations look at the
maximum contamination levels of chemicals within drinking water.
But, because water suppliers only look at the water contamination, not
other sources of contamination, public exposure to unhealthy levels of
contamination can occur regardless of water quality regulations.
Furthermore determining the maximum contamination levels of every
chemical, in Mr. Parekh's opinion, is not the right approach. Mr.
Parekh noted that public health issues are expressed in the existence of
a particular harm, such as skin cancer, not the existence of an elevated
chemical concentration in the water source. Mr. Parekh therefore
advocates for a more holistic regulatory approach, where the regulators
first identify the public health issues, and then regulations address the
sources of harm.
Next Justin Pritchard, a journalist with the Associated Press,
discussed the recent articles he wrote concerning the existence of trace
chemicals found in the public drinking water supply. He first pointed
out that over 41 million households in America have trace amounts of
pharmaceutical chemicals found in their tap-water. He noted that
much of that pharmaceutical contamination occurs because of the
"toilet-to-tap" drinking water systems that most American cities employ.
Because humans rarely metabolize all the pharmaceutical chemicals
that they ingest, and because municipal water treatment plants don't
remove pharmaceutical chemicals from the effluent or from the water
supply, large portions of the trace pharmaceuticals found in the tap
occur as a result of human waste. He also noted that another large
source of pharmaceutical contamination was the health care industry
itself. The health care industry disposes approximately 250 million
pounds of pharmaceutical drugs into the wastewater system every year.
Mr. Pritchard noted that the government regulates little of this
"pharma-water."
He noted that the FDA needs to consider
environmental impacts resulting from the improper disposal or
prescription drugs during the FDA drug approval process. He argued
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that the FDA should consider environmental impacts of disposed
pharmaceutical waste in order for drugs to get regulatory approval,
particularly because the health effects are basically unknown.
Ryan McLane

BREAKOUr SESSION

IB: CITIES FIRST - WATER FOR MUNICIPAL GROWTH

Christopher H. Meyer, of Givens Pursley LLP in Boise, began his
discussion about Idaho's municipal water law by proclaiming that, while
Idaho was not known for being on the cutting edge of many things, it is
on the cutting edge regarding its regulation of municipal water law.
Mr. Meyer discussed the basic challenges for municipalities within the
prior appropriation framework. He noted that while in most industries
in the United States, speculation is seen as important, but in water law,
speculation is despised. The feeling of many western states regarding
water is "use it or lose it." This, of course, is difficult to reconcile with
the planning that municipalities must take part in regarding their water
supplies. Municipalities need to have leeway when it comes to
gathering the amount of water that they will need in the future. In the
past, the "Great and Growing Cities Doctrine' and the "Growing
Communities Doctrine" have acknowledged this need.
These doctrines are essentially an exception in most states to the
forfeiture rule. In Idaho, rate of flow is the measure, and not the actual
quantity of water. Mr. Meyer noted that this rule was not planned, but
randomly came to be. However, municipalities have been required to
engage in full disclosure and long time planning for their future water
supplies, which results in the municipalities having to quantify their
water rights. In Idaho there are several prohibitions on speculation,
including a prohibition on obtaining future needs if there are
conflicting plans, and the prohibition against the sale of future water
rights.
Idaho learned from Colorado's method for dealing with
municipalities. By doing so, Idaho made it optional for municipalities
to operate under the 1996 Act. In Idaho, there must be an affirmative
step to protect a water portfolio under the 1996 Act. Also, a
municipality must show its entire water portfolio before being allowed
to adjudicate a new water right. Idaho has also expanded the definition
of municipal providers.
John Arum, attorney at Ziontz, Chestnut, Varnell, Berley & Slonim
in Seattle, represents western Washington Indian tribes regarding the
Washington Municipal Water Law of 1993, which is very similar to
Idaho's 1996 Act. The tribes are concerned about the law because they
have rights to harvest salmon, which are substantially affected by the
water levels in the rivers. From the Tribes' perspective, the expansion
of municipal water rights is done at the expense of water rights of
others. The definition of a municipal law provider in the 1993 Act has
resulted in the expansion of what qualifies as a municipality and
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overwrote prior case law on the subject. This definition included
private developers as being municipalities.
Under Washington law, a perfected water right certificate cannot be
perfected based on system capacity, but must be perfected based on
beneficial use. The 1993 Act overrode this law for municipalities. The
1993 law also allowed municipalities to expand their areas of water
service without going through an actual change process. The Tribes see
this as bad because the municipalities have no need to show they are
not injuring other users. They only have to show that the change is
consistent with a land use plan. This has taken a water adjudication
process and turned it into a planning process. Most Tribes and
individuals are left out of such planning procedures. Mr. Arum is
concerned that this law is poorly premised on the fact that water is still
abundant in the state of Washington. However, this is not true, as most
basins are fully appropriated.
Generally Mr. Meyer and Mr. Arum provided two very different
views of municipal water supply planning, however both were able to
agree upon the fact that inevitably in water supply planning, one party
will be harmed, be they municipalities, farmers, Indian Tribes, or the
physical environment. They agreed that there is no perfect answer to
satisfy all parties. However, they were also in agreement that there was
some need for change in both of their states.
Kathlyn Bullis

BREAKOUT SESSION 2A: THE ENERGY- WATER NEXUS
Christopher Ellison, of Ellison, Schneider & Harris, L.L.P. and
moderator of the panel, opened the discussion noting that connections
between energy and water exist in a variety of fashions. As examples, he
noted that nineteen percent of California's electricity use is for water
related purposes, and that in the year 2000 electrical generation
accounted for thirty-none percent of water withdrawals. Mr. Ellison
stated that because of the connection between energy and water uses,
any changes in water use will effect energy use, and vice versa. Because
of this connection, and because of society's expanding need for more
water and more energy, there is a real need to address the interplay
between the sometimes competing uses.
John Merson, the Water for Energy Project Lead for Sandia
National Laboratories, spoke next regarding the technical ties between
energy and water use. Mr. Merson began by discussing the use of water
in generating and producing energy. He first stated that when it comes
to energy production, increased water use is often a tradeoff to
increased or more efficient energy production. As an example, he
spoke about new methods of cooling processes used in electrical
generation plants, which withdraw less water but actually consume more
water. He then talked about the need to develop alternative energy
sources to fossil fuels and how nearly all of the alternative energy
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sources require a comparatively large demand of water compared to
existing fossil fuel production. He referred to oil shale development,
which results in large withdrawals of groundwater in order to access the
oil. Then Mr. Merson pointed out that the connection exists in
reference to producing more water. He noted that our clean fresh
water use meets our existing supply, and that to treat or reuse
additional fresh water we must use additional energy. Because of the
technical connection between our water and energy uses, Mr. Merson
explained that a balance of water use interests must be weighed against
the energy use interests to determine the efficacy of any project.
Furthermore, he notes that because of the connection between the
uses, the future development of either use is constrained, which will
lead to conflicts.
Finally Jim Caldwell, Former Assistant General Manager of
Los
Angeles Department of Water and Power, ended with a case study of the
Los Angeles water and energy demands. Mr. Caldwell's case study
highlights that Los Angeles, which faces considerable water and energy
shortages in the future, can transition energy consumption into
renewable energy sources, and change consumption patterns of water
use to meet its future needs. Mr. Caldwell noted that this case study
shows that these plans are also economically viable. From the energy
side, Mr. Caldwell first outlined the three major renewable energy
sources that Los Angeles should develop: the Tehachapi Wind Resource
Area, the West Mojave Desert for solar energy production, and the
Salton Sea basin for geothermal energy production. Mr. Caldwell notes
that among these areas, Los Angeles could reasonably supply sixty
percent of its electricity demand with renewable energy. This would
result in about an eighty percent carbon-free electricity supply. And as
Mr. Caldwell noted, this is all possible based on current technology. On
the water side, Mr. Caldwell outlined the three major water
conservation measures that Los Angeles should develop: standards for
further reductions of appliance fixture water use, increase drought
tolerant landscaping, increase water recycling measures, and improve
groundwater storage of storm runoff. Mr. Caldwell pointed out that by
implementing these measures, Los Angeles could see a fifty percent
increase in effective water supply. Mr. Caldwell noted that the
proposed energy and water use improvements, if paired together, would
solve both the energy and water problems facing Los Angeles. On the
other hand, Mr. Caldwell warned that attempts to increase water supply
that ignore energy demands, such as using desalinization plants would
result in a' greatly increased energy burden on Los Angeles. Similarly,
energy supply projects that ignore water demands, like nuclear plants,
would result in an increased water burden on Los Angeles.
Ryan McLane
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BREAKOUT SESSION 2B: A LID FOR THE RAINY DAY FUND: STORMS AND
WATER MANAGEMENT

Moderator, Wendy B. Crowther of Clyde, Snow & Sessions in Salt
Lake City, began the panel by explaining how Low Impact
Development ("LID") can create more opportunities for water
conservation.
Frances Spivy-Weber, Vice-Chair and a public member of the
California Water Resources Control Board, had a unique view of LID as
a non-attorney. Spivy-Weber discussed the emergence of LID from the
water supply side. The purpose of LID is to try and use structural and
non-structural means to restore a watershed to what it was before
pavements and houses. LID can include planting trees, laying porous
pavement and separated down spouts, and using that water for a garden
or collecting it in a rain barrel. From a water quality perspective, storm
water has become problematic, as it puts many pollutants into the water
supply. Although the Clean Water Act has created mechanisms for
regulating storm water, LID can be very helpful in this aspect also.
Spivy-Weber closed by noting that for water suppliers, the regulation of
water quality is very important. She proposed that having construction
storm water permits, obtaining data collection on where the waters of
that state travel, and setting targets for recycled water and storm water
collection are important places to start.
Mary Lynn Coffee of Nossman LLP in Irvine, California, next
discussed low impact development from the stand point of water
quality. She discussed the need for EPA guidance in LID, which both
the Natural Resource Defense Council and home builders recommend.
The issue, however is not whether the EPA should provide regulation
on LID, but what the regulatory standard should be. Should the
standard be retention and infiltration, or detention and treatment?
With retention, the water is held and never released, while with
detention, the water is released once it is treated. Ms. Coffee noted that
no matter what, the regulatory standard should mimic the natural water
balance.
Noah Garrison from Natural Resources Defense Council in Santa
Monica, California, discussed the future implications of LID. With the
urbanization of our landscape, it is imperative that porous surfaces are
used in future development. Several states, Pennsylvania, Washington,
D.C., and California already have requirements built in through their
adoption of the Clean Water Act. Naturally, water runoff should be
between zero and twenty percent; however, after urban development
runoff is between eighty and one hundred percent. Garrison also noted
that if water runoff stayed in the same basin, then there would be less
need for pumping water into different basins. Garrison ended by
discussing the importance in California of capturing as much snowpack
melt flows, before it flows to the ocean.
Kathlyn Bullis
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FISSURES IN CONSTUTIONAL BEDROCK

Rick Frank, Executive Director of the Center for Law, Energy & the
Environment at the University of California School of Law and
moderator of the panel, introduced the panel and gave a short
summary of the topic.
Professor John Echeverria from Vermont Law School spoke first
regarding the recent U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
decision in CasitasMunicipal Water District v. United States. In Casitas,
the appellate court held that an Endangered Species Act requirement
that a dam operator pass a portion of the water through a fish ladder
was a physical taking of the water. For background, Mr. Echeverria
summarized that a takings issue occurs when there is a property interest
which has been taken by some kind of government action. Mr.
Echeverria went on to outline the basic doctrines of regulatory takings.
The Supreme Court held that the Penn Central test applies when
evaluating a takings issue. Under this analysis, the court looks to any
economic impacts resulting from the government regulating action,
what degree of interference exists with investments in the regulated
activity, and the character of the government action. The analysis is
deferential to the government regulation. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has held that the per se Lucas takingsrules apply rarely, and only
when the regulation renders private property valueless, or if the
government regulatory action involves a physical occupation. These
rulings make the Casitas case interesting because the appellate court
held the regulation to be a physical taking, which would subject the
regulation to the stricter per se Lucas test. The basis for the appellate
decision was a U.S. Court of Federal Claims case, TulareLake Irrigation
Districtv. United States. In this case the judge ruled that since a certain
amount of water was required to be left in the river, it was a physical
taking and subject to the per se test. Interestingly, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit' distinguished Casitas from cases
applying the Penn Central test and rationalized that the amount of
water required to flow through-the fish ladder was a physical taking.
Mr. Echeverria noted that now Casitas throws into question what
regulations regarding water use are considered takings. He argues that
the Gasitas decision conflicts with Supreme Court precedent on the
matter and that the deferential Penn Central test should apply. Mr.
Echeverria opines that courts will overturn or confine the Casitas
decision.
Next Professor Christine Klein from the University of Florida, Levin
College of Law, gave a presentation regarding the dormant Commerce
Clause. Professor Klein started by outlining the facts behind the most
famous Dormant Commerce Clause decision in the water law realm,
Sporhase v.Nebraska. She then explained that since Sporhase, the
water law practitioners have continued to cite the holding of the case,
"groundwater is an article of commerce," without looking to further
precedent. Professor Klein then recommended that the legal
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community should start looking at the water issue again. In support of
this conclusion, she then pointed to three common misunderstandings
about the Sporhase holding and the dormant Commerce Clause. First,
Sporhase asked and answered the wrong question. In that case the
Court analyzed whether groundwater was an article of commerce.
Instead, the Court should have analyzed whether the state regulation
Whether the
imposed an impermissive burden on commerce.
regulation in question imposes an impermissive burden is the standard
on which other Dormant Commerce Clause cases rest, and that should
be the question when discussing water as well. Second, after Sporhasea
lingering disconnect remains between the Dormant Commerce Clause
and the Commerce Clause. In water issues the Dormant Commerce
Clause has become merely a mantra that water is an article of
commerce. But the Commerce Clause tells us that the regulation of
water and land is a quintessential state function. The result of these two
conflicting holdings evidences a disconnect regarding the permissible
extent of federal or state regulation of water. To overcome this
disconnect, Professor Klein recommends that water attorneys begin
looking for guidance in dicta from cases such as Rapanos. Third,
Professor Klein points out that since Sporhase, water law has not
recognized that not all water is the same. In fact current Dormant
Commerce Clause thinking does not look to whether the water at issue
is surface or groundwater, whether it is water as right or water as a
resource, or what water rights doctrines govern the use of the water.
Professor Klein believes that an analysis of what and how the water is
regulated informs the constitutional analysis better than a blanket rule
on all water.
Charles DuMars of Law and Resource Planning Associates, P.C.,
next spoke regarding the Compact Clause. He noted that the under
the Compact Clause, a fundamental question exists as to what control a
state has of its own resources. As an example of that struggle, he
compared an interstate Commerce Clause case, Sporhase v. Nebraska,
to Kansas v. Colorado, a case which led to an interstate compact. Mr.
DuMars noted that these cases appear irreconcilable. He explained
that the holding in Sporhase amounted to a ruling that under the
Dormant Commerce Clause, states had no control as to the export of
water. Then he noted that under the equitable apportionment
language in Kansasv. Colorado,every state has an absolute right to get a
determination from the Supreme Court.regarding the available water
the state can use. Mr. DuMars noted then that the question is whether
a state can protect its water arguing the allocation of the compact
governs, or does the ruling in Sporhase prohibit a states protection of
its water resources in this fashion? Mr. DuMars then argued that
because Congress must ratify interstate compacts, the compacts convert
into federal law upon ratification. As such, the signatory states may pass

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 13

legislation regarding that allocation of water under the compact
without fear of the Dormant Commerce Clause control. In Mr. DuMars
opinion, this includes reasonable limitations upon the export of water.
Ryan McLane
COMMENTS FROM THE SOLICITOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR,
WASHINGTON, D.C., HILLARYTOMPKINS

Solicitor Tompkins was a stay-at-home mother, who was teaching
part-time in a law school when Ken Salazar offered her a position as the
Solicitor in the U.S. Department of Interior. Tompkins was born in
Zuni, New Mexico on the Navajo Nation Reservation.
However,
Tompkins was adopted by a non-native American family and grew up in
New Jersey. She did not meet her Navajo family until she was fifteen
years old.
Tompkins finds her experience as a child telling in terms of the
impact that the policies of the Department of the Interior have on
peoples' lives. Tompkins noted that her life has been a direct product
of Federal Indian Policy. Federal Indian Policy also allowed her to
receive a great education at excellent schools under the Navajo Nation
Scholarship.
Tompkins started her career representing Pueblo Indians in New
Mexico in water law proceedings. It was then that she gained the
appreciation for water law.
She discussed the need to balance
complexities in the practice of water law including the unpredictability
of mother nature; the unpredictability of the courts; the lengthy process
of adjudicating water rights; the challenge of unadjudicated water
rights; the history of agriculture in the western United States; the
history of Indian water rights; the Endangered Species Act; the Clean
Water Act; and the role of the federal government on interstate rivers.
However, Tompkins offered one unifying message: "Water is the Core
of Our Survival."
Tompkins spoke of her experience in the Department of Interior,
and she praised Ken Salazar as being very enthusiastic, with a vision to
implement change. She discussed several issues the department is
currently addressing, including impacts of climate change, adaptive
management, ecosystem restoration, and new energy projects. She
stated that the department and the Solicitor's Office are working to
become more engaged across disciplines.
Overall, Tompkins' message was that things are changing at the
federal level, and she extended an invitation to everyone to work
together to find opportunities to ensure the availability of our natural
resources for future generations
Kathlyn Bullis
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DROUGHT DOWN UNDER: AUSTRALIA'S MURRAY-DARLING BASIN

Eric Garner, partner at Best Best & Krieger LLP in Riverside,
California, moderated the panel and introduced the speakers.
Jennifer McKay, Professor of Business Law for the School of
Commerce at University of South Australia, discussed transitions toward
sustainability in water management in Australia. She provided an
overview by explaining the basin and locations of the Great Artesian
Basin and the Murray-Darling Basin. Offering some background about
Australia, she noted that the country has transitioned into a more
However, the Australian federal
environmentally friendly nation.
government has no power in its constitution over water, thus it is
difficult to pass current laws for sustainability.
McKay next explored the five phases of the evolution of Australian
water law. The first phase from 1788 to 1901 was marked by colonial
power over water, and it did not focus on sustainability or aboriginal
rights. This left a legacy of damaged environments in many areas. The
second phase began in 1901 with the Australian Federation. States
created administrative allocation systems for surface and groundwater,
which repealed the previous riparian doctrine. However, Australians
expected to discover an inland sea, which resulted in misguided laws.
The third phase began in the early 1980s with enhanced federal power.
An increase in community involvement also appeared. The fourth
phase, lasting from 1994 to 2007, focused on federal reforms that
introduced the Ecologically Sustainable Development requirements and
competition into water suppliers. This era also separated land from
water to create water markets. The government also enhanced regional
delivery methods and provided stricter guidelines to the state for
reinforcing the reforms. The fifth phase, commencing in 2007,
included expanded federal constitutional powers through judicial
interpretations. The "Water Act 2007" required adoption of state "water
plans" in the Murray-Darling Basin. Further, the federal government
gave funding directly to regional bodies who agreed to regional delivery
of federal initiatives. McKay concluded by recognizing hurdles to a
sustainable water future including legal, institutional, and capacity
challenges.
The second speaker, Scott Slater from Brownstein Hyatt Farber
Schreck in Santa Barbara, California, works with private equity investors
in Australia. Australia has looked to California for idea in water
management. Australia decided to manage water on sustainability
ideas, create water markets, and institute water rights training as part of
sustainability. In fact, Australia has successfully embraced sustainability
management and tried to keep the issue out of the courts. The country
has also created a position for the federal government in water
management, and is working to integrate common and modern law.
Slater noted that the United States can take lessons from Australia.
He recommends a national water policy, rather than the federal
government just deferring to the states. He also suggests the adoption
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of uniform standards to help manage water, as well as the creation of a
standard to guide states in sustainability and tradable property rights in
water.
The session ended with a question and answer component. The
speakers answered a question by stating that severing water from the
land is a means to aid in transferability. Another question revealed that
the plan in the Murray-Darling Basin focuses on environmental values
and requires state to preserve the environment. The next question
asked if forces in California are crystallizing into similarities with
Aust-alian reform; the answer was yes and to look to the California Bay
Delta.
DanielleSexton

COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY WATER RESOURCES
ARCHIVE, WATER TABLES 2010, ACROSS STATE LINES:
SHARING THE RESOURCE

Fort Collins, Colorado

February 20, 2010

On February 27, 2010, Colorado State University Water Resources
Archive held its annual Water Tables fundraiser. As background, the
Water Resources Archive is a joint partnership between the Colorado
State University Libraries, and the Colorado Water Institute. One of
only two water archives in the United States, the Water Resources
Archives collects primary documents and materials relating to water
development and water history in Colorado and in the western United
States. Their collection covers many aspects of water use in Colorado
including legislative documents, maps, and even engineering
documents.
The Water Resources Archive holds its annual Water Tables events
to fundraise for the continued protection and expansion of the archives
collection. The Water Tables 2010 event, titled Across State Lines:
Sharing the Resource, brought approximately 170 guests to the event
and raised about $45,000 for the Archive. The event ended with
nineteen tables of water practitioners enjoying a dinner and discussing
current water issues. In accord with this year's theme, the general
topics of discussion at all the tables related to interstate water use.
At each of the .19 Tables, a table Host led a discussion relating to
interstate water use. Some examples of the topics discussed at the
event:
* Don Ament, Former. Colorado Commissioner
of
Agriculture, hosted Is Ag Dry-Up Inevitable?
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*

Alan Berryman, Assistant General Manager, Engineering
Division, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District,
hosted Interstate Comityls for the Birds.
" Tom Iseman, Program Director for Water Policy and
Implementation, Western Governors Association, hosted
How Far Has Multi-State Water Management Gotten Us?
Where Wll It Lead Us?
* Harry LaBonde, Jr., Wyoming Deputy State Engineer,
hosted The Green River Pipeline Regional Watershed
Supply Project- Perspectives-fiom Wyoming
" David Robbins, President and Co-founder, Hill & Robbins,
P.C., hosted Why We Have to Share - Limits on Our Right
to Consume.
Also the Archives solicited sponsorship of about 30 graduate
students who were able to join the Water Tables 2010. These students
were able to discuss the important water issues facing the state of
Colorado and the West, and learn from the hosts and practitioners at
the event. Thus even in when fundraising, the Archives was educating
the next generation of water users about the past. Following is a
synopsis of the discussion held at Mr. LaBonde's table.
Ryan McLane
HARRY LABONDE,JR., WYOMING DEPUTY STATE ENGINEER

Topic: The Green River Pipeline Regional Watershed Supply Project
Perspectives from Wyoming
Mr. LaBonde, Jr., led the discussion regarding the Green River
Pipeline Project, which the Million Conservation Resource Group
("MCRG") is currently planning. MCRG is planning to pipe water from
the Flaming Gorge Reservoir, across the southern boundary of
Wyoming and then south along the front range of Colorado down to
Pueblo. So far the MCRG has filed one of two applications regarding
this project in Wyoming. One application, having a priority date of
December 28, 2007, was for 400 cubic feet per second of direct flow
right. MCRG's application lists the water will be used for municipal,
industrial, irrigation, and domestic uses throughout the State of
Colorado. The other application, filed by Pioneer Canal Lake Hattie
Irrigation District ("PCLHID") was for 40 cubic feet per second of
supplemental supply. The uses that the District listed for the
application include irrigation, power, industrial, municipal, domestic,
and fish propagation.
LaBonde discussed several concerns for Wyoming regarding this
project. One major concern for Wyoming is the impacts to in-state
fisheries and to downstream endangered species. Another concern is
whether the pipeline could transport invasive species across watersheds.
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Other important questions that must be answered include whether
Colorado has a right to use this water, and whether there is a real need
for this water in Colorado. Because the water will be piped from the
Flaming Gorge Reservoir in southwestern Wyoming, the effect on
recreation in the Flaming Gorge is also an important issue.
LaBonde noted that Wyoming must consider whether this project
will impact Wyoming's ability to develop its remaining allocation of
Colorado River water. Also, it must weigh what benefits Wyoming will
receive from the project. While MCRG's pipeline remains a project in
the distant future, Mr. LaBonde noted that there is a possibility that it
could go forward, and it is not entirely a pipe dream.
Kathlyn Buflis

COLORADO CLEANTECH INDUSTRYASSOCIATION

ADVANCED WATER MANAGEMENT:
USING CLFANTECH TO MANAGE SCARE RESOURCES

Denver, Colorado

February 25, 2010

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, water technology has quickly risen to become a
major focus of innovation and commercialization. On a global scale,
there is an approaching water crisis as world populations rise while the
amount of safe drinking water decreases. The United Nations estimates
that by 2025, two-thirds of the world will experience some form of water
scarcity. This conference discussed the kinds of water management
innovations and technologies that have evolved to combat this
impending problem. Shelley Curtiss, Communications Director at
Colorado Cleantech Industry Association (CCIA) in Denver, Colorado
opened the conference and welcomed the audience and participants
KEYNOTE PRESENTATION: SMARTER WATER MANAGEMENT

Cameron J. Brooks, Ph.D., Director of Solutions and Business
Development at IBM Big Green Innovations, was the keynote speaker.
Mr. Brooks explained that many factors in recent years, such as
increased agriculture, climate change, and an aging infrastructure, have
required us to develop a better overall system of watershed
management. Currently, Mr. Brooks explained, up to 45% of water is
lost worldwide because of faulty or inefficient delivery systems.

Issue 2

CONFERENCEREPORTS

.495

However, according to Mr. Brooks, we can alleviate or even solve this
problem through the implementation of "smart grid technology," a
better overall system that predicts problems and finds solutions in
advance, rather than reacting to problems after they occur. In past
years, IBM developed smart grid technology for electricity management.
Smart grid technology increases the connectivity, coordination, and
automation between electricity suppliers, consumers, and overall
networks that are involved in long distance electricity transmission.
Now, IBM is developing this concept in the realm of water
management.
IBM accomplishes this newer system of water management by
collecting massive amount of data through a combination of
information gathering technology and analytic devices and tools.
Collecting more water data overall has allowed IBM to optimize future
events and in general get a better idea of how much water areas have on
a natural scale (overall water mass), a utility scale (overall water quality),
and an enterprise scale (overall water usage and management). The
result from this data is a variety of water technologies that manage water
in a predictive, rather than a reactive, outlook.
IBM has already implemented many of these technologies in various
parts of the world, all with positive results. These technologies include
developments in sensor and intelligence networks for water utilities,
smart water meters, and a new technology for water filtration. In
Galway Bay, Ireland, Brooks and IBM have been collecting data related
to water quality, aquaculture, chemical content, wave energy, and tidal
movement, and have been using that data to help the local fishermen
manage shellfish crops and to help the local governments regulate the
water supply. In the Netherlands, IBM has implemented new water
monitoring systems, helping the Dutch to monitor flooding and, thus,
exert better control of their levees. In Israel, the company has
employed water methodology to address water changes systematically
and to better adapt to drought. Mr. Brooks also discussed new kinds of
IBM-developed nanotechnology that can extract significant amounts of
salt from water, rendering it potable for human consumption. With
innovations like these, IBM will no doubt play a large role in the globe's
complicated water condition.
OPPORTUNITIES IN THE WATER MARKET: PANEL DISCUSSION

Opportunities in the water market are growing rapidly. The water
market is already enormous and expanding, and is involved in a crisis
that requires innovation and efficiency. Because of this problem and its
close connection with energy usage, the water market will demand a
variety of new technological approaches. CCIA invited four expert
panelists to discuss how they are providing creative and sustainable
solutions to water supply, treatment, and management challenges. The
panelists included Robin Newmark, Principal Program Manager of
Planning and Program Development at National Renewable Energy
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Laboratory (NREL); Roger Austin, National Vice President and
Global; Forbes Guthrie,
Managing Consulting Director of MWI
Director of Stewart Environmental Consultants, Inc. (SEC); and Jeffrey
Popiel, President and CEO of Geotech Environmental Equipment.
Robin Newmark started the panel and discussed NREL's growth of
generation and cooling technologies that combine water and energy
management. By developing a variety of biofuel, geothermal, solar, and
wind energy technologies, NREL hopes to expand the types of energy
innovations used to actually manage water supplies.
Roger Austin spoke next, describing how MWH Global provides
comprehensive consulting management, engineering and technical
services, and construction management services to Colorado and other
places around the country. These innovations will only become more
important as water resources diminish because "out west, whiskey is for
a'drinking, and water is for a'fighting." While a humorous quote, it
also holds a fair amount of truth: water is quickly becoming a valuable
commodity in Colorado and the western United States, and the next
hundred years of water management will most likely be different from
the last hundred years of water management.
Forbes Guthrie represented SEC and described various innovations
.inthe future of water storage and treatment. This included the
promising BIG 2 solution project, in which SEC was using certain species
of waste-extracting algae to treat and purify water rather than
employing the standard, energy-wasting devices commonly utilized.
Finally, Jeffrey Popiel discussed Geotech's role in the water
technology marketplace, specifically in the development of new
technology in the areas of groundwater sampling and analysis. Showing
how these innovations aid in data collection and analysis to help
manage water consumption, Geotech provides environmental
equipment to those who are interested in managing water efficiently.
Itis difficult to summarize the many ideas and viewpoints at this
conference concisely, but the role of "smart" water management came
up frequently. The theme of the discussions suggested that the world
around us is changing at a rapid rate, and we must use our new
technologies to adapt to these changes and wisely manage the water
that we have.
Ethan Ice
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WATER LAW REVIEW 2010 SYMPOSIUM: WATER LAW AND
CLIMATE CHANGE, PLANNING IN AN UNCERTAIN
FUTURE

Denver, Colorado

April 9, 2010

PROJECTED CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OURWATER RESOURCES

Brad Udall is the director of Western Water Assessment at the
University of Colorado - National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. Mr. Udall's work focuses on global climate change's
impact on water supplies, particularly in the western part of the United
States. He holds a Bachelor of Science from Stanford University and
Masters of Business Administration from Colorado State Un iversity..
Mr. Udall's presentation focused on four main issues related to the
connection between global climate change and the water supply system.
First, Mr. Udall stated the science of climate change is unequivocal, and
we have already experienced the effects of global warming. Second,
climate change will seriously impact global and national water supplies.
Third, hydrologic effects will stress water supply mechanisms and lead
-to conflicts. Fourth, climate change will seriously impact the Colorado
River Basin and create unique challenges for water users. Altogether,
global climate change has seriously affected water resources and will
only continue to stress limited water supplies.
Currently, the debate regarding climate change still focuses on
whether climate change will actually occur and what the effects will be.
Although the debate rages on, it is clear that ninety percent of climate
models agree that we will experience substantial warming before the
end of the century. Scientists have studied global warming since the
late nineteenth century and have detected warming trends over the last
three decades. While there is some dispute regarding the range of
effects, the evidence demonstrates that man-made greenhouse gasses
have contributed to a one degree rise in the twentieth century, and we
have already "locked in" a two to three degree rise by 2030. At current
emissions levels, man-made carbon emissions will directly or indirectly
heat the earth six to eleven degrees by the end of the century. While
doubling the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere accounts for
two degrees of this change, the cumulative impacts, especially increased
moisture in the atmosphere, exacerbates the problem. Uncertainty in
the science does not excuse policy makers from making tough decisions
regarding climate change that require delicate interest balancing.
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As climate change continues to occur, water temperatures will rise,
precipitation patterns will change, ocean heat content will increase,
atmospheric moisture content will increase, and arctic sea ice levels will
decrease. Higher overall air temperature increases water temperature,
which affects aquatic wildlife habitat and increases evaporation.
Increased water temperatures decrease dissolved oxygen content and
increase pathogen concentration, thereby making water unable to
support wildlife and unsuitable for human contact. Climate change will
also extend the growing season. As air and water temperatures rise,
storm patterns will shift north in the northern hemisphere and change
the locus of precipitation. Storms will also tend to be downpours,
substantially increasing erosion and accelerate runoff. Further, glaciers
and arctic sea ice will melt and increase sea levels.
These changes will affect the water sector substantially. Overall,
climate change will influence the water cycle by shifting the locus,
timing, and duration of precipitation, beginning in lower elevations. In
general, precipitation events will become more concentrated and
severe. There will be less summer rainfall and runoff will begin sooner
and occur more quickly. In arid areas, droughts will occur more
frequently and persist longer. In moist areas, precipitation will increase
and become more violent. Consequently, dry areas will experience
more conflict over water supplies and wet areas will struggle to
assimilate increased precipitation. These conflicts will be particularly
apparent where large populations in arid places already stress water
supply and control systems.
Climate change will substantially, if not ironically, impact energy
production. Thermoelectric energy is the largest non-consumptive use
of water in the West, where climate change will impair water supplies.
Thermoelectric energy production is also a leading source of
greenhouse gas emissions. Not only will climate change decrease water
supplies for energy creation, but also higher water temperatures will
reduce power generation in fossil-fuel fired and nuclear power plants.
The Colorado River Basin will experience the effects common to
arid climates, including increased incidence of drought. The basin is
already over-appropriated, and significant decreases in water quantity
will intensify conflicts. Indeed, the basin has already experienced the
primary adverse effects: drought, large fluctuations in storage, and
decreased flow. Climatologists agree that if the current pattern persists,
the basin will experience a five to forty-five percent decrease in water
quantity, with lower elevations bearing the brunt of these impacts.
Ultimately, the Colorado River Basin may see severe impacts such as
persistent drought and reservoir drying.
In conclusion, the uncertainty regarding the potential impacts from
climate change does not dismiss policy makers' obligations to address
the certainty of climate change. Globally, the polarizing effects of
climate change will be a calamity. Dry areas will become drier, wet areas
will become wetter. Precipitation will move further north and become

Issue 2

CONFERENCEREPORTS

more difficult to manage. Water short areas, such as the Colorado River
Basin, will face conflict and uncertainty over water supplies. If Congress
and the global community fail to address the issues, water systems will
no longer function sufficiently to meet the demands of a growing
population.
Daniel Vedra
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND WATER EXPORT: OPEN FOR
BusINESS OR SUCKERS BEWARE?

Professor Christine A. Klein of the University of Florida Levine
College of Law began by discussing the water regulation challenges
currently facing states. States have a greater interest in importing water
rather than in exporting water, particularly with the increasing stresses
on water resources. Professor Klein noted that many people are
sensitive to water exportation. As an example, she referenced a
billboard depicting people from around the country with straws into the
Great Lakes water supply. Professor Klein then addressed whether
states should have the ability to restrict water export.
As background, Professor Klein discussed Sporhase v. Nebraska,458
U.S. 941 (1982). In Sporhase, a landowner, who owned property in
both Colorado and Nebraska, wanted to irrigate the Colorado property
with Nebraska water. The state of Nebraska brought action under a
Nebraska statute to enjoin the landowner from using the water in this
manner. The United States Supreme Court struck down the Nebraska
statute, finding it violated the Commerce Clause. Thus, the Court held
that a ban on exporting water across state lines is unconstitutional.
Professor Klein thought the question the Court asked in Sporhase
of whether water is an article, of commerce was the wrong question.
Instead, she said that the Court should have asked whether the export
of water has an effect on interstate commerce. As a result of asking the
incorrect question, Sporhase overrode state water law. Following
Sporhase, courts struck down various state and federal regulations
preserving the states' regulations of water law. However, the Court
started recognizing congressional limits on the Commerce Clause in
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), thus slowly giving states
more regulatory authority.
In terms of reform, Professor Klein suggested that states, the federal
government, and individuals consider water along a continuum instead
of a "one size fits all" article of commerce. She argued that courts need
to evaluate whether the actions or regulations in a specific context or
case interfere with interstate commerce. To show the complexity of
water law issues, Professor Klein provided a categorical listing of
different water classifications and possible applicable doctrines. As
such, Professor Klein advocated for a more nuanced analysis of water
export cases.
Professor Klein perceived that the courts are diminishing the
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regulatory void of both the Dormant Commerce Clause and the
affirmative Commerce Clause. In support, Professor Klein cited both
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), in which the Court upheld a
federal regulation on marijuana, and GDF v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286
(2005), in which the Court upheld federal regulations protecting cave
insects. In addition, Professor Klein detected signs of increasing
tolerance for state water export regulations. In support of this notion,
Professor Klein cited UnitedHaulers v. Oneider-HerkimerSolid Waste,
550 U.S. 330 (2007). United Haulersdealt with the state of New York
requiring all waste to go through one facility. The Court upheld the
state regulation despite the holding being in direct contrast to
Sporhase The majority of the justices supported the decision and
distinguished United Haulers from Sporhase on the facts. Justice
Thomas, in his concurrence, discussed the Lockner freedom of contract
era, how the Court then adjusted precedent, and finally dismissed the
idea. Justice Thomas suggested that the Court might follow the
reasoning of United Haulers and eventually reject the Dormant
Commerce Clause.
Professor Klein concluded that expansion of regulations shows an
increased tolerance for the state regulation of water resources. As
climate change becomes a greater concern, however, the Court may
again strike down state regulations on water export.
Serena Hendon
THE SECURE WATER ACT: FIRST YEAR PROGRAMS AND IMPLEMENTATION

Melinda Kassen, Esq,, Managing Director of the Western Water
Project at Trout Unlimited, discussed the SECURE Water Act
("SECURE"), its new formulation as the WaterSMART Program, and
the effects the legislation will have on the practices of the Bureau of
Reclamation (Reclamation) in relation to climate change and potential
long-term drought.
Senator Jeff Bingaman of New Mexico introduced SECURE, and
Congress approved the legislation as part of the Omnibus Public Land
Management Act in March of 2009. The Department of the Interior
announced a departmental reorganization in February 2010 and placed
many of the important elements of the SECURE legislation under the
new WaterSMART program.
Kassen noted, however, that the
reorganization has not affected the important legislative goals
established in SECURE. Most importantly, the department is now
required to give credence to the importance of looking at the
environmental impact in areas where Reclamation is active, in addition
to the traditional concerns of the department such as the rights of water
users and addressing potential water shortages.
According to Kassen, SECURE, now WaterSMART, provides
Reclamation with additional authority and requires the agency to face
the potential impacts of climate change on eight different river basins.
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Reclamation facilities are present in the eight basins: the Colorado, the
Columbia, the Klarnath, the Missouri, the Rio Grande, the Sacramento,
the San Joaquin, and the Truckee Rivers.
The legislation provides a multi-step process for Reclamation to use
in addressing potential climate change impacts in the identified basins.
These steps include analyzing climate change impacts in the basins,
developing strategies to mitigate the identified impacts, conducting
feasibility studies on the proposed strategies, and finally, making grants
to implement strategies that will help to prevent water crises related to
climate change. These grants are limited in their application, and the
basins will utilize them to conserve water for municipal, industrial,
recreational, and ecological resilience purposes.
Reclamation is*currently conducting a study of the Colorado,
Yakima, and St. Marys-Milk Rivers because of new legislation and goals
Reclamation put into place prior to Congress passing the legislation.
Reclamation made the decisions based on a competitive process, and $3
million have been designated for the basin studies to date. In March
2010, Reclamation announced that it was accepting proposals for
another round of studies to continue the work outlined in
WaterSMART.
Kassen first discussed the Yakima basin study and explained that the
work group participating in the study consists of government entities,
water users, and a conservation NGO working to reach an agreement
on the allocation of the available resources in the basin. The challenge,
she conceded, will be to reconcile the needs of the senior water rights
holders who are farming traditional crops, with the needs of junior
rights holders who have established high-value orchard crops. In
addition, the group must take into consideration the needs of the
NGO, as outlined in the WaterSMART program.
Next, Kassen discussed the study underway in the Colorado River
basin. Kassen approved of the study, but noted her concern that
Reclamation has not invited the conservation NGOs and water user
groups to the discussion. Instead, Reclamation is dealing strictly with
the seven basin states , and the plan for the study indicates that it will
include a public comment period. The study's discussion surrounding
the Colorado basin includes dealing with decreasing flows in the river
due to climate change and the inevitable increase of population
throughout the southwest United States. Kassen analogized that all of
the parties interested in water rights within the basin see those rights as
currency, however, each party views its currency as something
completely different from the other parties at the table; therefore, there
is little room for exchange between parties because there is no common
currency. However, Kassen noted that the state's willingness to sit down
with Reclamation is an important first step in what is sure to be a long
process.
Kassen concluded saying that Reclamation's demonstrated
willingness to "grapple" with the effects of climate change is
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encouraging.
With further implementation of the SECURE Act,
encompassed in the WaterSMART program, positive steps in this area
are likely.
Matt Brodahl

WATER LAW AND ETHICS

Amy Beatie, Director of the Colorado Water Trust, presented on
current ethical issues concerning water law practitioners' appellate
practice. Specifically, Beatie discussed ethical issues arising when
practitioners decide whether to appeal, issues when prosecuting an
appeal, and issues regarding conflicts of interest.
First, Beatie addressed the ethical issues in a practitioner's decision
to appeal. Initially, she explained that because attorneys draft their fee
agreements, clients enjoy judicial deference for unclear or ambiguous
fee language. Accordingly, attorneys should ensure fee agreements
include clear language authorizing them to appeal on behalf of the
client and describe any fee adjustments for appeals. Colorado Rules of
Professional Conduct ("CRPC") 1.2(a) and 1.4(a) (2) instruct attorneys
to consult with the client about potential legal strategies, including the
decision to appeal.
Next, Beatie discussed the requirement that sufficient grounds for
an appeal must exist. An attorney's signature certifies that a pleading
has legal and factual merit. Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1
precludes filing an appeal that has no merit or asserting a frivolous
claim. Filing an appeal merely because an insistent client desires one
does not excuse CRPC 3.1 if no legal or factual basis supports the
appeal. All Colorado lawyers or lawyers practicing in Colorado are
subject to the jurisdiction of the CRPC. Consequences of filing a
frivolous appeal include court sanctions or even civil prosecution for
unauthorized practice of law.
Additionally, when a practitioner decides to appeal, he or she must
be competent. Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 requires
Colorado attorneys to demonstrate competent skill, thoroughness, and
preparation. If an attorney has no appellate experience but still
chooses to appeal, the rule requires the attorney to commit to
competent on-the-job training, turn the case over to a competent
appellate attorney, or associate with a more experienced attorney. To
ensure competent representation, Beatie advised attorneys maintain
keen interest in an appeal even after adding an experienced associate to
the appellate team.
If an attorney decides not to appeal, CRPC 1.16 requires notice to
clients to allow time to seek new representation for an appeal. Beatie
stressed that an untimely notice of appeal is an egregious mistake.
Attorneys should file notice of appeal on behalf of their client then
withdraw from representation. This way, the attorney communicates
the withdrawal to the court while preserving the client's right to appeal
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with another attorney. Finally, attorneys who are planning to withdraw
should not express any legal opinions about a potential appeal.
Second, Beatie addressed the ethical issues in a practitioner's
prosecution of an appeal. She implored attorneys to designate the
entire case record on appeal. An attorney who selectively picks
favorable sections of the record can potentially invoke candor
violations.
Candor violations include an attorney concealing or
omitting material facts or legal authority, and using out-of-context
quotations of case authority. Beatie warned that quotations riddled
with ellipses are a red flag for out-of-context candor violations. Water
attorneys must disclose all applicable administrative and municipal legal
authority to the tribunal, even directly adverse authorities. The
standard of review for failure to disclose relevant law is a "knowing" one.
For example, an attorney who includes a directly adverse law in a
previous case brief "knows" of the adverse law and cannot omit
disclosing that law to the tribunal in future case briefs if the adverse law
applies. Attorneys who fail to disclose adverse authority at the first
opportunity violate the candor rule. Beatie beseeched attorneys to
comply with candor rules to help build a reputation of honesty and
trust with judges and their clerks.
Further, Beatie advised caution when criticizing water courts' or
lower courts' decisions in appellant briefs. In addition to prohibiting
lawyers from including statements known to be false, CRPC 8.2 also
prevents reckless disregard as to truth or falsity concerning the integrity
of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer. Lawyers should
carefully craft appellant briefs critical of lower court decisions to avoid
offending water referees and water judges. Such an approach follows
the respect to legal officers CRPC 8.2 requires. Beatie noted that
following this rule may also pay dividends on remand should the case
return to the same lower court.
Finally, Beatie concluded by examining the potential conflicts of
interest in appellate proceedings. Positional conflicts occur when
common clients vie against concurrent conflicts of interest and can be a
common problem in water law. Beatie noted the example of a
Colorado Water Conservation Board-appeal that ended with common
clients fighting over rights in a resulting substitute water plan. In that
case, although the clients were collectively successful, ethical conflicts
arose when representation of one client became directly adverse to all
other clients claiming common portions of the same substitute water
distribution plan. Comments to CRPC 1.7 guide the issue of positional
conflict, providing four factors attorneys should follow when weighing
client loyalties against potential conflicts of interest: (1) clearly identify
the client or clients; (2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists;
(3) decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite the
existence of a conflict, and (4) if so, consult with the clients. Attorneyclient loyalties can complicate these conflicts, pushing clients to retain
their attorney even when conflicts exist. The factors of CRPC 1.7
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acknowledge the complexity of attorney-client relationships by
including the client's reasonable expectations as a consideration, but
positional conflicts may require an attorney to seek informed consent of
the conflicting clients, or even to withdraw if unable to balance
competing conflicts among common clients.
John McKee
QUALIT OF LIFE DECISION MAKING; PLANNING UNCERTAINTIES AND

LEGAL OBSTACLES PERSPECTIVE FROM DENVER WATER

Casey Funk, in-house counsel for the Denver Board of Water
Commissioners (the "Board"), and Marc Waage, Manager of Water
Resource Planning at the Denver Water Department ("Denver Water"),
discussed the Anti-Speculation Doctrine as a legal obstacle to planning
for future water uncertainties, including those uncertainties associated
with climate change.
The Board, composed of five members, is the primary decision
maker at Denver Water. The mayor appoints the members of the nonpolitical Board. It makes all policy decisions, including to whom to
serve water and how to serve that water. In 2006, the Board adopted a
new policy to plan for uncertainties, in part because of the worst
drought in recorded history in 2002.
Denver Water emphasizes efficiency, including conservation and
water reuse, Denver Water utilizes many conservation methods: (1)
education and outreach; (2) diagnostics, including audits and
monitoring habits; (3) rebates and incentives; (4) rules; (5) research,
monitoring, and evaluation; and (6) tiered rates, for example if one
uses more water, that user pays more per unit. One important policy
issue the Board must decide is what uncertainties to plan for and how to
plan for those uncertainties. Some examples include variations from
pine beetle kill, potential wild fires, and climate change.
Mr. Waage noted the planning method of the Traditional Future
method; future water use is extrapolated from past trends, without
anticipating any major changes. Denver Water, however, plots a cone
of uncertainty to plan for a range of solutions in different situations.
This cone allows Denver Water to prepare for a wide range of
uncertainty, and best suites planning for climate change. Scientists
predict that climate change will cause more frequent and severe
droughts. However, since Denver Water does not know what is going to
happen, it prefers a range of solutions, instead of waiting for scientists
to figure out the exact future.
As discussed above, Denver Water takes significant steps to increase
efficiency, but efficiencies alone will not solve all the possible problems
associated with climate change. Casey Funk proposes that laws should
permit Denver Water to save water to provide options for the future.
However, saving water violates the Anti-Speculation Doctrine because a
water user needs a vested interest and a specific plan. The can and will
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statute does not currently permit water saving without the capability of
putting that water to beneficial use in a reasonable amount of time.
The courts have interpreted these doctrines to ensure that applicants
will be able to actually use the water.
Casey Funk argued that these principles are misplaced and should
not apply to government agencies trying to plan for the future of its
constituency. Mr. Funk detailed the history of these principles. A few
private citizens tried to obtain all the remaining water rights in
Colorado. However, they did not have a specific plan of how to use that
water, but instead wanted the rights for future investments. The courts
would not allow this attempted water purchase because individuals
should not obtain water rights while only speculating as to that water's
use.
Nevertheless, Mr. Funk argued that a government agency planning
for climate change is significantly different from those private citizens.
Scientists know that climate change is going to happen and that there
will be changes to the water supply, even though these scientists cannot
predict the specific changes. Mr. Funk argues that the law should allow
Denver Water to account for water reserves to plan for when those
changes eventually occur. Courts should give government agencies
some deference for strategic planning.
The current law treats government agencies like every other water
applicant. Mr. Funk thinks this approach is incorrect. Because
governments are inherently different, they should have some ability or
leeway to plan for uncertainties. A study of the legislative history of the
Anti-Speculation Doctrine shows that the courts were concerned with a
monetary speculation scheme, and not government agencies planning
for the future needs of their constituencies. Courts should give some
deference to the government that must supply water to its citizens.
Shannon L. Carson
WATER LAW AND CLIMATE CHANGE, STRATEGIS FO ADAPTATION AND

MITIGATION

Professor A. Dan Tarlock of Chicago-Kent School of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology gave the keynote address at the 2010 University
of Denver Water Law Review Symposium. Professor Tarlock discussed
the different ways water managers could adapt to the challenges
brought on by global climate change.
First, Professor Tarlock discussed that worldwide mitigation to slow
the effects of global climate change could take from 100 to 1000 years
for the benefits to show. Therefore, Professor Tarlock said adaptation is
the key to slow the effects of greenhouse gases.
Earlier in the Symposium, Brad Udall, Director of CU-NOAA,
Western Water Assessment, presented the projected climate change
impacts on our water supplies. Professor Tarlock agreed with Mr.
Udall's conclusions that the chInge in climate will create both extreme
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wet and dry weather events. Overall, the planet will change to a wetter
and warmer climate; however, the western United States will change to
a drier climate while the eastern states will see more flooding in a wetter
climate.
In addition, Professor Tarlock explained that the changes in global
climate change would create more competition for water between the
various factions of society. This includes rivalries between the water
needed for urban areas, versus the water needed for agriculture, fish,
and energy production. Moreover, the internal rivalries within various
factions will increase, creating competition between different
agricultural users or between different urban areas.
Professor Tarlock presented seven options for adaptation to the
changing climate. The first option is letting the prior appropriation
doctrine work its natural course with a few minor changes. Prior
appropriation, a system with built-in risk assignment, calls for junior
right holders to bear the burden. Therefore, these junior right holders
have fair notice of strict enforcement of priority during times of
drought. However, Professor Tarlock noted two problems with prior
appropriation. First, water managers expect that courts will rarely apply
the prior appropriation doctrine on a big scale. Second, if courts apply
prior appropriation on a big scale, junior right holders will "push back."
As an example of these problems, Professor Tarlock spotlighted
American Falls Reservoir Dist. v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources. In
American FaLls, the Idaho Supreme Court found the application of the
prior appropriation doctrine "difficult" and "harsh" during times of
drought. The Court avoided the strict enforcement of prior
appropriation, instead allowing the state administrative agency to make
scientifically informed determinations on delivery of water based on the
extant of adverse effect to senior water users.
The prior appropriation changes that Professor Tarlock suggested
above include more emphasis on the beneficial use and anti-speculation
doctrine. For example, in Pagosa Springs I and H1, the Colorado
Supreme Court held cities can no longer give "faith-based" estimates on
the water needed for a particular area, and that global climate change is
no longer ajustification for bad water planning.
The second option to adapt to the changing climate is letting the
markets work. Allowing the market to reallocate water in the most
efficient manner will create a greater margin of safety during times of
water shortage. Under the two systems, riparian rights and prior
appropriation, there are different outcomes. While riparian rights are
transferable, the purchaser risks purchasing a questionable right,
because the conveyance only binds the grantor and makes no
contractual obligations upon the other water users on the source.
Under prior appropriation, water rights are transferable, but
transaction costs are high. Courts increasingly consider the interests of
other right and non-right holders, and sometimes require a review of
any environmental concerns before a transfer. Both considerations
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increase transaction costs of any water transfer.
The third option is technology-forcing conservation that adapts our
water use to climate change. States can use the beneficial use doctrine
to implement technology-forcing. California became the first state to
mandate efficient water management practices. California requires
agricultural water suppliers to adopt certain pricing structures to
encourage more efficient farm use and facilitate recycled water use. The
legislation also impacted cities by mandating a 20% per capita water use
reduction by 2020.
The fourth option is to link land use and water supply planning.
Planners often rejected climate as a reason to limit new communities.
Traditionally, governments separated land planning and water planning
agencies. Society assumed that water suppliers had a duty to meet water
supplies for new communities. Professor Tarlock explained how this
created golf courses in the middle of desert areas, such as Tucson,
Arizona. "Show me" laws like those enacted in California, Arizona, and
Colorado require cities and developers have realistic drought proof
plans for water supply.
The less likely fifth and sixth options are the introduction of
riparian sharing into the prior appropriation doctrine, and increased
federal preemption of state water laws.
Finally, the seventh option is to reimplement the use the dam to
capture more run-off water. Professor Tarlock first pointed out that
dams today differ from dams of the past. Today the use of smaller dams
serves as a key component in restoration of aquatic habitats by
capturing run-off. The problem with this option is the "Big Dam" era is
over, or at the very least in sleep mode, and a trend to remove these
dams and restore the land increases.
Professor Tarlock ended by stating that water managers must go
through a series of phases before they get to the point where they can
adapt to global climate change. The first phase is "Denial." Despite the
fact Europe has seemed to accept global climate change, the United
States has been slower to accept global climate change. California
Governor Schwarzenegger recently recognized climate change as a
problem for California. Next is the "Recognition" phase. In this stage,
water managers recognize the problem and start researching the
problem. Next is the "Get Serious" phase. This is the stage where most
water managers are currently. Last is the "What do we do?" phase in
which water managers start to take real action to adapt to global climate
change. Professor Tarlock ended by suggesting that water managers
need to evaluate the changes that they need make and the choices they
have to make those changes..
Nicole Tachibana
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OIL SHALE WATER IN COLORADO: THE ENERGY AND WATER CONNECTION

Western Resource Advocates ("WRA") is a non-profit law and policy
organization, which aims to protect the land, air, and water of the West,
Bart Miller, WRA's Water Program Director, helped shed light on the
oil shale industry's reliance on water to develop its resource, water's use
in the generation of energy and the impacts of oil shale and water on
the future. Last year, WRA released a report, Water on the Rocks: Oil
Shale Water lights in Colorado that focused on questions about the
relationship between oil shale and water. This investigative report
specifically focused on water requirements and water rights, in
conjunction with the future implications on the extraction of oil shale.
First, Mr. Miller discussed water requirements and water demands
associated with commercial oil shale development. He briefly discussed
the method of extracting oil from shale rock. With current technology,
developers create a "frozen water wall" around the rock and then
essentially cook the rock at extremely high temperatures, which causes
the oil to separate from the rock itself. Within Colorado lies the
Piceance Basin, the most prevalent oil shale formation in the United
States. Experts opine that through oil shale development, developers
may obtain over one-half of a trillion barrels of oil from this region.
Although prospectors discovered oil shale over 100 years ago in the
Piceance Basin, companies still cannot economically drill and extract
the oil in this area. Despite these difficulties, there is an increasing
demand for large-scale development because of people's dependence
on oil. In addition to the technical difficulties in extracting the oil,
developers would require large quantities of water for extraction. In
order to facilitate the large-scale developments, the Bureau of Land
Management estimates that developers would need one to three barrels
of water to produce a single barrel of oil from the oil shale.
Furthermore, a large development producing 1.55 million barrels of oil
per day would require approximately 378,310 acre feet of water
annually. In comparison, the Denver metro area, consisting of roughly
1.4 million people requires 275,000 acre feet of water annually.
Additionally, there are many uncertainties about oil shale development.
Since it is in its relative infancy, it is difficult for experts to determine
the actual amounts of water needed to develop the oil. Also, experts
question how much shale could reasonably produce oil given current
technologies, and how much people will begin to rely on other
technologies that produce energy, such as coal, wind, and natural gas.
Currently, the demand for water is high and production of oil shale is
difficult. But the development of oil shale remains on the horizon as
one of the future's premier energy resources.
Next, Mr. Miller spoke about water rights and future impacts on the
environment and society. Water rights for oil shale are mostly in the
White and Colorado River basins. Energy companies continue to
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obtain water rights for production of oil shale. Currently, energy
companies own absolute water rights to almost 70,000-acre feet of water
annually within the White and Colorado River basins. In addition,
energy companies have conditional water rights in these two basins with
1.960 era priority dates. If energy companies exercise the conditional
water rights that they own, this could create serious impacts throughout
the state. For example, many of the large water rights owned by Denver
Water have junior priority dates to many of the oil companies'
conditional water rights. Moreover, under the Colorado River Compact
of 1922, which the various states created during a historically wet period
in history, Colorado may be approaching serious risk of exceeding its
allocation and having its use of Colorado River water curtailed.
Additional water projects using substantial amounts of water may
further lead to excess water use causing a Compact call. Such a call
would first curtail the larger Front Range cities. Endangered fish also
mount a cause for concern. If oil shale developers with senior rights
require more water, endangered fish would lose their habitat at an
alarming rate because the White and Colorado River basins contain
extensive numbers of endangered fish.
Mr. Miller concluded his presentation by stating the various findings
of Water on the Rocks, which proffers that western communities must
understand and conserve water, especially if we continue our current
usage of water and hope to expand to include oil shale development.
The report found that commercial oil shale development would
transform western water communities by changing the ways that people
view and access water. Thus, we must balance the development and
sustainability of water, and further strive to evaluate and understand oil
shale development in terms of climate change and water availability. In
order to do this, experts must quantify water needs and identify supply
sources before we commit to oil shale development as the energy of the
future.
ChistopherMcNich olas

COLORADO WATER COURTS UPDAIT

Justice Gregory Hobbs of the Colorado Supreme Court discussed
the history of water law in Colorado and the future of the water courts.
Justice Hobbs explained that, throughout Colorado's history, the courts
helped develop Colorado water law. Colorado has seven water courts,
which solely handle water issues. These courts have influenced the
development of Colorado water law since 1879, when the Colorado
legislature created them. The Colorado Supreme Court also has a long
and significant history of deciding issues of importance in water law.
According to 'Justice Hobbs, the Colorado Supreme Court faces
significant challenges in interpreting and enforcing water laws. Several
water doctrines constrain the Colorado Supreme Court. In particular,

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 13

the doctrine of equitable apportionment and various interstate water
compacts limit Colorado's access to the water that exists within its
borders. Due to these compacts, Colorado may only appropriate onethird of the water in Colorado. The courts must further divide this
Under the Colorado
limited water among competing interests.
Constitution, the doctrine of prior appropriation dictates who may
appropriate Colorado waters and who possesses superior water claims.
Although prior appropriation controls distribution of Colorado water,
the Colorado Constitution contains a preference clause that favors
domestic water use over agricultural use and favors agricultural use over
manufacturing use. However, the Colorado Supreme Court has found
that this preference clause does not significantly modify prior
appropriation. Instead, Justice Hobbs suggested that the preference
clause operates as an emergency mechanism through which Colorado
cities may purchase water rights from other, less favored sectors.
Despite the preference clause, prior appropriation still applies to all the
different uses of Colorado water, regardless of whether the
appropriation is for mining, agriculture, kayaking, or other uses.
However, Colorado courts must also honor federal-reserve water rights,
such as tribal water rights. These rights are separate from, and
generally superior to, prior appropriation water rights.
Justice Hobbs explained that, although Colorado will face
challenges from climate change, the Colorado water courts are in a
Justice Hobbs
good position to approach these challenges.
acknowledged that Colorado must address the problem of having a
fixed supply of water and a rapidly expanding population. Accordingly,
Colorado must find ways to stretch its water resources farther. Justice
Hobbs explained that the Colorado water courts are well suited to
address this issue because the water courts address individual water
issues incrementally. Justice Hobbs predicted that, in the face of
climate change, courts might require the appropriators of water to
provide a persuasive showing that the appropriators are appropriating
the water for a beneficial use and not wasting water.
Justice Hobbs also discussed recent efforts to make Colorado water
courts more efficient. In the past, parties have complained that
Colorado's water court system is too costly and time consuming. To
address this criticism, the water courts have made all necessary forms
available online and have also implemented new procedural rules,
effective July 1, 2009. The rules impose stricter deadlines to promote
efficiency in the water courts. In particular, a water referee now only
has one year to make a decision before a water court addresses the
issue. These rules attempt to streamline the water courts; however, it is
too soon to tell whether these rules will make the court system more
efficient.
Despite the challenges of climate change and procedural efficiency,
Justice Hobbs expressed great faith in the future of the water courts. In
particular, he explained that Colorado has been, and still is, a great

Issue 2

CONFERENCEREPORTS

problem-solver of water issues to which other western states look for
guidance. Justice Hobbs ended his presentation with his a reading of
his poem, "Circumference." The poem described how living in a land
of scarcity and opportunity connects everyone.
Eflen Michaels
COLORADO LEGISLATIVE UPDATE OF WATER ISSUES
Doug Kemper, Executive Director of the Colorado Water Congress
("Water Congress"), concluded the day-long symposium with an
overview of the water-related issues the Colorado legislature is currently
discussing. Since 1957, the Water Congress has been the primary
organization representing water interests in the state. Created by thenGovernor Steve McNichols and then-Attorney General Duke Dunbar,
the Water Congress now has approximately 350 members.
The Water Congress has monitored the successful Upper Colorado
River Endangered Fish Recovery Program ("the Program") since the
1980s. The Program is a partnership that includes the states of
Colorado, Utah and Wyoming, the Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR"),
the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, Western
Resource Advocates, the Nature Conservancy, and the Water Congress's
sister organizations in Utah and Wyoming. The Program protects
endangered fish native to the Colorado River, including the Colorado
pikeminnow, the humpbacked chub, the razorback sucker, and the
bonytail chub. The Program's goal is to delist at least one of these
species on the Colorado River by 2023; delisting is an indication that
the species has recovered substantially. Mr. Kemper reports that the
Program has already completed both the fish bypass structures and the
hatchery program necessary for the delisting of each of these species.
Impressively, the Program has completed 11,000 Endangered Species
Act consultations to date-representing at least 2.1 million acre feet of
depletions without a single lawsuit filed. Colorado's share of the cost of
this program comes from a state severance tax from oil and gas
revenues (ranging from ten to several hundred million dollars per
year). About a quarter of the Program's revenue goes to maintaining
water infrastructure, with another quarter going to operational
accounts, which maintain basin amount and the water supply reserve
account to fund the work of the basin roundtables). The Program also
includes a fund for species conservation trust fund. Because the
legislature has struggled to balance Colorado's budget over the last two
years, the Program has pulled $150 million from the Colorado
Conservation Board's cash account that is no longer available for water
projects.
Kemper then summarized three recent and pending pieces of
legislation: first, Kemper discussed HB1I188, regarding rafting and
whether or not the "right to float" existed in Colorado from the time ofits creation as a state. There has long been legal uncertainty about the
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right to float through private property are in Colorado. Colorado State
Representative Kathleen E. Curry initiated this bill, which has taken
many forms. Initially, the bill read that Colorado would either adopt, or
formally recognize that Colorado already has adopted English common
law as well as the navigability concept. The Water Congress's State
Affairs Committee reviewed the bill, and expressed concern about the
bill in its initial form because the law referenced Oregon case law.
Often, according to Mr. Kemper, out of state case law is incompatible in
Colorado. Generally, the Water Congress's State Affairs Committee
believes that there are no navigable streams in Colorado that meet the
test proposed by the bill, and therefore the bill will cause more
uncertainty about the law. The House version of the bill passed with
these problematic areas still intact. However, the Senate version of the
bill stripped away the elements problematic to the Water Congress.
Accordingly, the -Water Congress adopted a neutral position on the
current bill. For the first time in history, the Senate has assigned the
current bill to the Water Congress, asking them to figure out a
resolution. Before the Water Congress assumes this role however, the
House must accept the Senate amendments. The bill is currendy with
the House.
Next, Kemper discussed HBI 159, regarding basin of origin and the
role of the Interbasin Compact Committee ("IBCC"). This bill did not
pass House review, thus the Water Congress never had to consider it.
The bill proposed that those who plan to transfer water from one river
basin to another, in amounts exceeding 1,000 acre feet, must work out
an environmental mitigation agreement with the local water
conservancy districts regarding environmental and economic impacts of
the water transfer. If parties are unable to come to an agreement, then
the petitioner is subject to the 1937 Water Conservancy Act, which states
that those seeking the transfer must demonstrate that the cost to
existing prospective users will not increase. IBCC provided no specific
recommendations regarding the proposed statutory changes ensuring
the mitigation of impacts resulting from the interbasin transfer of water.
After debating this bill, most legislators believe that the IBCC already
conducts this work. Mr. Kemper believes that this issue will return to
the legislature and the Water Congress in the next year.
Finally, Kemper discussed HB1051, which is a reporting
requirement that the legislature amended to require the water
conservation board, Colorado's primary water policy agency, to develop
rules and guidelines for information to be submitted. This bill
proposes that Colorado law makers should get consistent data regarding
water conservation efforts. Such data will aid in long range planning to
help Colorado better understand what its municipal demands are.
Kemper concluded his speech by briefly highlighting the following
pieces of legislation: HB1204, a water-conservation plumbing-related
bill; HB1250, which determines the funding for the Colorado Water
Conservation Board and other projects; HB1327, which the Water
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Congress opposed because it would have destroyed the Water
Conservation Board; HB1358, which requires new homebuilders to
offer water conserving options such as low-flow fixtures; HB1303,
extended deadlines for water permitting related to oil and gas wells
after the recent outcome of Vance v. Wolfe, 205 P.3d 1165 (Colo.
2009); and Joint Resolution 004 to fund the state revolving fund
administered by the Colorado Water Resources and Power
Development Authority for water and wastewater infrastructure.
Sarah Felsen

COURT REPORTS

STATE COURTS
ARIZONA
In re The Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the
Gila River Sys. and Source, 224 P.3d 178 (Ariz. 2010) (holding
that the lower court correctly approved the Gila River Indian
Community's settlement agreement as all of the requirements of
the Special Procedural Order for the Approval of Federal Water
Rights Settlements, Including Those of Indian Tribes were met,
and, further, that the objecting parties were not bound to the
agreement and could assert their rights in subsequent general
adjudications if needed).
In 2004, Congress passed the Arizona Water Settlements Act
("AWSA"). Title II of AWSA authorizes the settlement of the
federal water rights claims of the Gila River Indian Community
In the subsequent settlement agreement, GRIC
("GRIC").
received 653,500 acre-feet of water per year in exchange for a
waiver of claims to damages to water resources, greater diversion
rights, and the right to contest certain uses of Gila River water.
In May of 2006, the parties to the settlement agreement
submitted the agreement to the Superior Court of Maricopa
County ("lower court") for approval. Several groups objected to
the agreement, including the San Carlos Apache Tribe, the
Nation
and
the Yavapai-Apache
Tonto Apache Tribe,
(collectively, the "Apache Tribes"); a number of communities
that depend on the water from the Gila River, collectively
identified as the Lower Gila Water Users ("LGWUs"); and
ASARCO LLC. The lower court, limiting its inquiry to issues
covered by the 1991 Special Procedural Order for the Approval
of Federal Water Rights Settlements, Including Those of Indian
Tribes, ("Special Order") rejected the objections of these groups,
and entered a judgment approving the GRIC settlement. The
Apache Tribes, LGWUs, and ARASCO requested an interlocutory
appeal. The Arizona Supreme Court granted the request.
The Special Order, a previous creation of the Arizona
Supreme Court, required lower courts to approve settlement
agreements when they found by a preponderance of the evidence
that: (1) the amount of water granted was no greater than that
which could have been proven at trial; (2) the objectors' claimed
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contending that it placed unreasonable limitations on settlement review
that unfairly prevented them from raising arguments regarding the
constitutionality, legality, and fairness of the settlement agreement.
The court rejected these broad arguments, maintaining that the Special
Order did not arbitrarily limit the scope of review of settlements.
Further, the court noted that settlements that meet the conditions of
the Special Order are actually beneficial to all parties as they reduce the
amount of water claimed by a given Indian tribe to an amount below
that which the tribe could have proven at trial.
The parties also made specific objections to the GRIC settlement.
All three objecting parties contended that the settlement agreement did
in fact materially injure their claimed water rights. The court
responded by pointing out the fact that the Special Order required the
approval of settlement agreements despite potential material injuries to
objectors' claimed water rights when the agreement was not binding on
the objectors; thus, this left the parties free to assert their rights in
subsequent general adjudications. In this case, contrary to the assertion
of the LGWUs, the settlement agreement was not binding on any of the
objectors, so the lower court did not err by approving the settlement
agreement despite concerns of material injury to the objectors' claimed
water rights.
The Apache Tribes also argued that the settlement would provide
GRIC more water than it could have proven at trial, and that the
settlement would adversely affect the quality of their own water.
Regarding the former claim, the court noted that the settlement
provided less water for GRIC than the Global Equity Decree had
previously allocated. Consequently, the court affirmed the lower
court's holding that the settlement indeed provided less water than
could have been proven at trial. Turning to the issue of water quality,
the court observed that the Special Order is concerned only with the
quantity of water claimed; the question of water quality falls outside of
the scope of the Special Order, and thus was inappropriate for
consideration by the lower court.
The objecting parties further argued that the settlement agreement
violated GRIC's contractual agreements with both ASARCO and the
Arlington Canal Company ("Arlington"). In response, the court noted
that contractual claims do not fall under the scope of the Special Order.
Hence, even if the settlement agreement did create contract disputes,
ASARCO and Arlington could assert their rights in later adjudications.
Finally, ASARCO contended that the safe-harbor provisions of the
settlement agreement violated the Arizona Constitution by denying
ASARCO equal protection and conferring a special benefit to GRIC.
The court replied to this objection by maintaining that the safe-harbor
argument was outside the scope of the Special Order, and, further, that
the argument was without merit as the agreement neither infringed
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upon ASARCO's equal protection rights nor provided special benefits
to GRIC.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower court's approval of the
GRIC settlement agreement.
James Henderson
COLORADO
City of Aurora v. ACJ P'ship, 209 P.3d 1076 (Colo. 2009) (holding that
the City of Aurora could not be granted conditional water storage rights
for its proposed reservoir site as the City could not satisfy the statutory
"can and will" requirement because of a pre-existing contractual
agreement between the Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners
and Rangeview Metropolitan District).
The City of Aurora ("Aurora") filed an application for conditional
water storage rights for a proposed project that would divert water from
the Platte River into a new "East Reservoir." Aurora had not yet
determined where this reservoir would be located, so the application
contained requests for conditional water storage rights for six potential
sites. Three of the proposed sites are located on the former Lowry
Bombing Range ("Lowry Range"), which is administered by the
Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners ("Land Board"). Several
years prior, the Land Board and Rangeview Metropolitan District
("Rangeview") entered into a restated lease agreement that designated
four sites on the Lowry Range for use by Rangeview for future
reservoirs. As part of this lease agreement, Rangeview obtained nonexclusive rights-of-way for its reservoir sites. Three of Aurora's six
proposed sites significantly overlapped with the four Rangeview sites.
The Land Board rejected Aurora's request for access to the
disputed sites, noting that allowing this access would require Rangeview
to give up one or more of its sites and that the contractual arrangement
prohibited the Land Board from doing this without Rangeview's
consent In the subsequent action before the District Court, Water
Division 1 ("water court"), Rangeview requested a partial summary
judgment based on the assertion that Aurora could not satisfy the "can
and will" requirement for conditional water rights. To acquire a
conditional water right, an applicant must demonstrate that "there is a
substantial probability that the applicant can and will complete the
appropriation with diligence and within a reasonable time." Because of
the lease agreement and the Land Board's rejection of Aurora's
request, the water court agreed with Rangeview that Aurora could not
satisfy this requirement, and subsequently granted the motion for a
partial summary judgment. Aurora appealed the partial summary
judgment and dismissal of its claim for conditional water storage rights
for the three disputed sites.
On appeal, Aurora maintained that the Land Board could have
granted access to the disputed sites without violating its contractual
arrangement with Rangeview for two reasons: (I) Rangeview's right-of-
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way in the contract was "non-exclusive"; and (2) the Land Board had
The court
the discretion to relocate Rangeview's rights-of-way.
the
court
contended
that an
with
both
arguments.
First,
disagreed
owner of property where another has rights-of-way may not interfere in
an unreasonable manner with those rights, and allowing Aurora access
to the disputed sites would unreasonably infringe on Rangeview's
rights. Second, the court noted that according to the terms of the lease
agreement, the Land Board could only relocate Rangeview's rights-ofway when it was convenient for both parties, not for the benefit of a
third party. Further, relocating rights-of-way was only permissible for
the "commercially reasonable development of the Lowry Range."
Aurora next argued that, in spite of the Land Board's rejection of
their request, the City could still potentially gain access to the disputed
sites through negotiation with Rangeview, and thus a summary
judgment based on the "can and will" requirement was not appropriate.
The court rejected this argument, noting that the fact that the parties
were opponents in this action was sufficient evidence that compromise
was not a substantial possibility.
Finally, Aurora contended that a less rigid "can and will" rule should
be applied in this case because speculation was not an issue. The court
responded by clarifying that this rule actually requires a technical
obstacle to the "can and will" requirement and that such a requirement
impedes maximum utilization. The court pointed out that neither of
these criteria was satisfied, and so the relaxed standard did not apply.
Similarly, the court noted that section 37-87-101 (1) (b) of the Colorado
Revised Statutes, which requires state agencies to allow persons to
acquire real property for water storage "to the maximum extent
practicable," does not apply in this situation as it would not be
"practicable" for the Land Board to acquiesce to Aurora's request for
access to the disputed sites.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the water court's ruling, and
remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the decision.
JamesHenderson

N. Sterling Irrigation Dist. v. Simpson, 202 P.3d 1207 (Colo. 2009)
(holding that a fixed water year does not itself impose a limit on
decreed storage rights, but is merely the administrative mechanism by
which the one-fill rule lawfully limits those rights).
The North Sterling Irrigation District ("NSID") requested water
under its storage rights; however, the State and Division Engineers for
Water Division No. 1 (the "Engineers") denied the requests. The
Engineers stated that the November 1 water year and the one-fill rule
limited NSID's diversions. NSID filed a Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment requesting that the water court determine whether Colorado
law authorizes the Engineers to impose a fixed water year on NSID for
purposes of administering the one-fill rule. The City of Boulder,
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Centennial Water and Sanitation District, and Pawnee Well Users
intervened as Intervenors-Plaintiffs ("Intervenors"). The water court
held that the Engineers had the authority to impose a fixed water year
to administer the one-fill rule. NSID appealed, and the Colorado
Supreme Court conducted de novo review of the water court's
determination of Colorado law.
The Engineers maintained that, the November 1 water year had
been in place since 1936, and no change in administrative policy had
occurred. NSID asserted that, since 1911, the operable policy was the
low-point administration regime and diversion based on a variable
calendar year. Intervenors argued that a change in administration of
NSID's water rights would change the timing of NSID's requests and
inhibit Intervenors' diversions.
The court considered the Engineers' authority pursuant to
Colorado statute and explained that it is the Engineers' duty to
administer the waters of the state and that this duty includes curtailing
diversions that contravene applicable law.
Relying on previous
Colorado Supreme Court decisions, the court explained that the onefill limitation on water storage rights dictates that the Engineers limits a
reservoir to one annual filling, up to its decreed capacity. Upon
reaching capacity, the Engineers can refuse to honor a call during the
remainder of that one-year period. Further, if the storage decree is
silent regarding administration of the one-fill rule, then the Engineers
have authority to account for and, if necessary, curtail diversions that
violate the rule.
According to Colorado case law, the November 1 date represents
the generally accepted start-date for the administrative water year. In
addition, the court recognized that a variable year can provide
inadequate protection to the rights of junior water users. Finally,
parties claiming historical water uses must obtain' a judicial
determination adjudicating those rights so that the party has standing
to enforce its historical use.
The court concluded that NSID had not demonstrated any legal
injury associated with a change in administrative policy because 1) NSID
had not adjudicated its rights; 2) NSID's historical diversions were
consistent with a fixed water year; 3) a former NSID manager wrote a
letter in 1989, objecting to the November 1 policy; 4) NSID's decree
was silent regarding administration of the one-fill rule; and 5) NSID
could have diverted water in-priority any day of the year, as long as the
right had not exceeded the volumetric limitation of the one-fill rule.
Any limitation on NSID's storage rights was imposed by Colorado's onefill rule, not the Engineers' fixed water year. Finally, low-point
administration had the potential to unlawfully enlarge NSID's water
rights and harm to junior users.
Based on the foregoing, the court found that a fixed water year does
not itself impose a limit on NSID's decreed storage rights, but is merely
the administrative mechanism by which the one-fill rule lawfully limits
those rights. The court determined that because there was no change
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in administrative policy, the fixed water year did not affect Intervenors'
rights. Consequently, the court affirmed the water court's holdings.
Marie! Yarbrough
Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 219 P.3d 774
(Colo. 2009) (holding that the water districts did not display a
substantial probability that they. Would utilize the requested
appropriations, and that the evidence supported a fifty-year water
supply planning period, but did not support conditional water
appropriations for recreational in-channel rights or possible bypass flow
requirements of federal permits, or a fifty cubic feet per second
diversion from a pumping station for use in the water districts' system).
The Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District and the San Juan
Water Conservancy District ("Districts") made an initial application for
the right to store 29,000 acre-feet of water in Dry Gulch Reservoir with
the right to refill the reservoir and potentially use up to 64,000 acre-feet
of water per year, a 100 cubic feet per second ("cfs") direct flow right at
the Dry Gulch Pumping Station into storage, and a eighty cfs direct flow
right from the pumping station for use anywhere in the districts system.
The Districts based their initial application on a 100-year planning
period and the District -Court, Water Division 7 approved the initial
decree. Trout Unlimited appealed the decree and the Colorado
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the decision determining that
the Districts had not provided enough evidence to support a 100-year
planning period. On remand the water court issued a decree with a
fifty year planning period, and Trout Unlimited appealed to the court
again, bringing this action.
On appeal, Trout Unlimited asserted that the Districts had not
provided enough information to substantiate the allocation requests
made, even under the shorter planning period. The Districts' revised
decree consisted of a conditional storage right of 19,000 acre-feet with
the right to refill to a total annual storage of 25,300 acre-feet in Dry
Gulch Reservoir, a direct diversion of 100 cfs from the San Juan River
into storage at Dry Gulch, and a separate direct diversion flow right of
fifty cfs from the San Juan River for use anywhere in the Districts'
system. The Districts attempted to use a planning period of seventy
years, but the water court approved a period of fifty years. Trout
Unlimited appealed this decision as well, asserting that the court's
remand instructions lent to a thirty-five-year planning period, ending in
2040.
Reviewing the new appeal, the court determined that the fifty-year
planning period decided on by the water court was appropriate and
comported with statutory requirements and other decisions by the
court. Due to the lengthy lead-time necessary to prepare the Dry Gulch
Reservoir, it would not be ready for use until 2025. The fifty-year
planning period, which reaches to 2055, also coincides with other state
initiatives to project Colorado population and geographic location for
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the year 2050.
After determining that the planning period used by the water court
was appropriate the court turned to the substance of the proposed
appropriation by the Districts. Pursuant to section 37-92-103(3) (a) of
the Colorado Revised Statutes, governmental entities supplying water
have slightly less stringent standards with regard to anti-speculation and
beneficial use standards than nongovernmental appropriators.
However, proposed appropriations must be consistent with the
governmental entity's reasonably expected future water needs and the
entity needs to substantiate with solid projections of future growth in
the service area, within a reasonable planning period. To accomplish
this, the governmental entity has the burden of proving three
conditions in order to make a conditional appropriation of
unappropriated water. First, the entity must establish a reasonable
water supply planning period. Second, the entity must substantiate
population projections based on a normal rate of growth for the area in
Finally, the entity must estimate the amount of
question.
unappropriated water necessary to serve the anticipated needs of the
governmental entity for the proposed planning period, beyond the
entity's current water supply.
In determining what amount of water was reasonably needed the
court provided four considerations: (1) implementation of reasonable
conservation measures through the planning period; (2) expected land
use mixes during the planning period; (3) per capita usage projections
for indoor and outdoor use during the planning period; and (4) the
amount of consumptive use necessary for the increased population. In
a conditional decree proceeding, the court also said it would apply the
"can and will" test, requiring that the potential appropriator show there
is a substantial possibility that the proposed project will come to
fruition. Finally, the court determined that approving appropriations
based on future hypothetical uses of other governmental entities with
senior rights was speculative in nature and that the Districts could not
use them as evidence for an appropriation. The court first addressed
the decree-approved recreational in-stream rights or a federal by-pass
flow requirement, which allow diversions from the stream if all
appropriators maintain the desired flow amount in the river. The
Districts claimed that the United States Forest Service or another
governmental body might require a by-pass flow. The expert testifying
for the Districts asserted that there was a chance the Districts would
need the by-pass flows or in-stream rights to meet future obligations.
However, according to the court, the District did not substantiate its
assertions with any significant evidence. On remand from the previous
decision, the court indicated that the appropriation of water for
recreational in-stream flows and by-pass flow rights was too speculative
and that the Districts would need to provide further evidence to
The Districts, however, did not
substantiate the appropriation.
introduce any further evidence, and according to the court, did not
meet its burden to prove a non-speculative intent to use the water
beneficially. In addition, the Districts' request did not pass the "can
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and will" test.
Next, the court addressed the Districts' request for fifty cfs diversion
to be utilized anywhere in the Districts' service area. The court
determined that there are competing provisions in the Districts' decree
surrounding the fifty cfs direct flow request and that some of them are
open-ended and would not correspond to the fifty-year planning
period. While one provision of the decree seemed to put an overall cap
of 25,300 acre-feet of water annually on all proposed diversions, another
provision seemed to indicate that future projects would allow the
Districts to divert the fifty cfs flow to other areas that would not be
subject to the overall annual cap. The court remanded this issue with
instructions that the water court should limit the direct flow rate to the
amount necessary for the 2055 planning period.
Finally, the court determined that there was insufficient evidence to
support the Districts' request for 100 cfs direct flow diversion and an
annual storage amount of 25,300 in the Dry Gulch Reservoir. The court
used the considerations outlined above to determine that the Districts'
requests were too speculative in nature. While the court agreed with
the 50-year planning period proposed by the water court, the record
did not contain significant information about the amount of
unappropriated water reasonably needed to serve the needs of the'
Districts. In addition, there were significant discrepancies surrounding
the projected population of the area during the planning period.
Specifically, the court was dissatisfied with the lack of showing of the
projected land uses. The Districts did not attempt to do a build-out
analysis or account for significant tribal and public lands within the
service area in its analysis. The court cited legislation addressing the
requirement that a governmental entity provide a showing of particular
types of analysis when making appropriation requests, which included
the build-out analysis. In addressing the projected population, the
court compared the Districts' 2055 projected population of 62,906 with
the state-authorized study that concluded a maximum of 42,532
individuals in 2050. To deal with this variance and the lack of evidence
concerning a build-out analysis, the court asked the water court to take
further evidence to help further determine the amount of water and
the direct flow diversions necessary for the anticipated needs of the
District in 2055.
In addition to the specific water diversion request at issue, the
Districts also asserted a position that when making conditional
appropriatibns, the governmental water suppliers are acting in a
legislative capacity, and the courts should defer to the amount of water
the governmental supplier has deemed necessary to carry out its
functions. The court rejected that assertion citing statutes and case law
indicating that both private and governmental appropriators carry a
burden of proof when making an appropriation request. While the
burden on the governmental entity carries a limited exception
regarding anti-speculation and beneficial use standards, the burden is
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still present. The court reversed the judgment of the water court and
remanded the case to allow for the introduction of further evidence to
substantiate the Districts' requests.
Matt Brodahl
Well Augmentation Subdistrict of the Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy
Dist. v. City of Aurora, 221 P.3d 399 (Colo. 2009) (holding that (I) the
water court had jurisdiction over the subdistrict, which enabled it to
order an augmentation plan for water for out-of-priority depletions due
to well pumping that occurred prior to the subdistrict's filing of its
application; (2) the water court had authority under Colorado's Water
Right Determination and Adjudication Act of 1969 to order a well
augmentation subdistrict to provide augmentation water for out-ofpriority depletions resulting from well pumping that occurred prior to
the subdistrict's filing of its application; (3) the surface water conditions
that would exist absent pumping in the basin, rather than current
hydrological conditions, must determine the subdistrict's water
replacement obligations; and (4) the Administrative Procedure Act
governs the standard of review for substitute water supply plans
approved by the State Engineer pending approval of an augmentation
plan, rather than the de novo standard of review).
In 2003, the Well Augmentation Subdistrict of the Central Colorado
Water Conservancy and the South Platte Well Users Association
(collectively, "WAS"), submitted applications in the District Court for
Water Division Number One ("water court") for approval of an
The proposed plan sought to provide
augmentation plan.
augmentation water to offset the out-of-priority depletions of 215
structures diverting groundwater from the South Platte River Basin in
locations from Brighton, Colorado, to Fort Morgan, Colorado. Before
WAS filed its application, many of the wells included in its plan had
operated under annual substitute water supply plans issued by the State
Engineer in favor of Groundwater Appropriators of the South Platte
("GASP"). Following rulings by the Colorado Supreme Court, holding
that the State Engineer lacked the authority to promulgate rules
permitting out-of-priority alluvial wells, GASP dissolved, and former
GASP well owners petitioned the Central Colorado Water Conservancy
District to establish WAS so that they might seek a court-approved
augmentation plan. The wells involved in WAS make up a subset of the
former GASP wells.
WAS's augmentation plan employed a "well call" structure to
administer the groundwater seniority system, which obligated all wells
with priority dates junior to the date of the calling well to replace water,
while wells with priority dates senior to the calling well did not have to
replace water. Thirty-seven parties, including the City of Aurora
(collectively, "Aurora"), filed statements of opposition to WAS's
proposed augmentation plan. Some opposers of the plan filed a
motion for a question of law determination relating to the appropriate
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method for calculating depletions of water for WAS wells in the
alluvium of Box Elder Creek. Specifically, the motion sought the water
court's determination on whether the present hydrological conditions
in the basin or the hydrological conditions that would exist in the basin
without well pumping determines the amount of depletions to the
South Platte River from well pumping in Box Elder Creek.
The water court conducted a trial on WAS's application in 2007. In
2008, it issued a post-trial order that approved WAS's augmentation
plan, imposing specific terms and conditions on the operation of the
plan. The water court determined that, in the absence of well pumping
in the Box Elder Creek basin, Box Elder Creek would hydrologically
connect to the South Platte River. On the basis of these depletions to
the South Platte, the water court rejected WAAS's proposed
augmentation plan. The water court declined to include WAS's well
call provision in its decree. The water court found that uncertainty
regarding how much water a particular call could produce by curtailing
upstream junior rights and how much time it could take for the
curtailment of groundwater depletions to impact surface waters could
injure vested water rights.
WAS appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court (the "court"),
challenging these terms. WAS argued that the water court erred in
requiring WAS to provide replacement water for depletions that
continued to negatively impact surface conditions that WAS made
before filing its augmentation plan application. WAS also argued that
the water court erred in basing replacement obligations for wells in the
Box Creek Elder basin on conditions that would exist in the basin had
the historic pumping of wells in the area not occurred. Additionally,
WAS asked the court to decide whether the State and Division
Engineers have the authority to administer a "well call" structure in
their administration of the South Platte River basin. Finally, WAS
asserted that the water court erred in reviewing its substitute water
supply plan ("SWSP") under a de novo standard, arguing that the
correct standard of review, the arbitrary and capricious standard,
appears in the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").
On appeal, WAS argued that the water court lacked jurisdiction to
make an order that obligated WAS to provide replacement water for
depletions made before WAS filed its application. WAS claimed that,
although it is clear that the water court had jurisdiction over the
augmentation plan, it could not impose a requirement to provide
replacement water because the water court did not have personal
jurisdiction over the individual well owners. The court rejected WAS's
contention, finding that WAS's reasoning revealed a misapprehension
with respect to the nature of water court proceedings. The court
explained WAS had misunderstood Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-305, which
provides for substituted service through the publication of a water
division resum6 for matters involving applications for water rights,
changes of water rights, and augmentation plans. Publication of the
resum6 provides the water court with subject matter jurisdiction over all
issues inherent to a resolution of an application. The court reasoned
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that the opposers' requested relief, which asked for replacement of pre2003 pumping water that caused injury to their vested rights, directly
related to the subject of approval of the augmentation plan. Thus, it
was within the scope of the water court's jurisdiction. The court found
that when WAS filed its augmentation plan, it invoked the water court's
jurisdiction over the water rights involved in the plan. Consequently,
the water court undertook a duty to ensure that operation of the
augmentation plan would not injure senior vested water rights and
decreed conditional water rights, which is why the water court
conditioned its approval on the provision of replacement water by WAS
for pre-application depletions.
WAS next argued that the water court lacked the jurisdiction under
the Water Right Determination and Adjudication Act of 1969 ("1969
Act") to condition approval of its augmentation plan upon the
replacement of well depletions caused by pumping that occurred
before WAS filed its augmentation plan application. WAS argued that
conferring such jurisdiction upon the water court contravenes the
intent of the Colorado General Assembly in enacting the statute,
asserting that the phrase "applicant's use or proposed use of water"
limited the water court's consideration to depletions resulting from well
pumping occurring during the time that the application is pending.
The court rejected this argument, focusing instead on the provision in
the 1969 Act that gives the water court the power to require terms and
conditions in an augmentation plan intended to prevent injury to
vested water rights and conditional decreed water rights. The court
found that WAS's interpretation of "applicant" as the party currently
applying for approval of the augmentation plan was too narrow.
Rather, the court found that the "applicant" had the responsibility to
account for all injurious depletions made by water rights covered by the
proposed augmentation plan. The court found that the General
Assembly deliberately used broad language in the 1969 Act to allow the
water court to devise terms and conditions intended to protect water
rights from injury, without chronological limitation with respect to
when the injurious pumping took place. The court, therefore, agreed
with the water court's determination that pre-2003 depletions would
likely have an impact on surface water conditions in the future.
Relying on the principle that an augmentation plan requires the
replacement of out-of-priority depletions so that holders of decreed
water rights can receive the same amount of water that would be
available to them in the absence of those depletions, the court rejected
WAS's argument that WAS should be responsible for replacing only
those depletions made following the submission of its 2003 application.
The court began by noting that Colorado water law presumes all water
is tributary. As such, parties seeking to rebut that presumption bear the
burden of proving that the waters are nontributary. Only by showing
that the groundwater wells are nontributary can a party relieve its
obligation to augment the wells to avoid injury to senior water users.
While the water court had permitted WAS to present evidence showing
that the groundwater in the basin was nontributary, it found that WAS
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did not present sufficient evidence at trial to rebut the presumption
that the water of Box Elder Creek was tributary water. WAS did not
argue that Box Elder Creek was nontributary, but rather that the court
should adopt WAS's proposed replacement schedule. The court
reasoned that if the water court were to base replacement obligations
on current hydrological conditions in the Box Elder Creek basin, WAS
would receive the benefit of out-of-priority pumping of seepage and
return flow waters belonging to the South Platte River. The court
found that well pumping in the Box Elder Creek basin intercepted the
return flows and seepage water, which had established the hydrological
connection between Box Elder Creek and the South Platte. This
interception caused the water to stop flowing into the South Platte
River, thereby depriving senior users on the South Platte River of their
rightful return flows. The court agreed with the water court that
allowing WAS to base its replacement obligation on present conditions
would allow WAS's wells to pump seepage water and return flows that
should have remained in the river.
Before hearing the appeal, the water court had issued an order
finding that the appropriate standard of review for appeals from the
State Engineer's approval or denial of SWSPs was de novo. Because
WAS agreed to curtail its out-of-priority depletions pending the issuance
of the water court's final decree, however, the water court did not hear
the SWSP appeals before ruling on WAS's augmentation plan
application. While the court found that the SWSP issue was moot, it
nevertheless chose to address the issue, finding that the matter fit
within the exception to the mootness doctrine applicable to issues
capable of repetition yet evading review, as SWSP appeals tend to fit
within a short timeframe. Because the APA is a "gap-filler," its
provisions apply only to agency actions not covered by a specific
provision of the agency's statute or preempted by another statutory
provision. The court looked at whether Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92308(4) (c), which governs appeal of SWSPs, conflicted with APA review.
The court began its analysis with the plain language of subsection 37-92308(4), construing the statute as a whole to give "sensible effect to all of
its parts." The court found that the subsections surrounding subsection
(4) clearly designated a standard of review for the State Engineer's
approval or denial of SWSPs. Presuming that the General Assembly
purposefully included a standard of review in certain sections of the
statute and excluded it in others, the court found that subsection 37-92308(4) does not conflict with the APA standard of review. Therefore,
the court found the arbitrary and capricious standard under the APA
standard of review controls.
The court determined that WAS's request for the court to issue an
opinion deciding whether the State and Division Engineers have the
authority to implement a well call in the future asked the court to issue
a purely advisory opinion, because WAS did not challenge the factual
findings of the water court or seek an additional decree mandating use
of its well call system on appeal. Since the court could not base an
opinion on a hypothetical set of facts, the court found that the issue was
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not

yet ripe for judicial resolution and declined to decide the matter in its
decision
Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the
water court's decision.
MargaretKorey
-

Meridian Ranch Metro. Dist. v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, P.3d- , 2009 WL 3765490 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that
management districts have authority to regulate water pumping levels
by rule after the Ground Water Commission issues well permits and are
not preempted by the Commission's rules).
The Meridian Ranch Metropolitan District, the Meridian Service
Metropolitan District, and the Cherokee Metropolitan District ("Metro
Districts") are special districts created by Title 32 of the Colorado
Revised Statutes. The Metro Districts own and manage wells in the
Management District, organized under the 1979 Ground Water
Management Act ("GWMA").
The Metro Districts operate wells
permitted by the Ground Water Commission ("Commission"). In this
case, the Management District adopted rules ("Rules") to ameliorate
declining groundwater levels in its designated basin. The Rules focused
on wells supplying water to single-family homes, whether in a
subdivision or not, and commercial businesses, imposing lower use
limits than the Commission originally promulgated.
The Metro
Districts appealed the Management District's Rules to the Commission,
under Section 37-90-131(b) of the Colorado Revised Statutes. On two
occasions, a Commission-designated hearing officer declared-the Rules
invalid; initially, the officer held that the Management District lacked
authority to adopt the Rules, and later the officer held that the Rules
were unreasonable. The Commission, however, overrode the hearing
officer's findings, and upheld the Management District's Rules. The
Metro Districts sought judicial review in the District Court for El Paso
County, which upheld the Commission's ruling. The district court
found that after permits are issued for a basin, a management district
has wide authority to regulate the basin's water priorities. The Metro
Districts appealed this determination to the Colorado Court of Appeals
and simultaneously applied to the Supreme Court of Colorado for
cerdorari,.
which was denied.
As the Colorado Court of Appeals noted, the Supreme Court of
Colorado has jurisdiction over appeals involving priorities or
adjudications of individual rights. The court said, however, that though
the case involved water rights, there were no issues of relative rights
between individual users; thus, the case did not involve priorities or
adjudication of individual rights, and the court found it had jurisdiction
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over the case. Generally, rule-making is legislative in nature, and is thus
non-adjudicative. However, in Cotton Creek Circles,LLC v. Rio Grande
Water Conservacion District, the Colorado Supreme Court held that,
under the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969,
a water court's review of the state engineer's proposed rules was an
adjudication. The court said that Cotton Creek was distinguishable
from the present case because the state engineer was not subject to the
same notice and hearing requirements as the Management Districts.
The notice and hearing required before the Management District could
adopt rules were similar to the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act,
and given the court's regular exercise of jurisdiction over appeals
challenging agency rulemaking authority, the court held that it
maintained proper jurisdiction.
The Metro Districts argued that the GWMA did not authorize the
Management District to modify existing permits' water allowances.
Applying de novo review, the court first considered the GWMA's
language. The GWMA granted the Commission authority to issue well
permits, which the Colorado Supreme Court has held constitute a final
determination of the quantity of water an individual can use. However,
because ground water is non-renewable, the court said the
appropriation doctrine had to be modified to ensure "reasonable
depletion." Well users, the court held, have no right to maintain
historic pumping levels.
The Commission is the only entity empowered to approve permit
changes; thus, the court considered whether there were other means,
beyond changing the permit, by which an individual's groundwater
allowance could be reduced. The court noted that section 37-90-1 11 (1)
of the Colorado Revised Statutes allows the Commission to make
changes to permits through rule-making; however, the Commission
must confer with management districts in making rule changes. The
Commission's authority is further limited by section 37-90-111 (1) "to
the extent that similar authority is vested in ground water management
districts [by] section 37-90-130(2)."
The question before the court was whether management districts
have "similar authority" under section 37-90-130(2). That Section, held
the court, gives management districts authority to regulate water
pumping levels by rule after the Commission issues well permits. The
court elaborated, stating that the management districts' rules are
subject to Commission review and final approval. Thus, the court
rejected the Metro Districts' contention that the Commission's rules
preempted the Management District's rules.
Finally, the court found that the Rules did not violate due process
because the Management District provided the interested parties notice
and an opportunity to be heard prior to promulgating the Rules.
Consequently, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's ruling.
Andrew Reitman
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IDAHO
Nelson v. Big Lost River Irrigation Dist., 219 P.3d 804 (Idaho 2009)
(holding that that the universal shrink method of apportionment
implemented by the Irrigation District did not violate Idaho statutory
law or case law).
The Big Lost River Irrigation District ("Irrigation District")
purchased the Mackay Dam and Reservoir, and storage water rights in
the reservoir, in order to supplement the decreed water rights owned by
various water users in the Irrigation District. The Big Lost River runs
through the Mackay Reservoir, and the Irrigation District uses the river
to convey the water from the reservoir to the landowners in the
Irrigation District: A significant amount of this water seeps through the
gravel deposits and porous soils over which the river flows. This loss of
water through seepage comprises "conveyance loss" or- "shrink."
Historically, the Irrigation District apportioned conveyance
loss to
the landowners in two different ways. Prior to 1994, the Irrigation
District used the "universal shrink" method, which allocated the
conveyance loss equally to all landowners in the District - regardless of
their location on the river. In 1994, the Irrigation District began using
a formula, known as "river reach," that divided .conveyance loss based
on the section or reaches of the river. Under this system, a larger
percentage of the conveyance loss fell upon water users farther
downstream. In 2005, the Directors of the District voted to revert to the
universal shrink method.
Sixty-four landowners ("upriver landowners") on the upper reaches
of the river brought this action in the district court of the Seventh
Judicial District seeking an injunction to prevent the Irrigation District
from re-implementing the universal shrink method. The upstream
landowners also requested declaratory judgment that a state statute Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("IDAPA") Rule 37.03.12.040.03.b
("Rule 40.03.b") - required conveyance loss apportionment by reach.
The upriver landowners also arguedthat they received the storage water
from the river as appropriators of the natural flow from the river, not as
landowners within an irrigation district. The district court held that
Rule 40.03.b did not apply to the Irrigation District's apportionment of
conveyance loss among its water users, and entered judgment requiring
the Irrigation District to allocate conveyance loss by the universal shrink
method.
On appeal by the upriver landowners, the Supreme Court of Idaho
(the "court") addressed two issues: (1) whether the district court erred
in ruling that a 1936 decree does not limit the Irrigation District's
discretion to adopt the universal shrink method; and (2) whether the
district court erred in ruling that the universal shrink method is lawful.
The court held that the 1936 decree did not require apportioning
of conveyance losses by river reach. The court found that the decree
Irrigation District was the appropriator of the water, not the water users
as the upriver landowners contended, because the Irrigation District
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held tide to the storage water rights. The court then examined the
findings of fact of the 1936 decree. In the findings of fact, the decree
assigned the same dollar value per acre-foot of storage water in the
reservoir for each subdivision of land, regardless of its distance from the
reservoir, implied the use of the universal shrink method. The findings
of fact also addressed the issue of deducting conveyance loss, but did
not provide a required method for dividing those losses. Therefore, the
court found that the findings of fact and the 1936 decree more likely
pointed to the use of the universal shrink method of apportioning
conveyance losses.
Further, the court held that the universal shrink method of
apportioning conveyance losses was lawful. In doing so, the court
found that Rule 40.03.b, requiring the Idaho Department of Water
Resources' watermaster to apportion conveyance losses according to
water reach, only applied to appropriators of water. The court also
examined previous cases and determined that the implementation of
the universal shrink method was in accordance with existing case law.
The court emphasized that the legislature intended irrigation districts
to benefit all landowners equally, and that assessments placed on the
landowners by an irrigation district cannot vary according to river
reach.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district coiirt.
FrancisH1
INDIANA
Long v. IVC Indust. Coatings, Inc., 908 N.E.2d 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)
(holding that (1) whether water travelling through ditches was surface
water and (2) whether water containing mud ceased to be surface water
were genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary
judgment).
David and Connie Long ("Longs") and IVC Industrial Coatings, Inc.
("IC") owned property on opposite sides of a county road. The Longs
constructed two farm ponds between 10 and 20 feet deep at various
parts on the property, which the Longs stocked with fish. Before 2001,
IVC's property was a field. Rain falling on the field would drain
through an established course and eventually move to a culvert
travelling under the road between the properties and into the Long's
farm ponds. Beginning in 2001, IVC began improving its property and
hired contractors to begin construction on a manufacturing facility,
including a significant amount of earthwork resulting in a "rather large
mound of earth" on the side of the property nearest the road.
During that time and continuing into 2002, rain caused mud, silt,
and sediment to run off the mound, to the culvert, and eventually into
the Long's ponds, causing deposits that made the ponds muddy and
unfishable, and significantly decreasing their depth. In January 2002,
Dale Walker, an employee of the Indiana State Department of
Agriculture, issued an evaluation report indicating there was evidence
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that sedimentation from IVC's construction was leaving the site and that
sediment control was not in compliance with Ind. Admin. Code 15-5.
This section of the code governs construction related storm water runoff.
At the beginning of 2003, the Longs filed a compliant against IVC
and its contractors claiming negligence and that the sediment runoff
constituted a nuisance and trespass. IVC and the contractors filed
motions for summary judgment, which the Clay Superior Court
granted. -In its order, the trial court found that the common enemy
doctrine of water diversion applied to this case and that the Longs had
no cause of action because there was no genuine factual issue for
submission to a jury regarding whether the water depositing mud on
their property was surface water or water in a natural watercourse. The
Longs appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment to VC/Contractors and in
applying the common enemy doctrine.
On appeal, the Longs first argued that the water was not surface
water, but rather followed a natural watercourse. Additionally, the
Longs claimed that the common enemy doctrine did not apply because
the water contained mud, silt, and sediment.. The court began its
analysis by restating the definition of surface water as water "following
no defined course or channel." Under the common enemy doctrine, a
landowner can divert or contain surface water as he or she sees fit, even
if the method of control affects an adjacent property. In addition, the
court noted that the application of the common enemy doctrine
precludes a plaintiff's action regardless of whether the plaintiff asserts
the claim as negligence, trespass or a nuisance.
The doctrine does not apply, however, to water running in a natural
watercourse. Water establishes a natural watercourse when it begins to
flow in a definite and specific course. Several factors are essential to
designating a watercourse including substantial existence, regularity,
and dependability of water flow along a specific course. The court
recalled that the constant water flow is not necessary and the size of the
watercourse does not matter in making a watercourse determination.
Therefore, the court concluded there was a possibility that a jury could
determine that the flow of water from IVC's property to the Longs'
property followed a natural watercourse, making summary judgment on
the issue inappropriate.
The Longs also argued that the common enemy doctrine did not
apply because the water contained mud, silt, and sediment. The court
determined that mud and sediment in the water does not preclude the
application of the common enemy doctrine. The court reasserted that
application of the common enemy doctrine relies on determining
whether the water is surface water or water following a natural
watercourse. However, the court did conclude that the point at which
water ceases to be surface water and becomes a pollutant due to its
concentration of mud and sediment is a question of fact. Therefore,
the court concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate on
this issue either.
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Accordingly, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment finding that there were genuine issues of
material fact the trial court needed to determine. Thus, the court
remanded the case for further proceedings.

Matt Brodahl

NEW MEXICO
Lion's Gate Water v. D'Antonio, No. 31279, 2009 WL 5124536 (N.M.
Dec. 2, 2009) (holding that de novo review of a State Engineer's
decision that water is unavailable to appropriate limits a district court's
review to that sole, dispositive issue and that the statutory provision
requiring the State Engineer to order notice publication applies only
when water is available for appropriation).
In February 2003, Lion's Gate Water ("Lion's Gate") applied for a
permit with the Water Rights Division of the Office of the State
Engineer ("Water Rights Division") to appropriate new water from the
Gila River located in southwestern New Mexico. The Water Rights
Division summarily rejected Lion's Gate's application, concluding that
there was no water available for appropriation. Finding no water
available, the Water Rights Division did not answer the ancillary
questions of whether the proposed appropriation was contrary to the
conservation of water or whether the appropriation would be
detrimental to the public welfare. Lion's Gate subsequently filed seven
additional applications; the Water Rights Division rejected all of them.
Despite the rejected applications, Lion's Gate twice attempted, though
only once succeeded, to publish notice of its application for a permit.
According to New Mexico law, the State Engineer issues all permits.
Because of the statutory hearing prerequisite to an appeal, Lion's Gate
demanded an administrative hearing to review the State Engineer's
decision to reject Lion's Gate's amended applications. Before the
required hearing, however, Lion's Gate appealed its all of its initial and
subsequent rejected applications to the Sixth Judicial District Court (the
"district court").
The district court dismissed Lion's Gate's appeals for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies because the hearing required by
statute was still pending. A year later, the State Engineer ordered a
hearing on the sole issue of whether water was available for
appropriation. Lion's Gate then filed an additional appeal in the
district court arguing that a limited hearing denied Lion's Gate the
constitutional right to fair and unbiased treatment. The district court
once again found no statutory basis for appeal before completion of the
required hearing. In August 2007, the hearing examiner granted the
Water Rights Division's motion for summary judgment because no
water was available to appropriate. Lion's Gate appealed the State
Engineer's summary judgment to the district court and requested
confirmation that the district court would hear the appeal as an original
case, including the issues the State Engineer did not consider. The
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district court granted a trial de novo on all issues, stating that it would
consider new evidence and evidence previously introduced at the
administrative hearing. Without ruling on whether the State Engineer's
grant of summary judgment was proper, the district court made several
findings, including: (1) the State Engineer failed its statutory obligation
to provide notice of Lion's Gate's application for permit; and (2) Lion's
Gate's self-initiated notice substantially complied with the requirements
prescribed by statute. After the New Mexico Court of Appeals denied
the State Engineer's appeal of the interim order, the State Engineer
petitioned the New Mexico Supreme Court (the "court") for a writ of
certiorari, which the court granted.
Since 1907, the sole statutory means of acquiring a water right in
New Mexico has been by the State Engineer's issuance of a permit. A
statute establishing a de novo standard of review for appeals to the
district court from the State Engineer's rulings accompanied the 1907
water rights legislation. Judges have interpreted the 1907 statute as not
allowing a district court to hear new or additional evidence when it
reviews a State Engineer's decision. Agreeing with the judiciary, the
legislature added language to the statute, limiting a district court's de
novo review, "as cases originally docketed." Here, the court referred to
the statutory language and the legislative intent to determine the
meaning of the appeal statute's de novo provision.
The court reasoned that the intended effect of the water code's
grant of broad powers to the State Engineer regarding water rights
applications was to utilize the State Engineer's expertise and to provide
for a comprehensive administration procedure. Consequently, the
court determined that interpreting the appeals statute to permit the
district court to hear evidence on ancillary issues not decided by the
State Engineer would circumvent the intended effect of the water code.
Further, the court reasoned that because the availability of water for
appropriation is a threshold issue, the ancillary issues of whether the
proposed appropriation is contrary to the conservation of water or
whether the appropriation would be detrimental to the public welfare
are irrelevant when there is no water available. As a result, the court
concluded that the statute providing for a de novo standard of review
limits the district court's review to the sole decision made by the State
Engineer that water was unavailable. Additionally, the court noted that
public notice before a determination that water is available for
appropriation would unnecessarily involve the public and prior
appropriators. Therefore, the statutory provision requiring the State
Engineer to order notice publication applies only when water is
available for appropriation.
Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the district court's
ruling.
CrystalLay
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Waterfall Cmty. Water Users Ass'n v. N.M. State Eng'r, 216 P.3d 270
(N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that New Mexico Statute section 72-5-29
does not grant a superseding natural right to appropriate waters of a
fully appropriated stream system).
Waterfall Community Water Users Association ("Waterfall")
submitted an application for 320 acre-feet per year of surface water
from Culberson Spring, a tributary to Pecos River. The State of New
Mexico Office of the State Engineer ("State Engineer") concluded that
granting Waterfall's application would impair existing water rights to
water in the Pecos River stream system and denied Waterfall's
application. Waterfall appealed to the Twelfth Judicial District Court of
New Mexico. Waterfall argued that section 72-5-29 of the New Mexico
Statutes allows Waterfall to divert waters from the Culberson Spring for
the domestic uses of the inhabitants of the land adjacent to the
Culberson Spring as long as any distribution of water does not interfere
with vested rights. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the State Engineer finding that there was no available water for
appropriation in the Pecos River stream system, that Culberson Springs
was a tributary and part of the Pecos River stream system, and that the
provisions of section 72-5-29 were inapplicable to Waterfall's claim.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico addressed
Waterfall's assertion of a "natural right" to the fully appropriated water
in Culberson Spring under section 72-5-29. Waterfall conceded it could
only exercise the alleged natural right if doing so would not interfere
with preexisting vested water rights, but maintained that exercising its
natural right to the waters of Culberson Spring would have little or no
adverse impact on the existing appropriations in the Pecos River stream
system. Waterfall supported this argument by offering the opinion of
their domestic water system operator, James Murrill. Mr. Murrill's
affidavit stated that based on his personal knowledge, most of the water
Waterfall sought to appropriate would be "discharged back into the
ground in the valley through individual liquid waste disposal systems."
The court primarily addressed two issues. First, the court analyzed
whether section 72-5-29 provided Waterfall with a superseding natural
right to appropriate waters from the Culberson Spring notwithstanding
the fact that there is no unappropriated water in Pecos River stream
system.
Second, the court analyzed whether the district court
improperly denied Waterfall an opportunity to exercise this right by
granting summary judgment. To determine these issues, the court
initially looked at the plain language of section 72-5-29.
According to both the plain language of the statute and the State
Engineer's explanation of the statute, section 72-5-29 is limited to the
narrow purpose of conserving and utilizing torrential floodwater. The
intended effect of the statute is to smooth out the water supply curve by
allowing water to be impounded during periods of excess supply, which
otherwise would not be placed to beneficial use. The plain language of
the statute comports with the conclusion that the State Engineer could
grant such an application only if there is unappropriated water to

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

appropriate and such appropriation would not deprive prior rights
holders of that water. Thus, the Legislature did not create a "super
status water use" for utilization of floodwaters.
The court concluded that summary judgment was proper as a
matter of law because section 72-5-29 concerns flood waters and
Waterfall was not asserting a right to flood waters, but to water from
Culberson Spring.
Furthermore, Waterfall was not entitled to
appropriation under section 72-5-29 because this statute does not
provide Waterfall a superseding natural right to water from a fully
appropriated stream system. The only basis for Waterfall's argument
responding to the unavailability of unappropriated waters was from Mr.
Murrill's opinion, based on personal knowledge, that individual liquid
waste disposal systems would return the water Waterfall sought to
appropriate back to vested rights holders. The court dismissed Mr.
Murill's testimony because it was opinion testimony unsupported by
scientific fact and thus insufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's ruling.
Karna Swenson Phipps
UTAH
Otter Creek Reservoir Co. v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 203 P.3d
1015 (Utah 2009) (holding that a water user must complete seven years
of adverse use by the 1939 effective date of an amendment to the water
right statute to obtain a water right by adverse possession).
Otter Creek Reservoir Company ("Otter Creek") and New Escalante
Irrigation Company ("New Escalante") claimed rights to snow melt near
the divide between the Sevier River drainage and the Escalante River
drainage. Without a diversion, the water would flow into the Sevier
River, which forms part of Otter Creek's water supply. New Escalante
claimed that it adversely used the water since December 1, 1936 by way
of a ditch that intercepted the water and carried it to the Escalante
River drainage. The issue concerned the application of a 1939
amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1 which prohibited the
acquisition of water rights by adverse use. Prior to 1939, water users
could obtain a right through seven years of "continuous, uninterrupted,
hostile, notorious, adverse use." Otter Creek filed an action with the
Sixth District Court in Utah against New Escalante in 2001 seeking a
declaratory judgment that New Escalante had no right to use the water.
New Escalante filed a counterclaim, arguing that it had a diligence
right, or, in the alternative, a superior right based on adverse use.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Otter
Creek with respect to the diligence claim, holding that New Escalante
forfeited its right by not participating in the 1936 adjudication of all
water rights in the Sevier River drainage ("Cox Decree"). The district
court denied summary judgment regarding the adverse use claim,
holding that because New Escalante's adverse use began prior to the
effective date of the amended statute in 1936, the use could still ripen
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into a water right. Following the district court's decision, Otter Creek
filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with the Supreme Court of Utah
(the "court"). On appeal, the court addressed whether a water user
could acquire a right by adverse use if the seven-year period required to
maintain an adverse use began before the 1939 amendment, but did
not vest until after the amendment.
The court reviewed the district court's decision, but afforded no
deference to the district court's legal conclusion in interpreting the
statute. The court acknowledged that non-binding dicta in previous
cases conflicted with and caused confusion about whether an adverse
use claim could ripen into a water right after the effective date of the
1939 amendment. Therefore, the court looked to the plain language in
the statute. Finding that the statute was clear on its face, the court
relied solely on the statutory language in reaching its conclusion. The
statute states that "no right to the use of water either appropriated or
unappropriated can be acquired by adverse use or adverse possession."
The court reasoned that because the statute did not allow for adverse
use rights to be acquired after 1939, and because an adverse use right
vests only after seven years of adverse use, a party must complete the
seven years before 1939. The court focused on the legislature's use of
the word "acquired" as opposed to "initiated" or "begun," which
evidenced a legislative intent to prohibit the vesting of any water right
by adverse use after 1939. Based upon this reasoning, the court found
that New Escalante's adverse use claim failed because it did not
complete seven years of adverse use by 1939. The court held that an
adverse user must have completed seven years of adverse use before the
effective date of the .1939 amendment in order to satisfy an adverse use
claim.
Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's determination
and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its
ruling.
Mary Kate Finnigan

